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So spake the doleful mariner, 
Transfixing with his e’e, 
In fluent, graphic English – 
The language of the sea. 
 
‘I had no wish to work on ships – 
Filipinos know it’s hard –  
Mouths were many, jobs were scarce, 
From birth my life was marr’d. 
 
‘From green island homes we travel, 
As mariner, nurse, or maid, 
And remit to our loved ones 
The pittance we get paid. 
 
Excerpt from: The Rime of the Globalised Mariner: Part I 
Michael Bloor (2012). 
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Abstract 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Merchant shipping is considered one of the most dangerous industries for 
workers’ health and safety.  The International Labour Organization (ILO), the 
agency responsible for regulating global labour standards, developed the 
Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC) as what it describes as a “firm response” 
to an identified “deficit in decent work” on ships due to economic globalization.  
The MLC is therefore seen as an important instrument to govern employment and 
working conditions on commercial ships towards some positive outcomes in one 
of the most globalized of industries, where State regulatory capacities are said to 
be challenged.  This dissertation focuses on provisions in the MLC for seafarers’ 
representative participation, and the role of such provisions in the regulatory 
regime for health and safety management on board ships.  Studies from other 
industries, show representative participation in health and safety to be beneficial 
in improving working conditions providing certain preconditions exist.  These are, 
firm regulations supported by a strong regulatory steer, senior management 
commitment and organized labour.   
Using primarily documents and semi-structured interviews at the 
international level where such standards are developed, through to where they 
are operationalized and on to the level of the workplace where they are 
implemented, this study traces the thinking and practices driving these provisions 
for representative participation on ships, and their potential for positively 
impacting seafarers’ working conditions.  
The findings of the study show that representative participation was 
included in the MLC based on customary practices, and there was a lack of 
deliberateness in its development.  Equally, there was a lack of strategy for its 
operationalization, implementation and practice.  At the shipboard level, 
representation emerged as an institution in disarray where the preconditions 
were not met, and seafarers lacked a full understanding and appreciation of 
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representative participation as a mechanism for their health and safety 
protection.   
The study concludes that there is a disconnect between the theory and 
practice of representation for the seafaring workforce and suggests that an 
absence of consideration at the stage of developing the MLC, may account for this 
gap.  In these findings, the study highlights the challenges to representative 
participation owing to the nature, organization and control of work on board and 
the absence of the preconditions for its support.  In doing so, the study points to 
the limits of the regulatory lead and by extension the ILO’s global regulatory 
mechanism for addressing health and safety on board ships.   
 
Key Words: Maritime Labour Convention; Seafarers’ Health and Safety; Worker 
Representative Participation; Global Labour Standards; International Labour 
Organization; Global Regulation; Decent Work. 
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1 
Problematizing Standards for Seafarers’ Representation   
 
No moral endeavour, no political orientation, no human study that does not pay close 
attention to [people] at work, can possibly be adequate for our time. For work is affected by 
and in turn affects all that man is and all that he might become. The question we must ask of 
any society or of any social program is what kinds of men and women does it select, 
encourage, create? And in terms of this human evaluation, the most important question we 
can ask is whether work is a void in which men sacrifice themselves or whether work is a 
central feature of a style of life in which man may realize himself (C. Wright Mills, 1951, quoted 
in Abrams 2001). 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
Developing labour standards for workplace health and safety is an important issue 
for contemporary society.  There is ongoing academic and policy interest in how 
to protect workers from the dangers of the workplace (eg. Hilgert, 2013; EU-OSHA, 
2012; 2018; RoSPA, 2010).  Work risks are not confined to the immediate work 
environment but have social and economic consequences for wider society 
(Frayne, 2015; Hilgert, 2013; Abrams, 2001).  Workplace disasters, such as the 
Rana Plaza in Bangladesh or Aberfan in Wales, devastate communities, rob 
families of their livelihood and the full capacities of their loved ones.  The maritime 
industry has had its share of disasters, causing numerous loss of lives and 
destruction to the marine environment (see Anderson, 2003).     
The International Labour Organization (ILO)1 estimates that 2.3 million 
workers die annually from work-related injuries and diseases.  Another 160 million 
workers are estimated to suffer from non-fatal work-related diseases and 313 
million from non-fatal work-related injuries.  It is argued that most injuries and 
fatalities are preventable if workplaces are effectively regulated and health and 
safety systematically managed (Walters and Nichols, 2013; Frick et. al., 2000).  An 
important aspect of such efforts to regulate and manage health and safety at 
                                                             
1 ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/dw4sd/themes/osh/lang--en/index.htm. 
Accessed February 7, 2018. 
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work, is worker representative participation (Walters and Nichols, 2007; Nichols, 
1997).   
In 2006, at the Ninety-fourth (Maritime) Session of the International 
Labour Conference (ILC)2, labour standards to govern seafarers working and living 
conditions were adopted in the form of the Maritime Labour Convention 2006 
(MLC).  According to the ILO, the MLC was developed in response to a “deficit in 
decent work” on ships (TWGMLS/2001/10). 3  The ILO claims that these standards 
represent a “firm response” to the poor working conditions for seafarers.  They 
include provisions for seafarers’ representatives to participate in health and safety 
on ships. 
Shipping is considered one of the most globalized industries and States are 
said to be challenged in effectively regulating labour standards due to the effects 
of economic globalization (DeSombre, 2006; Lillie, 2006; Bloor et. al., 2005).  That 
is, shipowners are able to take advantage of global interconnections to reduce 
costs and avoid regulations.  Among the adverse consequences of these practices 
have been a “race to the bottom” in labour standards for the seafaring workforce 
(Lillie, 2006).  In this respect, global institutions are seen as important to establish 
global rules to contain the negative impacts of globalization (Ruggie, 2014; Karns 
and Mingst, 2004).  The ILO is considered to be one such institution and the 
development of the MLC a regulatory mechanism to address the reduction in 
States’ abilities to police labour activities on board ships (Lillie, 2006).  Indeed, the 
ILO considers the MLC to be a “firm” global response to the adverse effects that 
economic globalization has had on seafarers’ living and working conditions 
(JMC/29/2001/3). 
Against this claim, this study aims to explore and understand the MLC 
regulatory framework for seafarers’ representative participation on ships and 
examine its potential to contribute to decent work as envisaged.  Representation 
as it concerns this thesis is defined in Chapter 2.  The MLC mandates 
                                                             
2 The ILO conference of member States where conventions are adopted. 
https://www.ilo.org/ilc/AbouttheILC/lang--en/index.htm 
3 See Appendix II for list of documents used in the documentary analysis. 
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representatives to sit on health and safety committees on ships suggesting a 
structure for joint consultation.  Structures for representative participation are 
understood as being outside the employers’ sphere of influence to give workers a 
chance to have some impact on their working conditions.   
Reference to the MLC framework takes into consideration the mandatory 
provisions in the MLC (Title 4, Standard A4.3, paragraphs 1c & 2d), and its 
guidelines in Standard B, and the Maritime Occupational Safety and Health 
(MOSH) Guidelines 2014, as well as other guidelines and codes to which the MLC 
refers, particularly the ILO’s Code of Practice on Accident Prevention on Board Ship 
at Sea and in Port (COPAP).  Together, these documents present a set of regulatory 
policies and practices for representative participation in the shipboard work 
environment.  The presumed aim of these policies and practices is to give seafarers 
a “say” in their occupational health and safety (OHS) protection.  It is argued that 
regulations are an important precondition for effective representation (Milgate et. 
al., 2002: 285).  Regulations set the framework to guide the practice of 
representing workers towards positive health and safety management activities 
and workers health and safety outcomes (Walters and Nichols, 2007; Walters et. 
al., 2005).     
The existing research evidence that seafarers face exceptional risks in their 
work is convincing (Sampson, 2013; Walters and Bailey, 2013; Nielsen, 1999) and, 
therefore, the MLC provisions might represent a positive move towards helping to 
manage these risks.  In addition to exposure to extreme weather conditions, 
seafarers face risks from the cargo they transport, the physical worksite of the 
ship, the nature and organization of work, and geo-political threats, such as piracy 
and criminalization (Walters and Bailey, 2013).  These conditions are exacerbated 
by seafarers living and working in the same space, from which often, they may not 
even temporarily ‘escape,’ due to increased difficulties in accessing shore leave 
(Sampson, 2013; Graham, 2009).  Recent research points to an increase in poor 
mental health of seafarers (Sampson et. al., 2017).  These are among the 
occupational risks which led the ILO to declare a “deficit in decent work” on ships 
and pointed to a need for the MLC.  It is against this background of dangerous 
 4 
work and the ILO’s claim that the MLC represents a “firm response” to such 
conditions, that this study explores the viability of the MLC provisions for 
seafarers’ representative participation to have some impact in a globalized 
industry, characterised by precarious work.   
 
1.2. Motivation for the Research       
In research, “The biography of the researcher is always implicated” (Schostak, 
2002: 3).  This thesis was motivated by personal experiences as an administrator 
in the Maritime Authority of Jamaica (MAJ).  I worked there for 15 years in various 
positions leading to the final post as Registrar of Seafarers.  During this time the 
hardships faced by seafarers and the lack of organized support became evident to 
me. 
The MAJ was established under the Shipping Act 1998 as Jamaica’s 
maritime administration to oversee the country’s obligations to a number of 
International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) conventions it had ratified.  While 
much effort was made to give effect to the technical and business aspects of being 
a flag and port State,4 the seafarers’ section of the Act received scant attention.  
This became a concern for me as the country was, at the time, increasing 
enrolment at its seafarer training institution, without systems in place for their 
protection as cadets and afterwards.   In my post as Registrar of Seafarers, to which 
I was appointed in 2009, I soon discovered that Jamaica’s neglect of seafarers was 
not unique as concerns about seafarers’ welfare were being expressed across the 
international shipping community (Kahveci, 2007; ILO, 2004).    
As the Registrar of Seafarers, I dealt with Jamaican seafarers abandoned in 
foreign ports, foreign seafarers abandoned in Jamaican waters, victimization of 
Jamaican cadets and other OHS and welfare issues.  However, training and other 
resources to support the post were not forthcoming.  Also, there was no 
systematic programme in place to assist seafarers at the national or the 
                                                             
4 A flag State refers to the nationality of a ship under international maritime law.  Ships on a 
country’s registry are subject to the laws of that country wherever in the world they are.  When a 
ship enters the port of another country, the country has certain legal rights to board and inspect 
for compliance with international maritime standards, referred to as port State control (PSC).    
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international level.  Seeking information was met with bureaucracy from 
organizations that showed little authority or willingness to act.  On contacting the 
ILO regarding the abandonment of foreign seafarers in Jamaican waters, I was told 
to submit a report to the ILO (Appendix I) and nothing further.  Of the two Consuls 
representing the nationalities of the abandoned seafarers that were contacted, 
only one responded initially without any sensitivity to the situation, and 
subsequently stopped responding to my follow-up emails.  Fortunately, the 
seafarers were eventually repatriated on sale of the ship.      
In 2012, the ILO announced that the ratification threshold to trigger the 
coming into effect of the MLC had been achieved.5  The MLC was one of my 
portfolio items but efforts to prepare Jamaica for its entry into force were also 
given scant attention.  Therefore, when subsequently pursuing the PhD research, 
I decided to further explore the topic of labour standards to protect seafarers’ 
health and safety, and to focus on measures to give them a “say,” as in my 
experience this was one of the areas in need of urgent attention. 
 
1.3. Conceptualizing the Research 
Theories, perspectives and concepts guiding this research are drawn from 
industrial relations, the sociology of work and the social-legal literature on 
representation in health and safety in land-based workplaces.  These three 
disciplines overlap on the subject matter to present a combined body of work that 
offers a critical approach to the regulatory paradigm and workplace practices for 
representative participation in health and safety.  “Regulated self-regulation,” or 
“internal control” is the paradigm driving regulatory provisions and practices for 
OHSM in the contemporary context (Bluff et. al., 2004: 4-5).  Under this regime, 
the responsibility for health and safety outcomes rests on the organization, its 
management and workers.  The State regulatory apparatus should operate from a 
distance and be concerned with general requirements for the “social processes” 
                                                             
5 ILO (2012).  Milestone ratifications of seafarers’ labour rights charter. ILO News, August 20. 
Online. Available at: http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/ WCMS_187660/ 
lang--en/index.htm  [Accessed 20 July, 2015].  
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in arriving at the OHS outcomes (Bluff et. al., 2004: 4).  Workers’ input is seen as 
necessary under self-regulation but not necessarily representation which would 
entail union involvement (discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.3). 
The industrial relations perspective is concerned with the effectiveness of 
representative participation as a workplace relations institution for the collective 
participation of workers under self-regulation.  The industrial relations perspective 
sees representation as occurring through the normal labour relations channels 
(Walters and Nichols, 2009: 2).  This literature theorises a set of preconditions for 
effective representation (Walters and Nichols, 2007; 2009; Dawson et. al., 1988).  
These writers take a pluralist perspective of the workplace and their work overlaps 
with the sociology of work literature to emphasize the role of autonomous 
representative participation and the inclusion of unions in ensuring workers’ OHS 
is protected in situations of competing workplace interests.  In turn, the sociology 
of work literature emphasizes the structural conditions in workplaces that result 
in injuries and underscores the need for workers to have effective representation 
(Nichols and Walters, 2013; Nichols, 1997). 
Industrial relations frames of reference become important in this discourse 
on what makes representation effective.  The literature seeks to establish 
underlying perspectives driving the regulation and practice of representation and 
in this way account for the origins and rationale of regulatory provisions on 
representation that have been developed and its successes and failures.  This 
thesis draws on these frames at various points as concepts to talk about and to 
understand relevant aspects of the theory and practice of representation (eg. 
Cullinane and Dundon, 2014; Budd and Bhave, 2008; Fox, 1974; 1966).   
The frames of relevance to this thesis are unitarist and pluralist consistent 
with the management practices described in research on the shipping industry 
which are unitarist in orientation, and the ILO’s pluralist context for the MLC.  Budd 
and Bhave (2008: 94) argue that frames are the lens through which actors perceive 
and act on social phenomenon.  A unitarist framing considers management as the 
sole authority in the workplace and external influences such as unions and the 
State as unnecessary interference.  A pluralist framing considers the conflicts of 
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interest in the workplace and seeks to coordinate these interests through 
bargaining.  Unions and State regulations are seen as necessary to counter the 
unequal power relations inherent in the employment relationship (Budd and 
Bhave, 2008).   
From the socio-legal perspective, the self-regulatory paradigm comes 
under scrutiny, particularly in light of the changing nature of work.  This literature 
highlights and critiques the inadequacies of self-regulation to address workplace 
health and safety issues in the contemporary world of work.  It is argued that the 
self-regulatory regime was geared towards addressing a particular employment 
relationship comprising stable, predominantly male workforces in medium to 
large enterprises.  Changes in the nature and organization of work resulting in an 
increase in small enterprises and less stable and identifiable work situations are 
said to have undermined the self-regulatory paradigm and regulations for 
workers’ representation and participation (Quinlan, 2013a; Dawson et. al., 1988).  
Further, the paradigm is said to be built on erroneous assumptions about the 
nature of workplace injuries and as such, seemed destined to fail from the outset 
(Nichols and Armstrong, 1973).  These three disciplines, Industrial Relations, The 
Sociology of Work and Socio-Legal Studies, combine to present a convincing 
argument for the importance of representative participation in safeguarding 
workers’ OHS and the preconditions that support its effectiveness. 
Worker representation in OHSM is an established workplace institution in 
many countries.  For example, regional regulatory standards, such as the European 
Union (EU) Framework Directive 39/891, have institutionalized representation for 
all EU member States.  Provisions for representation is also found in workplace 
regulations and practices in other developed countries, such as Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States of America (USA) (Walters and Nichols, 2009).  
At the global level, representation is a feature in ILO conventions, such as the 
health and safety Convention 155.  Many developing countries also have some 
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statutory provision for workers’ representation on health and safety,6 although 
the extent to which these are operationalized and implemented is uncertain.   
Against a background that representative participation is an accepted 
workplace institution, this study examines the development, administration and 
implementation of representation on ships as laid out in the MLC framework.  
Research evidence from land-based studies shows that effective representation 
contributes to positive OHSM activities and positive OHS outcomes for workers 
(EU-OSHA, 2012; Shannon et. al., 2010).  However, the benefits of representation 
are found to be contingent on the support of firm regulations giving a strong 
regulatory lead, senior management commitment and organized labour (Walters 
and Nichols, 2007; Walters et. al., 2005).  These preconditions are said to work 
together to support effective implementation and practice of representation in 
the workplace (Menendez et. al., 2009; Walters and Nichols, 2007).  While the 
shipboard work environment may have its own peculiarities, such as being remote 
and mobile, it is argued that seafarers may also benefit from arrangements for 
representation on health and safety providing these preconditions exist (Walters 
and Bailey, 2013; Walters, 2005).  However, there are reasons to question the 
extent to which these preconditions exist in the shipping industry.   
Studies examining health and safety in the shipboard work environment 
reveal that there are conditions relating to the nature, organization and control of 
work, that inhibit seafarers’ participation in measures to manage health and safety 
(Xue, et. al. 2017; Walters and Bailey, 2013; Bhattacharya, 2012a; 2012b; Kahveci 
and Nichols, 2006).  These measures refer to unitarist management standards 
established to improve the safety record in the shipping industry.  Based on this 
literature this thesis questions the extent to which the preconditions to support 
representation on ships exists.  In this respect, the thesis problematizes these 
provisions and as a result, interrogates the ILO’s claim that the MLC is a “firm 
response” to poor working conditions on ships.    
 
                                                             
6 ILO Global Database on Occupational Safety and Health Legislation (LEGOSH), ILO, Geneva.   
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/legosh/en/f?p=14100:1000:0::NO::: [Accessed, February 7, 2018]. 
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1.3.1. Research Question and Objectives   
The central research question asks:  Are the MLC provisions for seafarers’ 
representative participation in OHS a firm response to poor working conditions on 
ships?  A “firm response” is described in Chapter 2 and refers to regulatory 
features to ensure responsible parties meet their obligations for effective 
representation.  These include the rights and powers given to representatives to 
support them in their roles (Walters, et. al. 2005).  The study is qualitative and 
driven by three interlinking objectives reflective of the stages in the development, 
administration and implementation and practice of ILO standards.  The objectives 
are: 
1) To examine the viability of the provisions for representation on 
ships by exploring their origins, and the rationale for their inclusion in the 
MLC, and supports for their effective implementation and practice on 
ships.  This objective is aimed at examining the thinking behind the 
provisions and what measures the architects of the convention have 
considered for giving them effect.   
2) To examine how the provisions are operationalized at the national 
level.  The study uses the United Kingdom (UK) as a case to examine how a 
reputable administration might operationalize representation for its 
flagged ships and in port State control.   
3) To examine seafarers’ experiences and perceptions of 
representation as intended by the provisions in the MLC.  As the 
beneficiaries of the provisions, seafarers’ perspectives are important to 
determine the likelihood that the benefits of representation will be 
realized. 
 
1.4. Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis consists of 9 Chapters.  Chapter 2 introduces the 
subject of representation focussing on the land-based literature.  The sparse 
literature for the shipping industry is reviewed in Chapter 3.  The land-based 
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literature establishes the foundation for representation, its history and practices.  
It provides the inspiration for provisions in the MLC and it is therefore pertinent 
to a study of representation on ships.   
Chapter 2 begins with a definition of representative participation to 
establish its meaning and use in the thesis.  It explores the origins of statutory 
provisions for representation in OHSM and the paradigm shift in regulatory 
approaches during that time.  The chapter reveals the underlying thinking driving 
the new paradigm and the source of some of the critique on statutory provisions 
for OHSM.  This leads to an examination of the literature on what makes for 
effective representation.  The research evidence and theory for what works in 
making representation beneficial to workers is explored.   
Chapter 3 examines the literature for the shipping industry and along with 
Chapter 2, forms the basis for problematizing the MLC provisions.  It outlines the 
evidence for seafarers’ work risks and explores research for regulatory provisions 
for OHSM on ships prior to the MLC.  The previous research highlights the absence 
of good workplace relations practices which might support effective participation 
consistent with what is described for land-based industries.  Consequently, this 
chapter sets the context for questioning the viability of provisions for seafarers’ 
representation in the MLC and raises questions as to the ILO’s claim for a “firm” 
regulatory response.           
Chapter 4 presents the methodology.  It details the study design, the data 
sources, participants and fieldwork.  The research is framed as a case study of the 
MLC.  It engages multiple sources of data: Documentary evidence of the 
deliberations spanning the 6 years of negotiating and developing the MLC; the 
testimonies of key participants who were involved in those negotiations; data 
from the UK used as a critical case at the national level; and interviews with 
seafarers at the shipboard level.  The chapter discusses the field work and 
challenges faced during data collection.  It ends with some reflections on ethics.     
Chapters 5 to 8 deal with the findings and analysis of the data.  Chapter 5 
presents the findings from the documentary analysis of the meeting records and 
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other relevant documents to which the MLC refers, or which form part of the 
general MLC framework for representative participation.  It explores the 
discussions, the conflicts and their resolutions towards producing the MLC as the 
‘new’ labour standard for global shipping.  Chapter 6 addresses the outcomes from 
the interviews with key informants directly involved in negotiating the MLC text.  
It explores some of the issues raised in the documents to clarify and substantiate 
events as they were recorded.  Based on the testimonies of those interviewed, the 
chapter examines the intent of including representation in the text and what 
consideration was given to supports that might be required to ensure their 
implementation and effective practice.       
In order to gain a fuller understanding of representative participation on 
ships as provided for in the MLC, the UK was selected as a case study and Chapter 
7 presents these findings.  Using documents and interviews with key personnel in 
the UK administration, the chapter presents the findings on how the provisions 
were operationalized and what adjustments were made for the UK to become 
compliant with the MLC.  Chapter 8 further explores the viability of representation 
through the perceptions and experiences of seafarers as they reported.  It 
presents the nature of representation on board ships and the views of seafarers 
on existing practices and changes brought about by the MLC.  It also shows the 
constraints to effective representation at the shipboard level.     
Chapter 9 discusses the key findings towards answering the research 
question.  The main themes surrounding the development, operationalization and 
practice of representation are discussed.  In drawing on the data, the chapter asks 
whether the MLC has provided a “firm” regulatory lead for representative 
participation and highlights the limits of global regulation.  
Chapter 10 concludes the study.  It revisits the main elements of the 
research and reflects on the core findings and explores the relationship between 
theory and practice of representative participation on ships.  The chapter also 
presents the contributions of the study and highlights its implications for 
regulating representative participation and points to areas for future research.     
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2 
Worker Representation on Health and Safety  
 
When directors or take-over bidders assess the health of a company, it is balance sheets that 
they look at, not medical reports on the health of workers. In capitalism’s language of 
priorities, it is not safety that comes first, but profit (Nichols 1997: 105).   
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
2.1. Introduction    
This thesis’ central aim is to assess the ILO’s claim that the MLC is a firm response 
to poor working conditions for seafarers, with specific reference to its provisions 
for representative participation in OHS.  This chapter reviews the literature on 
representative participation expanding on issues raised in the Introduction 
regarding its importance in OHSM and the theoretical position that a certain set 
of preconditions ought to be in place for its effective implementation and practice.    
That workplace injuries and ill-health are preventable is a position taken 
by those concerned with the effects of the work environment on workers’ health 
and safety (Nichols and Walters, 2013; Walters et. al. 2005; Quinlan et. al. 2001; 
Nichols, 1997).  Nichols (1997: 2-3) for example, argues that the concept of an 
“accident” is misleading as this suggests something unforeseen or “unanticipated, 
that which is unintentional and that which is down to misfortune or bad luck.”  He 
begins from the position that “accidents” are the result of how work is structured 
and organized therefore to call them “accidents” is a misnomer.  Instead, he 
prefers terms such as “industrial injuries” and “industrial ill-health” which, he 
asserts, more accurately account for how most people come to suffer harm in their 
workplaces, and therefore can be managed as they are not unavoidable.  This 
thesis supports this assertion and adopts a similar use of injuries and ill-health 
instead of “accidents.”    
This review draws on the land-based literature for advanced market 
economies as countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and other 
members of the European Union in particular, have been the focus of the majority 
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of studies.  In combination, the land-based literature provides strong evidence as 
to the value of representation in contributing to the establishment of good OHSM 
practices and OHS outcomes for workers, and the preconditions required for its 
effectiveness.  A few US studies are also included where they are relevant, 
particularly in showing how representation has been beneficial to workers.  The 
limited literature on representation in the shipboard work environment is 
reviewed in Chapter 3.  
This chapter begins with a definition of representative participation.  This 
is to distinguish it from other participatory arrangements which are different in 
how they include workers and therefore, as the literature shows, have different 
outcomes for workers “voice”7 and OHS protection.  Next, the chapter explores 
the literature on the origins of and rationale for representation in OHSM, thus 
establishing the thinking behind statutory provisions for representative 
participation which is an important aspect in understanding the practice.  The 
empirical evidence for the effectiveness of representation is then presented.  The 
final section examines the preconditions for effective representation. 
   
2.2. Defining Representative Participation  
Representation is one of a number of ways that workers may be given the 
opportunity to participate in health and safety in their workplaces.  
Representation can take different forms such as individual employee 
representatives, joint consultation committees or work councils.  As the structure 
most aligned with the MLC framework, joint consultation is defined by 
Marchington et. al. (1992) (quoted in Pyman, 2014: 264), as “a mechanism for 
managers and employee representatives to meet on a regular basis in order to 
exchange views, to utilize members’ knowledge and expertise, and to deal with 
matters of common interest which are not subject to collective bargaining.”  This 
research is concerned with worker representative participation as a formal 
                                                             
7 While there is an understanding of ‘voice’ as its own subject matter which includes expression, 
silence or exit from the workplace, it is used in this thesis in its basic form to mean speaking out, 
participating, having an input or meaningful ‘say’ in workplace issues and decisions (Morrison, 
2014; Budd and Bhave, 2008). 
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workplace structure having regulatory support for workers to collectively present 
their OHS interests to management8 as described in the literature (eg. Lewchuk, 
2013a; Walters and Nichols, 2007; 2009; Nichols, 1997; Dawson et. al. 1988).   
Representation is embedded in employment relations practices on OHSM 
through industrial relations traditions and law.  Throughout the thesis, 
representation as a stand-alone term to mean representative participation is the 
preferred usage to distinguish it from other participatory mechanisms.  The 
particular model of concern is for workers to elect their representatives who then 
work through a health and safety committee to ensure their concerns are 
considered by management and they are given the opportunity to influence 
decisions (as outlined in the MLC, Regulation 4.3, Standard A4.3, paragraphs 1c 
and 2d).9  Representation or representative participation, is also termed “indirect 
participation” in some of the literature (eg. Benders et. al. 2001), which is to be 
distinguished from “direct” or “individual participation” (Lansbury and Wailes, 
2008).   
Direct or individual participation is where workers represent their OHS 
interests individually to management and most likely through managerial channels 
(Walters, et. al., 2005: 9; Benders et. al., 2001).  Walters et. al. (2005: 9) define 
direct participation as “formal arrangements for the engagement of workers with 
supervisors, managers or employers on health and safety matters individually 
rather than through their collective representatives.”  While employers may allow 
workers to select representatives in direct participation, this happens without 
                                                             
8 This thesis uses managers or employers interchangeably to refer to those whose decisions affect 
the work environment in the context of this study.  As will be made clear, most of the literature 
refers to senior management, although some recognition has been given to the importance of 
supervisory and line managers.  Senior managers make the decisions in terms of expenditures and 
policies that affect workers and work, and therefore this is the understanding when management, 
managers or employers are used in this study, or additionally, the company or shipowners in the 
case of shipping.  These terms are used with the understanding that employers may not necessarily 
be managers, particularly when the different layers of management are considered, compounded 
by the fragmented nature of employment.   
9 Other models exist, such as works councils, found in some European countries eg. France and 
Germany, which, due to the EU Framework Directive 89/391 have to also incorporate its provisions 
for representative participation or direct participation (with the emphasis being consultation of 
workers to ensure genuine participation) (James and Walters, 1997).   
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support of an autonomous employee organization such as a union.  As such direct 
participation most likely remains under the influence of the employer.   
Direct participation is also of consequence to this study as in practice it is 
taken as an alternative to representative participation.  The situation is also 
muddled by regulatory provisions which make allowances for both.  For example, 
the EU Framework Directive 89/391 Article 11 says: “Employers shall consult 
workers and/or their representatives”.  Further, the UK, which is the case selected 
for exploration in this study, has two sets of regulations, one that concerns 
unionized workers and the other, non-unionized workers.  The latter gives 
employers the choice of consulting with workers or their representatives (James 
and Walters, 2002) (Direct participation is developed further in section 2.4.1).       
Consultation is described as the mechanism through which employers and 
employees interact to bring about positive health and safety outcomes (Pyman, 
2014: 264).  It involves two-way communication between employers and 
employees, with the intention of giving workers a chance to influence decisions 
on OHS (Walters, 2010; Gunningham, 2008).  Joint health and safety committees, 
sometimes termed joint consultative committees provide a structure through 
which consultation can take place.  Consultation can involve both direct and 
indirect forms of participation.  Direct consultation should occur where workers 
do not have union support or where employers chose to engage directly with 
workers rather than representatives.  However, this does not necessarily happen 
in these situations (such as when employers simply inform individual workers of 
their actions or requirements).  It is not uncommon however, to see reference 
being made in the literature to “consultation and representation” jointly to signify 
that a comprehensive and systematic approach is intended by the statutory 
provisions, where the aim is to achieve more than the unilateral conveyance of 
information from managers to workers (Walters, 2010: 29-35).    
Legislative provisions for consultation in non-unionized workplaces (for 
example in the UK), have been viewed with scepticism.  Commentators are 
sceptical when employers are deemed to have duties to consult workers outside 
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of organized labour.10  They argue that where workers are not organized, 
consultation might fall into one of the “involvement” mechanisms where there is 
no guarantee that workers are listened to nor their views taken seriously (Guest 
et. al., 2015; Gunningham, 2008).  Thus, the efficacy of consultation is doubted 
when it is not associated with representation.  For example, Gunningham (2008: 
344-345) contends that consultation may not be at the level to ensure workers’ 
genuine participation as employers may appear to consult to satisfy regulatory 
requirements but do not necessarily take employees’ views into account.  This raises 
questions as to whether regulations that do not provide for autonomous 
representation are able to deliver effective health and safety outcomes, a point that 
is later raised in examining participation in the shipping industry (Chapter 3).           
Participation as a generic term is also used to refer to “involvement” and 
“engagement.”  These terms often describe managerialist practices aimed at 
motivating workers without any guarantee of effective two-way communication 
and consultation (Guest et. al. 2015).  Indeed “engagement” and “involvement” 
are mostly associated with broader issues of participation, linked to human 
resources and management strategies that seek to simultaneously impact on 
productivity and worker satisfaction and commitment to the organization (Guest, 
2015; Lansbury and Wailes, 2008; Strauss, 2006).   
In relation to OHSM, commentators are also sceptical of the potential of 
the associated involvement and engagement practices, such as staff surveys, 
briefing groups and suggestion boxes, to effectively address workers’ OHS 
interests.  These managerialist methods claiming to involve workers are direct 
participatory practices and it is argued that they have limited scope for real 
contribution to better OHSM (Walters and Nichols, 2009).  Those commenting on 
broader participatory practices, such as Lansbury and Wailes (2008), believe that 
“participation” differs from “involvement” as participation implies some degree of 
influence by workers and that they have some power over decision-making, which 
                                                             
10 Organized labour consists of autonomous representation, trade union support and effective 
communication between representatives and their constituents.  The presence of these activities 
is expected to contribute to effective representation (Walters et. al. 2005 p. 118).   
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“involvement” does not imply.  From this wider perspective, these direct notions 
of participation have been implicated in the deterioration of workers’ health 
(Frost, 2008).        
Examining these various concepts and their implications for contributing 
to effective OHSM and workers’ “voice,” demonstrates the importance of clarity.  
Section 2.3 will show that there are consequences for developing and 
implementing statutory provisions depending on how participation is viewed.  Is 
participation a means to involve workers in their own protection or is it a means 
to cooperate with management for organizational outcomes?  As Walters and 
Frick (2000) discuss, the answer determines which practices are deployed.  
Although the two should not be mutually exclusive, it appears that there are 
challenges in integrating the two in most instances as management is said to be 
interested in participatory arrangements when they see the benefits to 
productivity.  Alternately, participatory arrangements may be neglected when 
such benefits are not apparent (Strauss, 2006).  Understanding the differences 
among these concepts and the implications for making regulations and driving 
practices in the workplace is therefore important.  Walters, et. al. (2005: v) stress 
the importance of “a shared understanding of the meaning and potential of 
worker representation and consultation…” in order to align regulatory provisions 
with practices.      
 
2.3. The Origins of and Rationale for Representation on OHS 
This section explores how and why representation achieved statutory status in 
OHSM.  It highlights the principles underlying the regulatory paradigm for 
contemporary workplaces which emerged in the 1970s and so provides an 
understanding of some of the challenges facing representation today.  Historically, 
representation emerged from pluralist thinking on workplace issues as modern 
views on work emerged to embrace notions of workplace democracy (Kaufman, 
2010).  Labour was thought to be embodied in the worker and meant more than 
economic exchange, therefore it was considered ethical that workers participated 
in determining their conditions of work (Kaufman and Kleiner, 1993). 
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These notions underpin the ILO’s development and is espoused in its most 
recent efforts at renewal evidenced by its Decent Work Agenda.  The Decent Work 
Agenda is geared towards promoting social justice and is underpinned by the 
philosophy that labour is not a commodity (Hughes and Haworth, 2011).  This 
agenda is said to be one of the main drivers of the MLC development (ILO, 
2006a).11  A pluralist thinking is therefore embedded in the tripartite structure of 
the ILO to demonstrate this non-commodification of labour and its importance 
alongside capital.  Standards are negotiated by the social partners where labour is 
deemed to have equal “voice” as capital (that is the employers).  In this structure, 
cooperation, consensus and compromise are key principles in arriving at decisions 
to satisfy the different and sometimes conflicting interests of all the parties 
(Hughes and Haworth, 2011) (as Chapter 5 reveals).  
Contrary to the pluralist thinking, a unitarist position identifies the 
employer as the sole authority in the workplace and would consider social 
dialogue as an interference (Budd and Bhave, 2008; Fox, 1974).  These opposing 
positions are also evident in health and safety matters in the workplace.  A 
unitarist position would rationalise representation on the basis that health and 
safety should be managed internally where workers cooperate with management 
to achieve the organizations’ safety goals (Walters and Frick, 2000).  While, a 
pluralist position would rationalise representation as necessary to ensure workers’ 
autonomous input to safeguard their OHS interests from management’s 
imperatives such as profit and production, which may over-ride attention to 
workers’ health and safety (Nichols, 1997).    
Representation in the workplace is underpinned by these frames of 
reference as seen in the self-regulatory paradigm.  Statutory provisions for 
representation on OHS was extended to all industries in the 1970s when there was 
a shift in how health and safety was managed (Walters, et. al. 2011).  The UK’s 
reforms in particular, have received much attention in the literature because they 
also influenced regulatory reforms in other jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia 
                                                             
11 See Appendix II for reference. 
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and New Zealand (Walters et. al. 2005; Bluff et. al. 2004).12  The UK’s Robens 
Committee report is at the centre of these reforms and the paradigm shift to 
regulated self-regulation (Bluff, et. al. 2004; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999).  
As Bluff et. al. (2004) note, these reforms resulted in a distinctive move away from 
previous prescriptive “command and control” approaches to health and safety, 
where employers followed detailed standards, to an “internal control” approach, 
where a desired outcome is pursued in a less prescriptive manner.  The State 
oversees the process towards this outcome.  The idea was that employers and 
employees were to jointly manage safety internally in a systematic way with less 
intervention by the State (Gunningham and Johnstone 1999).        
  The assumptions underlying self-regulation were however exposed as 
flawed (Walters and Nichols, 2013; James, 1992; Nichols and Armstrong, 1973).  
The Robens Committee assumed that employers and employees had a common 
interest in health and safety and therefore collective bargaining on OHS, and the 
intervention of the State’s inspectorate were redundant.  It therefore 
recommended that employers, as the main duty holders, consult with workers in 
solving OHS incidents, as these were claimed to result from apathy on both their 
parts (James and Walters, 2002; Dawson et. al., 1988; Barrett, 1977).  In the 
Robens Committee’s thinking, the solution to bad OHSM was to allow those who 
were responsible for workplace incidents to manage them (Walters and Nichols, 
2013: 3; Barrett, 1977).     
This unitarist thinking drew criticisms from industrial sociologists on the 
grounds that they did not account for the power imbalance between workers and 
employers which was a more accurate explanation for workplace injuries than 
apathy (eg. Nichols and Armstrong, 1973).  Such imbalances provided sound 
reasoning for advocating representative participation where workers could rely on 
trade unions to offset some of the employers’ power.  These criticisms and 
arguments continue to be relevant for current work relationships.  The argument 
                                                             
12 Walters et. al. (2016a: 421) point out that regulatory requirements for representation existed 
for certain industries such as mining in Australia and the UK well before they spread to all industries 
in the 1970s.   Frick and Walters (1998) also refer to statutory provisions for representation in 
Sweden since the 1940s. 
 20 
is that self-regulation is unsuited to the current work situations due to the 
changing nature of work and a return to precarious work, which characterise many 
work situations (Lewchuck, 2013a; 2013b; Quinlan, 2013a: 25-31; Nichols, 1997).  
Nichols (1997), for example, demonstrated that workers were far from apathetic 
and rather, were bound by workplace structures that made them vulnerable to 
injuries.  He showed that workplace injuries went beyond the immediate work 
environment to the wider economic demands to keep production going within a 
competitive business environment.  An even more critical perspective is shared by 
Beck and Woolfson (2000) who argue that the self-regulatory turn was in favour 
of business interests, which makes the subsequent statutory provisions 
susceptible to deregulation.        
A more pluralist thinking was incorporated into the self-regulatory 
paradigm in the UK as trade unions won legal rights to representation (Glendon 
and Booth, 1982).  The Safety Representatives and Safety Committees (SRSC) 
Regulations 1977 allowing recognized trade unions to appoint safety 
representatives was developed under the UK’s Health and Safety at Work Act 
(HSWA) 1974, which was heavily influenced by the Robens Committee 
recommendations (James and Walters, 2002: 144-143; Beck and Woolfson, 2000: 
41-42).  The UK subsequently developed the Health and Safety (Consultation with 
Employees) (HSCE) Regulations 1996, to satisfy EU requirements for employers to 
consult with non-unionized workers (Walters, 2006; James and Walters, 2002).  In 
adopting the UK’s lead, Australia initially included measures for trade union 
representation in its regulatory provisions, but these were later removed (Milgate, 
et. al. 2002; Johnstone, 2009).   
Other jurisdictions such as Canada were partially influenced by the Robens 
Committee recommendations (Lewchuk, 2013b; Walters et. al. 2011: 28-31).  
Trade unions’ pressure for regulatory reform resulted in the Ham Commission 
which, like the Robens Committee, recommended a form of self-regulation where 
external government control of OHS shifted to an internal responsibility regime.  
Nevertheless, this regime mandated joint health and safety committees with 
equal numbers of workers’ and management’s representatives (Lewchuk, 2013a; 
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Shannon, 1996).  Likewise, the EU’s systematic approach to managing health and 
safety developed in the 1980s took a pluralist position by mandating 
representation and consultation of workers (Vogel and Walters, 2009).  This meant 
an expansion of representation rights in OHS matters for workers across Europe.  
Walters and Nichols (2009: 5-6) point out that these EU requirements for 
representation were also influenced by trade unions.  
Despite an apparently strong beginning (see Lewchuk, 2013a; Dawson et. 
al., 1988), where Robens’ recommendations were praised for insisting on the 
involvement of “work people” (Dawson et. al., 1988; Barrett, 1977), self-regulation 
eventually faced challenges as the nature and organization of work evolved 
(Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999).  Dawson et. al. (1988), for example, found 
that the changes in UK workplaces in the 1980s exposed the limited ability of self-
regulation to protect workers beyond the standard employment contract of 
permanent male workers in large manufacturing companies, the employment 
relationship on which self-regulation was based.  Business practices, such as 
contracting out and downsizing, contributed to an increase in precarious workers 
and smaller workplaces, where employers are said to have less will and capacity 
to implement statutory provisions for OHSM and worker representation (Quinlan 
et. al. 2001).  Such conditions of the limitation of the self-regulatory regime to 
protect workers in the face of work changes, were also found in other jurisdictions, 
for example, Canada and Australia (Lewchuk, 2013b; Johnstone et. al., 2005; 
Quinlan et. al., 2001).    
Increase in small enterprises in particular, and the impact on regulating 
OHSM and representation, have received some focussed attention.  Frick and 
Walters, (1998: 367-368) argue that small enterprises tend to be poorly organized 
for OHSM activities.  They lack arrangements for representation; employers have 
limited knowledge of OHS regulations and preventive measures; limited 
resources; and limited use of professional services (EU-OSHA, 2018).  Small 
businesses are also said to be more likely than large ones, to be directed by short-
term economic pressures which may influence the prioritisation of profit and 
production over investment in measures to manage OHS (EU-OSHA, 2018; 
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Quinlan, 2004; Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999).  Alongside these changes was 
a decline in union representation in most countries since the early 1980s which 
also meant the erosion of a source of protection for workers and the weakening 
of the preconditions for effective representation on OHS (James and Walters 
2002). 
These discussions are important for the maritime industry as the self-
regulatory paradigm remains the statutory approach to health and safety in many 
jurisdictions despite the flaws and challenges (Nichols and Walters, 2013; Walters 
and Nichols, 2007; Bluff et. al. 2004).  Shipping regulations at the international 
level, in particular non-technical provisions, are patterned on land-based 
approaches.13  The ILO has also embraced the Robens’ approach which it pointed 
out has had some influence on Convention 155 (ILO, 2009b) and therefore likely 
to have also influenced the approach taken in developing the MLC.  Therefore, the 
arguments raised in the land-based context are of relevance to an exploration of 
the MLC as many commentators have advocated a rethinking of the regulatory 
paradigm towards measures more appropriate for the contemporary work 
environment (Lewchuk, 2013a; Bluff et. al., 2004; Quinlan, et. al. 2001).   
 
2.4. Why Worker Representation in OHSM?    
There is overwhelming support for the effectiveness of representation from 
researchers and commentators on the work environment (Gallagher and 
Underhill, 2012; Charlwood and Terry, 2007; Walters and Nichols, 2007; Milgate, 
et. al. 2002; Nichols, 1997).  Representation is understood as one layer in the 
enforcement of regulatory provisions for workers’ participation as it can 
contribute to the regulatory provisions being implemented and practised as 
intended (Charlwood and Terry, 2007; Beck and Woolfson, 2000).  In this regard, 
representation might prove beneficial in an industry such as shipping, where the 
workplace is isolated and mobile and difficult to regulate from ashore (Bloor et. al. 
2005).  A number of reviews of the literature at different periods show that 
                                                             
13 For example the International Code for the Safe Management of Ships and for Pollution 
Prevention (ISM) Code (Walters and Bailey, 2013).  
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representation has positive effects on OHSM activities and OHS outcomes for 
workers when it is applied according to regulatory provisions, and the 
preconditions exist to support its implementation and practice (EU-OSHA, 2012; 
Menendez et. al., 2009; Walters and Nichols, 2007; Milgate, et. al. 2002).  The next 
sections, 2.4.1. and 2.4.2., examine the evidence for the effectiveness of direct 
and representative participation respectively, following which, Section 2.5 
examines the role of the preconditions for effective representation.   
 
2.4.1. Evidence for Direct Participation 
Although this study’s focus is representative participation, it is essential to include 
direct participation as it stands as an alternative to representation in theory and 
practice.  As discussed in Section 2.2, the self-regulatory framework provides for 
both direct and representative participation by giving employers the option to 
consult with workers and/or their representatives.  Scholars have noted the rise 
in direct participation while indicating the simultaneous decline in representation 
and union support (Quinlan et. al. 2001; Nichols and Walters, 2009; James and 
Walters, 2002).   
Despite the efforts of such regulatory wording (workers and/or their 
representatives) to give some participatory rights to non-unionized workers, and 
the uptake in direct participation, direct participation has not received much 
support in the industrial relations, sociology of work or socio-legal literature, 
particularly in the context of precarious work (Lewchuk, 2013a; 2013b; Quinlan 
1999).  In precarious arrangements, workers are aware of their vulnerabilities and 
this awareness inhibits them taking actions which they feel might cast them in an 
unfavourable light (Lewchuk, 2013a).  These concerns are increasing due to an 
apparent trend in the responsibilization of workers for health and safety (Gray, 
2009).  
Direct participation has found support mainly in the management 
literature and normally relating to wider participation rather than just health and 
safety (Frost, 2008; Lansbury and Wailes, 2008).  Yet, even where such support 
lies, the conclusions are disputed.  Direct participation is discussed in relation to 
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high performance work systems (HPWS) and other managerial approaches 
developed to boost quality and productivity in the workplace (Lansbury and Wiles, 
2008).  Supporters of such systems contend that they are beneficial to all parties 
(Frost, 2008; Lansbury and Wailes, 2008).  HPWS are said to increase workers’ trust 
in management, increase commitment to the organization, increase job 
satisfaction, lower levels of stress are experienced by workers and increased 
wages.  Critics, on the contrary, point out the deleterious effects on workers’ 
health and safety.  They point to work intensification, overtime, and the lack of 
union support in such workplaces (Frost, 2008: 428). 
Studies of direct participation are inconclusive regarding its benefits to 
workers.  A study by Bryson (2004) used employees’ perceptions of management’s 
responsiveness as a measure of the effectiveness of types of participation.  It was 
found that employees perceived management as most responsive in situations of 
direct participation rather than situations with union or non-union representative 
participation.  Bryson (2004) used these results to refute claims that workers need 
autonomous union support for effective participation.  However, it was also 
argued that managerial level of support for consultation with unions might have 
affected the results.  That is, where management does not support unions, they 
might be less responsive to employees and therefore such situations would 
receive lower scores for management’s responsiveness.  Additionally, unions 
might be shunned by workers to appease management.  Therefore, these results 
showing successful direct participation might have been tempered by the 
intervening variable of management’s possible attitude to union presence which 
was not investigated in the study.  Poutsma et. al. (2003: 48) point out that 
“workers would rather a weak structure with management support versus a strong 
structure opposed by management.” 
Strauss’ (2006) examination of car manufacturing in the USA disputes 
claims for effective direct participation.  In the case of a particular car 
manufacturing plant, it was found that improved direct participatory practices 
which empowered workers to make decisions and control their work, led to 
increased job satisfaction and production.  However, unions were intimately 
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involved externally to the workplace, in setting terms and conditions of work.  
Strauss (2006: 785) concluded that while the case seemed to be one of direct 
participation, it was more so representative participation.   
Similar to the limited studies on the effectiveness of direct participation in 
OHSM discussed below, Strauss’ study demonstrated that for direct participation 
to be effective, workers must have some leverage and/or autonomous support 
external to the workplace with which to compel employers to listen to them.  
Strauss (2006: 787) noted that “…participative schemes are likely to be adopted 
only if they are perceived to have some sort of payoff in production, quality, 
turnover, satisfaction…they are dropped because they are perceived not to have 
such payoffs.”  Such apparent fickleness by management supports those who 
argue for autonomous representation, to act as a countervailing force to the 
likelihood of management’s arbitrary decisions (eg. Nichols, 1997).  
Thus, discussions of direct participation in health and safety, acknowledge 
that it may be effective providing that workers have some influence in the labour 
market and are supported by their unions (EU-OSHA 2012: 18; James and Walters 
2002: 145-146).  Walters and Nichols (2007: 12) for example, discussed an early 
Norwegian study (Karlsen, et. al. 1975), which showed that direct participation on 
OHS could be effective under certain conditions, where workers have strong 
influence both internally and externally and are supported by their unions.  
Walters and Nichols (2007) asserted that outside of those conditions, individual, 
non-unionised workers, are unlikely to benefit from direct participation.   
Nevertheless, others suggest direct participation is beneficial in OHSM 
irrespective of the lack of these conditions.  A study of non-unionised workplaces 
in Scotland in the wake of the Health and Safety Executive’s (HSE) strategy to 
promote participation on OHS claimed that “…beneficial worker involvement in 
health and safety is perfectly feasible in non-unionised workplaces” (RoSPA, 2010: 
11).  This study set its arguments in the context of the managerialist worker 
“involvement” and “engagement” literature.  It reported the findings of research 
on the success of self-managed work teams and made an argument for the 
business case for OHS which claims that both workers and employers can benefit.  
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Others dispute the arguments for the business case pointing out that 
management’s decisions are complex and are not necessarily associated with 
costs (Hart, 2010; Cutler and James, 1996).  This literature was not reviewed in the 
RoSPA report.   
Furthermore, while seemingly making a case for direct participation, the 
results of the RoSPA (2010) study in effect, confirm the limitations of direct 
participation to deliver comprehensive OHSM envisaged in regulations.  This 
report showed that, the involvement strategies in most cases were likely to follow 
management’s agenda and “be confined to the implementation end of the 
spectrum rather than anything approaching joint planning and collaborative 
decision-making” (RoSPA, 2010: 11).  Situations where consultation was most 
developed, involved workers who were represented by unions and those unions 
were active.  Situations where non-union representatives were empowered by 
employers to be “forthright” also showed better results than those where 
employers were not committed to workplace partnership.  In general, this study 
confirmed other research on the importance of representation supported by the 
preconditions of having management commitment and unions, for better OHSM 
(eg. Walters and Nichols, 2007).  
Despite efforts to show the importance of direct participation, the most 
common position driving research and concerns with workers’ health and safety, 
is that workers’ need autonomous support as a countervailing force to 
management’s power (Nichols, 1997).  In contemporary workplaces where 
precarious work arrangements have increased, scholars doubt the likelihood that 
non-unionized employees, acting outside a collective, whose labour market 
position is weak, will gain much, if any purchase, from direct participation 
(Walters, et. al. 2005; James and Walters 2002; Nichols, 1997). 
  
2.4.2. Effectiveness of Representation in OHSM  
Studies using both direct and indirect measures reveal strong evidence for the 
effectiveness of representation in OHSM.  Direct evidence includes the use of 
injury rates or lost time frequency rates and their associations with the presence 
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of representatives or health and safety committees having workers’ 
representatives (Walters and Nichols, 2007; Milgate, et. al. 2002; Nichols 1997; 
Shannon et. al., 1997).  Indirect evidence points to associations between the 
presence of representatives in the workplace and positive OHSM activities and 
perceptions about health and safety management.  These activities include 
compliance with the legal requirements for OHSM; having OHS policies and 
programmes in place; workers being given information; the conduct of risk 
assessment and audits; keeping records of injuries; and access to training 
(Johnstone, et. al. 2005: 94-95; Walters et. al. 2005; Milgate et. al. 2002). 
Indirect indicators of effectiveness of representatives have received some 
criticism that measures showing positive associations do not necessarily translate 
into reduced harm to workers (Shannon et. al., 1997: 202).  However, rather than 
a critique, both sets of literature combined, provide compelling evidence that 
representation is important.  Indirect measures of effectiveness of representatives 
such as training, empowerment of workers, and management involvement are 
also associated with direct evidence such as lower injury rates (Geldart et. al. 
2010).    
Studies using direct measures reveal positive OHS outcomes including 
fewer reports of illnesses and injuries, improvements in absences from work due 
to illnesses, lower compensation rates, injury rates or lost-time frequency rates, 
when representatives are present in the workplace (Geldart et. al., 2010; Shannon 
et. al. 1997; Shannon et. al. 1996).  The reverse is seen where they are absent, that 
is, workers experience poorer OHS outcomes (Geldart et. al., 2010).        
Shannon et. al. (1996: 267) found an association between the presence of 
representatives and lower frequency rates for lost time compensation claims in 
the companies they studied in Canada.  The reverse was found where 
representatives were absent or where participatory arrangements such as OHS 
committees were performing below expectations.  These companies had higher 
rates for lost time compensation claims.  Another study synthesizing the results of 
ten studies conducted in Canada, the USA, and India, on the effects of 
organizational and cultural factors on injury rate, found consistently significant 
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relationships between lower injury rates and the presence of joint health and 
safety committees (Shannon et. al., 1997)  
In the UK, Robinson and Smallman (2006) examined the impact of OHS 
arrangements on reported workplace injuries and illnesses in manufacturing and 
the service sector, using the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS 
98).  They were particularly interested in the impact of changes in work 
arrangements and work characteristics on OHS.  The work characteristics 
described precarious work, for example temporary, part-time, home, contracting-
out, flexible and shift work.  Arrangements to protect workers included the 
presence of OHS committees, representatives, OHS training, communication and 
consultation.  With the caveat that under-reporting is a problem with such 
surveys, they found that injury rates were lower for both manufacturing and 
services only in situations with specific OHS representatives.  A key issue, which is 
revisited below was the lower impact of representation on illness.  Like others 
(Section 2.3), Robinson and Smallman (2006) concluded that current regulatory 
arrangements for OHSM are not suited to the changing nature of work and 
contemporary workplace illnesses.    
Studies using indirect measures of representatives’ effectiveness, examine 
where they impact arrangements to ensure robust OHSM practices are in place, 
which is presumed to lead to positive outcomes, such as lower injury rates 
(Walters et. al. 2005; Walters and Nichols, 2007).  A series of analyses arising from 
two major EU studies, support other research that representation is positively 
associated with the existence of and adherence to good OHSM practices for both 
traditional and psychosocial risks, for example, having OHS policies, collecting OHS 
data and carrying out risk assessment.  Also, these practices were more likely to 
be perceived as effective by both management and employees, where there were 
representatives (EU-OSHA, 2010: 2012: 2016: 2018).  These studies also show that 
representation is beneficial in challenging situations such as with small businesses.  
The challenges of effectively regulating OHS in small businesses is a recurring 
theme throughout the literature (see eg.  EU-OSHA, 2018; Gunningham and 
Johnstone, 1999; Frick and Walters, 1998; Dawson, et. al., 1988).  However, as the 
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series of EU studies indicate, representatives do have some influence on 
encouraging better OHSM practices in this area compared with those without (EU-
OSHA, 2012; 2018).       
In addition to influencing best organizational OHSM practices, 
representation is also important for stimulating workers’ OHS behaviours.  In 
examining Spanish workplaces, Olle-Espulga (2015) found that workers knowing 
that representatives existed elicited better safety behaviours, which the 
researchers used as an indicator of the effectiveness of representation.  This study 
compared situations where workers had representatives and were aware of them, 
where there were no representatives, and where workers had representatives but 
were unaware.  Preventive actions were operationalized as risk assessment, 
training, being given information, and taking remedial actions.  Workers who 
reported not being aware of safety representatives engaged in the lowest levels 
of preventive action.   
Others have shown that workers with active representatives or a 
functioning participatory system are more aware of OHS issues since those 
enterprises are likely to conduct training, provide OHS information, conduct risk 
assessment and take timely actions to remedy faulty situations (Coutrot, 2009; 
Walters and Nichols, 2006; Garcia, et. al. 2007).  Coutrot (2009), for example, on 
investigating the actions of representatives in France, concluded that health and 
safety practices, safety training, professional judgement on the quality of 
prevention were all “unambiguously better” where health and safety committees 
were present.  Such workplaces increased their probability of having better quality 
prevention practices by 19 percent above those that did not have such 
committees.  Similar findings of the importance of representatives continue in 
recent studies.  Walters et. al. (2016a; 2016b) found that even in a hostile 
industrial environment, representatives use their knowledge of the law to compel 
management to take preventive and protective measures.     
In summary the evidence shows that for both direct and indirect measures, 
representative participation impacts positively on OHSM practices and outcomes.  
Representatives help to stimulate the implementation of regulatory provisions 
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and increase the awareness of workers and their involvement in health and safety 
practices.  In this respect the body of evidence strongly supports representation 
as an important institution to assist in protecting workers OHS.  However, for 
representation to be effective certain conditions must be in place, to which this 
chapter now turns. 
 
2.5. Preconditions for Effective Representation 
One of the concerns raised in problematizing the MLC provisions for 
representation is whether the necessary preconditions are in place for the 
shipping industry to effectively implement and practice representation.  Overtime, 
research evidence has repeatedly identified a number of preconditions for 
effective representative participation (EU-OSHA 2012; Walters, 2006; Walters et. 
al. 2005; Milgate et. al. 2002; Ochsner and Greenberg, 1998; Nichols, 1997; 
Dawson, et. al. 1988).  These preconditions are important irrespective of 
regulatory differences among countries (EU-OSHA, 2012; Walters and Nichols, 
2009).  These preconditions are: strong regulations, senior management 
commitment; organized labour taken to mean trade unions and active 
constituents; and an effective inspection regime (Walters and Nichols, 2007; 
Milgate, et. al. 2002; Ochsner and Greenberg, 1998; Shannon et. al. 1996).  Figure 
2.1 lists these preconditions as advocated by Walters et. al. (2005) from their study 
on “The role and effectiveness of safety representatives in influencing workplace 
health and safety.”  The study was conducted on behalf of the UK’s Health and 
Safety Executive (HSE). 
Conditions that militate against the effectiveness of representation include 
an unstable labour force characterized by precarious work and declining trade 
union influence; lack of management commitment and weak regulatory provisions 
and external enforcement (Johnstone et. al. 2005; Quinlan et. al. 2001).  This 
section focuses on these preconditions and their role in supporting representation 
in the workplace. 
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Figure 2.1: Preconditions for Effective Representation 
Preconditions for Effective Representation  
  
• A strong legislative steer; 
• Effective external inspection and control; 
• Demonstrable senior management commitment to both OHS and a 
participative approach and sufficient capacity to adopt and support this 
type of management; 
o Competent hazard/risk evaluation and control 
o Ensuring competence of representative through training 
• Effective autonomous worker representation at the workplace and 
external trade union support; 
o Consultation and communication between worker 
representatives and their constituents. 
 
Source: Walters et. al. (2005: xi). 
 
2.5.1. A Strong Regulatory Lead   
Regulatory provisions on their own do not automatically translate into effective 
representation (Walters, et. al. 2005: 113-122; Walters, 1995: 308), but are 
important in establishing the rules of engagement to ensure the actors meet their 
obligations.  It is argued that when organizations implement regulations as 
intended, including provisions for representation, OHSM activities and outcomes 
are better compared to when provisions are not implemented (Walters et. al. 
2005: 13).  However, it is the regulatory provision that sets the tone for 
organizations to implement regulations as intended.  James and Walters (2002), 
for example, in assessing the strength of the UK regulations, pointed out the 
strength of the regulatory lead in the SRSC 1977 Regulations in comparison with 
the HSCE 1996 Regulations.  The SRSC 1977 Regulations provide representatives 
with union support and give representatives powers to request the establishment 
of safety committees, whereas, the HSCE 1996 regulations make general 
provisions for employers to consult with workers, but without details.    
A strong regulatory lead is important to give legitimacy and legal backing 
to representatives and therefore help to determine their acceptance by the other 
parties responsible for OHSM.  In particular, regulations provide external support 
by giving representatives rights to contact a State’s inspectorate (Walters et. al. 
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2005: 34).  Regulations also outline the roles and responsibilities of the actors 
(management, workers, government agents) and offer support to representatives 
by giving them a statutory base from which to act (see eg. Walters et. al. 2016a; 
Olle-Espulga et. al., 2014; Hall et. al., 2006).  Regulations also provide 
representatives with legal protection from victimization in carrying out their duties 
and gives them authority to perform their roles.  Figure 2.2 outlines basic statutory 
rights for representatives in the UK as detailed in Walters and Nichols (2007: 13), 
but which are similar across the EU and other jurisdictions having statutory 
provisions for representation (Walters and Nichols 2009).    
 
Figure 2.2: Statutory Rights of Workers’ Representatives 
Statutory Rights of Workers’ Representatives  
Details may vary across jurisdictions, but the basic statutory rights are:- 
• Employees’ selection of representatives in health and safety; 
• Protection of representatives from victimisation or discrimination as a result of 
their representative role; 
• Paid time off to be allowed to carry out the function of a safety representative; 
• Paid time off to be trained in order to function as a safety representative; 
• The right to receive adequate information from the employer on current and 
future hazards to the health and safety of workers at the workplace; 
• The right to inspect the workplace; 
• The right to investigate complaints from workers on health and safety matters; 
• The right to make representations to the employer on these matters; 
• The right to be consulted over the health and safety arrangements, including 
future plans; 
• The right to be consulted about the use of health professionals;   
• The right to accompany health and safety inspectors when they inspect the 
workplace and to make complaints to them when necessary. 
Source: Walters and Nichols (2007: 13) 
 
 Representatives rely on the protective guarantees given in regulations to 
carry out their duties with confidence (Walters et. al., 2016a; Olle-Espulga et. al., 
2014).  Walters et. al.’s (2016a) recent study of coal mining in Australia shows 
continuing evidence-based support to this argument.  They showed how 
representatives relied on regulations to support their roles in a hostile industrial 
relations climate.      
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Hall et. al. (2006), made a claim for representatives’ knowledge activism as 
important in their workplaces amidst waning structural supports such as 
unionization, legislation and external oversight.  However, their study also 
supports the importance of regulatory structures.  They compared three types of 
representatives: those who view OHS in technical terms and separate from labour 
issues; those who take an adversarial approach and use external mechanisms such 
as complaints to government authority; and those who use a combination of legal, 
technical and indigenous knowledge to press claims for improvements.  Of the 
three, those who used “knowledge-activism” (i.e. a combination of strategies), 
were found to be most effective in achieving significant changes in their 
workplaces.  In this case, while legislation alone was insufficient, as noted earlier, 
existing legislation was important in setting the parameters for action and 
supported the representatives in performing their roles.   
Some jurisdictions give significant powers to representatives to stop 
dangerous work or issue improvement notices (Johnstone et. al. 2005; James and 
Walters, 1997).  It is argued that such regulatory provisions are important 
empowering mechanisms.  They give representatives legitimacy in the eyes of 
management and their constituents and boost the likelihood that they will be 
effective in their roles (Walters et. al. 2016a).  Regulations that do not have a 
strong lead are susceptible to changing conditions (Walters and Nichols, 2007; 
James and Walters, 2002; Dawson et. al. 1988).    
Changes in the nature of work and how regulations for representation have 
been undermined as a result, is a recurring theme in the literature (Robinson and 
Smallman, 2006; Johnstone et. al. 2005; Quinlan, et. al. 2001).  Johnstone et. al. 
(2005) argued that the basis on which the current self-regulatory regime was built 
has been eroded by modern practices that have fragmented work.  As such, the 
stable, permanent and secure workforces, largely in the manufacturing sector, are 
less a feature of today’s work environment and there are more workers in 
precarious situations where their ability to exercise “voice” is diminished 
(Johnstone et. al. 2005; Quinlan et. al. 2001).  However, despite the weakening 
regulatory lead, current studies have shown that representation on OHSM may 
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still be effective with the presence of the other preconditions and implementation 
of the prevailing regulations (EU-OSHA, 2018; Walters et. al. 2016a; 2016b). 
 
2.5.2. Management Commitment 
Management commitment is an important precondition for effective worker 
representation.  Much of the focus in the literature is on senior management 
commitment to OHS (Olle-Espulga et. al., 2014; EU-OSHA, 2012; 2018; Walters and 
Nichols 2007; Milgate et. al., 2002).  This is, however, extended to a commitment 
to representation following from the discussion that representation is important 
to good OHSM.  But, line managers are also important in ensuring the success of 
workplace representative arrangements.  Simard and Marchand (1994) for 
example, argued for the integration of line managers in participatory 
arrangements as this affects the effectiveness of such arrangements for OHSM.  
They concluded that “…the type of supervisory involvement in safety that seems 
to have an impact on worker accidents is one that integrates workers’ 
participation.” In contrast, hierarchical type of supervision was associated with 
higher accident frequency rates (Simard and Marchand, 1994: 178).   
Notwithstanding, senior managers have the power and control over 
resources to implement representation (Geldard et. al., 2010).  Walters and 
Gourlay (1990) [discussed in Walters et. al., 2005: 36] found in their study of the 
effectiveness of representatives, the other preconditions to support 
representation were dependent on management’s willingness to commit to 
participation.  Management commitment is demonstrated through managers’ or 
employers’ adherence to their statutory obligations to implement and support 
representative arrangements; investing in preventive actions such as training and 
risk assessment; and making use of safety professionals (Walters and Nichols, 
2007; EU-OSHA, 2012; 2018).   
The empirical evidence for the importance of management commitment is 
seen in studies using both direct and indirect measures to demonstrate its 
association with positive OHS outcomes (EU-OSHA, 2018; Morse, et. al. 2013; 
Geldart et. al., 2010; Shannon et. al. 1997).  Studies in North America using direct 
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measures reveal that management commitment is associated with lower 
compensation rates and injury rates (Morse, et. al., 2013; Geldart et. al., 2010; 
Shannon et. al. 1997).  In Canada, Shannon et. al. (1997) found that management 
style and culture, that is, whether they had good relations with workers and took 
an active role in OHS and empowered workers, were consistently related to lower 
injury rates.  As they argued “…many of the important variables seem to reflect a 
genuine concern by management for its workforce.  It is unlikely that this can be 
acquired simply by ‘tinkering’ with policies and practices….” (Shannon et. al., 1997: 
213). 
Another Canadian study also found that lower injury rate workplaces were 
more likely to demonstrate higher management commitment (Geldart et. al., 
2010).  Additionally, these workplaces were more likely than medium and high 
injury rate workplaces to include OHS responsibilities in managers’ job 
descriptions (Geldart et. al., 2010: 566).  Similar to Shannon et. al.’s (1997) 
findings, empowerment of workers and demonstrated management commitment, 
were features of workplaces with low injury rates.  Geldard et. al. (2010) also 
revealed that joint health and safety committees in workplaces with low injury 
rates had executive functions and greater involvement of workers.  The opposite 
was seen for workplaces having higher injury rates, as management in these 
situations was more likely to reject committee recommendations.    
From these findings Geldard et. al. (2010: 569) concluded that worker and 
management collaboration is important in effective OHSM and outcomes.  They 
argued that: 
… it is management that has the authority to make decisions on OHS.  
Ultimately…it is the attitude and values of top management and the 
manifestation of those attitudes in the form of operational policies and 
informal actions which contribute to safer workplaces. 
Similarly, Walters and Nichols (2006) found in their study of cases in the 
chemicals industry in the UK, that participatory arrangements were most 
developed in the cases where management commitment to demonstrable actions 
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rather than “tinkering with policies,” was highest.  The indicators of high 
management commitment included a senior person named as being responsible 
for health and safety; the discussion of OHS issues at board level; written safety 
policies which included the names of senior persons and their responsibilities for 
health and safety matters; and active engagement with, and commitment to a 
meaningful participatory system (Walters and Nichols, 2006: 241).  In the cases 
demonstrating high management commitment, workers also had positive 
perceptions of arrangements for OHSM.  Throughout that study there was 
consistent alignment between positive actions and attitudes with the case studies 
that had high management commitment.    
At the EU level, a study of a variety of organizations in different industries, 
also supported the importance of management commitment.  Workplaces with a 
combination of representation and high management commitment to OHS were 
seven times more likely to have implemented good OHSM practices.  For 
psychosocial risks, workplaces with this combination of management commitment 
and representation, were five times more likely, than those without this 
combination, to have implemented good OHSM practices (EU-OSHA, 2018: 8).  
This effect is important to note as psychosocial issues are being increasingly 
discussed in the maritime press.14 
An important indicator of management commitment is their investment in 
the competence of representatives and members of the health and safety 
committees (Markey and Patmore, 2011; Geldart et. al. 2010; Walters et. al. 2005; 
Shannon et. al. 1997).  Competence of representatives is associated with improved 
OHS outcomes for workers (Geldart et. al. 2010; Liu, et. al. 2010; Shannon et. al. 
1997).  In evaluating the effects of safety committees on injury rates, Liu et. al. 
(2010), found that only firms that comply with their statutory obligation to train 
members of the safety committee recorded reduced injury rates.  Training 
however was more significant if it was continuous.  Workplaces with higher injury 
                                                             
14 Example: Safety4Sea (2018): https://safety4sea.com/cm-addressing-seafarer-mental-health-
issues/ 
The Maritime Executive (2017): https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/bbc-looks-at-
seafarer-mental-health 
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rates provided lower levels of continuous training.  Morose et. al.’s (2013), USA 
study, supports these findings showing that companies where committee 
members were trained recorded lower compensation rates.    
Safety representatives or participatory programmes in the workplace are 
constrained by management’s willingness and/or capacity to meet their 
obligations (EU-OSHA, 2018; Olle-Espulga, et. al. 2014; Markey and Patmore, 
2011).  In assessing safety representatives’ perceptions of support to carry out 
their duties, Olle-Espulga et. al. (2014) found that management’s willingness to 
invest in OHS affected representatives’ ability to fulfil their roles.  Lack of 
management commitment in this particular study also impacted how much 
workers engaged with their representatives due to fear of reprisals from 
management (Olle-Espulga et. al., 2014: 342 & 346).   
This section explores the literature on management commitment showing 
its importance both on direct and indirect measures of health and safety outcomes 
for workers and good OHSM practices.  Although supervisory management is 
important, it is evident that, as the decision-makers, senior management’s 
commitment is essential to establish the culture and practices to support 
representation (Walters and Nichols, 2007; Shannon et. al., 1997).  Such support 
requires tangible evidence such as providing resources and ensuring the 
competence of representatives as well as naming a top manager as being 
responsible for health and safety.  In short, commitment should be seen in the 
words as well as the actions of top management, and their support for worker 
involvement and the management of health and safety is collaborative rather than 
unilateral.    
 
2.5.3. Organized Labour and Active Constituents 
Organized labour consists of autonomous representation, trade union support and 
effective communication between representatives and their constituents (Walters 
and Nichols, 2007: 139-140; Walters et. al. 2005 p. 118; Glendon and Booth, 1982).  
The evidence for effective representation strongly supports autonomous 
participation of workers through trade union involvement (Walters et. al., 2016a; 
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Coutrot, 2009; Walters et. al., 2005; Nichols, 1997).  Worker representation is 
typically associated with trade unions due to their longstanding role in 
representing workers’ rights and advocating for improved working conditions and 
regulatory protection (Charlwood and Terry, 2007; Walters et. al., 2005; Abrams, 
2001).  Ochsner and Greenberg (1998: 355) argue that it was “labour-based health 
and safety movements [that] shaped government’s response to occupational 
health and safety as well as practices at the worksite level” in the USA, similarly in 
the UK and EU (discussed in Section 2.3).  Weinstock and Failey (2014) for example, 
present detailed accounts on union advocacy over a number of years and their 
successes in gaining a slate of OHS laws passed in the USA.       
The evidence consistently shows that trade unions contribute to the 
effectiveness of representatives, whether on health and safety specifically or 
wider workplace issues (EU-OSHA, 2012; Charlwood and Terry, 2007; Milgate, et. 
al., 2002).  Their contribution also holds in situations of individual representatives 
or whether they operate through health and safety committees (EU-OSHA, 2012; 
Milgate et. al., 2002).  Union support provides workers with a sense of security 
and confidence to raise OHS issues (Walters et. al., 2016a; Gunningham, 2008; 
Ochsner and Greenberg, 1998).  Studies in the UK found that where workers had 
autonomous representation, supported by trade unions, OHSM was better 
organized and management’s response to their legal obligations was more 
positive (eg. Walters et. al., 2005: 118-120). 
Effective representation is also supported by those being represented 
(Glendon and Booth, 1982).  Studies on workers’ interaction with their 
representatives are limited but evidence exists to underscore their importance in 
supporting representation.  In examining representatives’ perceptions of support, 
Olle-Espulga et. al. (2014) found that representatives were more effective in their 
duties when they had workers’ support.  Alternately, representatives were 
constrained by lack of constituent involvement due to a hostile environment 
where workers feared reprisals and were therefore wary of supporting union-
related activities.  That study also found that workers’ labour market position 
(precariousness) constrained their support of representatives.  In other words, 
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workers in sectors affected by the broader economic climate who feared being 
laid off, were less likely to engage with representatives (Olle-Espulga et. al., 2014).      
As trade union influence has declined in many countries, there has been 
an ongoing debate about non-union forms of representation and their importance 
in giving “voice” to workers (Williams et. al., 2011; Haynes et. al., 2005; Taras 
2002).     Civil society groups and management-led initiatives have been studied as 
alternatives to union representation.  Williams et. al. (2011) for example, 
examined the scope of activities for civil society groups which included education 
and awareness creation among workers.  Civil society groups they explained, seek 
to influence laws, policies and practices and may engage in public actions such as 
protests to press for results.  However, they noted that unlike trade unions, civil 
society groups have less direct contact with the workplace which limits their direct 
influence on employer action.      
Other studies attempting to show that representation is possible without 
trade unions, have not been very convincing.  In questioning the survival of union 
representation in Canada, Taras (2002) pointed to the existence of other 
representative forms and argued that lack of unions did not mean that workers 
were not represented.  A number of alternative forms of representation were 
identified, including non-union staff associations, company-based representation 
plans, specific industry councils and rights and access to arbitration.  However, 
they found that union representation remained the foundation and fall-back 
institution for workers where these non-union alternatives were unable to deliver 
comparable services, or where the commitment of managers waned overtime 
(Taras, 2002).  While this study revealed that workers might have access to other 
forms or representation, it also supports the argument for unions as a more 
reliable and enduring institution for workers. 
Haynes et. al. (2005), also suggest that unions might not be as critical as 
others claim.  In discussing participation in general, in the context of workers 
having limited access to participatory mechanisms at work due to liberalization 
and decline in union influence, they analysed data from the 2003 New Zealand 
Worker Representation and Participation Survey.  A number of managerialist 
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direct mechanisms for involving workers were identified as alternatives to union 
representation.  These included regular meetings between management and staff; 
a personnel or human resources department; “open door” policies; and quality 
circles and consultative committees of management employees.  Their analysis 
showed union involvement to be significantly associated with the effectiveness of 
joint consultative committees.  At the same time, non-unionized employees 
reported that joint consultation was very effective, as against unionized workers 
reporting that joint consultation was quite effective.  They concluded that 
management’s interest in employee consultation did not decline with the rolling 
back of unionism and that workers may have gained new “voice” mechanisms.   
While this may be so, these findings should nevertheless be taken with 
some caution as qualitatively, the difference between very and quite is debatable 
for subjective ratings.  Haynes et. al. (2005) did not consider that unionized 
workers are usually more aware of workplace issues (EU-OSHA, 2012) and that 
their expectations may be greater and so might have accounted for the difference.  
In relation to OHS, studies have found unions to be associated with increased 
workplace injuries where it was asserted that unionized workers are more likely 
to report OHS issues as they have union support, rather than unions contributing 
to increased injuries (eg. Nichols, 1997).    
Despite contradictory findings, the overwhelming body of research 
indicates that trade union representation or the support of representatives by 
trade unions, delivers the most benefit for workers.  Unions have also been 
particularly useful to small enterprises that present special characteristics making 
regulating health and safety difficult.  Trade unions offer training and provide 
information to support workers and their representatives.  They provide a 
particular type of pedagogy focused on labour education which is found to be 
“…superior to that of mere ‘technical’ training…” in OHS (Walters and Nichols, 
2007: 140).  Unions investigate workplace complaints, relate to workers and 
provide a channel to management, as well as apply pressure for regulatory 
mechanisms.  According to Walters and Frick (2000: 40), the more these criteria 
are met the more representation is effective in addressing workplace risks. 
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 2.5.4. Enforcing the Regulatory Lead 
 An inspection regime to enforce regulatory requirements has emerged in the 
literature as an important precondition for effective representation (EU-OSHA, 
2012; Walters and Nichols, 2007).  Studies in this area are limited and are mostly 
concerned with inspecting for regulatory compliance with OHS standards rather 
than administrative processes associated with representative practices (EU-OSHA, 
2018; Walters et. al., 2011; Johnstone, 2004).  Ochsner’s and Greenberg’s (1998: 
357) survey investigating factors which support effective worker participation, 
found that being able to contact the industrial hygiene department was viewed as 
the most important resource available to safety professionals.   
In substantiating their argument of the importance of an inspection regime 
to support OHS, Ochsner and Greenberg (1998) discussed jurisdictions, such as 
Sweden, that has a history of strong workers’ rights but also saw it as necessary to 
have a well-developed system for representation and a strong and regular system 
of workplace inspections.   By contrast, a Canadian study showed that a shift 
towards relying on internal responsibility and reducing the resources for 
inspectorate monitoring saw a rise in workplace injuries (Ochsner and Greenberg, 
1998: 355).  Likewise, early studies in the UK showed that a reliance on self-
regulation and reduced inspections had its limits in protecting workers OHS 
(Dawson et. al. 1988), a trend which continues in later studies (Walters and 
Nichols, 2007). 
In the UK, self-regulation cast the role of the inspectorate as supportive 
rather than coercive.  It is argued that the regulatory agencies are not proactive in 
enforcing the regulations for representation, and take a distant approach largely 
leaving implementation to the employers and employees (Walters, 1998: 185).  
This reflects the unitarist thinking which underpins self-regulation, discussed in 
Section 2.3, where external influences were discouraged.  Although there may be 
regulatory provisions for a relationship between inspectors and representatives, 
this is left to the individual inspectors and influences of the broader political 
economic climate in terms of how OHS is viewed and therefore the resources and 
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support given by the State (Walters et. al., 2011: 174-186; Walters and Nichols, 
2007: 122-123).   
In a study of inspection practices in the UK, Hutter (1993) found that, in the 
majority of cases, local managers accompanied inspectors rather than 
representatives and that contact in all cases was with management 
representatives.  Several explanations were offered such as managers holding 
primary responsibility under the law and decisions about expenditure and safety 
systems being in their remit.  As such, inspectors found it easier to ask questions 
about deficiencies and reprimand management when representatives were not 
present.  Other aspects of the legal relationship were also not fulfilled according 
to the law.  Communication of inspection findings to representatives varied where 
letters were sent to managers and only in some instances were these copied to 
employees or their representatives.    
 Although inspectorates are considered important to ensure employers 
fulfil their OHS obligations, under the self-regulatory paradigm and neo-liberal 
deregulatory practices, inspectorates have been cast in a more supportive role 
(Walters et. al., 2011).  Regulatory provisions, for example, in the UK, for 
inspectors to engage with representatives is rarely practices (Walter and Nichols, 
2007; Hutter, 1993).  There is also very little research on this aspect of effective 
representation.  As such the evidence for the role and impact of inspectorates is 
limited but there are commentators who sees it as important. 
 
2.6. Conclusion  
This chapter reviewed the land-based literature examining issues of relevance to 
this thesis.  It defined representation as workers having the support to 
autonomously present their collective interest to management.  It distinguishes 
other concepts that are sometimes used interchangeably but are different in 
practice and OHS outcomes.  The chapter examined the origins and rational for 
representation and explored the thinking that drove the regulatory paradigm for 
OHSM and representation.  It highlighted the shortcomings of this thinking 
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regarding the causes of accidents and showed that self-regulation as an OHSM 
paradigm neglects the power imbalances in the workplace.    
The chapter showed much evidence for effective representation and the 
conditions under which it is effective.  While a strong regulatory lead is an 
important precondition, it is supported by the other preconditions.  It appears 
from the literature that management commitment could arguably be the most 
important element as they provide the resources to support representation.  It is 
their will and capacity that makes representation more than a “tinkering with 
policies.”  However, given a strong regulatory lead and union support, 
representation may also be effective in hostile work environments.  The next 
chapter zeros in on the shipping industry and explores the issues raised in this 
chapter regarding the evidence for what works in effective representative 
participation.   
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3 
Dangerous Work, Silenced Voices  
  
Merchant seafarers have chosen a dangerous occupation in which they are exposed to risks 
in a combination rarely encountered in other occupations (Nielsen 1999: 121). 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Consistent with the evidence in previous research, the main argument of this 
chapter is that seafaring is among the most hazardous occupations and seafarers 
have generally poor OHS outcomes due to the nature, organization and control of 
their work (Walters and Bailey, 2013; Kahveci and Nichols 2006; Nielsen and 
Panayides, 2005; Nielsen 1999).  Nevertheless, it is argued that these poor 
outcomes are preventable for the most part if effectively managed (Walters and 
Bailey, 2013).  Effective management of OHS means the development, 
implementation and practice of measures which support positive OHS outcomes 
for workers based on the evidence for what works (EU-OSHA, 2012; Walters and 
Nichols, 2009).  There is a convincing body of literature that what works is a strong 
regulatory lead with robust provisions for representation supported by the 
preconditions for its effective implementation and practice (Chapter 2, Section 
2.5.).      
In order to understand the link between OHS at sea and this exploration of 
measures to give seafarers some influence into how their health and safety is 
addressed, the chapter begins by examining the literature on OHS outcomes for 
seafarers.  The next section highlights how seafarers’ OHS risks arose as a 
consequence of economic globalization and the associated negative impact on 
working conditions and simultaneous removal of workplace support for managing 
these risks.  Subsequently the chapter examines the literature on OHSM prior to 
the MLC and the failure of the shipping industry to successfully address health and 
safety matters on ships.  The evidence for representation and seafarers’ 
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participation is then examined before introducing the MLC and reviewing the 
literature on its potential to address health and safety for seafarers.  
     
3.2. Health and Safety Concerns for the Seafaring Workforce 
This section highlights the risks seafarers face in their work to substantiate the 
argument that global regulation of representative participation in OHSM is a 
worthy pursuit owing to its potential for positive OHS outcomes.  The history of 
seafaring is replete with accounts of poor OHS outcomes (Carter, 2015; Quinlan, 
2013).  Although seafarers (mostly in developed countries) gained regulatory 
protection and support, this was eroded by what might be called the second wave 
of precariousness15 seen from the 1970s onwards (ILO, 2004; Alderton and 
Winchester, 2002a; 2002b).  During this time shipowners in developed countries 
increasingly registered their ships with foreign flags (countries) to reduce costs, 
and along with contingent employment practices, work risks for seafarers 
increased (discussed in Section 3.2.3).   
The body of literature on seafarers OHS outcomes is predominantly based 
on research of fleets of developed countries.  Studies of fleets from developing 
countries are few, but their findings are similar to those of developed countries in 
terms of the nature of risks, while showing that those seafarers may face even 
poorer outcomes (Borovnik, 2011; Roberts 1998).  OHS risks for seafarers are 
made evident in shipping as a mobile and isolated industry; in the operational 
requirements; the social and the organizational arrangements on ships; control of 
work by a distant shore-based management; as well as the broader global political 
economic context of the shipping industry (Xue et. al., 2017; Sampson 2013; 
Walters and Bailey, 2013; Nielsen and Panayides, 2005; ILO, 2004).   
                                                             
15 In outlining precarious work for the seafaring labour force between 1815-1935, Quinlan (2013) 
showed that precarious work arrangements have been a longstanding issue for seafarers.  
However, there was some reprieve for particularly seafarers of developed countries thorough 
worker activism and union organization, which saw laws being put in place and provisions for 
representation to protect seafarers OHS (see eg. Walters and Bailey).  With the economic crisis of 
the 1970s and other consequences of economic globalization, much of the gains made were 
eroded and additional risks added with increased technology and modern business practices (ILO 
2004; Sampson, 2013). 
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Reviews of the literature paint a grim picture of the magnitude of work 
risks and poor outcomes for seafarers (eg. Walters and Bailey, 2013; Iversen, 2012; 
Oldenburg et. al., 2008; Nielsen and Panayides, 2005).  The reviews show seafarers 
to not only be at risk of a wide range of occupational injuries and illnesses, but 
that they have higher rates of mortality and morbidity associated with their 
working conditions, than those working ashore.  Studies of Danish (Hansen, 1999), 
Polish (Jaremin and Kotulak 2003) and British (Roberts 2008) seafarers, for 
example, found these groups to have higher rates of death and illnesses than 
respective shore-based workers.   
An important issue is the institutionalized patterns of rules and work, that 
reflects a hierarchical military-like organizational structure of work and life on 
board.  These features have been shown to impact negatively on seafarers’ health 
and well-being (Kahveci, 2007; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006: 133).  Opportunities to 
go ashore for reprieve from such working conditions have declined with increased 
intensity in work schedules, the remoteness of modern ports and increased border 
protection strategies16  (Sampson, 2013; Graham 2009; Mukherjee and Mustafar 
2005). When other risks, such as exposures to chemicals, noise, vibration, and 
extremes of temperatures; bullying and harassment; criminalization, 
abandonment and piracy, are considered, seafaring makes for perilous work 
(Walters and Bailey, 2013; Bloor et. al. 2000).   
The most vulnerable groups have been found to be the ratings (ship’s crew 
minus the officers) in the studies where ranks were identified.  Roberts, et. al., 
(2010) found suicide rates in the British fleet higher for ratings than officers.  In 
another study, deck ratings had the highest risks for occupational fatalities and 
injuries (Roberts et. al. 2014: 264).  A study of telemedicine records over a 25-year 
period (1986-2010) from an Italian-based provider, also showed deck ratings 
having the highest deaths from natural (diseases and illnesses) and non-natural 
                                                             
16 Security measures introduced in shipping after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United 
States spurred the development of additional global standards to govern security at sea and in port 
in the form of the IMO International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code.  However, some 
countries also instituted unilateral measures such as onerous visa requirements and security 
measures for seafarers in ports which some describe as human rights abuses (Mukherjee 2006). 
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(incidents and injuries) causes (Grappasonni et. al., 2012).  In other instances, 
engine room crew appeared to be more vulnerable to cancers and are exposed to 
the effects of the physical environment of the engine room, such as noise, 
vibration and excessive heat (Bloor et. al. 2000: 334).   
That ratings are most vulnerable is unsurprising owing to their social 
position.  As Nichols (1997: 3) asserts, injuries at work are bound up with workers’ 
class positions.  Research, such as that of Kahveci and Nichols (2006) reveal the 
precarious occupational and social positions that ratings inhabit in the shipboard 
hierarchical structure and for many, the wider political economy (i.e. their 
countries of origin and/or their class positions).  Socioeconomic precariousness is 
associated with increased susceptibility to work risks and diseases in any industry 
and society in general (Scott-Marshall, 2010; Link and Phelan, 1995).  Bhattacharya 
(2012a) found that ratings were more afraid of losing their jobs than officers and 
were therefore less likely to speak out in OHS committee meetings.  This is the 
group most likely to benefit from representation as they lack the power position 
from which to present their interests individually to management, similar to land-
based precarious workers (Chapter 2, Section 2.4).   
 
3.2.1. Seafarers’ Death Burden 
This section gives some details regarding fatalities at sea.  The main source of 
physical harm for seafarers are maritime disasters and/or occupational injuries.  
Foundering, collisions, groundings, explosions and fires are some of the causes of 
maritime disasters which may result in total or partial loss of the ship and the crew 
(eg. EMSA, 2016; Roberts et. al. 2014).  Slips, trips and falls, involving mostly 
individual seafarers at sea, or in port, also account for a large proportion of 
occupational fatalities (eg. EMSA, 2016; Roberts et. al. 2014).  Other sources of 
physical harm include strains, suffocation in enclosed spaces, and handling of 
equipment.  
Non-physical causes of fatalities such as diseases and illnesses are 
classified as death from natural causes in the literature.  Studies have shown a 
preponderance of diseases of the major systems in the body.  In a review study of 
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Danish seafarers’ and fishermen’s health and safety, Poulsen et. al. (2014) 
reported that seafarers died from a range of diseases of the digestive and 
circulatory systems and several types of cancers.  Further, cardiovascular and 
gastrointestinal diseases accounted for large numbers of deaths, which have been 
linked to lifestyle practices such as smoking, alcohol consumption, lack of exercise, 
poor diet and/or eating habits, being overweight and stressed (Hansen 1999: 273).   
The magnitude of the work burden for seafarers can be seen when their 
occupational fatality rates are compared with land-based populations.  Roberts 
and Marlow (2005), showed that for British seafarers over the period 1976 to 
2002, there was a mortality rate from occupational accidents 27.8 times higher 
than the general British workforce for the corresponding period.  This included 
higher risk of fatal accidents compared with other high-risk occupations such as 
construction, forestry and fishing.  A later study for the period 2003 to 2012 
revealed a reduction in the rate, but it remained higher than all major shore-based 
British industries.  It was 3.5 times higher than the energy and utility supplies 
sector; 4.7 times higher than in construction; 13 times higher than manufacturing; 
and 50 times higher than the fatality rate in the service sector (Roberts, et. al. 
2014: 262-263).    
Similarly, among Danish seafarers for the period 1986 to 1993, the fatality 
rate was 11 times higher when compared with the average for Danish male 
workers ashore (Hansen, 1996: 274).  Borch et. al. (2012) also found significant 
improvements of death rates in the Danish fleet, although they remained six times 
higher than the death rate of male land-based workers.  Like other researchers, 
Borch et. al. (2012) concluded by expressing continued concern for the health and 
safety of seafarers.         
Outside of European fleets, a study of the Hong Kong Marine Department 
records over a 10-year period, indicated that maritime casualties were the leading 
cause of deaths among those seafarers (Nielsen, 1999).  In another study, Roberts 
(1998) reported that Singapore had a seafarer mortality rate 2.4 times, and Hong 
Kong twice the level of the British fleet, suggesting an even worse situation.  As 
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Roberts’ (1998) noted, the results were from accidents and incidents on board and 
do not include the high levels of fatalities due to maritime disasters.   
 
3.2.2. Illnesses and Injuries Among Seafarers 
This section details some evidence for non-fatal illnesses and injuries at sea.  
Seafarers’ injuries and ill-health arise from similar causes to those accounting for 
occupational fatalities.  Slips, trips and falls during work or moving around a ship 
account for a large proportion of injuries (Jensen et. al., 2005).  EMSA (2016: 41) 
reported that 34.5% of occupational accidents on cargo ships were due to slips, 
trips and falls.  This percentage is in keeping with a likely average according to 
Jensen et. al.’s (2005) review of the literature on slips, trips and falls which showed 
figures ranging from 27% to 46%.   
A study using self-administered questionnaires collected responses from 
6,461 seafarers from 11 countries (China, Croatia, Denmark, Indonesia, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Ukraine and the United Kingdom) 
(Jensen, et. al., 2005).  Of those reporting on injuries (n=467), 43% were due to 
slips, trips and falls.  The injuries suffered included fractures, sprains, back injuries, 
wounds to head, eyes, neck and other body parts.  Jensen, et. al. (2005) estimated 
that seafarers’ risk of injuries from these sources to be about three time higher 
than shore-based industries.  While the researchers indicated some limitations in 
terms of the nature of recall in research, which may lead to over or 
underestimation of events and their severity, the percentage results for injuries 
were consistent with other research (eg. Li, 2002).   
In addition to high rates of injuries, seafarers are at risk of and suffer from 
a range of illnesses and diseases.  Lefkowitz et. al. (2015) studied telemedicine 
records obtained from a global pool of seafarers and found that seafarers 
presented with twice as many illnesses as injuries.  The top illnesses were listed as 
dental, gastrointestinal, dermatological and respiratory.  Other illnesses and 
diseases identified by Lefkowitz et. al. (2015) included musculoskeletal, 
cardiovascular and psychiatric illnesses.  These findings demonstrate the 
significance of illnesses among seafarers as compared with injuries and 
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underscore the arguments of others calling for more attention to seafarers’ health 
(Bloor et. al. 2005; Nielsen and Panayides, 2005). 
A review of studies on health risks in global shipping found seafarers to be 
at risk of a variety of cancers, cardiovascular diseases, liver diseases, disease of the 
nervous system and infectious diseases (Bloor et. al., 2000).  The researchers 
noted a variety of health risks arising from the physical environment such as 
hearing, alertness and mental health issues due to noise, vibration and extremes 
of temperatures.  Poulsen et. al.’s (2014) review of register-based studies of 
Danish seafarers and fishermen spanning the years 1970 to 2012, revealed 
elevated hospitalization rates for diseases and illnesses such as gastrointestinal, 
cardiovascular, endocrine/nutritional conditions and cancers.   
While many of the studies examined prevalence of injuries and incidents 
in terms of numbers of seafarers who were hurt, the impact on work is rarely 
investigated.  Impact on work is important as illnesses place additional pressures 
on the remaining crew (Hansen et. al., 2002; Jensen, et. al. 2005; Tomaszunas and 
Weclawik, 1997).  Jensen et. al. (2005) found days lost from occupational injuries 
ranged from 1-90 days for seafarers across the 11 countries they investigated.  In 
their study of the telemedicine company’s records, Lefkowitz et. al. (2015) found 
that 50% of injuries led to restricted work.  In that study, illnesses were the greater 
cause for work restrictions than injuries.   
The above studies relied on quantitative measures that do not go behind 
the statistics to uncover root causes.  Borovnik’s (2011) qualitative study of 
seafarers from Kiribati and Tuvalu, provides an example of how work qualitatively 
impacts on the health and safety of seafarers.  The study was useful in relaying the 
seafarers’ lived experiences of work and how they responded.  The work risks 
identified included exposure to dangerous cargo; increased pace of work; fatigue; 
and fast turn-around-times.  Work intensification as a consequence of economic 
globalisation has been identified as an important factor in seafarers’ health and 
safety (Sampson, 2013; Wadsworth, 2008; ILO, 2004).  In Borovnik’s (2011) study, 
the seafarers explained how the lack of shore leave, intense work and feelings of 
stress, combined with the use of alcohol for coping, sometimes led to violence on 
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board.  Their vulnerabilities also increased due to extended time on board, which 
was sought to increase their income.  Thus, these seafarers’ socio-economic status 
and contingent employment arrangements further increased their exposure to 
risks - staying longer on board increases risks of stress and loneliness which may 
lead to more destructive coping strategies.    
Although the studies in this section are limited in terms of 
representativeness of the global seafaring workforce, they are nevertheless useful 
in demonstrating the levels and nature of risk and poor OHS outcomes for 
seafarers, justifying the need for measures to improve working conditions at sea.  
The study by Borovnik (2011) was useful in showing how seafarers may come to 
harm due to their lived experiences, but it also highlights that illnesses and injuries 
are “constructed” by the nature, organization and control of work.    
 
3.3. Globalization and Seafarers’ Health and Safety 
Economic globalization17 has had a negative impact on seafarers’ OHS through 
business practices that encourage work intensification, workforce fragmentation, 
the weakening of seafarers’ collective response and regulatory oversight (Lillie, 
2006; Alderton and Winchester, 2002a; Bloor et. al., 2000; Bergantino and 
Marlow, 1997).  Alderton and Winchester (2002a) describe how shipowners, 
seeking competitive advantages in response to increased costs from such events 
as the oil crises of the 1970s shifted the geo-political landscape of shipping by 
‘flagging-out’18 their ships to open registers or what the International Transport 
Workers Federation (ITF) labels as flags-of-convenience (FOCs).19  The prior 
                                                             
17 Economic globalization in this thesis refers to the transformation of the shipping industry from 
a predominantly national enterprise to a global enterprise involving a myriad of transnational 
interconnections and networks that now drive the industry.  In Kuman’s and Hoffman’s (2012) 
definition, the features of economic globalization are trade liberalisation, transport, 
standardisation and telecommunications which are key elements in the shipping industry.  Other 
important features are de-regulation and labour fragmentation.    
18 The practice of registering ships in countries other than that of the nationality of the shipowner.       
19 Prior to liberalization of the maritime industry ships would assume the nationality of their 
countries of origins, that is, where the owner was domiciled for the most part.  With globalization, 
ships can assume any nationality by being registered with a foreign country. This practice is called 
“open registration” or the country that registers such ships regardless of nationality is called an 
“open register.”  Open registers developed a reputation for perpetuating substandard shipping by 
accepting owners whose operations are substandard (Alderton and Winchester, 2000).  The ITF 
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practices, where traditional maritime States controlled ships and seafarer supply, 
gave way to a growth in business practices involving non-traditional maritime 
countries with less stringent or no regulatory requirements for doing business.  In 
that regard, areas such as the hiring of seafarers was liberalized and standards of 
employment and working conditions on ships declined as a result of attendant cost 
cutting practices (Lillie, 2006; ILO 2004; Bloor et. al. 2000).    
Traditional maritime States for the most part hired their own national 
seafarers to crew their fleet and these were frequently unionized seafarers with 
statutory provisions for their OHS protection (Walters and Bailey, 2013: 173-177).  
Flagging-out to countries with no requirements for hiring, resulted in a growth in 
multinational crewing practices as ship owners sourced labour from anywhere.  As 
such, a market developed for low cost seafarers from countries in Asia and Eastern 
Europe (ILO, 2004).   
A mixing of crew served several functions to the advantage of shipowners, 
such as, fragmentation of organized structures to support seafarers, for example 
unions (Walters and Bailey, 2013: 173-181).  It allowed cost-cutting through wage 
differentiation based on nationality, irrespective of seafarers’ rank (Sampson 
2013; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006).  Discriminatory practices served to create ill-will 
among some crew, further fuelling divisions and reducing the likelihood of 
collective actions.  Lillie (2006) argued that these were deliberate practices aimed 
at weakening seafarers’ solidarity.  In addition, such practices compounded other 
forms of discrimination and prejudicial relations on board (Kahveci and Nichols, 
2006).  Multinational crewing is also used as a tool by some managers to secure 
seafarers’ submission, increasing their sense of vulnerability and reducing the 
likelihood that they will seek redress for unfair practices (Kahveci and Nichols, 
2006: 30).     
Global changes affecting work structure and organization are not unique 
to shipping (Walters, 2005) and are similar to land-based experiences where 
                                                             
labels these “flags-of-convenience” as a way to highlight the lack of a relationship (genuine link) 
between owners and the flag, and to distinguish between these and traditional registers deemed 
to be providing better quality service. 
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business strategies have been pursued sometimes at the expense of workers’ 
health and safety (Quinlan, 2013a; Quinlan et. al. 2001).  Others have pointed out 
that, in a competitive business climate, management may forgo health and safety 
expenditures to achieve a certain profit level or maintain the financial health of 
the company (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999).  Practices at the work level are 
also affected and writers, such as Nichols (1997), explain these practices in terms 
of “safety versus profit” and workers themselves, aware of business pressures, 
may take risks to facilitate production.   
Within the shipping industry, the safety versus profit explanation for poor 
working conditions is also relevant (Walters and Bailey, 2013; Cutler and James, 
1996).  The business rationalization that took place in shipping is argued to have 
created conditions that led to a “race to the bottom” in labour standards as 
shipowners sought to avoid regulatory compliance, reduce costs and increase 
production and therefore profits (Bloor et. al., 2000; Bergantino and Marlow, 
1997).  These trends also affected other workers around the world, but arguably 
are more extensive for seafarers and have graver effects as their workplace is 
remote and removed from the gaze of regulators and support structures (Walters 
2005; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006).    
DeSombre (2006; 2008), offers a less pessimistic view arguing that there 
has been a “race to the middle” in labour and regulatory standards instead of a 
“race to the bottom.”  She pointed out that, while labour and regulatory standards 
in the maritime industry declined as a result of economic globalization, there are 
those whose interests are served by maintaining some level of compliance.  Bloor 
et. al. (2013: 179), found that ship operators were willing to comply with 
regulations on condition that other operators were also complying, as they were 
desirous of a “level playing field” without “free riders.”  In that respect, there are 
shipowners willing to subject their businesses to higher standards and they band 
together to apply market exclusion strategies to either force sub-standard 
operators from the industry or compel them to improve standards (DeSombre, 
2008).  Meanwhile, DeSombre (2008) also noted that, in response to competition, 
lower standards were also introduced by those deemed to be quality providers.  
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With that, she pointed to practices such as the opening of second registers by 
traditional maritime States with less stringent requirements.  Thus, the “up push” 
by compliant owners and the “push down” by flag States, led to a convergence of 
standards at a middle ground.    
It is however, uncertain, how much of this middle ground applies to 
seafarers’ living and working conditions.  Efforts by the ITF to address sub-standard 
shipping has received less success than envisioned (DeSombre, 2006).  Violation 
of seafarers’ rights does not seem to be diminishing amidst the emergence of new 
concerns with psychosocial illnesses on ships, or increased (or perhaps more 
publicized), cases of abandonment.20  Although seafaring work may always be 
precarious (Quinlan, 2013b), there has been a weakening of States’ capacity to 
regulate OHS in the face of these global forces, giving rise to the need for the ITF 
and a global network of welfare providers that support seafarers.  These and the 
expansion of global governance machineries of the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and the ILO have been among the responses in shipping, 
although there are many challenges in ensuring regulatory compliance (Bloor et. 
al. 2005). 
 
3.4. Regulating OHSM at Sea Prior to the MLC 
This section discusses efforts at global regulation of health and safety prior to the 
MLC with a specific focus on the International Code for the Safe Management of 
Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code).  The international regulatory 
regime for OHSM is dominated by the IMO with much less attention paid to the 
ILO instruments.  Regulating OHSM at sea has its foundations in attempts to 
address maritime disasters (Nielsen and Panayides, 2005; Anderson, 2003).  There 
was (and continues to be) a strong focus on maritime technical defects to address 
safety of ships with much less attention given to occupational health and safety as 
an end in itself (Bloor et. al. 2005; Nielsen and Panayides, 2005: 148-149).  A shift 
                                                             
20 Splash: Campaign on crew abandonment. Contributions from persons across various sections of 
the maritime industry highlighting the plight of abandoned seafarers and some of the companies 
involved.  This campaign might have contributed to a few countries banning companies or vessels 
involved. Available at https://splash247.com/?s=crew+abandonment. Accessed 08 August, 2018.    
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was made when the IMO increased its focus on the people in shipping with a 
rhetoric that the “human element” was neglected in attempts to address safety at 
sea.  This shift however, turned out to be a focus on managerialist standards for 
operational and technical safety, underpinned by a heavy behaviour-based 
approach to OHS (Walters and Bailey, 2013; Bhattacharya, 2012a).    
Health and safety at sea is couched in a narrative that over 80% of 
accidents involve the “human element” in one form or another (Anderson, 2003).  
Technological advancement was expected to lead to safer shipping, but regulators 
and industry spokespersons expressed alarm that major maritime casualties 
continued to occur (eg. O’Niel, 2001; 2002).  This alarm directed focus on the 
“human element” and the ensuing narrative of a safety culture in the shipping 
industry as the means to stem the human contribution to accidents (Barnett, 2005; 
IMO 2002).   
This narrative gained traction and is reflected in such underpinning IMO 
rhetoric as “safer shipping demands a safety culture,” where the focus turned to 
seafarers and shore management (IMO 2002).  Today, the IMO maintains that view 
as shown in its safety culture statement on its website21 
An organization with a “safety culture” [original emphasis] is one that gives 
appropriate priority to safety and realises that safety has to be managed 
like other areas of business.  For the shipping industry, it is in the 
professionalism [original emphasis] of the seafarers that the safety culture 
must take root… 
It is relatively unusual for new types of accidents to occur on board and 
many of those that continue to occur are due to unsafe acts by seafarers.  
These errors, or more often violations of good practice or established rules, 
can be readily avoided.  Those who make them are often well aware of the 
errors of their ways…Most will have received training aimed at preventing 
                                                             
21 IMO website: Safety Culture [Available at] 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/VisionPrinciplesGoals/Pages/Safety-
Culture.aspx [Accessed: 16 October 2016]. 
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them but, through a culture that is tolerant to the ‘calculated risk,’ they 
still occur. 
These beliefs about the cause of accidents at sea have most likely 
contributed to the turn to behaviour-based management and are reflected in 
practices and attitudes towards OHS in shipping where seafarers’ behaviour and 
qualifications became the focus of attention.  The EMSA (2016) shipping casualty 
report, for example, listed “human error” as the overarching cause of incidents at 
sea.  Although in some cases this “human error” was attributed to supervisory 
decisions and some shore-based decisions, the majority of human error was 
reported as arising on board ships.   
The maritime industry’s pursuit of a safety culture entailed the 
development of and amendments to international maritime standards, as well as 
enforcement elements to address “human errors.”  For example, amending the 
IMO STCW Convention22 (twice to date), developing the ISM Code, along with port 
State control and flag State initiatives, form a regulatory regime of international 
codes and practices focussing on surveillance and fixing the faulty humans.  
Although the industry claimed to have adopted a socio-technical approach 
(Graham, 2008; Anderson, 2003), in essence, the focus was directed at correcting 
the behavioural flaws in the seafarers and their quality of training, with little 
attention paid to the structural conditions affecting seafarers’ work practices, such 
as commercial pressures.23  The sociology of work literature speaks to structures 
of vulnerability that impact how workers undertake their tasks which may include 
taking risks (Nichols, 1997).  Issues of fatigue and work intensification emerged as 
evidence that the nature, organization and control of work need to be addressed.  
                                                             
22 The Standards of Training Certification and Watchkeeping  (STCW) 1978 as amended Convention 
of the IMO. 
23 While some attention was paid to fatigue as an occupational health issue, this was due to fatigue 
playing a major role in shipping casualties.  Fatigue was isolated from other occupational issues 
and served to substantiate the observation that the focus of the industry is on ship safety and the 
prevention of maritime casualties and pollution.  Yet the industry neglected to address the 
“elephant in the room” of reduced manning requirements and instead placed the responsibility on 
seafarers to comply with work/rest schedules developed by the industry and encouraging seafarers 
to “speak out” where these and other standards were being violated.  The industry is yet to openly 
discuss the structures of vulnerability (eg. precarious work; commercial pressure; power 
imbalances) and how to address these.  
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However, the industry is yet to take a concerted look at issues such as manning24 
levels that could assist in reducing seafarers’ workload (Bloor, 2012; Bhattacharya, 
2009).     
 
3.4.1. The ISM Code 
The ISM Code is the maritime industry’s principal regulatory instrument for OHSM 
on ships (Bhattacharya, 2009; Trafford, 2009; Anderson 2003).  Developed as a 
response to a series of maritime casualties in the 1980s and 1990s, (Table 3.1), the 
Code is a systems approach to OHSM inspired by such approaches that had 
developed for land-based enterprises (Walters and Bailey, 2013).  Prior to its 
adoption, the ship-owning community at the time, represented by the 
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Shipping Federation 
(ISF), developed a voluntary Code of Good Management Practice in Safe Ship 
Operations for their members.   
At that time the UK also issued a number of maritime notices which were 
presented at the IMO which was discussing mechanisms to address these 
casualties at sea (Anderson, 2003).  After the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster, 
the UK developed the Merchant Shipping (Operations Book) Regulations 1988.  
Following the MV Scandinavian Star casualty in 1990, elements of these UK 
regulations and those voluntary codes developed by shipowners, were formulated 
into the ISM Code.  The ISM was inserted as Chapter IX into the IMO’s Safety at 
Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention.  It was adopted in 1994 and phased in until it came 
into effect for all types of vessels in July 2002 (Anderson, 2003).  With that, 
regulated self-regulation of OHS was introduced into the shipping industry 
(Bhattacharya, 2009).   
 
 
 
 
                                                             
24 One effect of increased technology was to reduce the number of seafarers required to ‘man’ 
(crew) a ship. However, with work intensification this reduced manning was offset which the 
industry has not addressed (eg. Bhattacharya, 2009). 
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Table 3.1: Selected Maritime Casualties Influencing Development of the ISM  
 
Year Name of Ship Casualties 
1987 Herald of Free 
Enterprise (ferry) 
Capsized off Zeebrugge – 190 persons died 
1987 Dona Paz (ferry) Collided with a tanker – Philippines – 4,386 persons died 
1989 Exxon Valdez (oil 
tanker) 
Ran aground – Alaska, pollution damage 
1990 Scandinavian Star 
(ferry) 
158 persons died 
1991 Agip Abruzzo (oil 
tanker) Moby Princess 
(ro-ro-ferry) 
Collision - Livorno, Italy - 143 persons died, pollution 
damage 
1991 Haven (oil tanker) Fire and explosion - Genoa, Italy - 6 crew died, pollution 
damage  
1991 Salem Express (ferry) Struck a reef – Egypt – 470 persons died 
1992 Aegean Sea (oil tanker) Broke in two off La Coruna, Spain - pollution damage 
1993 Braer (oil tanker) Grounding – Shetland Islands - pollution damage 
1994 Estonia (ro-ro 
passenger ferry) 
Sinking - 852 persons died 
1996 Sea Empress (oil tanker) Milford Haven, UK – pollution damage 
Source: Anderson 2003 
 
The ISM Code focussed on shipowners (or managers) as the main duty 
holders with legal responsibility for safety but espoused the idea that everyone 
was responsible for safety, in the spirit of self-regulation.  A similar thinking to the 
land-based self-regulatory regime examined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.3) underpins 
the ISM Code (Walters and Bailey, 2013: 130-139).  The IMO website confirms the 
ideology of the Code and the self-regulatory thrust: 
Effective implementation of the ISM Code should lead to a move away 
from a culture of "unthinking" compliance with external rules towards a 
culture of "thinking" self-regulation of safety - the development of a 'safety 
culture'. The safety culture involves moving to a culture of self-regulation, 
with every individual - from the top to the bottom - feeling responsible for 
actions taken to improve safety and performance. Application of the ISM 
Code should support and encourage the development of a safety culture 
in shipping.25 
                                                             
25 IMO website: Human Element [Available at]: 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/HumanElement/Pages/Default.aspx [Accessed: 16 October 
2016]. 
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Ironically, the ISM seems to have led to some amount of “unthinking” 
compliance in managing safety contrary to the vision outlined by the IMO 
(Anderson, 2003; Bhattacharya 2012a).  For example, Bhattacharya (2012a) found 
that seafarers tended to rely more on their skills and experiences to manage day-
to-day shipboard safety rather than the ISM procedures which, in instances, were 
found to be unsuited for situations that arose on board.  Rather, the ISM was 
viewed as a paper exercise which was completed to satisfy the shore-based office.  
The IMO seemed to have promoted self-regulation uncritically and omitted to 
make allowances for seafarers’ autonomous participation, similar to the 
experiences on land.  But unlike land-based sectors, unions had no influence at the 
IMO to raise the issue of on board representation to support the ISM 
requirements.  Self-regulation has been criticised for land-based industries as an 
ineffective paradigm for OHSM owing to the structural conditions in the workplace 
and workers’ vulnerability due to the unequal power inherent in the employment 
relationship (Chapter 2, Section 2.3). 
This critique is also relevant for the shipboard work environment.  The 
literature shows that self-regulation has its limitations owing to working 
conditions that militate against seafarers’ participation (Xue et. al., 2017; Walters 
and Bailey, 2013; Bhattacharya, 2012a; 2012b; Bailey, 2006).  Xue et. al., (2017) 
for example, found that seafarers underreported incidents for fear of losing their 
jobs.  A similar finding emerged in Bhattacharya’s (2012a) study discussed in 
Section 3.5.  A criticism of the ISM Code is that it has no binding provisions for 
seafarers’ participation although this is presumed under self-regulation.     
The ISM Code system does entertain notions of participation on ships 
(Bhattacharya, 2012a).  OHS committees are to be established and seafarers are 
encouraged to participate.  However, critics of self-regulation have argued that 
precarious workers do not have the power position for self-regulation to deliver 
the envisaged outcomes (Lewchuk, 2013a; 2013b; Nichols, 1997).  As precarious 
workers, seafarers for the most part are also not in a position to individually 
represent their interests (Bhattacharya, 2012b; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006), which 
is the preferred modus operandi under self-regulation.  Studies revealed that the 
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ISM Code was not implemented as envisaged in many instances and therefore 
failed to achieve the desired purpose of effective OHSM (Bhattacharya, 2012a; 
Bailey, 2006; Anderson, 2003).       
The ISM is a systems approach where companies develop and implement 
safety management systems (SMSs) as the core activity in safety management 
(Trafford 2009; Anderson, 2003).  SMSs are described as standardized commercial 
packages used to manage work processes (Frick et. al. 2000).  These are voluntary 
and driven by documented procedures with audits as the main means of 
accountability.  These systems have not been viewed with much confidence for 
addressing workplace health and safety issues.  However, there are those who 
argue that SMSs have the potential to encourage positive OHSM practices if 
effectively implemented and there is management commitment to participation 
(Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999).   
SMSs are contrasted with a systematic approach to OHS, which is regulated 
management.  In distinguishing between these two approaches and their 
implications for workers’ participation, Frick et. al. (2000) argued that a systematic 
approach provides for worker participation, while a systems approach emphasises 
the role of management who are not obligated to consult with workers.  Scholars 
in this field have argued for the importance of workers’ participation and the 
preconditions to ensure self-regulation serves not only the purpose of 
management but those of workers (Chapter 2).  These conditions were not 
articulated in the ISM Code (Bhattacharya, 2012a).   Figure 3.1 outlines the main 
distinctions between these two approaches.  
 
Figure 3.1: General Distinctions between Systematic OHSM and OHSM Systems   
Systematic OHSM OHSM Systems 
• Regulated minimum standards for 
OHSM 
• Applicable to all types of employers 
• Risk assessment is a key component 
• Mandated worker participation 
• (pluralist) 
 
• Voluntary, market-based packages 
• Highly formalized prescriptions for 
OHSM as an integrated element in the 
business process 
• Emphasizes documentation 
• Management driven – top-down focus 
(unitary) 
Source: Compiled from Frick et. al. (2000). 
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Another concern regarding the ISM system is that its management focus, 
coupled with a behaviour-based paradigm, might have encouraged a top-down 
authoritarian approach to OHSM (Walters and Bailey, 2013).  In assessing the 
effectiveness of the ISM Code, Bhattacharya, (2012a; 2012b; 2009) reveal a clear 
leaning towards a behaviourist approach.  The behaviourist approach on the part 
of the managers in that study echoed the underlying narrative of “human error” 
in accident causation.  Incident reports developed by the companies, listed 
seafarers’ unsafe behaviour as both immediate and root causes of accidents 
(Bhattacharya, 2012b: 14).  These reports were substantiated by interviews where 
managers believed that they had to unilaterally manage safety because seafarers 
were not trusted to act safely.  Such perceptions show a persistence of attitudes 
underlying the regulatory reforms of the 1970s and arguments advocating for self-
regulation, where it was said that accidents were a result of apathy on the part of 
workers (and managers) (Chapter 2, Section 2.3).   
Studies on the ISM Code show the negative consequences for OHSM of not 
including workers, such as mistrust of the system, under-reporting of incidents and 
a gap between its envisioned purpose and the realities of practice (Bhattacharya, 
2012a; Bailey 2006; Anderson, 2003).  By contrast, Anderson (2003) found that 
including seafarers in the development of the SMS, was important in gaining the 
necessary commitment to the system.  In presenting a case study where seafarers 
were included in the process of developing and implementing the SMS to satisfy 
the ISM, it was found that those seafarers had a positive perception of the ISM 
and the SMS.  Otherwise unilateral development of the safety system was met 
with resistance and complaints.  In such instances, seafarers viewed the ISM and 
the attendant SMS as a tool for the shore-based company managers to pass on 
responsibility and blame to the crew (Bhattacharya, 2012a; Anderson, 2003).   
Such outcomes should be unsurprising when one considers the rhetoric of 
the “human element” driving the thinking behind the ISM.  Similar to the critique 
of self-regulation for land-based industries, those who developed the ISM Code, 
did not appear to have given adequate consideration to the structural and social 
issues on board, to make the ISM approach effective.  This is perhaps wishful 
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thinking as the IMO is a technical body that developed a management standard by 
way of codifying existing voluntary management practices.  Although there was 
some awareness of challenges in the work environment, and attempts were made 
to address them by providing for a “designated person ashore” (DPA)26 to support 
seafarers in their work, this operates within the shipowners’ power structures.  In 
the land-based literature, autonomous representation is supported in recognition 
of the need to have a countervailing force to management power (Walters and 
Nichols, 2013; Nichols, 1997).  Seafarers’ “voice” at the IMO is greatly limited and 
at the time of the development of the ISM would have been more so. 
Further, these mechanisms of the ISM Code do not address the broader 
political economic conditions driving work intensification and the imperatives of 
production that have been described for work at sea (Xue et. al. 2017; Walters and 
Bailey, 2013: 141-145).  Nichols (1997) has demonstrated for land-based workers 
that such business imperatives contribute to workplace risks.  Likewise, Nichols’ 
structures of vulnerability is applicable to what obtains at sea, as studies show that 
production has taken precedence over seafarers’ health and safety (Xue et. al., 
2017; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006; Cutler and James, 1996).   
 
3.5. Representation in Shipping  
Activism for regulations to improve employment and working conditions for 
seafarers is well documented, particularly for advanced market economies 
(Carter, 2014; Quinlan, 2013b; Walters and Bailey, 2013; McFarlane, 1970).  As 
such, statutory support for representation on ships is not new.  For example, from 
the 1960s, the UK has had provisions for crews to select their representatives 
whose duties included representation on general employment and working 
conditions but also health and safety (Walters and Bailey, 2013: 173-177).  
                                                             
26 Revised ISM Code (2015: para. 4). Designated Person Ashore: To ensure the safe operation of 
each ship and to provide a link between the Company and those on board, every Company, as 
appropriate, should designate a person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest level 
of management. The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons should 
include monitoring the safety and pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each ship and 
ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as required. 
https://www.classnk.or.jp/hp/pdf/activities/statutory/ism/ISM_Cd/ISM-Code-e.pdf  
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Representation also existed at the international level for seafarers, in ILO 
conventions, such as Convention 134, dated 1970, but these were not widely 
ratified. 
Changes in the business of shipping due to the effects of economic 
globalization, weakened structures for representation at sea (Bailey, 2006; Lillie, 
2006; Walters, 2005; ILO, 2004; Alderton and Winchester 2002a).  Lillie (2006: 66-
67) argued that globalization is an employer strategy to fragment workforces 
thereby weakening their capacity for solidarity and resistance.  He went on to 
show that, through the work of the ITF, union organized responses to globalization 
are possible (Lillie, 2004; 2006).  Gekara, et. al. (2013), have also shown union 
successful organising across borders in the case of the seafarers’ officers union, 
NATILUS, having alliances across the UK, Netherlands and Switzerland.  However, 
there remains a gap in understanding as to what obtains at the shipboard level in 
the day-to-day working lives of seafarers, as the research in this area is sparse. 
Trade unions as the traditional voice of seafarers have been severely 
curtailed at the shipboard level (Sampson, 2013; Walters and Bailey, 2013).  
Decline in union organizing at the workplace level has been more widely discussed 
for land-based sectors.  The changes wrought by economic globalization such as 
shift to service sectors and business practices to privatize and fragment 
workforces, have eroded unions traditional spaces and methods of organizing 
(Biffl and Isaac, 2002: 6-7).  Similar forces in shipping that sought to decentralize 
and deregulate the seafaring workforce have had similar consequences for union 
organizing on board (Walters and Bailey, 2013).   
The union response to globalization in shipping is most visible at the 
international level through the work of the ITF and its campaign against FOCs, to 
address issues of declining labour standards and wages for seafarers (Lillie, 2004; 
2006).  However, representation at the shipboard level appears underdeveloped.  
Alderton and Winchester (2002a) demonstrated that seafarers on FOC ships are 
more likely than those working on ships registered in traditional maritime States, 
to experience discrimination, have more intense work, work longer hours, receive 
lower wages and experience hostility from their employers towards unions.  While 
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the ITF has been somewhat successful in arresting the “race to the bottom” in 
wages in particular, the conditions outlined by Alderton and Winchester (2002a) 
remain problematic for many seafarers.  The ITF is a union of national unions and 
although it goes beyond the role of a secretariat and actively engages in setting 
standards and conditions of work for the global seafaring workforce, its activities 
at the shipboard level appear limited to crisis situations.             
      
3.5.1. Seafarers’ Participation on Ships   
A ship is a traditionally undemocratic workplace and regulatory and social 
practices in the past discouraged any form of independent “voice” (Quinlan, 
2013b; McFarlane, 1970).  Quinlan’s (2013b) historical study from 1815-1935 
found that British and Australian laws prevented seafarers removing themselves 
from unseaworthy ships, and systems for making complaints and seeking redress 
were onerous.  Modern shipping also has difficulties with establishing democracy 
on board which is likely to be a legacy of this tradition (Schrank, 1984; McFarlane, 
1970).  Seafarers’ participation is thus curtailed by traditional hierarchical 
structures and divisions on board (Sampson, 2013; Bhattacharya, 2009; Bailey, 
2006).  Its rigid military-like ranking system, reflected in for example, the physical 
layout of the ship (separation by rank in the location, quality and size of living 
spaces) reinforces divisions and might serve to constrain social interactions 
(Sampson, 2013; Schrank, 1984).   
Additionally, the wider political-economic environment is inimical to union 
organizing on ships.  Multinational crewing practices, the use of employment 
agencies and weak national industrial relations systems for many seafarers, 
coupled with the mobile nature of work, make it difficult for seafarers to develop 
solidarity at the workplace level to represent their interests collectively (Lillie, 
2006).  A few studies have found deliberate attempts by shipowners to prevent 
seafarers from seeking union representation (Kahveci and Nichols, 2006; Alderton 
and Winchester 2002a).   
With the absence of union support, OHSM is left to the interaction of 
seafarers and their managers on the ship and those ashore.  Relevant studies into 
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the shipboard work environment which examine seafarers’ participation are 
limited.  Participation usually emerges as findings rather than being the subject of 
inquiry.  One exception is Kahveci and Nichols (2006: 126-128) who included 
consultation and perceptions of participation as variables within their study on the 
life of seafarers on car carriers.  The study compared seafarers’ responses to being 
consulted with that of land-based responses from the British WERS, 1998 survey.  
Health and safety was the topic on which seafarers reported being mostly 
consulted.  However, in unpacking this finding, the researchers noted that this was 
not exceptional compared with the land-based reports.  Additionally, it was not 
clear from the quantitative data how much consultation took place and the quality 
of this consultation.    
Some insights were gained into the quality of the participation from the 
study’s qualitative data, which showed that while some shore managers were 
efficient in giving information on some ships, there were less opportunities for 
seafarers to give feedback and influence decisions in the true spirit of participation 
and consultation (Kahveci and Nichols, 2006).  Some seafarers in the study 
explained that instructions were given by shore office staff and they simply 
followed these instructions, so were not consulted.  As discussed by Walters and 
Bailey (2013: 178-181), consultation in the manner already described (Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2), (as a statutory requirement for allowing communication flow two 
ways, thus providing structures for workers’ “voice” on health and safety matters 
and for managers to listen and respond) is not a common feature of employee 
relations on ships.    
Other studies also support the discussion that seafarers’ participation is 
curtailed due to working conditions.  Seafarers are reluctant to speak out on issues 
or report dangerous situations (Xue et. al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2012a, 2012b; 
Bailey, 2006; Anderson, 2003).  Xue et. al., (2017) demonstrated the implications 
of poor communication between seafarers and shore-based management.  They 
revealed that communication was top-down and authoritarian, with the 
suggestion of consultation in theory but not in practice.  Communication was 
driven by production targets which were found to be inimical to seafarers OHS as 
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risks were taken to meet these targets.  In relation to the control of work, shore-
based management was very involved in the daily operations of the ship which 
took away some of the decision-making role of the seafarers, while seafarers in 
turn were reluctant to go against shore management’s decisions (Xue et. al., 
2017).  Sampson et. al., (2016), also found tensions between the shore-based 
office’s need to keep production going and the needs of those on ships.    
Seafarers’ “silence” is a common theme in the literature on participation 
on board.  Such silence is associated with concern for their jobs and professional 
reputation.  In that regard, seafarers may underreport safety matters or be biased 
in their reporting of incidents to present a positive picture of themselves and/or 
the operations of the ship (Xue et. al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2012a).  The potential 
for communication to positively influence OHSM practices by being transparent 
and open was not realized for the seafarers in those studies.  Organizational 
learning from incident reporting is a principle of building a safety culture, to which 
the maritime industry aspires (Manuel, 2011; Graham, 2008).  Nevertheless, poor 
communication arising from the conditions of work threatens such aspirations.  
Rather, the opposite outcome of a safety culture is often the reality and threatens 
both the safety of the ship and seafarers’ OHS.  Seafarers often feel stressed with 
having to communicate with shore-based management (Xue et. al., 2017; 
Sampson et. al., 2016).  Some of this stress was managed by underreporting or 
withholding information generally, but seafarers may also attempt to self-manage 
personal injuries rather than report them (Acejo et. al., 2011).    
 As the foregone discussion shows, precarious employment conditions may 
serve to “silence” seafarers and contribute to suspicious relations with shore-
based management.  This mistrust also flows from shore management to seafarers 
and heighten negative relations (Bhattacharya, 2012a).  In that respect, 
management commitment as a precondition for effective worker participation is 
likely to be compromised.  There is evidence that management commitment to 
health and safety in shipping may be exercised through authoritarianism and 
control (Bhattacharya, 2012a).  As discussed in Chapter 2, such unitary approaches 
to management tend to be associated with behaviourist explanations for 
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occupational injuries and, therefore, behaviour-based solutions are pursued.  
Bhattacharya (2012a) found that managers held behaviourist notions of the cause 
of accidents believing that most accidents result from seafarers’ lack of expertise 
or non-compliance with the company’s SMS.  The “human error” narrative already 
discussed, was invoked by managers and served as the rationale for their 
authoritarian approach to managing what they perceived as seafarers’ apathy.  
Rather than the “no blame” culture espoused by the maritime industry in pursuing 
a safety culture, Bhattacharya (2012a; 2012b) found that the blame culture was 
palpable, even among those managers who had some awareness of its negative 
effects.   
Studies such as Anderson (2003); Kahveci and Nichols (2006); and 
Bhattacharya (2012a) revealed a picture of shore management who were highly 
committed to the ISM Code, and its effective functioning but not to a participatory 
system.  Anderson (2003) found that for the most part, the SMSs were unilaterally 
developed, and seafarers were expected to follow the procedures.  By contrast, 
the companies that sought seafarers input in developing their SMSs had better 
compliance and reported improvements in rates of injuries and cost savings 
(Anderson, 2003).  This lack of seafarers’ input in the OHSM systems on board was 
further supported by Bailey (2006) who examined risk assessment as an important 
aspect of safety management under the ISM.  Seafarers were not included and as 
such the purpose of risk assessment towards continuous improvement was not 
being realised.   
This section examined the literature on seafarers’ OHS outcomes and 
arrangements for OHSM prior to the MLC.  It showed that while arrangements are 
in place for seafarers to participate, these are plagued by faulty thinking and 
ineffective approaches which stifle participation.  Representation is not a feature 
described in this literature.  The practices described are consistent with a unitarist 
model of self-regulation seen in early regulatory developments to address 
workplace health and safety matters.  This literature has demonstrated that the 
preconditions of strong regulations, management commitment and union 
presence to support a participatory practice are poorly constituted for the 
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shipping industry.  This is the context within which the MLC was developed to 
function and therefore the basis for problematizing representation in the MLC.     
 
3.6. The Maritime Labour Convention 
This section introduces the MLC and the rationale for its development.  As a “new” 
instrument, there is not yet a well-developed body of critical literature on the MLC.  
The publications that exist are mainly from the ILO or from those who were 
involved in some way with its development and are geared towards explaining the 
convention or promoting its virtues (eg. Christodoulou-Varotsi, 2012; McConnel 
et. al. 2011; Bolle, 2006).   
There is much rhetoric surrounding the MLC.  The ILO’s narrative sets the 
MLC within its “decent work agenda” to address the “deficit in decent work” on 
ships.  It is viewed by the ILO and industry as the seafarers’ “bill of rights” which 
will provide a “firm” but “flexible” global response to the poor working conditions 
resulting from the business practices driving economic globalization.  As the ILO 
explains, the MLC is “firm” on rights but “flexible” in how its standards are to be 
met to serve the different national systems (see Chapter 5).  The MLC is also held 
as the “fourth pillar”27 in the international maritime regulatory regime for quality 
shipping encompassing safety, security and marine pollution prevention.  The 
other three pillars are maritime standards developed by the IMO:  
• International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as 
amended. 
• International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, 
as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto and by the Protocol of 
1997 (MARPOL). 
• International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) as amended, 1995 and 2010. 
                                                             
27 See Safety4Sea maritime press release at https://safety4sea.com/seafarers-bill-of-rights-to-
come-into-force/ [Accessed, December 04, 2017]. 
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Yet, this alignment with the IMO, might be more reflective of the ILO’s 
public relations narrative rather than the reality of the situation.  Research 
evidence suggests that this is a promotional tactic by the ILO to bolster the MLC, 
rather than legitimate cooperation, as IMO officials maintain that the two 
organizations have a different focus (Thomas, 2012: XIii).   
The MLC is a consolidation of ILO maritime conventions that existed as 
separate instruments dealing with specific subject matter such as “paid vacation,” 
“wages” and “social security.”  Article X of the MLC lists the conventions that were 
consolidated and replaced by its coming into effect (MLC 2006: 6-7).  The MLC 
brings seafarers’ labour and social issues to the fore in a comprehensive manner 
that did not exist prior to its coming into effect, and gives regulatory support to 
representation for seafarers, an element that is missing from the other “pillars.”   
Additionally, the MLC is intended to address unfair competition among 
shipowners by creating a “level playing field” through re-regulating the industry 
and in so doing, remove some of the economic advantages gained by sub-standard 
operators from lowering labour standards (Lillie, 2008: 193-194; DeSombre, 2006).  
In this goal, both the employers’ and workers’ group were united, making the MLC 
possible (Lillie, 2008: 193-194).  
A major position of those supporting the MLC is that it is an innovative 
instrument.  Supporters outline the features giving rise to this description, such as 
the MLC as a consolidated instrument, its tacit amendment procedures and 
enhanced compliance and enforcement mechanisms which require certification 
and inspection of labour standards.  However, these are only innovative to the 
extent that they broke from ILO traditions.  These are features of IMO instruments 
on which the MLC structure is modelled.  But for those supporting the MLC, its 
“firm” yet “flexible” approach is the feature to ensure wide ratification and 
therefore effective protection for seafarers (Bolle, 2006).   
These views from the ILO camp regarding the extent to which seafarers will 
be protected by the standards of the MLC, might be overly optimistic.  More 
critical perspectives such as Bauer (2008), highlight some important concerns that 
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might result in the MLC being less effective than envisaged.  With direct reference 
to seafarers’ health and safety, Bauer (2008) pointed out the lack of strong 
provisions on shore leave to alleviate the institution-like atmosphere on ships.  
Importantly, he also noted the absence of measures to empower seafarers to 
protect the rights afforded under the MLC, in particular the absence of provisions 
for seafarers to take industrial action.  While acknowledging the historical reality 
that ships are not democratic workplaces and not all jurisdictions allow for 
seafarers to strike, Bauer interpreted the absence of such provisions as a weakness 
in the MLC framework and argued that it is at least worth some consideration 
(Bauer, 2008: 655-657).  Bauer (2008) however stopped short of arguing for union 
support which is normally a precondition for workers to avail themselves of such 
rights if they exist.     
Legal views describe the MLC as a “new direction” in international labour 
law and global governance (McConnell et. al. 2011).  McConnell et. al. (2011), gave 
a detailed explanation of each aspect of the MLC and how it is intended to apply 
in law.  Emphasizing the legal strength of the MLC, downplays the politics of 
compliance and regulation in the maritime industry (Bloor et. al. 2013).  The ILO 
itself does not have any enforcement capabilities and its “horizontal” governance 
regime, where it relies on member States to give effect to conventions, is 
considered unreliable (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2008; Standing, 2008; Biffl and Isaac 
2002).  Countries differ in how they view efforts at global governance and seek to 
protect their economic interests.  Biffl and Isaac (2002: 27) note that developing 
countries are wary of standards that seek to regulate their workforces as they see 
this as a hindrance to economic growth.  But there are those who are of the 
opinion that the port State control (PSC) enforcement regime in the MLC is a firm 
regulatory lead and will be effective in ensuring uniformity of application of the 
standards (Christodoulou-Varotsi, 2012; Lillie, 2008; 2006; Bolle, 2006).   
Confidence is placed in the “no more favourable treatment”28 clause in the 
MLC where any relevant ships are to be inspected whether or not the country 
                                                             
28 See Glossary 
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whose flag it flies have ratified the MLC.  Bauer (2008) was cautious in lauding the 
measures for PSC arguing that the “flexibility” built into the MLC might result in 
compliance and enforcement issues where States will act in their own interest 
under economic pressures and might not judiciously apply the standards on their 
own ships.  Nevertheless, he also noted that the “no more favourable treatment” 
clause might counter any such practices from becoming widespread.  Although 
speculative, there seems to be some confidence in the literature that the 
regulatory steer will ensure an acceptable level of compliance and enforcement of 
the standards.  However, these perspectives have not taken into consideration 
problems identified with the PSC governance machinery or that ships spend most 
of their time at sea away from the gaze of regulators. 
Another problem with these accounts in relation to seafarers’ OHS 
protection, is that they refer to the MLC in general.  The limited attention paid to 
Regulation 4.3 on health and safety protection and accident prevention which 
provides for representation, focuses on the provisions for social dialogue29 at the 
national level in giving effect to the MLC and for its regular review.  According to 
Christodoulou-Varotsi (2012: 475), this element of flexibility in providing for 
consultation of the social partners, will bring the MLC framework closer to the 
realities of the industry.  However, Christodoulou-Varotsi (2012) neglects to 
consider the shipboard level and the minimal provisions in the MLC for social 
dialogue on board.  Instead, the complaints mechanism was highlighted as a 
positive move in providing seafarers with a means to seek redress should their 
rights be violated.  Studies into land-based workplaces demonstrate that 
precarious workers do not make much use of such individual means of protecting 
their rights (Lewchuk, 2013a).  Such opinions coming out of the ILO are legal 
perspectives outlining in theory what the MLC provisions mean, and they ignore 
the social and political contexts governing shipboard work.  Writers from a 
                                                             
29 Social dialogue is defined by the ILO as “an instrument of good governance which fosters 
cooperation and economic performance and helping to create an enabling environment for the 
realization of the objective of decent work at the national level.”   Further explanation is given in 
the Glossary. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/workers-and-employers-organizations-
tripartism-and-social-dialogue/lang--en/index.htm.  
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sociology of work, industrial relations and socio-legal perspectives are yet to 
significantly contribute to discussions on the MLC. 
  An exception might be Lillie (2008; 2006; 2004) who provides an industrial 
and international relations perspective on the possible effects of the MLC.  Similar 
to some of the views coming from the ILO, he regarded the MLC as a new paradigm 
for global labour rights with special reference to the ILO’s tripartite structure.  
However, this is not a new paradigm and while tripartism may function effectively 
enough at the international and even the national level, Lillie (2006) does not 
account for its absence on ships and how the international will translate into 
effectiveness at the workplace level.    
Another claim that needs critical attention is that “when the MLC comes 
into force it will signal an important change in the way that global labour rights are 
governed in the maritime industry…” (Lillie, 2008: 194).  Like others, Lillie is 
referring to the PSC regime for members States to enforce standards on each 
other as the “teeth” in the MLC compliance and enforcement mechanism and a 
sign that the MLC will be an effective instrument (Lillie, 2008).  He is also of the 
opinion that “PSC will operate as an incentive encouraging shipowners and flag 
States to adequately regulate their own shipping” (Lillie, 2008: 193), and therefore 
maintain the continued relevance of States in global governance.  Yet, similar to 
the legal commentaries, his analysis remains at the international level without 
consideration of the complexities in global governance and its dependence on 
factors ranging from the will and the capacity of States to the experience and 
individual approaches of inspectors (Bloor et. al., 2005).  In theory, the ILO has 
indeed changed how it previously approached the governance of maritime labour 
standards, but the literature provides little assessment of the practicalities of the 
infrastructure on which the MLC governance regime relies, and it scarcely 
addresses the shipboard work environment. 
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3.7. Conclusion 
The chapter examined the literature on the status of seafarers’ health and safety 
and conditions giving rise to poor health and safety outcomes on ships.  The main 
argument is that these poor OHS outcomes are preventable by having effective 
measures to manage the risks of the shipboard work environment, including 
representation.  The literature showed that the main health and safety 
management instrument, the ISM Code, has failed to achieve the envisaged 
outcome and some of this failure is attributed to lack of seafarers’ participation.  
The ISM Code system presumes the participation of seafarers rather than having 
actual provisions.  While safety committees with seafarers’ representatives have 
been instituted as part of fulfilling its requirements for risk assessment, seafarers 
are not provided with an autonomous “say” in health and safety.  Further, OHSM 
provisions and practices under the ISM are inconsistent with the evidence in the 
land-based literature for effective participation.       
Examining the existing literature on the introduction of the MLC, the 
emphasis has been mostly the legal aspects and what should happen in theory.  
These perspectives have not addressed the supports necessary for the legal 
provisions to be effectively implemented and practiced.  The review of this 
literature revealed an absence of discussion on unions and management 
commitment, although much has been made about the regulatory steer.  
However, as the land-based literature shows (Chapter 2) a strong regulatory steer 
is also influenced by the regulatory lead.  These prevailing conditions have given 
rise to the question as to whether the MLC is a firm response to poor working 
conditions on ships, with respect to representation.  The remainder of the thesis 
explores the provisions for representation in the MLC by examining their 
development, administration, implementation and practice.    
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4 
Methodology 
 
 …when I enter the world of those I have chosen to study it is my gaze in dialogue with theirs 
that begins to shape the project in conjunction with the literature that I read for inspiration 
and guidance (Schostak, 2002: 24). 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This research examines the viability of regulatory provisions for seafarers’ 
representation in health and safety management on ships.  It poses the research 
question: Are the MLC provisions for seafarers’ representative participation in OHS 
a firm response to poor working conditions on ships?  Seafarers’ representation 
was singled out from among the MLC’s provisions as it has the capacity to 
contribute to improved working conditions by involving those at risk.  Other 
studies conclude that seafarers’ participation is important to safeguard their 
health and safety but is missing from work relations practices on board (Xue et. 
al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2012a; 2012b; Bailey, 2006).  Chapter 3 reveals that the 
ISM Code, as the established OHSM regime for shipping, does not make provisions 
for any form of autonomous participation.  Although seafarers’ participation is 
presumed under the ISM self-regulatory regime, a unitarist approach is taken 
which has not effectively delivered OHS protection for seafarers.  To my 
knowledge, this is the first empirical study on the MLC and more so with specific 
focus on representation.   
Representation is advocated in this thesis as it provides for workers’ 
autonomous input into OHSM in recognition of the organizational features of work 
that make workers vulnerable to illnesses and injuries (Nichols, 1997).  Empirical 
evidence shows that representation has direct and indirect benefits to workers’ 
health and safety outcomes (Chapter 2, Section 2.4.2.).  However, it needs to be 
supported by certain preconditions which Chapter 3 (Sections 3.4. and 3.5.) 
revealed are poorly constituted for shipping.  In that context, this research 
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problematizes the claim made by the ILO that the MLC is a “firm response” to 
seafarers’ poor working conditions.  This research aims to examine this problem 
in respect of representation in the MLC, to ascertain in what ways the architects 
have considered developing a “firm response.”    
This chapter describes the methodology used in addressing the research 
question.  It first outlines the study design and justification for selecting the 
particular approach.  Next the chapter explains the structure of the study based 
on the objectives and goes on to describe the data source and collection 
strategies.  Accessing participants and some challenges involved in that process 
are subsequently discussed.  A description of the field work is followed by an 
outline of the data analysis and then some reflections on ethics in the research.    
 
4.2. Selecting an Appropriate Approach    
This section describes the research design and the decisions taken in selecting the 
particular approach.  The research is a case study of the MLC with specific focus 
on the standard for seafarers’ representation in health and safety management.  
Adopting an appropriate methodology is important in ensuring the validity of the 
research outcomes (McCaslin and Scott, 2003).  A qualitative design is most suited 
to accessing the ‘backstage’ dynamics which influenced the development of the 
MLC and the inclusion of these specific provisions for representation.   
The appropriateness of a qualitative design is supported by previous 
studies examining regulations in shipping and how they impact seafarers OHS 
(Sampson, 2013; Bhattacharya, 2012a; Dacanay and Walters, 2011; Abou-
Elkawam, 2011).  For example, Bhattacharya (2012a) discovered that previous 
quantitative research inadequately accounted for failures of the ISM Code to 
achieve the envisaged purpose of positive OHSM practices on ships.  In adopting 
a qualitative design, he found that social and organizational factors in the 
shipboard work environment thwarted the effective functioning of the ISM Code.  
A qualitative design thus allowed access to perceptions and attitudes and 
unearthed underlying dynamics that better explained the failures of the ISM.       
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Ethnographic designs in particular are widely used in researching seafarers’ 
issues.  Akamangwa (2017), Xue et. al. (2017) and Bhattacharya (2012a), for 
example, incorporated case studies of shipping companies within an ethnographic 
design.  Sampson (2004), in studying the effects of regulations in raising maritime 
education and training standards, carried out ethnographic research in training 
institutions in the UK, Singapore and the Philippines.  In the tradition of using 
ethnographic designs to explore and examine the various concerns within the 
seafaring workforce, I also considered an ethnographic approach.   
Ethnographies are suited to investigating cultural interactions (Creswell 
2013: 90-96).  While representation or the lack of it, and how it is practiced, would 
be part of the workplace culture and would be suited to ethnographic research, 
this was not the main focus of this research.  The focus of this research is primarily 
the thinking behind the regulatory provisions and the supporting mechanisms for 
their effectiveness which would have been established prior to implementation.  
The data source for this is the documentary records of how the provisions were 
developed, interviews with those who negotiated the convention and interviews 
with those operationalizing the requirements.  However, seafarers as the main 
beneficiaries, were included to strengthen the empirical evidence and gain a fuller 
understanding of the provisions by examining how they are deployed in the work 
environment.  Owing to the time and resources required to do an ethnography on 
board a ship, it was decided that the necessary insights could be gained from semi-
structured interviews with seafarers while they were ashore.  This method has 
been used by other researchers in this field of research (eg. Acejo et.al. 2011; 
Dacanay and Walters, 2011).    
 
4.2.1. The Case Study   
The case for study is the MLC focussing on the provisions for seafarers’ 
representation in OHSM on ships as the unit of analysis.  Case studies are 
traditionally used in research on individuals or a small group, but they can also be 
used for researching an event(s) or entities such as decisions, programmes, or 
organizational change (Yin, 2014: 31).  Case studies allow in-depth exploration of 
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a bounded system or systems in detail with the intent of understanding a specific 
concern or issue (Creswell, 2013: 98; Stake, 1995:49-68).  In this instance, the case 
study allows an interrogation of the suitability of the approach taken to give 
seafarers autonomous representation.  The study uses semi-structured interviews, 
various types of documents and field notes as the main data sources suited to case 
studies (Creswell 2013; Stake 2005; 1995).  Multiple sources of data are used to 
establish validity (Creswell, 2013).  Case studies are used in other disciplines such 
as education, health and political sciences to evaluate programmes, policies or 
processes and develop interventions (Yin, 2014: 4; Baxter and Jack, 2008).   
While the MLC forms part of an international regime to address health and 
safety on ships, it is its own ‘bounded’ system.  As the only public (versus private) 
international maritime labour regulatory instrument for shipping, the MLC 
contains a set of ideas and practices which makes it different from the other 
international maritime regulatory instruments.  It is the main labour instrument of 
shipping and the chief one from the ILO by virtue of its ratification record.  In 
general terms it brings labour and social issues more to the fore alongside 
technical and operational issues.   
Discussions of the importance of case studies involve whether the case(s) 
selected is of intrinsic or instrumental value (Creswell, 2013; Stake, 1995).  
Although in later discussions, Stake noted that the boundaries between these are 
flexible and one case can be chosen both for intrinsic and instrumental value 
(Stake, 2005).  In this research these have come together.  Intrinsically, this case is 
valuable as a labour standard for the shipping industry previously dominated by 
technical maritime standards.  It is therefore useful to the industry to ascertain 
how a labour standard integrates with embedded technical standards and the 
benefits to be derived.  Instrumentally, this case may inform the wider context for 
regulating OHSM on ships and offer insights into the ILO’s attempts at global 
governance.  The case also adds another dimension to the existing literature on 
representation by including the seafaring workforce in the discussions on worker 
representation in OHSM which is dominated by land-based studies.     
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4.2.1.1. The UK Case 
The UK was chosen as a case at the national level for its instrumental value, to gain 
a better understanding of the MLC provisions by examining their function in a real-
life context.  The UK is what is considered a closed or a traditional maritime 
register30 with well-developed maritime regulatory systems.  As a case, the UK’s 
experience provides a supportive role in this examination and facilitates a more 
in-depth look at the standard (Stake, 2005: 445).  The initial plan was to select at 
least one open and one closed register, as a multiple case approach to compare 
how the different systems operationalize the provisions.   
Multiple cases are recommended as their findings are deemed to be more 
compelling than single cases (Yin, 2014: 63-64).  The discourse around ship 
registers is that open registers are generally of a lesser quality than closed registers 
(DeSombre 2006; Alderton and Winchester, 2002a; 2002b; Li, 1999).  Choosing a 
case from each group would have provided an opportunity to examine how these 
contrasting regimes go about giving effect to representation and what could be 
learned from those findings.  Although one open register agreed, and one 
interview was conducted,31 time and resource constraints would not have allowed 
timely completion of the data collection.   
The UK was therefore chosen as a critical case.  Such cases are considered 
the standard bearers against which others are compared (Yin, 2014: 51; Stake, 
2005).  The UK can be considered a standard bearer in the maritime industry.  It 
adheres to international shipping regulations it has ratified and is a leading player 
in setting and enforcing international maritime conventions, both globally and 
locally.  Its Merchant Shipping Act forms the legal basis for most commonwealth 
countries and its practices are among those used as best practices for the industry.  
As such, the UK provided a setting in which there was the likelihood for the 
                                                             
30Closed registers only accept shipowners who are citizens in their country.  These registers have 
rules regarding crewing of ships with their own national and usually have more stringent 
regulations and tax schemes. Open registers are the opposite and gained popularity as a way for 
shipowners to avoid regulations and lower costs.  
31 This interview was conducted in London on the participants’ visit to an IMO meeting.   
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provisions on representation to be implemented and is expected to demonstrate 
how viable those provisions are for improving working conditions on ships.    
  
4.3. Structuring the Inquiry: The Three Levels   
The research adopts a multi-layered approach reflective of the three levels at 
which an international convention operates.  First, there is its development and 
adoption.  Next the requirements are given effect at the national level, where 
laws, regulations and polices along with monitoring and enforcement regimes to 
support the conventions are developed, which is described as “horizontal 
governance” (Thomas, 2018).  These are then implemented at the workplace level, 
in this case, on board ships.  This research is therefore organized according to the 
three main objectives, as follows:   
1) The developmental level.  To examine the origins of and rationale 
for seafarers’ representation in the MLC and supports for its effective 
implementation.  The purpose of this objective is to ascertain the 
influences on determining the inclusion of the provisions, the thinking 
behind their inclusion and support mechanisms.  This part of the research 
seeks to ascertain the background issues and what consideration was given 
to the context for effective representation, bearing in mind the theory for 
effective representation, and also previous research outcomes that the 
nature of the shipboard work environment is not conducive to 
participation.     
2) The administrative level.  To examine how a country goes about 
operationalizing these provisions.  International treaties are given effect at 
the national level.  Resource availability, political commitment and the 
country’s industrial relations system, are important influences on 
implementing regulations for representation (EU-OSHA, 2018).  Based on 
the evidence for the necessity of meeting the preconditions, this section of 
the research examines how a particular country goes about implementing 
these provisions given what is envisaged and provided for at the 
developmental level.    
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3) The workplace level.  To examine seafarers’ experiences and 
perceptions of representation.  The purpose of this objective is to ascertain 
the on board practices of representation, given what is envisaged at the 
other two levels, and to determine whether the theory aligns with the 
practice.    
The participants are described below in Section 4.5.  The study is structured 
in this manner as it allows insight into the different dimensions of this 
international standard and how the parts relate to and influence each other 
towards the stated ILO intention to secure decent work for seafarers.    
  
4.4. Data Collection  
This section describes the data collection, the different strategies and the 
justification for their selection.  The main sources of data were semi-structured 
interviews and documents.  However, for a better understanding of the workings 
of the industry relative to the study objectives, selected conferences and 
meetings32 were attended, informal conversations were also held with persons at 
all three levels of the study.     
 
4.4.1. Documentary Research 
Documents are an important source of data in this research.  Other researchers 
have discussed the importance of documents to the social researcher (eg. Prior, 
2003; Scott, 1990).  Traditional approaches to documents in research see them as 
mute evidence, as Hodder (2012) describes the written text.  However, others such 
as Scott (1990) and Prior (2003; 2008) consider documents to be active agents and 
that they play a role in social interaction, as part of the human network of actors.  
                                                             
32 1) Britain and the Sea 3. ‘Enriching Britain’s Maritime Capability.’ Plymouth Graduate School of 
Management, 11-12 September, 2014; 2) London International Shipping Week. ‘Maritime Welfare: 
The Big Debate.’ The Willis Building, London, 8 September, 2015. 3) International Festival for 
Business 2016. ‘UK National Maritime, Invest in Blue.’ Exhibition Centre, Liverpool, UK, 15-16 June, 
2016; 4) Seafarers International Research Centre 21st Anniversary Symposium. Cardiff University, 
Cardiff, 29-30 June, 2016. 5) NAUTILUS International Symposium. ‘Jobs, Skills and the Future.’ 
Radisson Blu Hotel, Cardiff, 4 October, 2016. 
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This description of documents is in keeping with my experience with the MLC and 
the other documents used in this research.        
Documents are described as the consequences of social activities and are 
not created for research purposes (Payne and Payne, 2004: 61).  The key issues 
examined in this research were derived from negotiations in the meetings to 
develop the MLC which were recorded and produced as meeting documents.  Also, 
policy and regulatory documents are a result of the socio-political context within 
which they were created and are directed at social action.  Prior (2003; 2008) 
invites us to expand our research relationships with documents beyond the 
accustomed encounters as mute evidence.  Documents play an active role in the 
decisions taken in my research, from conceptualizing the study through to the 
analysis.  As I read, re-read and follow document trails, they became a guide to the 
deliberations and how decisions were taken (Stake, 1995: 68).  As a partially 
retrospective study, the documents also helped in reconstructing events of the 
MLC negotiations as they unfolded over the 5 years.  
As the main document, the MLC was the source of the research problem 
and therefore the portal through which I entered the study.  It was also used 
extensively during the interviews both by myself and some interviewees.  I 
particularly used my copy of the MLC as a buffer and evidence as to what the 
provisions in question required in order to legitimize the questions I was asking.  It 
was a case of “the MLC says…” rather than me the researcher.  In this way I 
positioned myself as one who was seeking to understand the directives given in 
the MLC which the ILO and the shipping industry framed as being very important, 
rather than an intrusive researcher.  Owing to the limitations of memory (asking 
persons to recall events that took place over 14-15 years prior) and subjectivity on 
the part of interviewees, the documents were important in aiding recall and 
served to corroborate interview responses.  Table 4.1 shows the main categories 
of documents as they were used in the research.  Appendix II presents a detailed 
list of the documents used in the research.  
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Table 4.1: Categorization of Documents used in this Research 
Archival Active PR documents  
- ILO Meeting Records 
- ILO Reports 
- Discussion Papers 
submitted by 
representative groups to 
the MLC negotiations 
 
- MLC 
- MLC MOSH Guidelines 
- ILO Applicable Codes 
- Relevant ILO Conventions 
- ILO Flag State 
Implementation Guidelines 
- ISM Code 
- MCA Code of Practice 
- Relevant UK Government 
Laws and Policies 
- ITF Guidelines 
- Brochures 
- Pamphlets 
- Annual Reports 
- Official Websites of 
Representative groups 
(seafarers’ and 
shipowners/ship-managers) 
Source: Author 
 
Scott (1990: 96-111) proposes four criteria for assessing documents to be 
used in research: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning.  These 
criteria were taken into consideration in assessing the documents for this 
research.  The documents were authentic and credible in being official public 
documents of the ILO and the organizations which the interviewees represented.  
Official websites were perused as recommended by interviewees, which were 
used to corroborate documents and gain additional information and insights into 
organizations.  As such, the documents used were deemed to be representative of 
the kinds of documents produced by these organizations.  As public documents 
giving instructions and stating official positions, their meanings were taken as 
unambiguous and reflecting the organizations’ intentions.  That said however, it is 
understood that the main documents do not necessarily reflect all the concerns 
and issues that might have influenced the MLC deliberations and final outcome 
(see eg. Trebilcock, 2009; 2008).33  Many issues appeared to have been discussed 
informally or in smaller workgroups and a summary of outcomes documented 
rather than the discussions in full.   
While some details of deliberations may have been lost, the documents 
also proved valuable in providing some insights into the operations of the global 
                                                             
33 These are two in-depth interviews conducted with the spokesperson of the seafarers’ group and 
the shipowners’ group in the MLC negotiations, as part of the ILO Century Project. They were not 
available to participate in the study, but these interviews provide rich data on the behind the scene 
dynamics. 
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governance machinery of the ILO and how standards are made (at least for the 
maritime industry).  The documents importantly outlined the various interests and 
offered a window into the concerns of the architects.  They showed how proposals 
were made and defended, what concessions were made, and how conflicts were 
resolved.  The documents allowed for a better understanding of the inner 
workings of the ILO standard setting apparatus and how this relates to the final 
product which might not reflect the initial concerns brought to the discussions.    
In the main, 48 key documents were instrumental to the research 
(Appendix II).  These comprised all committees and subcommittees meetings from 
2001, when the MLC negotiations began, up to 2006 when the convention was 
adopted.  These and other documents, were read and key themes and issues of 
relevance to representation, and the wider issue of how this process affected 
standards developed were noted.  Documents presented for consideration to the 
meetings by interest groups, and draft MLC texts produced at each stage were 
read.  Provisional and final resolutions coming out of the adoption conference 
were also read.  Active documents were read noting instructions given as to the 
mode of participation and how the system should be arranged, for example UK 
Marine and Coastguard Agency (MCA) Code of Safe Working Practices (COSWP), 
and regulations to which this document refers.  Some of these documents also 
made references to other documents and therefore document trails were 
followed to get a full understanding of the issues of interest.   
 
4.4.2. Semi-structured Interviews 
Interviews are common and acceptable methods of data collection (Rubin and 
Rubin, 2012; Fontana and Frey, 2005).  They can be structured, unstructured or 
semi-structured.  Semi-structured interviews were chosen for their flexibility in 
keeping with the nature of the research as an exploration of a newly developed 
convention, but also allowing for some structure and formality, particularly in 
dealing with the corporate-type participants (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).  This study 
is retrospective in parts, as the main events took place between 2000 and 2007 
requiring participants’ recall.  The flexibility of the semi-structured interview 
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allowed participants the space to expand on narratives and facilitated the natural 
emergence of information.  Semi-structured interviews encouraged more in-depth 
descriptions and facilitated probing to gain a deeper understanding of the topic 
under study (Rubin and Rubin, 2012).   
The interview questions were guided by the research question and 
organized according to the main objectives at each level.  Three basic interview 
guides were developed for each of the levels although modifications were made 
where necessary depending on the interviewee’s area of expertise.  Although 
these were organized according to sections, the interview flow directed the 
questioning rather than adhering to any pre-set order.  The guides are found in 
Appendices III-V.  The interview scheduled went along with a consent form, that 
respondents were asked to sign if they wished (Appendix VI).      
 
4.5. Participants: Access and Challenges  
Participants at the first two levels were selected by purposeful sampling (Creswell, 
2013: 154-157).  The interviewees included key informants who were recruited for 
their specialist knowledge to respond according to the objectives at levels one and 
two.  These have been characterised as elite informants (Section 4.5.1.).  These 
persons were involved in the development of the MLC, referred to as the 
‘architects’ of the convention.  At the UK level, those responsible for 
operationalizing the provisions through policy development and enforcement 
were interviewed.  Seafarers were selected through convenience sampling and 
included those employed on UK-flagged ships.  Table 4.2 describes the 15 
interviewees, all of whom have had considerable involvement with the MLC with 
the majority being involved from the beginning of the negotiations until present 
time.  Two persons from the seafarers’ group, one from the shipowners’ group 
and the ILO participant were involved in discussions prior to the decision to 
develop the MLC.  Only 3 of the 15 were women, and 9 participants were former 
seafarers.  The participants also possessed considerable knowledge and 
experience of the maritime industry spanning 15 to over 40 years.  Seafarers are 
described in Section 4.5.2.
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Table 4.2: Description of Interviewees at the Developmental and Administrative Levels 
Category  Number of Informants 
(n=15) 
Description 
INTERNATIONAL  
development of the 
MLC 
 
1 ILO   Involved before, during and after the adoption of the MLC. Was retired at the time of the interview. Former seafarer. 
4 Seafarers’ Group   
 
1 - National Union – involved before, during and after the adoption of the MLC to present. Former seafarer. 
 
3 – International Union   
- 1 - involved before, during and after adoption of the MLC to present; involved in the MOSH guidelines  
- 1 - involved during and after the adoption of the MLC to present (during the MLC deliberations he represented his country); 
involved in the MOSH Guidelines. Former seafarer. 
- Became involved after adoption of the MLC to present; involved in the MOSH guidelines. Former seafarer. 
3 Shipowners’ Group  
 
1 National Shipowners’ group  
- 1 - involved before during and after the adoption of the MLC to present; involved in the MOSH guidelines. Sits on committees 
with the International Shipowners’ group and national maritime committees. 
International Shipowners’ Group 
- 1 - involved before during and after the adoption the MLC to present; involved in the MOSH and other MLC guidelines. 
- 1 - involved before, during and after the adoption of the MLC to present. Was retired from the group at time of interview but 
went into private consultancy and continues, to present, to be heavily involved in maritime industry policy issues and 
seafarers’ labour issues at the international level, including with MLC issues.  Former seafarer. 
 
1 Government National and international levels – involved after the MLC to present.  Was involved in developing some of the accompanying 
inspections guidelines for the MLC; involved in the MOSH guidelines; national policy, compliance and enforcement level. Former 
seafarer. 
NATIONAL  
Operationalization/ 
Policy 
4 Administration Administrative policy, compliance and enforcement 
- 1 - involved during and after the MLC to bring the country’s policies in line with MLC; sits on national maritime committees. 
- 1 - involved after the MLC at the national level to bring the country’s policies in line with the MLC 
- 2-  involved at operationalization level. Before and after MLC to bring national system in line with MLC. Former seafarers. 
1 shipowners’/ship 
managers’ group 
 
 1 – Shipowners’ international organization/ship management group.  Advisory role on the MLC but did not attend MLC negotiation 
meetings. Former seafarer.  
1 National Union   1 - National officers’ union, senior official. The union had an input in the MLC, but interviewee not personally involved. 
  
Source: Author 
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4.5.1. Elite Informants 
The persons of interest were at the highest decision-making level as they 
negotiated the text of the MLC and, for the UK, were responsible for the maritime 
policy.  Their status as heads of, or, holding other high-prestige positions in 
organizations and on national and international committees, meant that they fit 
the criteria as elite participants (Mikecz, 2012; Harvey 2010; 2011; Tansey, 2007).  
Welch et. al. (2002: 613) provides a definition of elites suitable to this research as 
it reflects the types of individuals whom I attempted to gain access to, and the 
challenges encountered.  They define the elite participant as: 
…an informant (usually male) who occupies a senior or middle 
management position; has functional responsibility in an area which enjoys 
high status in accordance with corporate values; has considerable industry 
experience and frequently also long tenure with the company; possess a 
broad network of personal relationships and has considerable 
international exposure. 
A key challenge of using elite participants is that they are difficult to recruit 
even though they may be public figures or very much in the public domain 
(Goldstein, 2002).  This was the experience with the current research.  Although 
they were purposefully selected using the list of attendees for each meeting found 
in the respective ILO documents, snowballing was the main recruitment strategy.  
Snowballing is an acceptable qualitative method for recruiting difficult to reach 
and elite participants (Mikecz, 2012; Goldstein, 2002).  Where contact was made, 
and the participants agreed to participate in the research, the next hurdle was to 
settle on a suitable date, time and meeting place, as these were very busy persons.   
Elite participants provide specialist knowledge, corroborate information 
from other sources, reconstruct an event and give insights not available to the 
general public (Tansey, 2007).  As this research was seeking to ascertain among 
other things, the thinking behind the provisions, these participants were valuable 
in giving details that were not recorded, provided explanations as to what was 
recorded and were used to triangulate the documentary sources and each other’s 
accounts of events.  The participants also played a major role in giving insights 
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about the shipping industry generally and making introductions with other key 
informants (Goldstein, 2002).    
Their assistance also presented challenges as some were dominant and 
opinionated as to some of the details of the research (Welch, et. al. 2002).  Mikecz 
(2012) argued that elite respondents are accustomed to being in charge and being 
asked about their opinions and may dominate an interview.  Additionally, the 
location of the interviews made a difference.  The majority took place at 
participants’ workplace.  However, those that were in their offices proved to be 
somewhat more challenging as there was the tendency for the participant to 
interrupt the flow of the interview to access information on the internet and in 
their folders which they believed I should read.  While this was helpful in some 
instances, in others, these were ILO documents that I had already read in 
preparation for the interviews.  Ostrander (1995) advised that interviews take 
place in neutral locations to give the researcher more control over the 
environment.  However, consistent with the participants’ availability, this was the 
best option.    
Attempts were made to address this challenge by careful listening and 
identifying cue points to return the discussion to the subject matter and resume 
control of the interview.  Questions were repeated and reworded at various points 
to keep the respondent on task and to ensure the questions pertinent to the 
research were addressed.  I recognized the offer of assistance which was 
welcomed, and the idea was to end the interviews on a positive note with an open 
door, should the need for post-interview assistance and clarification of interview 
points arise (Mikecz, 2012).     
An additional hurdle was that not all persons targeted on the list were 
available, while others did not consent to participate.  Refusal is not an unusual 
research experience and it takes different strategies to gain participants’ “buy in” 
to do an interview.  Interviewing elites involved luck as much as it did preparation 
(Goldstein, 2002).  The first respondent I met by chance, at a conference I attended 
as a terrain mapping strategy, had been instrumental in the decision to develop 
the MLC and fortunately participated in the research.  In contrast, another very 
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important person whom I also met by chance at an industry gathering, and who 
was initially positive, did not follow through with being interviewed.  Likewise, 
there was a similar experience with a ship manager at the national level.  
Additionally, some of those identified had retired and/or changed jobs or moved 
to other countries, which made them more difficult to locate.  Although a few were 
located, they did not participate.  Another who would have proved very valuable 
based on the meeting documents, had sadly passed away.  At the national level, 
shipowners proved challenging.  In the end only one person who spanned both 
the national and international level was interviewed from the shipowners’ 
perspective.  Figure 4.1 provides an interesting example of two refusals made 
through a personal contact, citing the use of previous research at the Seafarers’ 
International Research Centre (SIRC), as the reason. 
 
Figure 4.1: Response to Interview Requests by Shipowners 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s contact. 
 
Union officials were also difficult to recruit.  While they were willing, they 
were very busy and therefore it took considerable time from initial contact to do 
the interview.  Others did not materialize and an interview that was conducted by 
telephone while the participant was in transit, was later discarded due to its poor 
quality.  These challenges impacted the research process, consumed resources 
and led to extended time for data collection.  However, the final interviewees 
provided valuable data and along with the documents, there is confidence that 
the data gathered is valid and reflects the events of interest to this study.    
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4.5.2. Seafarers 
Seafarers are defined in the MLC (2006: p.3) as “any person who is employed or 
engaged or works in any capacity on board a ship to which… [the MLC] applies.”  
These are the technical crew on board (including cadets) who are responsible for 
navigation, cargo handling and maintenance of the ship, having received 
specialized maritime education and training, as well as others employed to cater, 
serve and entertain on passenger and cruise ships.  This is an expanded definition 
to include hospitality staff and others who might be employed on a ship.  However, 
States are allowed to define seafarers according to their national situations, but 
this is to be done in consultation with the social partners.  This study is concerned 
with the technical crew on board.   
Seafarers are also a difficult group to research for different reasons.  They 
are usually more accessible when at sea and so many researchers tend to use 
ethnographic designs and non-participant observations on ships (eg. Akamangwa, 
2017; Sampson, 2013; Bhattacharya 2009).  Others have conducted land-based 
studies by recruiting participants at ports, through groups and organizations 
where they gather for business or pleasure (eg. Acejo et. al., 2011; Decanay and 
Walters, 2011; Jensen et. al. 2005).  This study recruited seafarers through a 
welfare centre in the UK port of Liverpool.    
Seafarers on UK registered ships proved more difficult to access.  
Additional strategies were used to recruit such participants.  Contact was made 
with UK seafarers’ organizations, union officials and personal contacts.  Social and 
print media were also used, for example, posting requests on recommended 
seafarers’ group pages and advertising in a seafarers’ newsletter.  These strategies 
had mixed results with some responses not fitting the criteria and others while 
fitting, were not on UK registered ships.  Consequently, 5 seafarers recruited were 
working on British flagged ships. 
No involved selection criteria were used for ship type as the MLC applies 
to all ships except those in domestic shipping or inland waterways, fishing vessels, 
traditionally built ships and naval vessels (MLC, 2006: 3).  A State may nevertheless 
choose whether to apply the MLC to its domestic shipping or other ship types.  
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Regardless of the ship type or cargo, in general terms, the requirements of the 
provisions under study are not affected.  Therefore, using an international port 
gives access to relevant ship types.  The following sets out the basic seafarer 
selection process:    
• Seafarers with enough sea experience to respond competently to the 
questions.  This may include cadets providing they had some experience at 
sea. 
• Seafarers having good enough command of English language as judged by 
informal conversations to assess ease of communication and 
understanding.  I only speak English and the seafaring workforce is 
multilingual. 
• Seafarers from a general pool visiting the welfare centre, or those recruited 
otherwise and seafarers specifically working on UK registered ships. 
 
The seafarers interviewed were typical of what would be expected coming 
to an international port such as Liverpool.  They worked on a variety of ships types 
in the bulk, oil and container ship sectors.  There were also a few on combined 
passenger and cargo ferries (roll-on-roll-off, or, ro-ro passenger ferry).  Their job 
positions span those typically found on ships from ratings to senior officers and 
captains, across the main departments on those ships, the galley, the engine room 
and the deck.  Reflecting the gender imbalance at sea, the majority were men.  Of 
the 26 seafarers interviewed only two were women, one junior and one senior 
officer.  There were also a variety of nationalities mainly from the Far East and 
Western and Eastern Europe.  Seafarers were from the Philippines, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, India, Madagascar, Hungary, the Netherlands, England, Wales, Greece, 
Ukraine and Panama.  The ships they worked on were multinational, with an even 
wider variety of nationalities.  Table 4.3 describes the seafarers interviewed. 
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Table 4.3 Description of Seafarers Interviewed 
Pseudonym & 
Time as a Sea 
Position/Rank Nationality Ship Type & Flag 
1. Frank, 17 yrs. Fitter Ukrainian Bulk carrier - Cyprus 
2. Eva, 5 yrs. 4th Engineer Filipino Tanker - Bahamas 
3. Archie, 10 yrs. 2nd Engineer (Acting) Dutch Ro-ro ferry - Dutch 
4. Earl, 13 yrs. 3rd Engineer Welsh Ro-ro ferry – Dutch 
5. Winston, 2 yrs. Wiper Filipino Tanker - Bahamas 
6. Oliver, 6 yrs. Ordinary Seafarer Filipino Bulk carrier - Dutch 
7. Alfred, 7 yrs. Able-bodied 
Seafarer 
Filipino Bulk carrier - Cyprus 
8. Courtney, 11 
yrs. 
Chief Officer Panamanian Container ship - Bolivia 
9. Peter, 38 yrs. Captain Filipino Container ship – Bolivia 
10. Carl, 7 yrs. Chief Officer British Platform Supply Vessel - 
Singapore 
11. Nigel, 14 yrs. Captain Indian Bulk carrier - Malta 
12. Christine, 20 
yrs. 
Chief Officer British Anchor Handling - Denmark 
13. Joseph, 27 yrs. Captain British Container - Denmark 
14. Eddie, 14 yrs. 2nd Engineer Indian Tanker – Bahamas  
15. Mark, 10 yrs. Junior Officer Filipino Bulk carrier – Japan 
16. Stanley, 15 yrs. Steward Indonesian Container ship – missing 
17. Enroy, 2 yrs. 3rd Engineer Vietnamese Bulk carrier - Dutch 
18. Russel, 10 yrs. 3rd Engineer Filipino Bulk carrier - Japan 
19. Chris, 21 yrs. Steward Malagasy Container – missing 
20. Marlon, 33 yrs. Motorman Filipino Bulk carrier - Singapore 
21. Donny, 1.4 yrs. Deck Cadet Hellenic Bulk carrier - Singapore 
22. Oscar, 5 yrs. Ordinary Seafarer Filipino Container ro-ro - UK 
23. Ashton, 26 yrs. Able-bodied 
Seafarer 
Filipino Container ro-ro – UK 
24. Sam, 12 yrs. 2nd Officer British Ro-ro Ferry – Belfast, UK 
25. Ezie, 30 yrs. Electro-Technical 
Officer 
Hungarian Container – Gibraltar, [UK] 
26. Oniel, 4 yrs. 2nd Officer British Fisheries Protection, UK 
 
 
4.6. Fieldwork    
Fieldwork was scheduled for June 2015 to August 2016 which was thought to be 
adequate time to conduct interviews at each level and use those findings to inform 
interviews at the next level.  However, it became apparent that this was not 
feasible owing to delays in establishing contacts and arranging interviews.  The 
initial plan for a cascading approach to collection was abandoned and data 
collection was mostly simultaneous.  Data collection continued into 2017.  An 
arrangement made to attend a seafarers’ representative training on the MLC, 
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which would have given me access to union representatives and British seafarers 
and provided a unique opportunity to see how representatives are trained to carry 
out their roles on board, was cancelled a few days before the event was due to 
take place. 
Fieldwork was undertaken in two main locations, London and Liverpool, in 
addition to Skype and telephone interviews.  London is one of the major global 
shipping capitals and is home to the corporate headquarters of shipping 
organizations (UK Gov 2015).  The persons of interest had their offices located 
mainly in London.  Face-to-face interviews were conducted in their offices.  
Participants located in other areas of the UK or outside the UK, were interviewed 
by Skype or telephone, as they preferred.  One of the UK’s Marine and Coast Guard 
(MCA) offices was visited, where face to face interviews were conducted.  Sections 
4.4 and 4.5 already describe the data collection methods and participants.  The 
interviews at the developmental and administrative levels lasted on average 60 
minutes.  The interviewees were helpful, and each interview ended with the offer 
of further assistance including follow-up questions, which became necessary in a 
few instances to clarify issues or to provide further information. 
  Liverpool was the main site of the seafarers’ interviews.  This site was 
chosen as one of the UK’s busiest with a variety of ship types calling at this port.  
Seafarers’ centres at Bristol and Cardiff ports were also explored but proved 
unsuitable.  Bristol was a “dry centre” (it did not serve alcohol), seafarers did not 
visit the centre regularly, and those who did, immediately left.  The Cardiff centre 
was undergoing administrative review at the time and eventually closed before 
field work began.  Although Liverpool was some distance away, which necessitated 
the use of additional resources, it was accessible and adequate for conducting the 
interviews with seafarers.  The centre was visited three times.  The first visit was 
for familiarization and to test the seafarers’ interview guide.  This took place while 
visiting Liverpool to interview inspectors, December 9-11, 2015.  Data gathering 
was conducted in two main phases, January 27-February 1 and March 1-8, 2016.  
Skype interviews were conducted with seafarers recruited through other means.        
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The first visit to the seafarers’ centre was for familiarization to become 
accustomed with the location and the workers at the centre.  I also approached 
seafarers and had informal chats where I was able to identify language as a 
potential problem which I had not initially considered.  Three interviews were 
conducted to test the interview guide.  It was discovered that seafarers might not 
be familiar with the word “representative” as I had taken for granted.  Also, 
“health and safety” is not commonly used as I had thought, and seafarers were 
more familiar with “safety.”  Notes were made to probe these in interviews to 
ensure seafarers were clear on what I was asking.  Interviews lasted approximately 
30 to 60 minutes.  Eight interviews were conducted in the first phase and twelve 
in the second phase.  Of the remaining interviews, four were conducted by skype, 
one by email and one face-to-face in Cardiff.    
 
4.7. Data Processing and Analysis   
Data processing and analysis were ongoing.  It was useful to embrace the iterative 
approach that data analysis is “a reflexive activity that should inform data 
collection, writing, further data collection, and so forth” (Coffey and Atkinson, 
1996: 6).  As such, data processing began with the meeting documents as they 
informed the interview schedules for the architects of the convention.  Interviews 
were personally transcribed to begin familiarizing myself with the data and noting 
initial codes.  Transcriptions were completed within a few days of each interview.  
This aided recall and, along with notes made during the interviews, key issues 
relating to the objectives of the research began to emerge.  Early transcription also 
indicated where the participants’ stories aligned with those of the documents and 
how these sources of data related to each other.   
Coding was done manually.  Codes were developed based on the research 
aim and objectives (Saldana, 2016; Braun and Clarke, 2006).  Appendix VII provides 
a list of codes and themes.  Initial codes relating to the objectives were noted on 
printed transcripts.  As more interviews were transcribed these were added to 
create a group of codes describing particular trends in responses in the data.  This 
analysis consisted of reading and re-reading the documents and transcripts, 
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writing down codes and grouping these into themes along with supporting quotes.  
Braun’s and Clarke’s thematic analysis approach (2006) was adapted in developing 
themes from the codes.   
 
4.8. Ethical Considerations   
Ethics are considered very important as they serve a number of functions, such as 
ensuring credibility of the research and legitimacy of the findings, as well as 
safeguarding participants and researchers (Payne and Payne, 2004).  A common 
approach is to assure participants of privacy and confidentiality, gaining their 
informed consent and giving them the option to withdraw from the research at 
any time or to withhold their responses if they see fit (Christians, 2005; Payne and 
Payne, 2004).  In Stake’s (2005: 459) words “Qualitative researchers are guests in 
the private spaces of the world.  Their manners should be good and their code of 
ethics strict.”   
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the Cardiff University, School 
of Social Sciences Ethics Committee (Appendix VIII).  While generally speaking this 
was not a particularly sensitive topic, seafarers are considered a vulnerable group 
because of their precarious employment situations.  This was taken into 
consideration although there were no obvious threats.  Ethical practices should 
always be considered as a core aspect of research even in such low risk studies 
(Payne and Payne, 2004).  The standard ethical considerations were applied in this 
research.  Confidentiality and anonymity in collecting, storing and using the data 
were applied.  Interviews were recorded on a personal device with a password.  
Participants were informed of the nature and purpose of the research and my 
obligations to ensure confidentiality and anonymity.  Some seafarers did not wish 
to be recorded and instead the responses were hand written.    
With the seafarers, care was taken in proving my identity as a PhD student 
by presenting my Cardiff University business card.  A number of studies indicated 
that seafarers work in a low-trust environment (eg. Sampson, 2013; Bhattacharya 
2012a, Xue et. al., 2017).  These are issues to be considered when conducting 
research with seafarers.  To build rapport and trust (Rubin and Rubin, 2012), the 
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interviews with seafarers began with informal conversations.  It was helpful that I 
am from Jamaica which I discovered made for a good icebreaker and general 
conversation to put the seafarer at ease.  Some were curious about my studies 
and asked questions.  It was also helpful to explain about what we do at the 
Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC) and that we could easily be found 
online.  I believe these various strategies assisted in building rapport and provided 
proof of my identity and helped in seafarers consenting to being interviewed. 
For the elite participants, the beginning was more direct.  Most of them 
took charge of the opening of the interview and began talking about the research 
before the ethical formalities.  Welch et. al. (2002) discuss the positionality of 
researcher in elite interviewing and the power dynamics, which were experienced 
to some extent in this research.  However, I had already made contact and my 
introductory emails had provided information about the research and my ethical 
obligations.  In such situations, I attempted to steer the interview back to the 
beginning and obtain signed informed consent.  Those interviewed on skype or 
telephone gave verbal consent.  Their permission was also sought for the interview 
to be recorded and there were no refusals at this level.   
Although this was not a particularly risky project, personal safety was 
discussed with my supervisors.  Before departing to any location, supervisors were 
informed as to where I was going and for how long.  The SIRC administrator was 
also informed in general that I would be away from Cardiff and which city I would 
be visiting.   
 
4.9. Conclusion 
This chapter presented a detailed description of the methodology of the research.  
The design and methods were carefully considered in relation to the research 
question and objectives.  The research was designed as a case study to explore the 
regulatory measure for seafarers’ representative participation in OHS on ships.  It 
is concerned with the thinking behind this standard, consideration for its purpose, 
and structures that are necessary for its effectiveness.  A qualitative approach was 
deemed most suitable to access these backstage issues dealing with negotiating 
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international standards and attempting to access past events via recall and the use 
of documents.     
Key informants were chosen for their involvement with the MLC.  These 
participants had many years of experience in maritime industry spanning 15 to 
over 40 years, and were involved at the highest levels, nationally and 
internationally.  They were all involved in the development of the MLC and the 
majority were still involved at the time of the interview and continue to be 
involved to the present.  Seafarers were chosen more generally to convey their 
experiences of representation on ships.  Although there were some challenges, 
they did not detract from the data quality and the findings that emerged towards 
answering the research question.  The next four chapters present the findings 
reflecting the development, administration, implementation and practice of 
representation on ships.    
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5 
Negotiating Maritime Labour Standards   
 
There are…pressing social and human rights issues associated with crew composition and size, 
wage levels, continuity of employment, health and safety, the quality of shipboard life and, 
and above all the quite fundamentally, an unfailing recognition of the seafarers’ need for 
dignity and respect.  None of these issues can be properly dealt with without appropriate 
regulation of the labour market at the global level. (JMC/29/2001/3: 30). 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the documentary analysis.  The documents 
were analysed for their accounts of the negotiations with the aim of tracing the 
development of the provisions for representation, such as, when they were 
included, who proposed them and what discussions surrounded their inclusion.  
Special attention was paid to the supports for effective implementation and 
practice.  The main documents used in the analysis are listed in Appendix II. 
The documents spanned the MLC negotiations from 2001 to 2006 (as 
explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1).  These include the meeting reports and 
relevant position papers presented at the meetings.  The MLC 2006 and relevant 
regulatory guidelines were also considered part of the data source and constitute 
what the thesis refers to as the MLC framework for representation.  Documents 
used as supplementary data in examining the UK’s case are incorporated in 
presenting those findings in Chapter 7.    
Documents have their limitations, as they are the products of the 
interpretations of those who developed them.  Also, not all discussions took place 
formally and therefore some information may not be on public record.  However, 
the meeting documents used in this research were sufficiently detailed that they 
present an acceptable account of what transpired in negotiating the MLC text.  The 
documentary accounts were also supported by interviews which serve to 
supplement and corroborate the records.  
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This chapter has two main sections.  The first section presents the data and 
analysis of the MLC negotiations.  It gives the context for the MLC and how its text 
was deliberated and the outcomes of interest to the study.  The second section 
deals with the MLC framework and the model for representation, consistent with 
the research question as to whether these provisions provide a “firm response” to 
poor working conditions on ships.  The conclusions draw out concerns around the 
lack of discussions on representation in the MLC negotiations, the limitations of 
provisions for representation in the MLC framework and wider issues of standard-
making in the ILO and global governance.   
 
5.2. Negotiating Labour Standards at the ILO  
The MLC came into force on August 20, 2013,34 having received the required 
number of ratifications to fulfil the entry into force criteria of 30 member States 
(countries that are members of the ILO), commanding 33% combined share in the 
global gross tonnage of ships (volume of all the enclosed spaces on a ship) (MLC 
Article VIII, para 3: 6).  While it is not an entirely new instrument, as many of its 
provisions existed as separate conventions, the architects sought to amalgamate 
and update these conventions into one instrument with more robust compliance 
and enforcement mechanisms than previously pursued by the ILO.  The MLC 
therefore contains provisions the architects claim will secure seafarers’ rights to 
decent work.  Article X of the MLC lists the conventions that the MLC revises.  
These conventions along with respective recommendations represent just over 70 
international maritime labour instruments that the ILO has adopted.35    
The list of conventions tells the history of the ILO’s efforts to regulate 
employment and working conditions on ships, with many conventions receiving 
scant attention from member States (TWGMLS/2001/10: para 5: 2).  Table 5.1 is 
                                                             
34 The MLC received the required ratifications in 2012, but entry into force was one year after this 
criteria was achieved, consistent with Article VIII of the MLC which outlines the administrative 
aspects of the convention.    
35 ILO website: https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-
standards/seafarers/lang--en/index.htm.  
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an illustration of the ratification status of some conventions relating to seafarers’ 
health, safety and wellbeing, as at the early stages of the MLC negotiations. 
Table 5.1: Ratification Status of Seafarers’ Employment and Working Conditions 
Conventions as at December 2002. 
Conventions  Number of 
Ratifications as at 
December 2002 
 
Prevention of Accidents (Seafarers) Convention 1970 (No. 134) 
 
27 
 
Seafarers’ Annual Leave with Pay Convention, 1976 (No. 146) 
 
13 
 
Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1976 
(No. 147) 
 
43 
 
Seafarers’ Welfare Convention, 1987 (No. 163) 
 
12 
 
Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers) Convention, 
1987 (No.164) 
 
11 
 
Social Security (Seafarers) Convention (Revised), 1987 (No. 165) 
 
2 
 
Labour Inspection (Seafarers) Convention, 1996 (No. 178) 
 
7 
 
Seafarers’ Hours of Work and the Manning of Ships Convention, 
1996 (No. 180) 
 
9 
Source: International Labour Conference (ILC) 91st Session 2003. Report III, Part 2. List of 
Ratification by Convention and Country (as of 31 December 2002). 
 
At December 2002, the ILO had 175 Member States.36  Convention No. 147, 
considered the most well-known of the ILO maritime conventions, with provisions 
for PSC inspections, had 43 ratifications and by May 2004 before the Preparatory 
Technical Maritime Conference (PTMC) in September of that year to deliberate 
the final draft of the MLC, it had received 46 ratifications (PTMC/04/2).  As of 2004, 
the convention with the highest ratification was the Medical Examination of Young 
Persons (Sea) Convention, 1921 (No. 16), with 81 ratifications (PTMC/04/2).  This 
is one of the least controversial conventions and in some jurisdictions the costs 
are borne by the seafarers.   
                                                             
36 ILO website: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11003:0::NO::: Accessed 
6 September 2018. 
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To date (August 6, 2018) 87 countries, representing 91% of global gross 
tonnage, have ratified the MLC.37  With the “no more favourable treatment” 
clause in the MLC, this should cover the approximately 1.5 million seafarers38  
working internationally.  Prior to its entry into force, the MLC has been hailed by 
supporters as a land-mark instrument accompanied by lofty narratives of the 
expectations for its contribution to decent work at sea (eg. Bolle, 2006; 
Charbonneau and Chaumette, 2010). 
The Geneva Accord, an agreement reached by the Joint Maritime 
Commission (JMC), is used by the ILO to mark the beginning of MLC’s development 
(TWGMLS/2001/10: 3).  The JMC is the bipartite body of the ILO, comprising 
seafarers’ and shipowners’ representatives and chaired by a government 
representative of the ILO.  The decision to strengthen the labour regulatory regime 
was bolstered by the JMC’s review of the ILO film “The Vital Link”, a report by the 
International Commission on Shipping (ICONS, 2000) on Inquiry into Ship Safety: 
Ships, Slaves and Competition and an ILO report on the Living and Working 
Conditions for Seafarers (ILO, 2001).  These documents reported on the poor 
working conditions at sea, the effects of globalization on the seafaring workforce 
and shipping in general, as well as the failures in the shipping industry’s regulatory 
regime to address them.  According to the ILO’s summary of the ICONS report for 
example, it “identified the underlying causes of sub-standard shipping and 
suggested that commercial and regulatory mechanisms be used to eliminate the 
fiscal advantages which arise from avoiding international standards, labour in 
particular” (TWGMLS/2001/10: 3).   
With the evidence from these documents, the JMC concluded that an 
appropriate response was necessary to stem substandard shipping to the benefit 
of seafarers and those shipowners and governments that were applying the 
standards.  According to the meeting report: 
                                                             
37 ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/maritime-labour-convention/lang--en/ 
index.htm. Accessed 6 August 2018. Accessed 6 August 2018. 
38 ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-
standards/seafarers/lang--en/index.htm. Accessed 6 August 2018. 
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The Shipowners’ and Seafarers’ representatives of the Commission, … 
considered that the protection provided by the standards was not reaching 
numerous seafarers.  Even Convention No.147, the best known of the ILO 
maritime Conventions, had been ratified by States representing about half 
the world shipping gross tonnage... Thus, shipowners and governments 
providing decent conditions of work were bearing an unequal burden due 
to the absence of generally applicable labour standards or, where they 
existed, their lack of proper enforcement.  As the JMC had said what was 
required was an international regulatory response of an appropriate kind 
– global standards applicable to the entire industry. (TWGMLS/2001/10: 
para 5: 2). 
  As the JMC recommended, a high-level Tripartite Working Group on 
Maritime Labour Standards (TWGMLS) was formed.  The role of this group was to 
assist the ILO in the development of the MLC.  Additionally, a Subcommittee of the 
high-level Tripartite Working Group on Maritime Labour Standards (STWGMLS) 
was formed.  This was a working group tasked with preparing the text as directed 
by the high-level group.  The MLC negotiations were time-tabled for 4 years, to be 
adopted in the 5th year.  As such, there were to be 4 meetings of the TWGMLS 
from 2001 to 2004 with the aim of producing a draft instrument to be finalized at 
the PTMC, which would produce a final draft to be deliberated and adopted at the 
International Labour (Maritime) Conference (ILC) in 2005.  However, a number of 
outstanding issues prevented the production of a final draft at the PTMC and an 
additional intersessional meeting was held to address those outstanding matters.  
None of the outstanding matters included representation, although Title 4.3 under 
which it falls was one of the areas to be discussed (PTMC/04/2: Comment 32: 30).   
The additional meeting pushed the ILC to 2006, where it was held in February and 
the MLC was unanimously adopted.  Figure 5.1 outlines the committees and main 
meetings held over the period 2001 to 2006.   
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Figure 5.1: Timeline of the Meetings of the Working Groups that Negotiated the  
MLC   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Author, compiled from the meeting records 2001-2006.  
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5.2.1. A Framework Convention 
Prior to beginning the MLC negotiations, the JMC’s proposal for a consolidated 
instrument was approved by the Governing Body of the ILO.   The Geneva Accord 
contained recommendations, not only on the structure and schedule of meetings 
for developing the MLC, but preliminary ideas as to the nature of this “new” 
instrument:    
The Commission [JMC]… discussed the significance and impact of maritime 
labour standards. It agreed that many of the existing ILO maritime labour 
instruments were outdated, deficient and not reflective of modern 
practices; those which were up to date and pertinent were not sufficiently 
ratified. It concluded that the best way forward in line with the integrated 
approach approved by the Governing Body at its 279th Session (November 
2000) was the adoption of a single “framework” instrument which would 
consolidate the existing body of ILO maritime Conventions and 
Recommendations. (ILO, 2001a: GB.280/5). 
As a framework instrument, the MLC provisions were to be less detailed, 
clear, simple, coherent and concise.  These words were frequently used, 
particularly in the first meeting where the guiding principles for the deliberations 
and aspirations for the “new” instrument were established.  A framework 
convention is understood as containing minimum standards aimed at securing 
wide ratification.  Framework conventions are treaties outlining the broad 
objectives of an instrument of governance and establishing commitments for the 
duty holders, where the details are decided in further protocols or regulations 
(Matz-Luck, 2009).    
The structure for the MLC was modelled on the IMO’s Standards of 
Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Convention 1978 (as amended).  
The MLC contains Articles, Regulations, Standards and Recommendations under 
one cover (Explanatory Note, MLC 2006: 12-13), a deviation from previous ILO 
model where conventions consisted of articles only and had Recommendations as 
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separate documents.39  Subject areas are given titles and broadly stated 
regulations to give them effect.  The regulations are immediately followed by 
mandatory standards Part A, which are followed by non-binding guidelines 
(Recommendations) Part B, (Appendix IX illustrates this structure with the section 
of relevance to this study: Title 4: Health Protection, Medical Care, Welfare and 
Social Security Protection).   
Framework agreements have their challenges in attempting to be 
simultaneously universal and effective (Matz-Luck, 2009).  As Matz-Luck (2009: 
445) notes “…universal legal regulation requires compromise that impedes 
substantive commitments by the parties.  Often the choice is between many States 
but weak regulations or strong legal obligations but few participants.”  To solve 
this problem, framework conventions may have broadly stated and relatively 
weak statements of principles and objectives to the agreement of all parties with 
more substantive details being settled in protocols.  In the case of the MLC, the 
details are non-binding and governments and shipowners raised concerns and 
sought assurances that these were merely guidelines (for example, 
TWGMLS/2003/10: para 26: 6: paras 152-155).  A government member’s concern 
was recorded as follows: 
Members were requested to give “full consideration” to implementing the 
responsibilities stipulated within Part B and this seemed to have a more 
stringent legal status than a Recommendation.  He expressed concern that 
this could become a major obstacle for some members to ratify.  Careful 
consideration needed to be given to make Part B softer and more flexible 
in terms of legal status. (TWGMLS/2003/10: para 26: 6).    
There was much discussion as to the legal status of Recommendations, as 
the ILO sought to assuage the concerns, while simultaneously attempting to give 
                                                             
39 Adopting this structure also served the purpose of flexibility in making amendments through a 
simplified procedure (see Explanatory Note, MLC 2006: 12-13).  Articles are the treaties and these 
require a long process to amend.  The standards in the MLC can be subject to tacit approval.  This 
was one of the modernized features of the MLC that would ensure its currency. 
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some status to Part B.  As it was noted, some of the substantial provisions of 
previous conventions had been incorporated into these guidelines:   
Part B was intended to be non-mandatory and would therefore not be 
binding.  However, member States had to report as for Recommendations 
under article 19, paragraph 6, of the ILO Constitution, but in addition, 
Article V of the proposed draft asked for full consideration to be given.  This 
wording had been chosen because most provisions in Part B were cascaded 
from Part A and originally stemmed from Conventions. 
(TWGMLS/2003/10: para 31: 7).   
Using “full consideration” was an attempt to give some weight to these 
recommendations.  Yet, further clarification was sought as some government 
members remained uneasy with the term “full” and statements by the ILO that 
Part B was an “integral part” of the Convention.  This was clarified through 
distinguishing the legal implications of the words used in each section.  “Shall” 
meaning where provisions are binding, for example used in the Regulations and 
Standard Part A, is different from “should” used in the guidelines 
(TWGMLS/2003/10: para 36: 8; paras 199-200: 27-28).  Not to be consoled 
however, it was further suggested by a government member that “full 
consideration” should be replaced by “due consideration” (TWGMLS/2003/10: 
para 152: 21).  The seafarers’ group expressed their concern at what seemed to 
be a weakening of some provisions:   
The Seafarer spokesperson drew attention to the overall structure of the 
instrument.  Part B was a guideline and non-mandatory but he expected 
States to give “full consideration” to its contents since many of its 
provisions would have been moved down from Part A.  Part B should not 
become irrelevant; if this was to be the case, [original italics] he would 
demand a substantial amount of the text to be moved back to Part A. 
(TWGMLS/2003/10: para 154: 22). 
It was also pointed out by the ILO’s legal adviser that the “…new 
Convention’s only real innovation was that in the new Convention the amount of 
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non-binding provisions was much higher than in any earlier Convention.” 
(TWGMLS/2003/10: para 199: 28).  This however, did not sway the concerned 
government members who did not want added obligations.  The compromise was 
to accept the suggestion of the wording “due consideration,” as it now stands in 
the MLC (Article VI: para. 2: 5).  To ensure that recommendations remained on the 
radar, the explanatory note to the MLC indicates that:    
…by following the guidance provided in Part B, the Member concerned, as 
well as the ILO bodies responsible for reviewing implementation of 
international labour Conventions, can be sure without further 
consideration that the arrangements the Member has provided for are 
adequate to implement the responsibilities under Part A to which the 
Guidance relates. (MLC 2006: para 10: 13). 
The alternative was that a member State would be obligated to prove to the ILO 
that measures it implemented were “substantially equivalent” to those provided 
in the MLC guidelines.  This seemed sufficient to have satisfied the seafarers’ group 
as they made no further protests on the matter.   
The preceding is one, but important example of how these standards were 
negotiated and how their effectiveness was lessened in order to gain wide 
support.  The example reflects wider discussions on how the robustness of 
international standards might come to be less than envisaged (Hilgert, 2013; Matz-
Luck, 2009) and exposes the limits of global regulation.  Nevertheless, the ILO has 
hailed the MLC development as an example in the effectiveness of tripartism: 
This Convention demonstrates that social dialogue and international 
cooperation can effectively address the challenges of living, working and 
conducting business at sea. But it goes even further by showing how 
dialogue and tripartism can also address the challenges of globalization 
(ILO, 2015a: VII).  
The reality is however more subdued than the ILO’s statements.  The MLC 
development, as the outcome of “negotiated compromise,” shows how firmer 
provisions became recommendations in an attempt to satisfy the various interests 
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of the social partners and to achieve the objectives of flexibility and wide 
ratification (further explored in Section 5.2.2).   
 
5.2.2.  Contradictions in Negotiating Decent Work 
This section furthers the analysis as to the nature of standards in a context of 
varying interests.  The MLC discussions were set within the context of providing 
decent work in keeping with wider themes in the ILO (TWGMLS/2001/10: para 8: 
2).  Throughout the MLC process, the ILO’s Decent Work Agenda was used as a 
reference point, particularly by the seafarers’ group but also by some government 
members, to remind the meeting of the rationale for the MLC, and the importance 
of social dialogue as an important principle in arriving at decent working 
standards.  The seafarer spokesperson was reported as saying: 
It is …essential that the deliberations reflect the core mandate of the [ILO] 
which is to promote decent conditions of work.  We must ensure that the 
concepts, which the ILO has agreed are fundamental to decent work, are 
not only included in the new instrument but guide us at all times as we 
consider the draft instrument. (TWGMLS/2003/10: para 10: 3-4).   
A vital aspect of the decent work agenda is the inclusion of workers’ 
“voice.”  The ILO’s submission on decent work for the consideration of the 
architects pointed to the ILO’s goals of improving working conditions for people 
and promoting opportunities for decent and productive work in “conditions of 
freedom, equity, security and human dignity” (STWGMLS/2002/5: 1).  According 
to the records, improving the situation of workers: 
…is a very human aspiration that expresses the hopes of people for work 
that will respect their individuality and dignity, provide them and their 
families with sustenance, ensure provision for the uncertainties of 
employment, health and old age, provide equal recognition and enable 
women and men to make choices and to take control of their lives, permit 
them to have a say and to participate in decisions about what they do, 
provide an opportunity to participate in representative organizations and 
be a source of social meaning and identity [stress added]..  
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The first meeting of the subgroup was tasked with outlining how the goals 
of decent work related to the shipping industry.  This was accomplished by 
referencing the report on seafarers’ living and working conditions and previous 
discussions in the JMC, as well as the first meeting of the high-level tripartite group 
to stress the deleterious conditions at sea and to reiterate the goals of the group 
to develop a “firm response” to these conditions.  In this manner, the subgroup 
linked the task of developing the MLC to the goals and aspirations of the ILO’s 
decent work agenda and concluded on the necessity of applying the agenda to the 
shipping industry, which was taken as important for human rights at work; 
employment and income; social protection and social security; and social dialogue 
(STWGMLS/2002/5: 3-10).   
Decent work therefore formed the foundational principles of the MLC 
which are to be found in its preamble, including full references to the ILO’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998, which embodies 
the core labour standards of the ILO that should ensure decent work.  Decent work 
is also included in the constitutional provisions of the MLC which are the most 
binding parts of such international treaties.  In that respect, Article I on the general 
obligations of members to the convention, and Article IV, listing seafarers’ 
employment and social rights, make references to decent work.   
The ILO’s decent work agenda was influenced by the 1995 World Summit 
on Social Development, Copenhagen 1995 (ILO, 2005)40.  The summit focussed on 
poverty eradication, human development and other social and economic rights, 
such as; a decent standard of living, safe and healthy working conditions, fair and 
equitable treatment and dignity at work (Eade, 2009).    The consensus from the 
                                                             
40 The ILO noted that the World Summit on Social Development aligned with some core principles 
of the ILO.  “The Social Summit had for the first time recognized, within the ILO’s battery of 
international labour standards, a core set of enabling rights which merited special emphasis. They 
concerned freedom of association, freedom from discrimination, freedom from forced labour and 
freedom from child labour – fundamental freedoms which constituted the foundation on which 
the ability to realize other rights and aspirations could be built.” (ILO, 2005: 3).  Subsequently the 
ILO released its Decent Work Agenda driven by the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work 1998 containing the Core Standards from these 8 Conventions (listed in the 
Preamble of the MLC).  
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summit was that there was a need to put people at the centre of development in 
order to achieve stable, safe and just societies (United Nations 1995).  These ideas 
from the Summit were aligned with the ILO’s programme and motivated the ILO 
to take its work forward from then, under the theme of decent work (ILO, 2005).   
Decent work is promoted on the basis of the Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work and the core labour standards which is considered a 
new international labour rights regime of soft law (Alston, 2004).  This approach 
has its supporters and detractors.  Support has been given on the basis that this 
approach introduces flexibility in the labour standards regime in allowing the core 
standards to apply to diverse situations outside the confines of the conventions to 
which they belong (Alston, 2004).  Others see the notion of core standards as the 
ILO stepping back from standard setting and creating a hierarchy of standards to 
the detriment of others (Alston, 2004).  In other words, the decent work agenda 
is seen as a compromise by the ILO in light of criticisms of its failure to implement 
firm standards to impact working conditions in the advent of economic 
globalization (Standing, 2008).  The softer approach is evident in the MLC as a 
framework convention.  Its development in the context of the broader politics of 
ILO standard-making, places the foundations of the MLC on shaky grounds, with 
writers such as Bauer (2008) questioning whether it is an adequate guarantee of 
seafarers’ rights or an impediment to true reforms at sea.   
  
5.2.2.1. Cooperation, Consensus and Compromise  
The first meeting to negotiate the MLC held in 2001, was largely to co-opt 
governments as they were not party to the Geneva Accord.  Subsequent meetings 
were focussed on negotiating the contents of the MLC based on drafts prepared 
by the ILO office from the deliberations.  The first point for consensus was for all 
the social partners to agree to go forward with the consolidation process.  Among 
the concerns of the Geneva Accord was that governments had not ratified many 
of the existing ILO maritime conventions and the first meeting focused on gaining 
their commitment to developing the MLC in a spirit of cooperation and 
compromise with the goals of adoption and wide ratification (TWGMLS/2001/10).  
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The tone of the deliberations was set by the ILO with reference to several points 
of interest and the aspirations for this “new” instrument.   
The ILO stressed the need for active participation and a demonstration of 
governments’ commitment through national actions of statutory provisions and 
enforcement.  Having no enforcement powers of its own, except to name and 
shame (Bauer, 2008: 649), the ILO relies on governments to implement and 
enforce its conventions.  This “horizontal” form of governance is said to be limited 
in a globalized world and it is argued that critics see it as contributing to the 
ineffectiveness of ILO standards (Thomas, 2018).  The ILO also realizes the limits 
of its influence on effective application of its standards (Wilson et. al. 2006), as 
such it sought to capitalize on the cooperation exhibited by the seafarers’ and 
shipowners’ group in arriving at the Geneva Accord: 
Success [in arriving at a final instrument] would require dedication and 
continuity of participation.  The rewards would be considerable. …the 
maritime industry was an example of social dialogue at its best.  This 
meeting must now demonstrate tripartism at its best.  The result would be 
standards which ensured protection for the vast majority of seafarers in 
their multinational environment. (TWGMLS/2001/10: para 7: 2). 
This statement reflects a strategic pre-emption of the likely conflicts that 
such negotiations could encounter.  The documentary analysis revealed that each 
of the social groups had their own interests which were evident from the first 
meeting and maintained throughout the 5 years of negotiations.  Although these 
interests overlap and at various points groups shared or supported the interests 
of another, to perhaps further their own cause, it was also possible to align certain 
key interests with certain groups.   
The ILO was interested in consensus, compromise and cooperation in 
arriving at decisions, while upholding ILO traditions: 
While the work ahead should be based on existing standards, the Working 
Group should seek a balance between the industry’s tradition and the need 
to innovate.  It was necessary to build an instrument which was coherent 
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with the ILO’s current approach to standard setting and also with the 
contributions of other organizations working in the maritime field such as 
the IMO.  The working Group should be able to count on contributions 
from all, with consensus as the golden rule. [italics inserted] 
(TWGMLS/2001/10: para 9: 3). 
The ILO also stressed the need for an instrument that would be widely accepted.  
Wide acceptance was an interest also shared by the other groups in order that the 
“new” convention would not go the way of the others that were not ratified. 
The shipowners’ group also made references to their “unanimous 
agreement with the Seafarers at the JMC” (TWGMLS/2001/10: para 87: 18), as a 
means of pre-empting the cooperation of the governments.  They went on to 
thank the Government representatives that spoke in agreement with the Geneva 
Accord and hailed the consensus towards the process of developing the MLC as 
“unprecedented in the history of ILO maritime meetings” (TWGMLS/2001/10: 
para 87: 18). 
The seafarers’ group also made their contribution as to their expectations 
for compromise and cooperation.  The record showed that: 
The Seafarers’ spokesperson declared that the Governments’ views were 
welcome and that, even if the Seafarers has some fundamental concerns 
about some of the opinions expressed, they would adopt a tolerant 
attitude at that stage, expecting identical behaviour from the Government 
group regarding their own positions in the future. (TWGMLS/2001/10: para 
89: 18).   
The governments mostly required flexibility and were concerned with how 
compatible the standards would be with their own national systems.  Flexibility 
was seen in a number of ways.  The first was to make provisions for “substantial 
equivalence” meaning that, governments that already had provisions in place 
would not need to duplicate their requirements but demonstrate to the ILO that 
their national systems provide compatible levels of protection.  The second notion 
of flexibility was not having too detailed a convention.  Third, that the instrument 
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takes national peculiarities into consideration with some allusion to the capacity 
of some governments to give effect to conventions.  It was interesting that the 
capacity of governments to comply was to be taken into consideration around the 
theme of flexibility, however governments’ will to fulfil their obligations was 
somewhat of the elephant in the room, particularly in respect of open registers 
that have gained a reputation for substandard shipping (Frawley, 2005; Alderton 
and Winchester 2002a; 2002b; Li, 1999).  For example, one government member 
of an open register with a reputation for having substandard ships on its register, 
raised the point that: 
…until this afternoon, open registers had been insufficiently taken into 
account.  However, the agreement reached today…should ensure that 
every member State would be given an opportunity to participate in the 
future proceedings…[this country] was prepared to cooperate with 
everybody in the current exercise, provided that the new instrument will 
not upset the role of flag States… Neither should it endanger the economy 
of open registries and the employment of so many seafarers, in particular 
those coming from developing countries (TWGMLS/2001/10: para 69: 14) 
The economic discussion was not pursued at this point although at other points 
throughout the negotiating period, the importance of flag States’ role in 
compliance and enforcement was stressed.    
Flexibility was also of interest to the shipowners’ group.  They pointed to a 
number of options for flexibility that already existed in some ILO maritime 
conventions, including “substantial equivalence” in ILO Convention 147, or the 
mechanism for agreeing to higher or lower standards from an agreed list, similar 
to ILO Convention 165 (TWGMLS/2001/10: paras 51-54: 11).  Later on, the IMO’s 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL)41 was also 
suggested.   
                                                             
41 The IMO’s marine environment pollution convention.  International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 and the Protocol of 
1997.  It was suggested at various points in the negotiations that the MARPOL’s flexible regime 
which allows governments to “pick and choose” which standards to apply after ratification could 
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Shipowners were also interested in enforcement and verification and a 
clear text that was easily understood.  They stressed consolidation and argued 
that, due to time constraints all existing instruments could not be revised.  
Therefore, the compromise would be to find a middle ground where “outdated 
standards are eliminated, duplication is avoided, and excessive detail is removed 
without straying into the contentious areas of inventing new standards” 
(TWGMLS/2001/10: para 53: 14).  The “consolidation pact” would later emerge as 
a constraint on developing more progressive standards (Section 5.2.2.2.).  
Consistent with wider discussions around employers’ aversion to regulations 
(Walters and Bailey, 2013: 8; James and Walters, 2002), shipowners did not wish 
to be dealing with new standards and were keen on sticking closely with the 
consolidation process.    
In parallel, one major interest of the shipowners’ group was fair 
competition and they saw the MLC as a means of addressing this and were 
therefore willing to accept some amount of (re)regulation of the industry.  This 
was the major area of consensus between the shipowners’ and seafarers’ groups.  
The ITF has had a longstanding campaign against substandard shipping, 
particularly targeting open registers (Lillie, 2006).  According to the International 
Shipping Federation’s (ISF) submission to the meeting: 
…shipowners … were no different from other employers so far as their 
concept of how they wished to run their businesses was concerned. They 
were not pleased with the idea of yet more regulations, controls or 
penalties. However, they were pragmatists and they wanted to make sure 
that sensible labour standards were in place and that they were applied 
impartially to all competitors. This would allow for a level playing field in 
                                                             
be looked at for adoption for the MLC (TWGMLS/2002/13: para 6: 2).   MARPOL comprise 6 
Annexes relating to different pollutants. A State only had to ratify Annexes I (oil) and II (chemicals), 
the others were optional and could be ratified as the State gained the capacity to do so: IMO 
website: 
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/ReferencesAndArchives/FocusOnIMO(Archives)/Docu
ments/Focus%20on%20IMO%20-%20MARPOL%20-
%2025%20years%20(October%201998).pdf#search=how%20does%20a%20country%20comply%
20with%20MARPOL Accessed 11 September 2018. 
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which standards of service dictated customer preference and not the 
ability to drive labour conditions down below an acceptable minimum 
standard.  However, such level playing field for maritime labour standards 
did not now exist.  The industry did not have an up-to-date, effective and 
properly enforced core of key labour standards impartially applied to all. 
(TWGMLS/2001/10: para 21: 5).   
The shipowers’ position reflects DeSombre’s (2006) analysis of regulating 
labour standards in the maritime industry, as a “race to the middle” discussed in 
Chapter 3, (Section 3.3).  Some level of regulation above the bottom is achieved 
as the “better” group of shipowners subject themselves to regulatory standards in 
order to bring substandard operators up to par or to force them from the industry.  
As this chapter demonstrates at various points and specifically in Section 5.2.2.2., 
the shipowners were willing to subject themselves to some regulatory control.  
However, they also argued for flexibility and were adamant in resisting some 
areas, for example seafarers’ autonomy in the complaints mechanism, which 
would mean tighter regulation of their operations, as they would have been 
agreeing to additional external oversight on board.  This analysis highlights the 
shipowners’ unitary framing of the shipboard work environment.  
In expressing their interests, the seafarers’ group firstly cautioned against 
the drive for flexibility.  In response to the shipowners’ group’s submission they 
noted: 
The ISF submission was balanced, but perhaps overemphasized the issue 
of flexibility.  Some flexibility was necessary to ensure widespread 
ratification, but too much could result in a meaningless instrument.  What 
was truly needed was a true “bill of rights for seafarers.” 
(TWGMLS/2001/10: para 56: 12).    
The seafarers’ group’s interests were articulated in their submission in the second 
meeting (TWGMLS/2002/13).  Like the other groups, they were interested in a 
widely ratifiable instrument, and reiterated their statement made in response to 
the shipowners’ submission. The MLC, they believed, “should help to eradicate 
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substandard shipping.  It should constitute a real and unambiguous Seafarers’ Bill 
of Rights, making decent work a reality on all ships.” (TWGMLS/2002/13: para. 10: 
3).  In their thinking, the seafarers’ group was “proposing a radical approach, which 
was a package, and which would remove a lot of the prescriptive details.” 
(TWGMLS/2002/13: para. 10: 3).  With these interests, the seafarers’ group’s 
vision for the MLC was not very different from what the other groups articulated, 
although with different stresses.  While they were concerned about too much 
flexibility, they embraced the notion of a less prescriptive instrument.      
A major point of interest for the seafarers’ group was the compliance and 
enforcement mechanism.  While they agreed with the other groups as to the need 
for a robust system, the seafarers’ group was adamant on the means by which this 
was to be achieved.  The group refused to support the inclusion of working 
conditions within the ISM Code regime in keeping with their interest against too 
much flexibility (further discussed in Section 5.2.2.2.).  They also refused the 
suggestion for the IMO’s MARPOL-type regime which gives States a choice in 
which sections to comply with, as they believed it would lead to excluding some 
seafarers on certain ships which they saw as incompatible with the Declaration of 
Philadelphia (TWGMLS/2002/13: para. 11: 3-4).  The group explained that the idea 
of having a “bill of rights” was to make breaches of social regulations detainable 
as in the case of safety under the IMO Conventions. 
The theme of flexibility ran throughout the negotiations along those lines 
of either picking and choosing standards or including the “substantial equivalence” 
clause.  While some governments and shipowners stressed a need for flexibility, 
seafarers opposed to some extent, and the ILO attempted to find a middle ground.  
The compromise was to state that the MLC provisions would be “inflexible with 
respect to rights” but “flexible with respect to implementation” 
(TWGMLS/2001/10: 24).  This notion remained in reference to the MLC in 
subsequent narratives that it is a “firm but flexible” response to the deficit in 
decent work for seafarers.  Assessing the contradictory nature of this statement 
would require some detailed analysis which is currently beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  As seen in Section 5.2.1. on the framework convention paradigm, flexibility 
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imposes constraints on developing a firm regulatory lead.  These were the main 
interests on the table and the parameters established that the process was more 
one of consolidation, with the principles of cooperation, consensus and 
compromise guiding the deliberations.  The negotiations went ahead to produce 
what the ILO has described as the seafarers “bill of rights” and the “fourth pillar” 
in the maritime industry international regulatory regime for quality shipping. 
 
5.2.2.2. Constraints and Conflicts  
While it was strategic and most likely an efficient way of approaching the 
development of the MLC in having an established agreement between seafarers 
and shipowners prior to the meetings (this would have also involved some 
governments as the proposal had to be sanctioned by the ILC (GB.280/5 (Corr.)), 
the Geneva Accord also imposed some constraints on the deliberations and 
therefore the final product.  One main constraint was the aim of consolidation, 
explained in Section 5.2.2.1., where the shipowners’ group reminded the meeting 
that new issues should not be included.  While the documents did not record any 
controversy in this regard, mention was made in the interviews that this was a 
constraint (Chapter 6).  However, based on the documentary record, it appeared 
that by the third meeting, this constraint was circumvented to some extent.   
The third meeting of the high-level group recorded a modification.  It 
stated that the initial purpose of consolidating existing conventions now included 
updating the conventions, taking into account, “current and emerging issues 
including the changing nature of the international seagoing workforce” 
(TWGMLS/2003: 2).  Although at that point there was no indication as to how 
these conventions were being updated, the compliance and enforcement 
mechanism in particular, (Title 5 of the MLC) improved on measures in previous 
conventions such as Convention 147.  One interviewee from the shipowners’ 
group did express some dissatisfaction with the seafarers’ group wanting to move 
away from the “consolidation pact” (Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2).   
The need to satisfy the various interests and ensure an instrument that had 
the potential for wide ratification also posed some constraints.  The consensus 
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was that one of the aims would be to reduce the details and create a framework 
instrument with much of the details outlining the specificities put into the non-
mandatory Part B.  Governments had to be satisfied that the “new” convention 
would be compatible with their national systems.  For example, in discussing 
exempting domestic shipping from the convention, the seafarers’ group expressed 
concern that such seafarers would not benefit from the protection offered by the 
convention.  They proposed that provisions be made in the convention for an 
agreement with the social partners to sanction such exemptions.  Governments 
however preferred the less binding “in consultation” rather than “an agreement” 
claiming it was contrary to a government’s exercise of sovereignty.   As the record 
showed: 
Various Government representatives said that an agreement being 
concluded between the national legislature and social partners was not 
compatible with their systems.  The adoption of legislation should not 
depend on obtaining the agreement of the social partners.  Any such 
requirement would clash with the national legislatures’ supreme right to 
free decision.  It was considered, however, that consultations were often 
essential parts of the process and considered useful. (TWGMLS/2003/10: 
para 99: 16). 
They agreed that the wording for “consultation” in the draft being discussed at the 
time, would remain, particularly as some governments had already decided to 
exempt domestic shipping and would not be entering into agreements with the 
social partners on the subject. 
The main areas of conflict of relevance to representation were with the 
compliance and enforcement mechanism, with respect to the seafarers’ group, 
and the complaints mechanism with respect to the shipowners’ group.  The first 
meeting of the subgroup in June 2002, was mainly concerned with compliance and 
enforcement, including the role of port State control (PSC) as the possible 
mechanism through which to secure these.  This led to a discussion of the 
difference between technical and labour standards, making it clear that the 
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shipping industry recognizes and acknowledges the differences and that the 
industry is based largely on technical standards.   
How technical and labour standards were to be integrated, and recognition 
that PSC officers were not qualified to inspect labour standards, were discussed.  
The need to ensure objective criteria for inspecting social issues, so as to avoid 
subjective detentions, and the training of inspectors in that respect, were seen as 
critical to the successful functioning the MLC.  The agreement to address this 
deficiency in labour inspection was for the ILO to offer technical assistance to 
countries without the capacity for labour inspections.  The ILO’s technical 
assistance programme is argued to be one means by which it persuades 
governments to ratify conventions in the absence of enforcement capabilities 
(Gumbrell-McCormick, 2008: 338).         
The ISM Code regime was recommended as providing a framework for 
enforcement and compliance by several government members in the first meeting 
(TWGMLS/2001/10: para 37: 8; para 64: 13; para 76: 16), to which other 
government officials expressed reservations.  For example, one was clear that: 
…he did not think the Working Group should rely on the participation of 
the IMO in the development of the new instrument.  After all, there were 
boundaries between the safety issues to be handled by the IMO and the 
social issues to be dealt with by the ILO.  He observed that references had 
been made to the possibility of placing the envisaged new ILO Convention 
under the ISM Code.  He did not believe that the IMO would accept this. 
(TWGMLS/2001/10: para 79: 16-17). 
This reservation was later confirmed in the third meeting when a government 
representative reported that the IMO Maritime Safety Committee at its 77th 
session, had a discussion on the matter of transferring issues from the ILO to the 
IMO, and was not in agreement. (TWGMLS/2003/10: para 114: 17).  
In the second meeting the Norwegian government member submitted a 
proposal based on their national system, demonstrating how labour standards 
could be incorporated into the ISM Code regime and be certified, in keeping with 
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the proposal of having certification attached to the “new” instrument 
(TWGMLS/2002/Appendix).  The shipowners group had reservations about this 
proposal on the grounds that “they were not fully committed to the issue of 
certification.  Nor were they yet convinced about the need for an auditing system 
and remained very sceptical about the ISM auditing process” (TWGMLS/2002/13: 
para 67: 14).  This reservation by the shipowners’ group furthered their desire to 
limit regulatory control, although they supported some regulation.  For example, 
their continued reference to a MARPOL-type approach (also preferred by some 
Government members) would offer less control.  In response, the seafarers’ group 
“reiterated their fundamental and implacable opposition to a MARPOL-type 
approach which did not conform to the aspirations of the Seafarers.” 
(TWGMLS/2002/13: para 117: 21).    
The most discussed proposal for an enforcement and compliance regime 
was the ISM-type approach.  This became most contentious for the seafarers’ 
group, and one on which they were unwilling to compromise.  The seafarers’ group 
vehemently rejected any thought of using an ISM-type approach.  They contended 
that the ISM is a self-regulating system and its reliance on audits and paperwork 
did not provide a suitable model for compliance and enforcement and therefore 
they did not have confidence in this regime to address their interests.  The 
seafarers’ group was interested in a certification process for compliance and not 
a certification of procedures (TWGMLS/2002/13: para 11: 3).  Chapter 3 (Section 
3.4) explained the reservations in the literature regarding safety management 
systems, including the failures of the ISM safety management system.  If not 
effectively managed, these systems may become paper exercises which do not 
address the realities of the situations for which they were developed (Frick et. al., 
2000).  In response to the Norwegian Government’s submission and other 
discussions, the seafarers’ group spokesperson firmly laid out their position.  As 
the records showed:   
The Seafarers’ view of ISM-type regime was well known… There was no 
possibility of accepting such a regime, regardless of the standards on which 
it was based as it would be tantamount to de facto self-regulation.  There 
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was a role for audits to verify that the flag Stages discharged their 
responsibilities and for labour-supplying States in verifying effective 
oversight and control of manning agencies… These issues could be further 
discussed, but there would be no change in the Seafarers’ group’s views 
about quality assurance systems and he entered a formal reservation on 
this issue. [stress added] (TWGMLS/2002/13: para 65: 13). 
The outcome in this instance was that the compliance and enforcement 
mechanism as envisaged by the seafarers’ group was adopted.  The mechanism 
includes a maritime labour certificate, issued by the flag State, to certify that the 
measures for compliance outlined by the shipowner, in a declaration of maritime 
labour compliance document, meet the requirements of national regulations 
(MLC, Regulation 5.1.3: 76) (The mechanism is detailed in Chapter 7, Section 7.3).  
Nevertheless, integrating the ISM and the MLC remains on the agenda.  A 
resolution adopted by the maritime session of the ILC in 2006 concerning 
occupational safety and health, acknowledged the “inextricable link” between 
seafarers’ health and safety and their work risks and the implementation of the 
ISM Code, while also emphasizing the need for the ILO to promote safety 
committees and the appointment of safety representatives on ships (ILO, 2006f: 
10).  The Provisional Records (ILO, 2006d: 9) showed that this resolution was 
jointly submitted by the employers’ and the workers’ groups.  It is a milder 
promotional approach to the integration approach submitted jointly by 26 
government members which was not adopted (ILO, 2006d: 13-14).    
The proposed resolution by these government members continued the 
subject of integrating aspects of the ISM with the MLC (see Appendix X).  It is worth 
noting as it contained some salient points on the commonalities between the two 
instruments and the importance of integration.  Such integration might serve to 
stimulate shipowners’ commitment to representation.  The findings at the 
administrative and shipboard levels reveal that the decision by the seafarers’ 
group to oppose even a discussion on the matter might have been hasty.  There 
are difficulties to harmonize the two regimes in practice without an orchestrated 
effort, which this resolution seemingly advocated.  According to an interviewee 
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from the seafarers’ group, the matter is not concluded and is expected to be 
discussed in the standing committee established to continuously review the MLC42 
(Chapter 6).   
The shipowners’ group had two distinct points of conflict of relevance to 
representation.  One having to do with including the term “management systems” 
in the MLC and the second one on the complaints mechanism allowing seafarers 
some autonomy to complain to State officials.  Firstly, the term “management 
systems” was introduced into the draft convention discussed at the PTMC 
(PTMC/04/1).  The explanatory notes to this draft indicated that some shipowners 
were amenable to the use of the term, but others raised objections to having 
“management systems” in the MLC.  Those objecting noted that there were many 
existing health and safety management programmes, including health and safety 
committees under IMO requirements and they did not wish to be bound by further 
requirements for systems (as was confirmed in the interviews, Chapter 6, Section 
6.2.3).  
These provisions were introduced by the ILO office in preparing the text.  
Their commentary on the draft indicated that “relevant ILO occupational safety 
and health experts” were consulted and proposed the adoption of the ILO 
Guidelines on Occupational Safety and Health Management Systems (ILO-OSH, 
2001) (PTMC/04/2: Comment 32: 31-32).  The seafarers’ group were in favour of 
its use and explained that specifying “management systems” provided for greater 
emphasis on data collection, risk management and prevention strategies.  This 
explanation echoed the EU’s framework for a systematic approach to OHSM.  
Indeed, the ILO-OSH (2001) is an attempt to merge both systematic and systems 
approaches to OHSM and it contains requirements for representatives.  The 
shipowners were adamant that all references to “management systems” be 
removed from the draft.  They were instead in favour of using the term 
“consultation” with respect to measures to be developed for health and safety and 
                                                             
42 Article XIII Special Tripartite Committee States that “The Governing Body of the International 
Labour Office shall keep the working of this Convention under continuous review through a 
committee established by it with special competence in the area of maritime labour standards” 
(MLC, 2006: para1: 8). 
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not “management systems.”  This, however, did not lead to a discussion on 
“consultation” and how it would be operationalized.  The resulting compromise 
was a rewording of the text to read “guidelines for the management of 
occupational health and safety.”  Subsequently the shipowners were vigilant in 
ensuring all uses of “management systems” were removed from the MLC text. 
The second distinct point of conflict for shipowners was developing a 
complaints mechanism for seafarers to appeal to officials outside the shipowners’ 
sphere of influence.  The shipowners were resistant.  This might also be an 
indication of the unitary framing that dominates shipboard activities.  To resolve 
the differences, both groups were asked to make a joint submission.  In 
summarizing the concerns, the joint submission noted: 
It is fair to say that the position of both groups was very similar with regard 
to the procedures for dealing with grievances on board.  Different views 
were expressed, however, with regard to the procedures for dealing with 
grievances that could not be resolved at the level of the ship or the 
employer and were therefore referred to the government officials or 
agencies or to a legal system. (TWGMLS/2003/10/Annex 3: 53). 
Both groups agreed on laying out internal and external procedures having 
details for an on board mechanism and very general statements on the right of the 
seafarer to raise grievances with external authorities outside the shipowner’s 
sphere of influence.  Also, in receiving complaints, external authorities should 
inquire that the on board procedures were exhausted.  The final provisions in the 
MLC mandatory standards note that laws and procedures shall have appropriate 
on board complaints procedure which shall include provisions for seafarers to be 
accompanied or represented during the complaints process (Standard A5.1.5: 
paras 2-3: 84).  However, this was not linked to the formal on board representative 
process and it installed an individual means for seafarers to represent their 
interests. 
In concluding this section on negotiating labour standards, the 
documentary findings showed that in the process of developing the MLC the 
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various groups had their own interests to satisfy which were mediated by 
cooperation, consensus and compromise, although there were also conflicts.  This 
account serves to demonstrate how global labour standards are developed and 
the nature of the process that accounts for what finally emerges.  The 
requirements for consensus, compromise and cooperation to satisfy the varying 
interests might not necessarily lead to the best standards to suit a particular 
situation but emerge as the best compromise.  However, this compromise may be 
disconnected from the realities of the situations they aim to address and may not 
meet the needs of the intended beneficiaries. 
 
5.3. Representation in the MLC Framework   
This section presents the documentary analysis on representation in the 
MLC.  It first outlines the provisions for representation as written in the MLC and 
then examines the discussions leading to these provisions.  The MLC provides for 
the election of representatives and the establishment of OHS committees but does 
not have any definitive statement on consultation albeit presumed in joint OHS 
committees.  Some jurisdictions make specific provisions for joint consultative 
committees or joint consultation on health and safety.  The French system, for 
example legally requires the establishment of joint consultative committees for 
workplaces with 50 or more employees.  This committee becomes a subsection of 
the broader works council and workers elect representatives to the committee 
with the employer as the chair.  The representatives have statutory roles and 
rights to act on behalf of workers and take their concerns to the committee and 
the committee in turn have statutory rights to be consulted by the employer 
(Coutrot, 2009).   
Provisions for representation are found under Title 4, Regulations 4.3 
(MLC, 2006: 60) (Appendix IX).  The purpose of these regulations is “to ensure that 
seafarers’ work environment on board ships promotes occupational safety and 
health.”  The regulations provide broad statements regarding the obligations of 
ratifying countries to ensure laws are in place to give them effect.  The provisions 
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for shipboard representation are found in Standard A, paragraphs 1c, and 2d.  
Paragraph 1c states:  
On-board programmes for the prevention of occupational accidents, 
injuries and diseases and for continuous improvement in occupational 
safety and health protection, involving seafarers’ representatives and all 
other persons concerned in their implementation, taking account of 
preventive measures, including engineering and design control, 
substitution of processes and procedures for collective and individual 
tasks, and the use of personal protective equipment; and (MLC 2006, A4.3 
para 1c: 60) 
This paragraph echo the land-based systematic approach to health and 
safety, particularly those promulgated by the EU in the Framework Directive 
89/391, where the employer manages the process with these preventive 
principles in mind and the involvement of representatives.  Absent in this 
paragraph however, is the requirement for consultation with the representatives.  
Although it requires their “involvement,” as Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.) explains, this 
is a nebulous term and is usually associated with managerial unilateral styles of 
managing the workplace and have been found to be less effective in OHSM than 
representation.  “Consultation,” although subjected to misinterpretations, has 
been introduced in land-based regulations to strengthen participation and 
emphasize to management the need for meaningful two-way communication and 
giving serious consideration to workers’ views (James and Walters, 2002).   
Paragraph 2d of Standard A, goes on to make clear the framework for 
representation:   
Specify the authority of the ship’s seafarers appointed or elected as safety 
representatives to participate in meetings of the ship’s safety committee.  
Such a committee shall be established on board a ship on which there are 
five or more seafarers. (MLC 2006, A4.3 para 2d: 61). 
Joint consultation is implied by the mandatory provision for OHS 
committee.  However, the details to support these broadly stated standards are 
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found in the Guideline B4.3.1 which does not make a definitive statement but 
requires that the provisions should43 take into account the ILO Code of Practice on 
Accident Prevention on Board Ship at Sea and in Port (COPAP).  The COPAP 
precedes the MLC and contains details for representative arrangements.  The 
COPAP provides details as to the role of the health and safety committees, also 
found in subsequent MLC health and safety guidelines (MOSH) developed in 2014 
and the ILO/MLC/ITF guidelines on OHSM.  Together, these guidelines show the 
model of representation as joint OHS committees where seafarers elect or appoint 
their representatives to participate on these committees.  Table 5.2 lists the 
features of the model in each document which together comprise what the thesis 
refers to as the MLC framework for representation.   
 
Table 5.2: The MLC Framework for the Roles and Rights of Representatives 
MLC 2006 
Mandatory 
Provisions 
Code of Practice on 
Accident Prevention 
on Board Ship at Sea 
and in Port (COPAP), 
1996 (Section 2.8.4.: 
12) 
Maritime Occupational 
Safety and Health 
Guidelines (MOSH), 2014 
(Section 5.5: 43-45) 
ILO/MLC/ITF Guidance 
about the Safety and 
Health on board Ships 
(Section 8: 12) 
States are to 
develop laws, 
regulations and 
other 
measures to 
ensure OHS 
protection.  
These shall 
include: 
 
- Seafarers’ 
representatives 
(appointed or 
elected) 
- Authority of 
representatives 
to sit on OHS 
committee;  
Representatives 
should be: 
- Elected or appointed 
by and from the crew; 
- Participate in safety 
committee meetings; 
- Not be subjected to 
dismissal or 
prejudicial measures 
because of their role; 
- Have access to all 
parts of the ship; 
- Participate in the 
investigation of 
accidents and near-
accidents; 
- Have access to all 
the necessary 
documentation, 
Representatives should be: 
- Elected or appointed 
from their work groups or 
departments; 
- Participate in safety 
committee meetings; 
- Allowed time without 
loss of pay to fulfil 
functions or receive 
training as representative; 
- Not be subjected to 
dismissal or prejudicial 
measures for conduction 
functions assigned to this 
role; 
- Have access to all 
relevant information and 
documentation, including 
investigation reports; 
Representatives should be: 
- Elected or appointed in 
consultation with seafarers’ 
organization from the crew; 
- Participate in safety and 
health committee meetings; 
- Allowed time off without 
loss of pay to fulfil functions 
or receive training; 
- Not be subjected to 
dismissal or prejudicial 
measures for carrying out 
functions assigned to this 
role; 
- Have access to all relevant 
information and 
documentation, including 
investigation report; 
                                                             
43 Should and shall have particular meanings, where provisions that are mandatory are referred to 
using shall and guidelines or recommendations are referred to as should. As is made clearer in 
discussing the structure of the MLC (Section 5.3.1), it is divided into mandatory sections denoted 
by Standard A and guidelines denoted by Standard B.  Standard A and the Regulations which 
precede them are worded as what governments shall do to give effect to the MLC, and Standard 
B, is worded as what they should do (TWGMLS/2003/10: para 36: 8; paras 199-200: 27-28).   
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- Health and 
safety 
committees to 
be established 
on ships with 5 
or more 
seafarers. 
including investigation 
reports, past minutes 
of safety and health 
committees, etc.; and  
- Receive appropriate 
training. 
 
 
 
 
 
- Have access to all parts 
of the ship; 
- Participate in planning on 
board tasks including 
applying preventive 
measures and risk 
assessment; 
-Participate in accident 
investigation; 
-Have the unrestricted 
right to communicate 
directly with the relevant 
competent authorities and 
seafarers’ organization; 
-Receive appropriate 
training and instructions. 
 
- Have access to all parts of 
the ship; 
- Participate in planning on 
board tasks including 
applying preventive 
measures and risk 
assessment; 
- Participate in accident 
investigation; 
- Have the unrestricted right 
to communicate directly 
with the relevant competent 
authorities and seafarers’ 
organizations; 
- Receive appropriate 
training and instructions. 
Sources: MLC 2006;  ILO (1996a) 2nded. Code of Practice: Accident Prevention on Board Ships at Sea 
and in Port; ILO-MOSH (2015); IMO/MLC/ITF Guidance on Health and Safety. 
 
The table puts into perspective the broad provisions in the MLC mandatory 
section relative to the details in the guidelines.  No further provisions are found in 
the MLC mandatory section.  The supporting COPAP and guidelines give details 
establishing what is envisaged by the MLC provisions and the wider industry actors 
who developed and agreed on these standards. 
In this model, seafarers’ safety representatives are to be elected or 
appointed to serve on OHS committees where there are 5 or more seafarers 
working on a ship.  Representative is defined in the COPAP (Section 1.3: 2), an 
element missing from the MLC list of definitions.  It states: “safety representative: 
a member of the crew elected or appointed by and from the members of the crew 
to serve on the shipboard safety and health committee.”  
The MLC non-mandatory guidelines also do not specify arrangements for 
representation but make specific provision for the use of the COPAP and general 
references to other industry guidelines that should be taken into account when 
measures are being developed for OHSM.  As stated in the MLC Guideline B4.3.1: 
61. 
The provisions required under Standard A4.3 should take into account the 
ILO code of practice entitled Accident prevention on board ship at sea and 
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in port, 1996, and subsequent versions and other related ILO and other 
international standards and guidelines and codes of practice regarding 
occupational safety and health protection…   
Nevertheless, as had to be repeatedly explained in the negotiations to allay 
the concerns of some government members, guidelines are not mandatory, but 
the expectation is that they are treated “in good faith” (TWGMLS/2003/10: para 
202: 28).  Additionally, while representation was made mandatory in the MLC and 
there were discussions on social dialogue and representation at the national level, 
representation on ships was not discussed in terms of how it was to be 
operationalized and the supports for its implementation and practice.       
Social dialogue as a key component of decent work were two recurring 
themes in the negotiations (discussed in Section 5.3.2).  The ILO situated the MLC 
in its decent work agenda where workers’ “voice” is an important component 
(Budd, 2004).  Some government participants in the negotiations were keen on 
pointing out the link between decent work and social dialogue and suggested that 
the “new” convention incorporate these principles. (TWGMLS/2001/10: para 28: 
6; TWGMLS/2002/13: para 21: 5).   
The seafarers’ group expanded on the need for a mechanism to ensure 
social dialogue.  This was considered important particularly as some countries had 
no representative social partners.  However, in the MLC negotiations, discussions 
on social dialogue foucssed at the national level with no discussion for dialogue at 
the shipboard level. 
 
5.3.1. Origins of and Rationale for Representation in the MLC  
Provisions for representation in the MLC are consolidated from Convention 134.  
Article 8 of Convention 134 (Prevention of Accidents (Seafarers) Convention, 1970) 
provides for seafarers or their representatives to play an active role in 
implementing programmes for occupational accident prevention.  The 
recommended draft discussed at the MLC adoption conference also made 
references to other sources of influence on the MLC standards for Title 4.3 on 
health and safety protection, these included Convention 155.  Convention 155 is 
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the ILO’s main health and safety convention and has broad requirements for 
representation.    
The meeting reports had no record of who introduced the text.  It was 
absent from the early drafts and the second preliminary draft taken at the final 
high-level meeting had these provisions in the non-mandatory section.  Provisions 
for health and safety committees were also absent.  It appeared that the ILO office 
introduced the text when it prepared the recommended draft for the PTMC (PTMC 
04/1).  This was also when the ILO included provisions for adopting its OSHM 
system into the MLC.  While the paragraph containing representatives was 
amended to its current form during the PTMC, again any discussion as to the role 
of these representatives and how the mechanism was to function on board was 
absent.  The only amendment made was to change the word “powers” in the text 
that, representatives “powers” shall be stated to attend health and safety 
meetings.  Shipowners instead preferred the word “responsibilities.”  The 
seafarers later proposed to use “authority” as a compromise, which was accepted. 
 As Table 5.2 shows, the safety representatives’ roles and rights as outlined 
in the COPAP, and subsequently the MLC MOSH and ILO/MLC/ITF guidelines, are 
limited compared with land-based provisions, although they were inspired by 
land-based provisions.  Much of the duties for OHSM in the MLC framework are 
delegated to the safety officer and the OHS committees.  Table 5.3 compares the 
provisions for representatives’ role in the COPAP (as the document named in the 
MLC) with the UK’s provisions, as an example of how limited these provisions are. 
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Table 5.3: Comparison of Provisions for the Roles and Rights of Seafarers’ 
Representatives with Land-based Provisions. 
 
Code of Practice on Accident 
Prevention (COPAP)  
Land-based provisions –  UK. 
Representatives should be: 
• Elected or appointed by and 
from the crew; 
• Participate in safety committee 
meetings; 
• Not be subjected to dismissal or 
prejudicial measures because 
of their role; 
• Have access to all parts of the 
ship; 
• Participate in the investigation 
of accidents and near-
accidents; 
• Have access to all the necessary 
documentation, including 
investigation reports, past 
minutes of safety and health 
committees, etc.; and  
• Receive appropriate training. 
 
• Employees’ selection of representatives in 
health and safety; 
• Protection of representatives from victimisation 
or discrimination as a result of their 
representative role; 
• Paid time off to be allowed to carry out the 
function of a safety representative; 
• Paid time off to be trained in order to function 
as a safety representative; 
• The right to receive adequate information from 
the employer on current and future hazards to 
the health and safety of workers at the 
workplace; 
• The right to inspect the workplace; 
• The right to investigate complaints from workers 
on health and safety matters; 
• The right to make representations to the 
employer on these matters; 
• The right to be consulted over the health and 
safety arrangements, including future plans; 
• The right to be consulted about the use of health 
professionals;   
• The right to accompany health and safety 
inspectors when they inspect the workplace and 
to make complaints to them when necessary. 
 
Sources: ILO (1996a) 2nded. Code of Practice: Accident Prevention on Board Ships at Sea and in Port. 
Section 2.8.4.: 12; For UK regulations: Walters and Nichols (2007: 13). 
 
Other jurisdictions such as Australia have even stronger provisions 
allowing representatives to require dangerous work to cease and to issue 
improvement notices (Johnstone, 2009).  Another short coming of the MLC 
provisions is that they do not outline a specific relationship with the State 
inspectorate, nor make any detailed statements as to the role of seafarers’ 
representative organization in supporting representation on board.  In short, 
provisions outlining support for representation in the MLC are absent.  In the MLC 
framework, minimal support is suggested in the ILO/MLC/ITF guidelines (3.6 para 
2: 6).  These guidelines suggest the appointment of a person ashore from the 
company to “consult closely with the master and crew on all matters concerning 
safety and health.”   This is however not linked to the activities of the on board 
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health and safety committee, and echoes provisions in the ISM Code for a 
designated person ashore to support the company’s safety system.  Further, this 
support might be problematic as it is within the employer’s sphere of influence 
and the point of representation is to have autonomous support as a countervailing 
force to that of the employers. 
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings of the documentary analysis.  It examined how 
the MLC text was negotiated generally and highlighted the competing interests 
and constraints.  The chapter demonstrated how such efforts at global governance 
might come to be less substantial than intended as negotiating parties make 
compromises to arrive at a consensus.  In respect of representation, the 
documents revealed that it was not discussed as expected.  Considering the MLC 
and supporting guidelines, there is the notion of joint OHS committees, yet the 
role and rights of representatives are limited.  Further, there is a leaning towards 
detailed provisions of the role of all parties except trade unions in the on board 
health and safety activities.  The records showed that representation was included 
as part of the consolidation process as provisions for seafarers’ representatives to 
participate in on board health and safety were in other conventions and ILO 
guidelines.  This absence of a discussion is important as it raises questions as to 
the rationale for including such provisions without a clear intent as to its role in 
achieving the ILO’s decent work objectives and how it might benefit seafarers.    
The absence of a discussion on the role of seafarers’ representatives is 
surprising, considering representation has been shown to benefit workers’ OHS, 
and the evidence regarding the poor employment and working conditions on 
ships.  The architects also acknowledged the changes in the nature and 
organization of work at sea, and the lack of representative organizations in some 
countries, but this did not lead them to discuss the viability of these provisions or 
the mechanisms required to support their implementation and practice.  The 
following chapter draws upon the interviews with the architects to explore why 
representation was not given much consideration.   
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6 
Accounting for Representation in the MLC 
  
…safety in shipping should not just mean prevention of accidents to the ship that may arise 
due to faulty construction methods, defective equipment and lack of operator training.  
Rather, safety in shipping should encompass the prevention of casualties (accidental death or 
injury) and all associated aspects of health and safety (Nielsen and Panayides, 2005: 148).   
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings on the origins and rationale for the provisions 
for worker representation in the MLC to further address the research question as 
to the firmness of the regulatory lead for representation on ships.  Regulations 
legitimize the role of representatives and provide a statutory basis for them to act 
and as protection from discrimination because of their role (Gunningham and 
Johnstone, 1999).  Building on the findings in Chapter 5, this chapter explores the 
perspectives of the architects of the MLC text, how they rationalized the lack of 
discussions and detailed provisions on representation, in light of the challenges on 
board ships.     
The MLC was negotiated by government representatives and 
representatives of the shipowners’ and seafarers’ groups from the ISF and ITF 
respectively.  The ILO, as the responsible organization oversaw the negotiations 
although its officers were not passive as they also contributed to the text (Chapter 
5).  This chapter draws on interviews with key informants, referred to as the 
architects of the MLC.  They were members of the seafarers’ and shipowners’ 
group and one participant from the ILO.  One interviewee from the seafarers’ 
group had represented his government at the time of the negotiations and offered 
some insight from a government’s perspective.  The ILO interviewee also reported 
on various governments’ positions.  Otherwise the research relied on 
documentation for the governments’ perspective, as described in Chapter 5, and 
therefore this chapter mostly explores views of the shipowners’ and seafarers’ 
groups and the ILO.   
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The chapter is divided into three main sections and a conclusion.  The first 
two sections examine the viability of the provisions on representation by exploring 
their origins in the MLC and the rationale for their inclusion.  The third section 
explores the strength of the regulatory lead by focusing on whose interest is 
served by having representation in the MLC as understood by the architects and 
how they envision representation would be supported on board ships.    
 
6.2. The Origins of Representation in the MLC 
This section examines the main findings regarding the origins of worker 
representation in the MLC.  Key informants at the international level who had 
direct involvement in the development of the MLC were asked about the source 
of the provisions on seafarers’ participation in order to understand the basis for 
their inclusion.  The findings revealed that representation in the MLC had both 
ideological and concrete origins.  The architects explained that the philosophy of 
tripartism in the ILO and existing land-based practices influenced the provisions.  
The ILO’s influence stood out among these explanations, with respondents being 
clear that the tripartite structure of the ILO dictated that all instruments 
developed by the ILO contain provisions for workers’ representation.  As such, 
other ILO conventions, including previous ILO maritime conventions, were used as 
examples to justify provisions for representation in the MLC.  The following 
sections detail the various influences as described by the architects. 
 
6.2.1. ILO History, Structure and Traditions 
The history, structure and traditions of the ILO provided the more ideological 
explanations for representation in the MLC.  The ILO was founded on principles of 
social justice to be achieved through social dialogue among the social partners.  
These origins were reflected among the main explanations given by the architects.  
A shipowners’ group member explained:   
… it goes further back…the whole ILO process…when was it born? 1919.  
What was going on at the time? Russian Revolution…they didn’t believe in 
employers and workers…we were all there together in Russia and bringing 
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soldiers home and thought there might be riots over here [Western 
Europe]…So enshrined in everything that the ILO produces is workers 
representatives.  The whole philosophy of this at the ILO is workers have 
an equal right to be represented…and all we’re doing in here [points to 
MLC]…is reflecting that, and you should also mention…the Declaration of 
Philadelphia – “no lasting peace without social justice”… it would be 
enshrined in the whole idea that workers must have a say in what’s going 
on. (KI-2). 
The ILO was formed in 1919 after the First World War.  It was founded on 
pluralist principles of cooperation, consensus and compromise towards achieving 
harmonious labour relations (Hughes and Haworth, 2010: 5-19).  The Second 
World War also led to further assertions regarding social justice and labour rights 
towards creating social harmony.  The Declaration of Philadelphia 1944 marked 
this reassertion of the founding principles of the ILO.  The quest for peace in post-
war reconstruction on both occasions was defined through industrial relations 
terms involving cooperation through collective bargaining in addressing the 
various interests of the social partners (Hughes and Haworth, 2010; Rodgers, et. 
al. 2009).  Of significance was the declaration that labour was not a commodity.  
In that respect, work was defined in terms wider than economic exchange to 
embrace notions of wellbeing and self-actualization (Swepston, 1998).   
In this framework, labour “standards were an indelible part of political 
democracy bound up with a growing post-war emphasis on human rights and the 
pursuit of industrial prosperity” (Hughes and Haworth, 2010: 13).  These early 
activities to bring the social partners into cooperative dialogue to pursue peace 
and prosperity, also formed the basis for other responses to the question of the 
origins of the provision on representation in the MLC.  The ILO respondent 
explained that if one wanted to know the origins of representation in the MLC 
then this philosophy must be understood:        
You should look at the philosophy of the ILO in relation to worker 
representation…  Look at the other… conventions that the MLC replace. 
Look at the context of this in terms of worker representation issues and 
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also then, look at the ILO conventions for other industries in terms of 
worker representation.  That will give you the philosophy of the ILO. (KI-8). 
This philosophy, as understood by the interviewees, was operationalized in the 
ILO’s tripartite structure as reflected in its conventions.  A seafarers’ group 
respondent said:     
That’s the very basis of how the ILO operates.   You have the tripartite 
structure in the ILO and any convention in the ILO is to be adopted in 
consultation and in participation of the social partners.  The employers and 
the workers and the voting which takes place in Geneva. (KI-1). 
The decision-making apparatus of the ILO comprises employers’ and 
employees’ groups (trade unions), along with governments.  The employers’ and 
employees’ groups share a combined 50% of the vote (25% each) with the 
remaining 50% going to governments.  This is unlike other UN bodies where other 
interest groups may be observers and only governments make the decisions.  The 
ILO’s structure compels an alliance of workers and employers in some instances to 
present their concerns to government, as was the case with the MLC.  The 
shipowners’ group in general found employers’ rights at the ILO to be 
advantageous when the fate of the maritime conventions were being 
contemplated.  A participant from the shipowners’ group explained that prior to 
the decision to develop the MLC, some shipowners had suggested moving the 
maritime labour issues to the IMO, but the majority were not in favour because 
they had less “say” in the IMO.  As it was put, the shipowners decided: “…we 
actually like the ILO, we have the right to speak…” (KI-2).    
Additionally, the ILO structure attempts to preserve the participatory 
rights of employees and employers through its supervisory mechanism, which 
allows complaints to be lodged against governments for breaches of the social 
pact (Hughes and Haworth, 2010: 27-29).  This right was also used in narratives to 
underscore the explanations for representation in the MLC.  One member from 
the seafarers’ group explained: 
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… governments are obliged to follow the advice given by unions or 
employers…there has to be justified reasons in writing from government 
authorities to say OK, we have decided to implement certain changes that 
the shipowners said they don’t like it, the seafarers said they don’t like it, 
but then we are going to do it anyway because we believe it’s 
important…and if you don’t follow this process, it gives the possibility that 
either the employers or the representatives of the workers will file a 
complaint with the ILO for breach of the spirit of the convention.  It’s not 
just the MLC but any convention adopted and is in force by the ILO. (KI-1).   
With participation of the social partners engrained in the fabric of the ILO, 
the respondents thought it logical that seafarers’ representative participation be 
included in an ILO instrument.  This marks the general understanding and 
acceptance of the origins of the standard to the extent that probing regarding the 
supporting structures, elicited a somewhat defensive response from a respondent 
of the seafarers’ group: “…what are you saying then, that we shouldn’t have 
included it?” (KI-1).   
The line of questioning seemed to have disrupted the taken-for-granted 
understanding of representation in the MLC.  Another from the seafarers’ group 
said:  
Stepping back to how the ILO works as a tripartite organization with 
shipowners and seafarers being equal partners and the governments 
completing the tripartite dynamic, … it shouldn’t surprise anybody that 
when we then develop a convention, the roles of the workers and the 
workers’ voice, the involvement in consultation of workers is up there 
alongside the obligations of the flag State and the role of the shipowners, 
so at every level of the convention, it is a requirement to involve seafarers. 
(KI-3). 
The findings revealed that respondents considered representation in the 
MLC as a given.  The respondents’ narratives were substantiated by documentary 
sources which added further clarity to the persistent reference to the ILO’s 
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influence.  As Chapter 5 revealed, the historical origins of the ILO, its structure and 
traditions were invoked at the first meeting as the principles that should guide the 
deliberations.  For example, the documentary analysis showed some tensions 
between the old (ILO previous format) and the new structure that was suggested, 
which the MLC now has.  The opening remarks of the ILO secretariat to the 
attendees at the first meeting is illustrative:    
[The deliberations] …would include considering questions with little 
guiding precedents and preparing solutions which, though perhaps drawn 
upon the practice of other organizations, would require adaptation to the 
special philosophy and constitutional requirements of the ILO [italics 
inserted] (TWGMLS/2001/10: 2).   
The strength of traditions was demonstrated by a few participants who 
explained that the ILO was not convinced of the need to adopt a different structure 
by consolidating the maritime conventions into one.  Commentators such as 
Standing (2008: 374) have argued that there is somewhat of a culture of resistance 
to innovative thinking at senior levels of the ILO and the Governing Body.  This 
perhaps explains the ILO’s appeal to traditions and alignment with the ILO’s 
agenda as the organization laid the ground rules for the negotiations.  One 
participant from the ILO, who indicated intimate involvement prior to the Geneva 
Accord, explained the ILO’s reluctance as follows:   
…There was a lack of confidence in the ILO that so many conventions could 
be revised and be merged into a single one.  It was not easy for them to be 
convinced.  Particularly on the matter of one single convention.  This was 
different from the custom… there was a lot of opposition… it was not easy 
to get them to accept the proposal (KI-8).  
While the MLC eventually took shape, the text remained that of the old 
conventions.  The ILO, however, was not solely responsible for this, as the 
“consolidation pact” referred to in Chapter 5 dictated much of the outcomes.  
Representation was one of the provisions that maintained the traditional 
approach.  Another participant however, offered some vindication for the ILO in 
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wishing to maintain some of its traditions.  The focus on flexibility explained in 
Chapter 5, had the undertones of de-regulation resulting in much of the details of 
previous conventions being put into non-binding guidelines.  A shipowners’ group 
member reported that the ILO wanted to preserve the force of previous 
conventions:  
…we had a discussion as to what we could do to improve things and to 
make these [ILO maritime conventions that were not ratified] more 
effective and the idea was put forward to… consolidate them all into one 
single instrument.  The trade unions, the ITF were in general supportive of 
that, the biggest obstacle was actually the ILO itself, because we 
[shipowners’ group] pointed out that a number of these instruments that 
it had adopted hadn’t entered into force because they contain too much 
detail. Probably governments hadn’t participated sufficiently in their 
development and quite often an instrument would be adopted, and an 
actual government would look at it, find a provision it couldn’t accept and 
therefore the entire instrument wasn’t ratified.  So there had to be a 
certain amount of modernization and cleaning up of text, which meant that 
certain provisions that were mandatory in the earlier conventions, ceased 
to be mandatory in the consolidated instrument that became the MLC.  
Now from a legal point of view the ILO had a problem with that because it 
was already in parts of international law, especially for those countries that 
had already ratified those instruments… the problem was solved by 
inserting the clause that a State shall not provide any lesser provisions than 
those it already had in place. [KI-5].  
This insight notwithstanding, another aim of the MLC was to have 
provisions to address the changes in the nature and organization of shipping.  Yet 
representation, which studies have shown to be limited in its traditional form, and 
even more limited in this instance (Chapter 5, Section 5.3.1.) was not addressed.  
The provisions for representation were a recycling of longstanding approaches.  
The documents outlining the details for representation to which the MLC refers, 
and which subsequently formed part of the MLC guidelines for OHS management, 
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have not been updated since the 1990s.  The particular approach to 
representation seen in the MLC framework (Chapter 5, Section 5.3), circulates 
around the various documents on health and safety put out by the ILO and the 
shipping industry.   
While a consolidated maritime labour convention, and other features of 
compliance and enforcement, were regarded as innovative from the perspective 
of the ILO (eg. McConnell et. al., 2011; Bolle, 2006), it was also a compilation 
exercise in many respects and particularly so for health and safety and 
representation.  Although there was a parallel narrative of innovation and 
modernization of the conventions, efforts were made by the ILO to anchor these 
in its traditions.  The ILO respondent said:  
…in whatever area you have occupational health and safety look at the old 
conventions and the new one and you will see there is not much difference, 
the words may be different because what was attempted was a 
simplification of the language…. At one point we put in the text things that 
were forgotten…but you see the text on that subject would be similar.  
Look at the non-maritime conventions and you will see if the texts are 
similar or the substance is similar.  You will see that on that area there is 
not anything new, it’s just that we have applied first what seafarers had 
and second what other workers had.  The ILO is dealing with all workers. 
(KI-8). 
While there is some understanding of the reluctance to move away from some of 
the provisions, in respect of representation, research has shown that innovation 
is needed as the particular model is unsuited to contemporary flexible labour 
practices (Quinlan et. al., 2001; Gunningham and Johnstone, 2009), which are also 
evident in the shipping industry (Walters and Bailey, 2013).  Other models exist 
that might have been explored (Frick, 2009). 
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6.2.2. Consolidating Existing ILO Maritime Conventions  
On a less philosophical level, representation was explained as originating with 
other conventions.  The understanding that the MLC was to be only a consolidated 
instrument was a strong element in the negotiations.  In explaining the origins of 
representation in other ILO maritime conventions, a respondent from the 
seafarers’ group revealed the insistence in the negotiations on maintaining the 
status quo:     
…it [representation] must have been in the original instrument, because 
95% or more of what we did, was strictly consolidation, and there was a lot 
of pressure applied to everyone not to try and introduce new issues, even if 
those new issues were not contentious, the emphasis was stick to the deal 
of consolidation, get it through and then we’ll worry about other aspects 
later. [KI-3]. 
The “consolidation pact” made between the seafarers’ and shipowners’ 
group at the JMC was a strong element in determining the MLC text (Chapter 5, 
Section 5.2.2.1.; 5.2.2.2.).  Although it was indicated that the MLC development 
process would also involve updating the conventions, there was also 
paradoxically, a strong desire to maintain what was already in place, with the 
exception of those conventions that were identified as outdated, too detailed or 
contained duplications.  A respondent from the shipowners’ group confirmed that 
the main aim was consolidation and expressed some displeasure that the 
seafarers’ group had attempted to introduce new areas inconsistent with the 
“pact.”  The respondent said: 
The workers, the seafarers’ side, as I am used to them, would always take 
what is here [points to CMC44] as the start point of negotiating for the next 
level up.  The shipowners’ people did not see it like that, so we thought the 
words of that [CMC] would go straight into that [the MLC], and felt it was 
a bit unfair that the workers said oh yes that’s all we’re going to do is 
                                                             
44A copy of the Compendium of Maritime Labour Instruments, a publication by the ILO compiling 
all the maritime instruments. 
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consolidate, but then as soon as you start looking into the words, they 
upgrade you into something else. [KI-2]. 
These findings substantiate discussions in Chapter 5, on the shipowners’ interest 
in not having too much regulations, and the tensions among the various groups’ 
agendas and how these might have led to the development of weaker standards 
generally.  Others have documented challenges in developing strong standards in 
the ILO institutional framework.  Hilgert (2013), for example, has documented how 
weaker standards might emerge to suit the dominant interests.   
The rationale for the MLC as a consolidated instrument was outlined as 
emanating from a standstill in the work of the JMC.  A shipowners’ representative 
explained that there was no work programme going forward from the JMC to the 
resolutions committee which would usually take issues forward to the 
International Labour (Maritime) Conference (ILC).  The standstill resulted in an 
initiative by the shipowners’ group to “do something” about the ILO maritime 
conventions: 
…this was a shipowner initiative to breathe life into the ILO…and try and 
make things better for us. So that’s where it comes from.  The shipowners 
were quite clear that all we wanted to do was to move what was in the 
Compendium [of Maritime Labour Instruments] into a consolidated text 
based on…,if you look at the STCW convention at the IMO, it is exactly the 
same framework, because we’ve already been through that and we 
thought…this is much better framework than the usual ILO conventions, 
and we wanted updated procedures based on the IMO tacit amendment 
procedures…so that’s in here…so this is borrowing from the IMO. (KI-2). 
Another respondent confirmed the role of the shipowners’ group in suggesting a 
consolidated convention: 
There was a concern amongst the shipowners that there was a whole body 
of international law covering labour standards for seafarers that had been 
adopted at the ILO and not all of it had taken effect, not all the conventions 
had been ratified, those that had been…were still unratified by a number 
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of significant flag States…and we had a discussion as to what we could do 
to improve things and to make these more effective and the idea was put 
forward to …consolidate them all into one single instrument. (KI-5-
shipowners’ group). 
The Geneva Accord outlined the areas of agreement between the 
seafarers’ and shipowners’ group to consolidate the ILO conventions.  The upgrade 
entailed an overhauling of the conventions and making them more “ratification 
friendly” for governments.  There was consensus surrounding the change of 
format toward the IMO model where the articles, regulations and standards were 
under one cover with a tacit approval approach for amending the guidelines.  But, 
as the findings show, the shipowners’ group was resistant to too much change in 
terms of existing text.    
The research found that representation was consolidated more out of 
custom than any strategic move to give seafarers a genuine “say” in OHS, although 
the responses showed some received wisdom that workers’ should be included in 
OHSM.  One seafarers’ group member was not clear where the provisions came 
from outside of giving the general philosophy of the ILO (bearing in mind the 
retrospective nature of the study):    
…and it isn’t a particularly revolutionary convention…it isn’t particularly 
revolutionary…and it is in the spirit, which is why I try to frame my answer 
in the context that this is a tripartite instrument developed by three 
parties…(KI-3) 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.2.2.) corroborates this response.  Although a 
commentary by the ILO office showed that representation was consolidated from 
Convention 134, and in the spirit of ILO’s guidelines, in particular the COPAP, it 
was also not “revolutionary” and perpetuated the status quo.   
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6.2.3. The Influence of Other ILO Conventions 
Other ILO conventions covering land-based industries also featured among the 
explanations as to the origins of the provision for seafarers’ representation in the 
MLC.  The land-based conventions were mentioned to substantiate the 
explanations regarding the embeddedness of the ILO’s philosophy and tripartite 
structure in all its instruments.  General references were made to the ILO’s 
involvement in the process and it was therefore presumed that this could have 
been where the provision originated: 
I think it’s not impossible that in the formulation of these particular 
words…the ILO office would’ve been advising us on other ILO standards, 
for example, so if there are other ILO standards that suggest that seafarers’ 
representatives…or workers’ representatives should be involved, the 
answer might lie there, because the office would’ve been advising us… (KI-
3 – seafarers’ representatives)    
This explanation was also given by another participant in relation to the 
ILO’s involvement in drafting the convention guided by what was agreed in the 
meetings:     
…ILO, I think, hoped that they could just push through the health and safety 
stuff from elsewhere…because they were focussing on trying to resolve the 
issues related to social security…stuff then came from the ILO which they 
wanted to take from land-based stuff which related to occupational safety 
and health and participation.  So they prepare the drafts… they include 
stuff to complete sections that were not as controversial…I think to help 
the process along and to keep their focus, they include stuff on 
occupational safety and health and they would include participation…(KI-4 
- shipowners’ group)  
The commentary by the ILO on the draft prepared for the technical 
conference showed that the ILO had included provisions for OHSM systems based 
on its own publication and this was the draft that had provisions for 
representation as seen in the MLC (PTMC/04/2).  Other ILO conventions, in various 
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ways, make up the ILO regime for health and safety and representation.  For 
example, Convention 135, Workers’ Representatives Convention, 1971, (and the 
Workers’ Representatives Recommendation, 143), sets out protective rights for 
workers’ representatives in carrying out their roles.  Its preamble makes 
references to Convention 98, 1949, on the Application of the Principles of the Right 
to Organise and to Bargain Collectively.  Convention 98 establishes rights of 
workers and employers to non-interference in the establishment of their 
organizations and participation in such organizations.  Convention 98, Article 1 
speaks to the protection of workers from “acts of anti-union discrimination in 
respect of their employment.”  Convention 98 does not make specific reference to 
workers’ representatives but its alignment with representation in Convention 135, 
expands the protection it offers to workers’ representatives.   
A year prior to Convention 98, the ILO membership adopted Convention 
87, 1948 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize.  
Convention 87 sought to protect these rights from government intervention, while 
Convention 98 focused on workers’ protection from employers’ interference.  
These three early conventions speak to representative participation or the 
principle of participation confirming its embeddedness in the ILO structure and 
previous conventions.  They allude to unionization, although the word itself is not 
used, it is accepted that unions are workers’ representative organizations in the 
ILO and makes it a reasonable conjecture that the MLC framework expects union 
involvement.   
Further, the Director General’s final report on the MLC (ILO, 2006c), makes 
references to the influence of Convention 155.  Convention 155 is not sector 
specific but makes exceptions for the shipping industry owing to its particular 
characteristics.  This point is important as elsewhere the ILO points out the 
influence of the Robens Committee self-regulatory approach on Convention 155 
(ILO 2009b) and therefore underscores the link that this thesis makes between the 
MLC and land-based self-regulatory practices.  This link also highlights one of the 
arguments of the thesis regarding the re-cycling of ideas and approaches rather 
than innovative thinking.   
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6.3. Rationale for Representation in the MLC 
The architects of the convention were asked for the rationale for including the 
provision to ascertain how they envision seafarers might benefit from being given 
a “voice.”  Similar responses as those given on the origins of the provision, served 
as rationalizations for its presence in the MLC.  Representation was included 
because that was the custom of the ILO based on its tripartite structure, therefore 
it is required in any instrument developed by the ILO.  Additionally, there were 
other explanations specific to answering the question “why?”  This section 
examines the main arguments that emerged in this regard: codifying existing 
measures; developments in OHSM in general including risk assessment; the 
provision was uncontroversial and; it is beneficial to shipowners. 
 
6.3.1. Codifying Existing Practices 
It was explained that health and safety standards in the MLC were also a 
codification of what “good shipowners” were already doing.  This explanation was 
given mainly by shipowners’ group members.  The “good shipowner” was a 
recurring theme in the interviews (further explored in Chapter 9).  The shipowners 
were instrumental in the development of the MLC and it was made clear that 
those involved were seeking to re-regulate the industry to address unfair 
competition.  These shipowners could be considered as the “good shipowners” 
operating at the better end of the market.  One respondent reported: 
Well originally it was… shipowners [– unclear] that pushed forward this 
idea because we wanted to try to negotiate with…we were fed-up …quite 
frankly of the bad shipowners giving the industry a bad name, think it’s like 
that all over... probably similar for airlines, you know… (KI- 4 – shipowners’ 
group).  
Therefore, substandard shipowners who were driving global labour 
standards down were the targets of the MLC rather than “good shipowners.”  The 
“good shipowners” wanted to make things better for themselves but did not wish 
to be subjected to additional regulations.  It therefore made sense that they would 
wish to formalize some of their practices to bring substandard operators in line, 
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but which would require little change in their operations (as the findings in other 
chapters show).  This finding is not unlike the development of the ISM Code which 
was also a codification of best practices of “good shipowners” (discussed in 
Chapter 3).  A shipowners’ group member said:   
…what we wanted…was really what the good shipowners, what the well 
established companies were doing already, which is basically what’s 
codified here in standard A4.3, so health and safety policies, on board 
programmes and the involvement of crew members...that’s not to say it 
was happening everywhere, but if you look at it from the point of view of, 
for example, a ship operator based in the European Union or flagged in the 
EU, there is already a pretty comprehensive body of health and safety law 
emanating from EU directives. (KI-5). 
The EU was also reported as one of the influencers at the MLC meetings.  
One seafarers’ group member explained it was so the EU could monitor what was 
being proposed to ensure the final document was compatible with EU directives: 
…the European Commission was also there advising us and also informing 
the European seafarers and shipowners’ groups of the necessity to make 
sure that nothing came into the convention would cause a problem at the 
European level, if we wanted Europe to embrace the convention…and 
don’t forget the EU would have to give the OK to member States to ratify 
the convention and did so.  So, they got very nervous around the provisions 
because they didn’t want anything that conflicted with treaty 
obligations…there’re directives on this subject matter and so we would 
have been thinking about what the directives said as well.  Of course that’s 
a sensitive issue because you can’t tell the rest of the word that they have 
to adopt European standards, but it’s quite possible that within the 
framework of these discussions in the corridors, in breakout groups, these 
issues would come up… what are existing ILO standards in other areas, 
other industries general ILO conventions and what EU directives are out 
there. (KI-3). 
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Another seafarers’ group interviewee also mentioned the EU’s presence as an 
important element in determining the text of the MLC and in this respect, its 
provisions for health and safety: 
…the EU as well would want to make sure it was compatible with their 
system.  The EU has its directives and requirements for risk 
assessment…there is the role for representatives in this… the EU system 
very much has worker representatives as part of health and safety. (KI-1).  
The documentary records were silent on any interventions by the EU 
although the list of participants at the end of each meeting report showed EU 
presence.  However, documents do not provide accounts of all the other meetings 
that took place.  Small group meetings were held where only the results were 
made public.  It is also expected that informal discussions formed a large part of 
these negotiations as a seafarers’ group respondent pointed out (KI – 3).  Greater 
involvement of the EU was recorded in two in-depth interviews with key figures, 
who were not available for this research (Trebilcock, 2008; 2009). 
That the EU had no objections to the MLC text and directed its members 
to ratify the convention, is an indication of its acceptance of these provisions (EC, 
2012).  The MLC provisions were made into an EU directive to take effect 
simultaneously with the coming into force of the MLC.  This is evidence of the 
compatibility with EU policy (EC, 2009).  Directive 1999/63/EC replicates the MLC 
verbatim.  This might also be considered as further evidence underscoring the 
conventional approach to representation which reproduces the status quo.  As 
Chapter 2 discussed for land-based workplaces, these measures in their traditional 
form are not necessarily suited to an environment of fragmented (and precarious) 
work and what the evidence in this study has shown, is a continuous re-cycling of 
existing provisions for representation.     
  
6.3.2. Risk Assessment and Changes in Approaches to OHSM 
The rationale for representation in the MLC was also linked to a general trend in 
health and safety where the notions of OHSM and risk assessment were 
introduced.  This explanation also, did not incorporate arguments for decent work 
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and the MLC as the “seafarers’ bill of rights,” rather the adoption of practices 
influenced by wider developments in addressing health and safety was given.  A 
seafarers’ group member explained that these developments would have 
influenced notions of seafarers’ representatives.  He pointed out that:    
…changes took place…the idea of safety and health management systems 
and then as part of this…it is compulsory for employers to develop and 
implement safety and health procedures…he has to involve the 
employees…on top of that is the requirement for risk assessment…and in 
order to do the risk assessment you have to involve the people who are to 
perform those duties and the easiest way is to get the safety rep involved. 
(KI-1). 
This explanation may be reflecting the received wisdom in theory and 
particular understandings and expectations for adopting risk assessment, rather 
than the reality of shipboard life.  Risk assessment has also been a part of the 
OHSM practices on ships through the requirements of the ISM Code.  Bailey 
(2006), for example, found that lack of seafarers’ input undermined effective risk 
management, which highlighted another dimension in which the absence of 
genuine participation has led to a gap between theory and practice.       
The ILO has embraced the language and practices of the systems approach 
for risk assessment and continuous improvement with the expectation that 
workers are included (see for example the ILO guidelines on health and safety 
management systems – ILO-OSH, 2001).  However, early understandings of OHSM 
systems saw them as commercial packages for voluntary, private self-regulation.  
These were management driven and unitarist in their approach to OHSM.  
Workers’ input was orchestrated to assist management’s goals and were direct 
rather than representative and autonomous.  While the OHSM systems approach 
may require workers’ input, this was not mandated but taken as good practice 
(Frick et. al. 2000).   
This contrasts with a systematic approach, such as the EU’s approach, 
which takes a more pluralist view of the workplace and mandates the involvement 
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of workers and/or their representatives to protect workers OHS interests.  Even 
then, these may fall short of envisaged practice in managerialist settings (James 
and Walters, 2002).  A systematic approach does not preclude the use of OHSM 
systems to achieve this goal, as the ILO for example attempts to merge the two in 
its ILO-OSH Management Systems Guidelines (ILO-OSH, 2001).  Commentators 
argue that a systems approach has the potential to deliver positive OHS outcomes 
providing that the preconditions are present (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999: 
43-45).  Another respondent from the seafarers’ group pointed to the ILO’s 
activities in this regard:    
Seafarers representatives is a standard part of risk assessment.  Once the 
requirement for risk assessment exists, it is presumed that representatives 
are involved.  This comes from the ILO Code of Practice on Accident 
Prevention which is in the MLC as one of the documents to be consulted in 
developing policies to comply with the MLC.  It has always been a part of 
the ITF’s collective agreement to have shop stewards and a part of the ILO 
system as a tripartite organization. (KI-7). 
Although this code of practice and other guidelines have no statutory 
weight, and are in essence voluntary, the architects seem to believe that they will 
be given “due” consideration (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1.), as KI-4 reported: “So 
basically the text in the MLC is the flesh and bones and then the more substantive 
meaty stuff is actually in the MOSH guidelines” (KI-4).  These explanations 
underscore the influence of wider developments in regulatory approaches on 
representation in the MLC.  They echo performance standards approach in respect 
of self-regulation, where general duties are substantiated by non-binding codes 
which do not have statutory weight but are of “evidentiary value” to demonstrate 
that activities by the duty holder are comparable with those outlined in codes 
(Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999: 27). 
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6.3.3. Uncontroversial 
To further understand the rationale for representation in the MLC the architects 
were asked about its apparent neglect during the negotiations.  As has been 
revealed to this point, representation was not considered critical, but the notion 
that it was uncontroversial is noteworthy:    
To tell you frankly, it was not considered to be a very, very critical area of 
the convention, not because it’s not important, in the spirit of the ILO this 
is essential to improving conditions of work, on a day to day basis on board 
ship, if you are to improve conditions of work, it is a question of the crew 
finding out what’s wrong to improve the situation, but It was not 
considered a critical area because agreement on those things was not 
difficult, it was not controversial.  Not controversial because it is already 
an acquired system in the ILO that there must be worker representation. 
(KI-8- ILO interviewee). 
A seafarers’ group member also reported that the provision was 
unanimously accepted: “Everyone accepted the provision…” (KI-7).   The main 
arguments emerging was that it was not controversial and given the limited time 
it was not discussed.  It was explained that more controversial issues, such as social 
security, took time.  As put by a shipowners’ group member (KI-4), since “…nobody 
questioned the concept of having trade union representatives, it was a given,” 
there was no need to discuss this matter.  This is surprising given that research 
evidence elsewhere found representation to be political and controversial 
(Chapter 2).  The definition and issues of the rights involved, and the existence of 
direct and collective representation simultaneously, and the role of 
representatives and the extent of their powers, are some of the complexities of 
representation, which seem to have eluded the architects’ awareness.   
Another finding supporting the analysis that representation is 
controversial is the confidence placed in the ISM system by the shipowners’ group.  
The ISM approach to participation is direct, where workers individually represent 
their interest, rather than through representation.  Yet, as one participant from 
the shipowners’ group sees it, provisions were already in place and so there was 
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no need for a discussion on representation in the MLC.  For this participant, the 
MLC was a step backward and the “good shipowners” were already operating at 
higher standards and therefore the “situation” (meaning the ISM arrangements) 
was adequate: 
As far as I’m concerned there was no need. I don’t think there’s a problem 
with that, and therefore there was not much to be gained from a 
discussion. The situation we’ve got at present was deemed adequate. 
There was no need for improvement in this respect. (KI-9).   
Yet, there was a difference with the seafarers’ group that thought the ISM 
was inadequate.  A respondent from that group pointed out: “The ISM does not 
institutionalize seafarers’ representation but we [the ITF] have” (KI-7).  During the 
development of the MLC, conflicts arose in discussing the ISM and its suitability 
for ensuring workers’ rights are upheld (Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2.2.).  Participation 
as understood by the shipowners’ group, is having safety committees and 
consultation of seafarers as per the ISM system, that is, direct participation rather 
than representation.   
Whether the instrument [the ISM] is being used, whether there is a 
committee on board is another issue, but there are provisions already in 
place, which allow… which actually insist on shipboard management to 
consult seafarers, for seafarers to have a voice, whether it works or not is 
another issue. But provisions are already in place (KI-9). 
Consultation in situations of direct participation has emerged at several 
stages throughout this study with the conclusion that typically it does not work.  
In theory, consultation was introduced to ensure non-unionized workers had a 
“say” in health and safety.  In practice, a unitary understanding of consultation 
exists where managerial top-down approaches are deemed to be consultative 
(Chapter 2).  Others have commented on the neglect in the ISM system to include 
workers.  Bhattacharya (2009) for example, argued that allowing seafarers to 
participate under the ISM system is more of a presumption based on good 
management practices than an institutionalized practice for including seafarers.  
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Where OHS committees exist, the literature shows that social conditions on board 
inhibit participation in committee meetings (Bhattacharya, 2012a; Bailey, 2006).  
Committee meetings can be dominated by the captain leaving no opportunity for 
seafarers to participate (Bhattacharya, 2009).  Further, the ISM does not include 
seafarers’ participation (or representation) among its functional requirements.  
Seafarers’ representatives may have been included as part of risk assessment, but 
the ISM does not specifically provide for seafarers’ participation or representation.   
The seafarers’ group in contrast, frames representation within a more 
pluralist understanding of industrial relations at sea and would rather have union 
involvement on ships.  However, it appears to be a challenge to gain shipowners’ 
commitment to representation on board.  A seafarers’ group member explained:   
It is the ITF’s view that safety reps should be preferably elected and be 
union reps; if not the union should be consulted. The safety reps should 
have the same protection as union reps and should be allowed to contact 
the unions concerned without fear of prosecution. (KI-1).   
These findings underscore the argument that representation is 
controversial, particularly as a shipowners’ group member explained that they 
would not have accepted any union-type representation.  This explanation is more 
consistent with the expected behaviours of shipowners when the wider context of 
employers’ attitudes to representation on OHSM is considered.  The respondent 
reported:     
…There might be a misunderstanding over the term "seafarers’ 
representatives".  Although not often expressed publicly, shipowners are 
very determined to avoid a situation arising on board where a crew 
member might appear before the Master and claim to represent the crew 
before making a demand i.e. a shop steward or union convenor. They will 
in the main accept a shore-based union official making demands on behalf 
of their employees - provided the employees are members of that union - 
but they will resist a union-type structure emerging among the crew of a 
ship. Shipboard Safety Representatives are not generally regarded by 
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employers as representatives of the crew in a union sense so their role is 
considered to be a practical rather than a political device. (KI-2-
shipowners’ group). 
The documentary evidence supports this testimony in not having any record of 
representation being discussed, showing instead the acceptance of the provisions 
without objections.  This study revealed that while representation might have 
been unanimously accepted, there are underlying issues such as a distinction 
between the shipowners’ and seafarers’ groups as to the meaning of 
representation.  These differences might have benefitted from a discussion and 
perhaps resulted in a more suitable model.  
Another explanation for the scant attention paid to representation during 
the negotiations is that the provisions do not place too much obligation on 
shipowners: 
I am sure there was not much discussion because it was not controversial, 
the contents are pretty straightforward it doesn’t bring a lot of obligation 
on shipowners as that’s is why it was easily accepted. (KI-8- ILO 
interviewee). 
On the contrary, representation has a number of statutory obligations for 
employers, particularly in the context of facilitating the operation of the practice 
(Walters and Nichols, 2007).  The employer should provide resources for 
representatives to fulfil their roles, provide training, they have obligations to 
consult, give information and to listen to representatives (Chapter 2).  These 
details are however in the guidelines and might rightly be interpreted as not 
placing much obligation on shipowners.  Of greater concern is that this response 
gives cause to reflect on the intended purpose of representation in the MLC.      
Representation as the architects reported, turned out to be ambiguous and 
is in need of clarification within the MLC framework.  The findings clearly illustrate 
that the architects do not share a common understanding of representation and 
that it is controversial, contrary to their testimonies.  As the provisions were not 
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discussed, these contradictions did not arise in the negotiations, however they are 
more likely to be apparent at the shipboard level (Chapter 8).    
 
6.4. Protecting Seafarers or Shipowners?    
Although it was absent from the discussions, the respondents from the seafarers’ 
groups saw a role for representation as giving seafarers a “say” on board.  When 
questioned further about lack of supports and the reason for including 
representation, a respondent from the seafarers’ group thought it was logical for 
shipowners to want to include seafarers.  It was put this way:     
How would you develop on board programmes for prevention of 
occupational health and safety management if you didn’t involve the very 
people whose health you were trying to improve or whose safety you were 
trying to improve without listening to them and the problems and 
experiences and giving examples of where things have gone wrong or 
where things have gone right. How would you do that without…it seems 
very obvious…if you start from the perspective that we are involved as 
equals in this process [i.e. the social partners], you then determine that 
there is a need to make sure there is continuous improvement, how would 
you go about that without involving seafarers? (KI-3-seafarers’ group). 
This respondent applied a simple rationality to a complex issue.  Although 
the response is in keeping with perspectives in the literature on the importance of 
including workers, the absence of deliberate actions to ensure shipowners fulfil 
these obligations raises questions as to the level of understanding relative to the 
requirements to support representation.  The participant seems to have 
erroneously thought that since there was cooperation at the international level 
then this might also be translated into cooperation at the shipboard level.      
Within the literature, the rationale for worker representation might be 
divided into two broad themes.  Representation is a protective mechanism for 
employees, particularly, where unions are involved, and is considered a 
countervailing force against management’s decisions, whose interests differ from 
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employees in some respects (Walters and Frick, 2000; Gunningham and 
Johnstone, 1999: 3-6).  The idea expressed by KI-3, echoes the ethical perspective 
in this literature which is required to balance the power relations.  Additionally, 
workers might also be involved from a practical perspective that they have the 
knowledge of the day-to-day work and are best placed to advise management in 
a corporatist framework (Walters and Nichols, 2009).  These ideas, although 
expressed by the respondents, fall short for representation in the MLC framework, 
as they lack the appropriate regulatory support.  The literature shows that without 
deliberate orchestration and the presence of the preconditions, employers may 
not fulfil their legal obligations for representation and instead pursue consultation 
without effectively including workers (Walters and Frick, 2000; Gunningham and 
Johnstone, 1999). 
The architects, from the shipowners’ group gave explanations suggesting 
confidence in the “good shipowner” to willingly implement the provisions for 
representation.  Section 6.3.1. noted that the MLC is also a codification of the 
practices of “good shipowners” who are attempting to address substandard 
shipping.  It therefore stands to reason, in the thinking of the architects, that 
shipowners would recognize the value in seeking seafarers’ input: 
Yes, there was never any suggestion that ships would not have a safety 
committee and would not either appoint safety representatives or ask the 
trade unions to appoint safety representatives or have an election.  The 
shipboard safety committee is seen as an integral part of the same 
management system, and it was really quite uncontroversial. (KI-5 – 
shipowners’ group). 
Another explained in terms of utilizing seafarers’ knowledge: 
We see that absolutely as integral because the best people to resolve a 
concern or understand what a concern is are the seafarers themselves.  So, 
you need to have them involved...they can come up with the most cost 
effective and possible solutions…Certainly the big companies recognize 
that health and safety is absolutely paramount and it could be very costly 
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if they get it wrong, so they are changing the culture for people they are 
putting on board (KI-4 shipowners’ group).  
  This explanation is consistent with the employers’ perspective derived 
from the management literature which rationalises participation in cooperative 
terms to support organizational imperatives (Chapter 2).  There are also echoes of 
the business case for health and safety in the participant’s stresses that costs 
might be incurred if seafarers were not included: 
A lot of companies have suggestion schemes, have plans, ask for innovative 
ways to come forward and say…introduce tool box, tool talks, because the 
best ideas invariably come from the people who work at the sharp end and 
so, if nothing else it can be cost effective for the company to be more 
proactive. I’m not saying it’s always philanthropic but there’s a bottom line 
advantage for companies to do it which is why a lot of them are doing it. 
(KI-4- shipowners’ group). 
The mechanisms for including seafarers under the ISM Code, are in keeping 
with this perspective.  They are aimed at allowing seafarers to bring operational 
and technical safety issues to the attention of the shipowner.  In the interviews, it 
emerged that representation might be understood from the shipowners’ group’s 
perspective in terms of protecting shipowners’ interests by preventing costly 
incidents.  This was seen as a strong motivator for shipowners to seek seafarers’ 
input.  Attempts have been made in land-based industries to motivate employers 
to fulfil their health and safety obligations by promoting a business case for health 
and safety (Cutler and James, 1996).   
The business case has however been questioned as management decisions 
are not necessarily determined by costs (Sampson, 2016; Hart, 2010; Cutler and 
James, 1996).  Management is also bound by the need to make short term profits 
and so may defer decisions on health and safety expenditures (Gunningham and 
Johnstone, 1999: 4-5).  Additionally, workers may take risks to keep production 
going (Nichols, 1997; Cutler and James, 1996).  Some decisions also appear to be 
idiosyncratic and are not explained solely by the production and profit theory, as 
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Cutler and James (1996) demonstrated in their analysis of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise casualty.45    
Examples of this nature underscore the argument that the business case is 
not a reliable basis to expect that safety and health will be addressed, and also 
that workers require a countervailing force to management.  In the Herald of Free 
Enterprise case, although the seafarers had made recommendations to enhance 
safety they were dismissed, suggesting that they needed a countervailing force. 
This seems absent for the shipboard work environment in many instances (Xue, 
et. al. 2017; Walters and Bailey, 2013; Bhattacharaya, 2012a).  The architects’ 
responses were therefore, not fully consistent with the complexities of business 
decisions in the industry.  They applied a rather narrow albeit rational view to 
shipowners’ motivation to include seafarers, contrary to the reality. 
In addition to the business case, including seafarers’ in on board practices 
is seen as a protective strategy for shipowners:   
…we’ve always seen safety as a reciprocal thing.  If there is gonna be 
worries about accident prevention at sea, then you can’t just say – we have 
another accident because of those nasty employers – you are going to say 
– hey your guy was on that committee as well. (KI-2- shipowners’ group).  
These understandings of representation are more reflective of direct 
participatory practices with no guarantee of consultation (as the evidence for the 
seafarers’ experiences shows in Chapter 8).  This response carries elements of 
responsibilization, if not blame, for workers having no authority to impact 
decisions. While representation, and the MLC more generally, is prominently 
placed as a tripartite regime, and the importance of social dialogue towards 
achieving decent work was espoused during the MLC development, there was an 
                                                             
45 This casualty resulted from the bow door being left open causing the vessel to be flooded.  The 
operational procedures included manual checking of the bow doors.  However, seafarers’ 
experiences suggested that a warning system that can be monitored from the bridge be installed.  
This was recommended to management but was dismissed because they claim it was a workplace 
matter as they had paid staff to see to this (Cutler and James, 1996). 
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absence of a follow through on ensuring a strong regulatory lead for participatory 
arrangements at the shipboard level.   
This lack of consideration for how representation was to be made effective 
on ships, might be a symptom of the difficulty of obtaining shipowners’ 
acquiescence on this matter.  A seafarers’ group member indicated that 
representation on ships is discussed at the international level when the ITF 
negotiates their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).  Article 30 of the CBA 
provides for safety committees on ships in a manner consistent with existing 
requirements for accident prevention.  In respect of representation, the CBA 
states: 
The Company acknowledges the right of the crew to elect a safety 
representative to the on board Safety and Health Committee.  Such a 
representative shall be entitled to the same protections as the liaison 
representative as provided for in 31.5…(CBA, Article 30, para 30.3: 17). 
Article 31 provides for a “liaison representative.”  This appears to be a case 
of semantics as the wording is consistent with representation: 
The Company acknowledges the right of the seafarers to elect a liaison 
representative from among the crew who shall not be dismissed nor be 
subject to any disciplinary proceedings as a result of the seafarer’s duties 
as a liaison representative unless the Union has been given adequate 
notice of the dismissal and the agreed Grievance procedure has been 
observed (CBA, Article 31, para 31.5: 17-18).  
It is perhaps then a case of having to secure this “right” privately, despite 
challenges, rather than through the ILO’s public form of regulation, in order for it 
to take effect on ships.  However, not all shipowners have agreement with the ITF 
and furthermore there remain challenges even where representation is 
negotiated.  As a seafarers’ group respondent reported: 
Frankly, it [representation] doesn’t work, whatever is said.  If it is a national 
flag and you have 90% national crew, it works, if you have multi-national 
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crew, it doesn’t work. We have CBAs for 11,000 ships, and the CBAs says 
ok the crew has the right to elect their own representatives we have…very 
few cases where the crew was able to elect their own 
representatives…Even before the MLC and even now after the 
implementation of the MLC, we’re having trouble to implement the idea 
of the election of the safety representative on board.  (KI-1). 
The respondent pointed out that some shipowners are resistant to 
representation, even though it is provided for in their collective bargaining 
agreement (CBA) with the ITF.  He explained that some argue that representation 
is not practical, while “good shipowners,” faced with the same challenges appoint 
representatives, although the ITF prefers them to be elected:   
The owners say they have the problems because it is multi-national crew 
and they are on a temporary basis, they have 50% of the crew changing the 
company and they are on board for 6 months or 4 months on 4 months off, 
they don’t know each other, they are coming from different countries, they 
don’t get effectively trade union meetings on board… so what is 
happening… you have the safety committee which operates on a monthly 
basis….good companies they say ok, every other month or every 3 months, 
the safety committee will discuss safety and health issues, and then since 
no union meetings are taking place, no election is taking place, then you 
have in the procedures that the captain has the right to appoint safety 
representatives, so in the safety committee they have appointed already 
maybe the boatswain or somebody from the engine room as member of 
the safety committee…(KI-1 – seafarers’ group).   
This section highlighted perspectives on representation as reported by the 
architects of the MLC.  It was revealed that there are different perceptions of 
representation divided between the employers’ and employees’ groups.  The 
section underscores previous analysis of the need for a shared understanding of 
the meaning of representation and how it is to be operationalized.  While the 
architects reported that the provisions were not discussed because they were 
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uncontroversial, the evidence suggests this was not the case.  Importantly, the 
explanations focussed on the protection of shipowners rather than seafarers.    
 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter presented the findings from the interviews with the architects of the 
convention.  It showed that there is an absence of clarity about representation.  
Importantly, supports were not considered for its on board implementation and 
practice during the MLC negotiations.  The findings support the documentary 
analysis in Chapter 5 that representation was not discussed and added further to 
an understanding as to why this was not the case.  Key themes arising from this 
chapter is the traditional approach to representation with heavy reliance on the 
ILO institutional tripartite structure and land-based approaches.  These 
perpetuated the status quo with a lack of innovation to reflect the contemporary 
realities of the shipboard work environment.   
The findings revealed contradictory thinking in the architects’ reports as to 
the reason for not discussing the provisions.  They claim that it was 
uncontroversial which was surprising as their testimonies revealed otherwise.  An 
apparent tension between the ISM Code and the MLC emerged in these findings 
as it was also reported that the ISM system was adequate and therefore the MLC 
provisions were not needed.  This is further developed in Chapter 8.  
Representation at this developmental level needs to be clarified as it was not 
defined in the MLC and a shared understanding seems to have been taken for 
granted but which does not exist.  Finally, there were no supports provided for 
effective representation, relying only on the notion of the “good shipowner” and 
the business case.   
  
160 
 
7 
Operationalizing Standards for Representation on Ships 
 
The MLC, 2006, is seen by seafarers as a “charter of rights” that will help ensure “Decent 
Work” …no matter where ships sail and no matter which flag they fly.  Shipowners also support 
the MLC, 2006, as it is seen as an important new tool to help ensure a level playing field for 
quality shipowners that may have to compete with ships that have substandard conditions. 
The MLC, 2006, is also important for governments because it brings together nearly 70 
international legal instruments in one comprehensive modern document that covers almost 
every aspect of decent work in this sector. (ILO (2009). Preface. Guidelines for Flag State 
Inspections Under the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
 
7.1. Introduction 
With the aspirations outlined in the flag State inspection guidelines quoted above, 
this chapter examines the regulatory steer by drawing on the findings from the 
documentary analysis and interviews with senior administrators and operations 
personnel (inspectors) in the UK case study.  The UK was chosen as a critical case 
(Yin, 2014) in order to further explore the ILO’s claims that the MLC is a firm 
response to the decent work deficit on ships, focussing on seafarers’ 
representation.  The chapter is divided into two main sections.  The first section 
presents findings on the regulatory lead as one precondition for effective 
representation.  It examines how the MLC provisions were operationalized in UK’s 
laws and policies and assesses what statutory adjustments were made to comply 
with the MLC.  The second section presents the findings on compliance and 
enforcement at the shipboard level and how representation is supported.  No 
shipowner participated at this level, insights into their perspective is restricted to 
data obtained from the inspectors and the union official.    
 
7.2. Operationalizing the Regulatory Lead   
The UK ratified the MLC in 2013, which came into effect for the country in 2014.  
This section explores how the UK operationalized representation for its ships as a 
flag State and also what enforcement it applies to ships visiting its ports which is 
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also useful in exploring whether these provisions for representation are the “firm 
response” envisaged.   
The findings reveal a high level of compatibility between the UK’s 
requirements for representation and those in the MLC framework.  The 
respondents reported that this compatibility, is related to the UK being a member 
of the EU and having to comply with EU directives, as well as ILO conventions that 
the UK had ratified, and the UK’s own national requirements for OHS.  Chapter 6 
(Section 6.3.1) presented findings that suggest the EU was influential in ensuring 
the text of the MLC was consistent with its own requirements, which was later 
underscored by its sanctioning of the MLC as a directive.  In explaining the 
connection with the EU’s requirements, a senior inspector said:    
We were quite fortunate, because our safety regulations stem from the EU 
directive, so it came into force years ago, 1997, so we were well ahead of 
the process because what the MLC requires is not too different to what 
we’ve already got in place. (KI-10).   
The responses of the senior policy officers also corroborate this explanation:   
We have a lot in health and safety legislation.  It comes from the EU and 
the framework directive and daughter directives on health and safety, 
which apply across the board in Europe.  We’d already implemented those 
for UK ships. …we had risk assessment requirements, and requirements for 
reporting and investigation of accidents, we had requirements for health 
and safety policy on board ships. (KI-11). 
As founding members of the ILO, advanced economies in Europe have 
always influenced standard making at the international level (Van Daele, 2008).  
Commentators have argued that this continues with key decision-making 
positions, such as in its Governing Body, occupied by the major industrialized 
countries in Europe (Van Daele, 2008: 491).  This argument is also important to 
note for further discussions on the UK’s compatibility with the MLC.    
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The other source of inspiration for the UK’s provisions on representation 
as reported by the policy makers, is the ILO.  It was explained that the UK would 
have been in compliance with the MLC requirements as it was already applying a 
number of ILO maritime conventions, chief of which for regulating health and 
safety were Conventions 134, 147, 178 and 180.  Figure 7.1 briefly describes these 
instruments. 
Figure 7.1: ILO Maritime OHS Conventions Influencing UK’s Compliance Regime 
Convention 134 - Prevention of 
Accidents (Seafarers) Convention, 
1970. Entry into force, 17 February, 
1973. 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO
::P12100_ILO_CODE:C134  
 
Makes general references for a person to be 
appointed, or a committee, who is responsible for 
accident prevention. Establishment of OHS 
programmes should be done in cooperation with the 
social partners and that such programmes should be 
organized so that they can play an active part.  Also 
provides for training in OHS and sharing of information 
on hazards. (Articles 7 to 9).  
Convention 147 - Merchant 
Shipping (Minimum Standards) 
Convention, 1976. Entry into force 
28 November, 1981. 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO
::P12100_ILO_CODE:C147  
Speaks to ratifying States having laws for safety 
standards, social security, living and working 
conditions on board. Also, agreement between 
shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations to adhere to 
provisions for freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, for mechanisms to address seafarers’ 
complaints both on foreign ships and flag-ships.   
Minimal provisions for port State inspection of 
working and living conditions. 
Convention 178 - Labour Inspection 
(Seafarers) Convention, 1996. Entry 
into force 22 April, 2000. 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO
::P12100_ILO_CODE:C178  
Provides for flag State inspection of working and living 
conditions. For the appointment of inspectors with 
requisite qualifications and statutory support to board 
and inspect ships and require deficiencies to be 
remedied. Article 9 has requirements for inspection 
reports to be sent to the ship’s master and a copy 
posted on the ship’s notice board for the attention of 
the seafarers or be sent to their representatives. 
Convention 180 - Seafarers' Hours 
of Work and the Manning of Ships 
Convention, 1996. Entry into force 
08 August, 2002. 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO
::P12100_ILO_CODE:C180  
 
Sets conditions for maximum hours of work and 
minimum hours or rest and how these shall be 
managed.  
Source: Author – compiled from the respective ILO websites 
 
In Chapter 6 (6.2.1.) it emerged that the proposal to consolidate previous 
conventions was initially resisted by the ILO.  One reason for this resistance was 
to prevent the lowering of standards as some States were already applying these 
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individual conventions.  The UK however, maintained those standards, which 
meant the country was already in compliance with the ILO health and safety 
provisions, including requirements for representation.  Other researchers have 
noted in cross-national comparisons of inspection regimes that the UK was the 
most consistent in inspecting living and working conditions (eg. Bloor et. al. 2005).  
Convention 134 in particular, covers accident prevention and has requirements for 
safety representatives, or safety committees.  As the senior inspector noted: 
Convention 134 was subsumed into the MLC.  A lot of Convention 134 that 
is not that old would be repeated verbatim in here [in the MLC] and 
updated slightly.  I will give you another example, Convention 180 would 
get the same in the MLC, the whole text of 180 is in here, and that would’ve 
been covered by convention 147 for foreign ships and 178 for UK ships. (KI-
10). 
In addition to the ILO’s influence, interviewees further identified the UK’s own 
developments in influencing provisions for OHSM on ships.   
…we already had requirements for health and safety guidelines to be 
provided for ships.  We had the Code of Safe Working Practices for 
Merchant Seamen which had been around since about the 1970s and 
updated regularly, so that was already in place, so we broadly comply, it 
was just a question of bringing the legislation fully in line. (KI-11: senior 
policy officer). 
This interviewee explained that these requirements were stimulated by the 
requirements for health and safety in UK’s land-based industries:   
The land-based HSW 1974 Act covers shore-based regulations and the 
HSE46, the other government body, they implement legislation for shore-
based industries under the act… so maritime and coastguard agency and 
                                                             
46 Health and Safety Executive (HSE), is the land-based agency for policy making and enforcement 
of health and safety regulations in land-based enterprises in Great Britain.  Northern Ireland has 
its own agency that carries out the same functions.  However, the maritime administration (UK 
Marine and Coast Guard Agency [UKMCA]) covers the entire UK, as explained by a senior policy 
officer (KI – 11). 
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its predecessors have basically implemented parallel legislation for 
shipping. (KI-11). 
This view was also supported by the senior inspector who indicated that:   
It was agreed with the Health and Safety Executive that their work would 
stop at the gangway, and our work would start at the gangway…so the 
wording of the regulations, the scope of the regulations is very similar 
between the two, so you can draw direct parallels between what you have 
to do ashore and what you do at sea (KI-10). 
The application of land-based requirements to situations at sea is 
somewhat of a concern.  Although parallels exist in terms of how globalization has 
affected other workplaces and there are suggestions that seafarers could benefit 
from practices such as representation (eg. Walters, 2005), it is also recognized that 
shipping has its own idiosyncrasies.  This recognition is emphasized in the 
preamble to the MLC (2006: 1): “given the global nature of the shipping industry, 
seafarers need special protection….”  The evidence did not show, from the UK’s 
case, where special arrangements or adjustments were made to ensure the 
viability of these land-based provisions in the shipping context. 
The respondents’ accounts corroborated each other on the UK’s preparations 
to comply with the requirements of the MLC and influences on the UK’s statutory 
provisions for representation.  Further, these accounts for the origins and 
rationale for representation in the MLC as understood by those at the UK level, 
echo those explanations at the developmental level.  The UK’s laws and policies 
already satisfied the MLC requirements and only minor adjustments were made 
to its regulations in order to give effect to the MLC framework for representation 
(and OHS requirements in general).  As the interviewees revealed, adjustments 
were made in the UK’s regulations and policy to: 
• Reflect the widened definition of a seafarer to include non-technical 
maritime crew; 
• Adjust the wording to reflect the requirements for safety committees.  The 
UK regulations previously provided for the establishment of a safety 
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committee on a ship with “more than 5” seafarers.  The MLC requires a 
committee to be established where there are “5 or more” seafarers; 
• Include regulations for reporting occupational diseases as previously there 
were regulations only to report accidents. 
 
These points reflect the extent to which the MLC provisions impacted on 
health and safety arrangements and representation for seafarers in the UK.  This 
is hardly surprising when one learned that the UK was heavily involved in the 
development of the MLC as a member country, and subsequently in the drafting 
of flag and port State guidelines and the development of the MLC health and safety 
guidelines.  The interviewees’ accounts told a story of “business as usual” and a 
smooth transition for ships on the UK flag and also in its PSC regime.  
   
7.2.1. The UK’s Regulatory Steer for Representation on Ships 
The UK has documented its regulatory steer for OHSM and seafarers’ 
representation in the Code of Safety Working Practices for Merchant Seamen 
(COSWP).  According to a senior inspector, this is the “Bible” for health and safety 
practices on UK ships, which is also used by other flag States: 
…we’ve always had this on UK merchant ships… so this is the Bible for 
practices on board that we insist that UK flag ships always have this…most 
ships in the world will have a copy of this safe working practices, whether 
they are UK ships or not.  This has become the sort of international Bible 
of how you should operate safety on board ships… (KI-13).   
The COSWP is a little over 500-pages long and gives details of how to 
implement and manage health and safety on ships.  It is regarded among the most 
important codes in the maritime industry.47  Respondents indicated that it was 
developed in the 1970s and periodically revised with the latest revision at the time 
of the interviews being 2015.  The Code was next revised in 2017, but with no 
                                                             
47 See for example a blog by a deck officer, Shilavadra Bhattacharjee (2017) who considers the 
COSWP among 23 important maritime codes used in the shipping industry.  None of these include 
any ILO codes. Marine Insight website: https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/21-
important-codes-used-in-the-shipping-industry/  
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changes to the section on representation.  The UK system requires that copies are 
made available on all its ships and accessible to all crew members.  The document 
covers a wide range of subject matter from the social to the highly technical.  The 
COSWP speaks specifically to safety but is intended as a “health and safety” code.  
This underscores the observations by others that seafarers’ health is somewhat 
given less attention than safety as they critique the industry’s heavy focus on 
technical and operational safety (eg. Bloor et. al. 2005; Nielsen and Panayides, 
2005).    
Although codes of practice are usually voluntary, the UK gives the COSWP 
legal status by referencing it in the UK regulations (The Merchant Shipping and 
Fishing Vessels (Health and Safety at Work) Regulations 1997; Part I, Section 2, 
paragraph 2) and cross-referenced with respective parts of these regulations 
(demonstrated in Figure 7.2 below).  As a senior inspector explained: “…for these 
regulations… the Code means the Code of Safe Working Practices, so the 
regulations say you must comply with the Code, so that’s how they bring it into 
force.” (KI-13).  
Safety representatives are listed among safety officials in Chapter 13 of the 
COSWP.  It contains broad statements requiring full cooperation of all those 
concerned in creating and maintaining a safe working environment: 
As described in Chapter 1, Managing occupational health and safety, the 
development of a positive ‘safety culture’ and the achievement of high 
standards of safety depend on good organisation and the whole-hearted 
support of management and all seafarers. Those with specific safety 
responsibilities are more likely to perform well when management is 
clearly committed to health and safety. It is also important that procedures 
are in place so that all seafarers can cooperate and participate in 
establishing and maintaining safe working conditions and practices. 
(COSWP; 13.1.3: 149). 
This is a clear statement in the UK’s regulatory steer acknowledging the 
importance of management commitment to an effective participatory system.    
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Figure 7.2 presents the general guidance in the COSWP for management to engage 
with representatives.  The corresponding regulations which give them effect, are 
shown above each paragraph (COSWP: 13.2.4-13.2.7).   
Figure 7.2: Provisions for Representation as written in the UK’s COSWP 
Source: UK Government Website48  
 
                                                             
48Gov.UK  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-safe-working-practices-for-
merchant-seafarers-coswp.   
Reg. 19(1)  
13.2.4 The employer is required to consult workers or their elected representatives on health 
and safety matters, in particular:arrangements for the appointment of a competent 
person;the findings of the risk assessment; arrangements for health and safety training; and 
the introduction of new technology.  
Reg. 20(1)  
The matters to be discussed might also include the selection of work equipment and/or 
protective clothing and equipment, installation of safety signs, follow-up to accidents and 
other incidents, and arrangements for health surveillance.  
13.2.5 Seafarers and other workers on board or their elected representatives must be 
allowed to make representations to the Company or their employer about health and safety 
matters without disadvantage to themselves. Such representations should be given adequate 
consideration, perhaps in conjunction with the safety committee, and any agreed measures 
to improve safety implemented as soon as reasonably practicable.  
13.2.6 It is also the Company’s and the employer’s responsibility to ensure that workers or 
their elected representatives have access to relevant information and advice about health 
and safety matters from inspection agencies and health and safety authorities and, from their 
own records, about accidents, serious injuries and dangerous occurrences.  
Reg. 20(3)  
13.2.7 The Company and the employer must give elected representatives adequate time off 
normal duties, without loss of pay, to enable them to exercise their rights and carry out their 
function effectively. Safety representatives must not suffer any disadvantage for undertaking 
this function.  
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Employers’ duties include consultation with workers or their 
representatives.  The code outlines the matters on which seafarers’ 
representatives should be consulted such as the purchasing of equipment.  
Employers also have a duty to facilitate the functioning of representation, by 
making arrangements for the election of representatives: “On every ship on which 
five or more seafarers are working, the Company must make arrangements for the 
election of safety representatives…” (COSWP: 13.3.3.1).  This section goes on to 
say the company should make rules for such elections in consultation with the 
seafarers’ organization and consideration should be given to the number of 
seafarers on the ship, the departments or working groups so that there is effective 
representation on board.  Section 13.3.8 speaks to effective two-way 
communication between the company and representatives and the need to keep 
them informed of developments on matters which they have brought to the 
company’s attention.  While these provisions are similar to the MLC framework, 
these have been given statutory weight by the UK, unlike the MLC provisions that 
are in non-mandatory guidelines. 
On closer examination however, the UK’s system presents some 
inconsistency.  Although it outlines details for election of representatives, that 
section ends by saying the master “must record the election or appointment of 
every safety representative in writing…” (COSWP: 13.3.3.4).  This wording suggests 
that representatives may be elected or appointed, but the text of the COSWP is 
not clear as it combines both.  There are no details as to how the appointment 
should take place and under what conditions.  Elected representatives cannot be 
terminated by the employer, the company or the master and the COSWP indicates 
that where changes take place on board, the master must remind seafarers of 
their rights to elect new representatives.  However, in the event of an appointed 
representative, it is not clear for example, who should appoint these and whether 
they can be terminated by the employer.  This is a point needing clarification 
considering the inspectors reported that most of the representatives are 
appointed by the shipowner. 
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Further, the major role is that of the safety officer.  A distinction is made 
between the “responsibilities” of the safety officer and the “powers” of the 
representative.  The safety officer is responsible for safety practices on board.  This 
person has to maintain a relationship with the safety committee and the safety 
representative.  They carry out risk assessment, keep all parties informed, and 
ensure seafarers are knowledgeable in the ships’ safety policy and practices.  The 
safety officer also “…has a duty to stop dangerous work in progress…” (COSWP: 
13.4.6) and should encourage other seafarers to stop work that they believe could 
cause an accident (COSWP: 13.4.6.3).   
In some land-based jurisdictions, such as Australia (Johnstone, 2009: 43) 
and Spain (Garcia et. al. 2009: 87), representatives are given statutory rights to 
stop dangerous work.  Commentators are of the opinion that the right to stop 
dangerous work is as much an actual empowerment tool, as well as a symbolic 
one, and serves to strengthen representatives’ position (eg. Walters, 2006).  The 
MLC framework has references in its guidelines to seafarers removing themselves 
from dangerous situations.  The COPAP (para 2.5.2: 8), says “seafarers should have 
the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations or operations when 
they have good reason to believe that there is an imminent and serious danger to 
their safety and health.”  Section 4.4 of the MOSH (2014: 37) guidelines, repeats 
verbatim, this text in the COPAP.  As guidelines, these documents do not have any 
statutory weight.  Refusing dangerous work is an important workers’ right under 
international labour law (Hilgert, 2013) and it was surprising that the subject was 
not raised for the MLC despite claims of updating the provisions and innovation.     
In contrast to the safety officers’ role, the text of the COSWP: Section 13.5, 
on powers of safety representatives, is curiously worded: 
13.5.1 Unlike the safety officer, the safety representative has powers not 
duties, although membership of the safety committee imposes certain 
obligations. [Emphasis added]. 
13.5.2 Safety representatives may, with the agreement of the safety 
officer, participate in investigations and inspections carried out by the 
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safety officer or, after notifying the master or a nominated deputy, may 
carry out their own investigation or inspection.  
13.5.3 They may also make representations to the Company or the relevant 
employer on potential hazards and dangerous occurrences, and to the 
master, Company or employer on general health and safety matters, such 
as the findings of the risk assessment, health and safety training, and the 
introduction of new technology.  
13.5.4 They may request, through the safety committee, that the safety 
officer undertakes an investigation and reports back to them, and may 
inspect any of the records the safety officer is required to keep under the 
regulations. They should ensure that they see all incident reports 
submitted to the MAIB under the accident reporting regulations (see 
section 13.3.8.4).  
This text suggests that these activities are left to the discretion of the 
representatives, who may, or as implied, may not exercise these powers.  
Although “powers” may suggest a stronger position, an absence of specific duties 
and support in a precarious and hierarchical working context such as the shipboard 
environment, might be less empowering as the representative might be wary of 
exercising powers in ambiguous situations.      
The COSWP was developed in the spirit of tripartism led by UK policy 
makers and included seafarers’ and shipowners’ groups.  The interviewees who 
are currently responsible for administering and updating the Code were also 
involved in aspects of the MLC process as advisers on national committees and/or 
at the international level where the various guidelines were developed to support 
the MLC provisions, including the MOSH guidelines.  The COSWP is an articulation 
of the model of representation envisaged by the UK, which is also similar to the 
MLC.  As the senior inspector explained:   
The Code of Safe Working Practices for Merchant Seamen, COSWP…that’s 
the basis really of what we expect to happen on board a ship, that’s what 
we want them to adhere to.  That was also used as a guide for the ILO MLC 
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health and safety guidelines, we were happy for them …those developing 
the MOSH… to refer to them…the COSWP guidelines.  The idea of 
COSWP…it is a practical guide to the seafarer and every ship has to carry 
one, and that sets out the roles of safety officers, the roles of safety 
representatives and what’s expected and what training they need, so in 
many ways that was already in place for the UK. (KI-10).   
These findings support previous analysis (in Chapter 6) of the perpetuation 
of the status quo in setting the standards for representation on ships.  The 
customary practices for representation were re-cycled from one document to 
another without apparent thought for their relevance or of the supports required 
to make them effective.  As it was found that the UK’s and wider EU and ILO 
practices were used as guidelines for the MLC framework, it became clear that the 
MLC provisions had no new or innovative standards for representation that could 
stimulate changes in how representation is approached at the UK level and 
subsequently on ships.   
 
7.3. Implementing and Enforcing the Standards for Representation   
This section furthers the analysis as to the strength and viability of the MLC 
provisions on representation by examining the findings relating to its 
implementation and enforcement on ships.  Countries that ratify the MLC, in their 
roles as flag and/or port States,49 are required to have arrangements in place to 
ensure the requirements of the MLC are applied to ships on their registry and/or 
those calling at their ports.  The common practice in the maritime industry is to 
have a maritime administration with an inspectorate to implement and enforce 
the obligations the convention places on the State.  This form of horizontal 
governance is the source of some of the criticisms levied against the ILO’s 
governance regime as countries may not have the will and/or the capacity to 
implement standards (Thomas, 2018; Biffl and Isaac, 2002).            
                                                             
49 Not all flag States are port States, eg. Bolivia and Mongolia, 2 land-locked countries also have 
international ship registers.  
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A part of the MLC which is considered innovative for an ILO convention, is 
the requirement for the certification of compliance measures (Charbonneau and 
Chaumette, 2010; Bolle, 2006).  The compliance system requires the completion 
of a Declaration of Maritime Labour Compliance (DMLC) Parts I and II.  Part I refers 
to the responsibility of the competent authority50 within the State.  The DMLC Part 
I (MLC, Appendix A5-II: 95-97), is to be completed by the competent authority 
outlining the national requirements giving effect to each of the subject matter as 
per the following list (MLC, Appendix A5-I: 91):   
• Minimum age 
• Medical certification 
• Qualifications of seafarers 
• Seafarers’ employment agreements 
• Use of any licensed or certified or regulated private recruitment 
and placement services 
• Hours of work or rest 
• Manning levels for the ship 
• Accommodation 
• On-board recreational facilities 
• Food and catering 
• Health and safety and accident prevention 
• On-board medical care 
• On-board complaint procedures 
• Payment of wages 
 
In the DMLC Part II, the shipowner is required to indicate measures 
adopted to comply with each of the items listed in the DMLC Part I (MLC Appendix 
A5-II: 98-99).  After inspection, the competent authority issues a Maritime Labour 
Certificate (MLC, Appendix A5-II: 92-94), indicating that the ship has been 
                                                             
50 The competent authority is defined in the MLC as the minister, government department or other 
authority having power to issue and enforce regulations, orders or other instructions having the 
force of law in respect of the subject matter of the provision concerned. (MLC 2006: 2). 
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inspected and the measures the shipowner have indicated comply with the 
national requirements for giving effect to the MLC.  These documents are to be 
kept on board and inspected during subsequent flag and port State inspections.  
These documents have a 5-year validity.  Flag State inspections occur at 
the initial stage to verify the measures adopted by the shipowner prior to issuing 
the certificate.  An interim inspection takes place half-way through the validity 
period to ensure the standards are being maintained, and then a renewal 
inspection for re-issuing of the certificate.  There are other circumstances 
requiring inspections such as, change of registry, change of owner or modifications 
to the ship.  Port State control inspections take place depending on the policy of 
the inspectorate and their obligations under the port State control memorandum 
of understanding area in which they are located.51 
 
7.3.1. Inspecting for Representation 
The findings in Chapter 5 indicated that there was agreement among the 
architects of the MLC that compliance and enforcement were important for an 
effective convention.  Compliance and enforcement are the purview of national 
administrations or the organization identified as the competent authority.  An 
inspection regime is an important precondition for effective representation 
(Walters and Nichols, 2007).  Health and safety is one of the key areas to be 
inspected in the MLC regime.  In the UK, arrangements for representation are 
inspected as it falls under health and safety.  As the senior inspector reported: 
“health and safety is one of the 14 items listed in the annex to health and safety 
                                                             
51These are regional agreements on the inspection of foreign ships entering the ports of countries 
in particular geographic regions that have signed to be a part of such agreements, for example the 
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port State Control (Paris MOU on PSC), for western 
Europe in particular or the Caribbean MOU on PSC.  Countries agree to inspect 25% of ships calling 
at their ports and to maintain a database of these inspections and cooperate towards eliminating 
substandard ships from their region. Individual countries use this database to determine which 
ship to target for PSC so as not to duplicate efforts and also to identify high risk ships. 
(https://www.marineinsight.com/maritime-law/what-lead-to-the-formation-of-paris-
memorandum-of-understanding-mou-in-the-shipping-industry/). 
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and accident prevention, so we have to inspect it [representation], it is a 
mandatory item” (KI-10).  He further explained: 
The idea of the DMLC Part II is that ….so we have an input and an output, 
and the process in the middle.  The input is the MLC, the mandatory part 
of the MLC, the DMLC Part II transforms that into practical application, so 
it says that you must have a safety committee…with X number of members, 
the captain will chair it, and have representatives from each department 
of the ship, you will meet once a month and minutes will be provided. (KI-
10).    
Such details are to be found in guidelines in the MLC framework and appear to be 
a re-cycling of existing approaches in the UK and elsewhere.   
In inspecting for the functioning of the OHS committee, inspectors verify 
that a committee is established with the required positions of a safety officer, 
seafarers’ representative and the captain as the chair.  Inspecting for compliance 
entails looking at documentation, walking around the ship and speaking with 
seafarers.  This is more feasible when inspecting ships registered in the UK.   
Inspections are normally conducted with the master or his/her 
representative, who is normally the safety officer.  Comparable studies on 
inspections are limited but Hutter (1993), for example, in examining inspection 
practices in land-based industries in the UK, noted similar behaviours in the 
inspection of workplaces.  Less emphasis is placed on the representatives and 
inspectors tend to focus on the manager or his/her representative (this is 
elaborated on in section 7.3.2).  In their study shadowing PSC inspectors, Bloor et. 
al. (2005) observed a similar pattern of checking documentation and walking 
around the ship.     
Inspectors in this study explained several approaches to inspections due to 
the nature of shipping.  A distinction was made with inspecting large ships and 
small ships.  For example, the senior inspector noted that:  
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So the way I did that when I was doing the cruise ships, they got a large 
safety committee…is we got them all together, all the health and safety 
committee members without senior officers, so the Master is out and the 
Chief is out, so you have junior officers and ratings and we went 
through…what problems have you got…Talking to seafarers is quite a big 
part of this.  If you look at the minutes you will see where the action has 
been closed out and check how effective the committee is on the minutes, 
any outstanding items they’ve got how much has gone to the office ashore 
and what the responses are.  The minutes of the health and safety 
committee will also review any accidents, so the accident reports and 
investigations…whether they changed the practices and did training.  So 
there is a lot of documentation you can look at which confirms that the 
actual MLC requirements is being adhered to or implemented.  But 
underpinning all that is talking to the seafarers. (KI-10).   
For smaller ships, while there are specific criteria against which the 
inspections are conducted, the inspectors indicated that more discretion is 
involved.  As such, there might be deviations in application of the regulations that 
are accommodated during an inspection:   
It varies from company to company.  The tendency is if you go to a smaller 
ship, let’s say you got a crew of 7 or 8 the safety committee usually consists 
of everyone, and 9 times out of 10 they talk about health and safety 
anyway in conversations, because it is so close-knit, you don’t necessarily 
need a meeting to discuss health and safety and in some ways it works 
better that way.  But also smaller ships tend to be a lot more informal so 
the practices that go on might not necessarily be as good as they should be 
because people tend to cut corners. (KI-10 – senior inspector). 
Small ships tend to have all crew as representatives, and therefore the 
policy of electing or appointing a representative is not strictly adhered to: “A lot 
of ships hold safety meetings with all crew, so the representative role does not 
work well. With larger crews it does.” (KI-10 – senior inspector).  These responses 
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reveal that there is a culture of dealing with smaller vessels and some assumptions 
are made particularly in flag State inspections:   
We assume they have safety meetings...they have minutes so we still have 
that documentation…but the actual everyday practices, may not be as rigid 
as you would find on a larger ship, because it is not that level of 
discipline…so there’s more likely to be accidents on smaller ships, and 
statistics prove that. (KI-10 – senior inspector). 
In respect of PSC, inspections appear to offer less of a certainty that health and 
safety committees are functioning.  From the inspectors’ experiences there are 
differences in how flag States exercise jurisdictions over their ships:   
The effectiveness of the convention is dependent very much on how 
dynamic the flag State is.  Now we don’t delegate52 flag Sate inspections 
we do them ourselves…if you take other countries, the one that comes to 
mind is the one that the canal goes through it connecting the Caribbean 
and the Pacific, they’re not dynamic at all and they delegate everything to 
classification societies…they don’t take complaints.  We’ve had a lot of 
complaints related to their ships in the UK…so if you look at safety 
committees, it could be perceived that they are likely to be less effective 
on ships where the flag State does not take any interest, than where a flag 
State does take an interest because we’re monitoring what they are doing. 
(KI-10 – senior inspector).    
Bloor et. al. (2005) discovered such differences in their study of inspection 
regimes.  They refer to the “regulatory character” of flag States and how this 
affects approaches to PSC.  It is not solely the “regulatory character” of the flag 
States however, as practices in the maritime industry also influence how ships are 
inspected.  Although the MLC requires similar topics to be inspected in PSC 
inspections as for flag State, inspectors have less authority to deviate from 
                                                             
52The compliance and enforcement regime developed for the MLC allow States to delegate flag 
State inspections to recognized organizations, although this does not take away the responsibility 
of the flag State. 
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checking documentation when undertaking PSC inspections.  In explaining how 
the system works, the senior inspector said: 
The guidelines for PSC are clear. Unless there are clear grounds then we 
only do an initial inspection. We check paperwork and walk through.  If we 
have clear grounds we will do more detailed inspections in the area we 
found but to the limit of the requirements of MLC.  In UK then if we found 
problems in MLC we would apply no more favourable treatment53 than 
what we expect on UK ships.  The application of MLC should universally be 
the same.  However we see that other flags may not be as rigorous as we 
are in application. (KI-10). 
For PSC, documents are use as prima facie evidence for compliance and 
unless clear grounds exist, inspectors do not necessarily conduct a more detailed 
inspection.  Documents are sometimes falsified on ships (Bloor et. al., 2005: 19-
20).  The inspectors interviewed indicated that the walk-through is an important 
addition, although it may (or may not) give clues as to the working conditions on 
the ship as sometimes the documentation is not a true reflection of the status of 
the ship.  One inspector noted that:   
…so you would have to walk around the ship and see…you know…trip 
hazards…in some ways you have to go for the obvious…the obvious ones 
would be, let’s say you go to the galley, the galley is dirty, you go to the 
store room you find no vegetables, you start asking the crew when did you 
have your last fire drill, safety drill, you find walkways obstructed…the 
obvious, what you can see.  It is very difficult to go to the soft parts, the 
human factors part…the issue of people wishing to talk so you have to go 
for the obvious… cause what you don’t want to do is by your actions make 
the life of the crew worse. (KI-13). 
                                                             
53The “no more favourable treatment” clause was introduced in the MLC compliance and 
enforcement mechanism to ensure the standards are uniformity applied across countries.  As the 
governance regime relies on State regulations, the architects deemed it necessary to insert this 
clause to ensure ships are not inspected against different criteria.     
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When conducting flag State inspections, speaking to seafarers is an 
important element of this walk through.  However, speaking to seafarers has its 
challenges, as discussed in the next section.      
 
7.3.2. Relationship Between Inspectors and Representatives 
The MLC inspection regime makes some general provisions for linking 
representation with inspections where inspection reports are to be sent to the 
master and a copy shall be placed on the ship’s notice board for the attention of 
seafarers or be sent to their representatives upon request (MLC, Standard A5.1.4. 
para 12: 81).  This provision was previously in Convention 178.  With the 
introduction of the DMLC and the Maritime Labour Certificate, provisions were 
also included in the MLC for copies of these to be placed on the ship’s notice board 
for the attention of seafarers, and made available to inspectors, seafarers’ 
representatives and other relevant organizations (MLC, Standard A5.1.3. para 12: 
78).   Additionally, inspections and verifications carried out subsequent to issuing 
the Maritime Labour Certificate and any significant deficiencies found shall be 
recorded and copies made available to seafarers, flag State inspectors and other 
relevant persons/organizations, including shipowners’ and seafarers’ 
representatives (MLC, Standard A5.1.3. para 11: 78). 
The UK also has requirements for a relationship between inspectors and 
seafarers or their representatives.  Although the COSWP does not have this 
provision (perhaps as it is mainly targeted at seafarers), Merchant Shipping Notice 
(MSN) 1848 (2017: 4)54 indicates that inspectors should send reports of their 
inspections to the ship’s master and a copy is to be posted on the notice board for 
seafarers’ information, and a copy may also be sent to the seafarers’ organization.  
However, the reciprocal provisions are not in place for seafarers or their 
representatives to interact with inspectors as in some land-based provisions, 
where representatives may accompany inspectors during inspections or where 
representatives have the right to contact the inspectorate (Hutter, 1993).  Such 
                                                             
54 MSNs are official notices sent out by the UK to advise the shipping industry as to how the UK 
inspects for maritime compliance. 
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contact with external authorities has been individualized through the MLC 
complaints mechanism. 
Details of the role of representatives are found in the non-mandatory 
guidelines and ILO Codes.  These are limited provisions for representatives’ roles, 
particularly when compared to some land-based provisions (Chapter 5).  Much of 
the duties that would be assigned to representatives in land-based enterprises, 
have mostly been assigned to the safety officer and some to a lesser extent to the 
OHS committee in the MLC framework.  In the UK’s COSWP, these duties are 
assigned mostly to the safety officer (Section 7.2.1).   
In practice, the inspectors interviewed reported that the written report is 
sent to the master of the ship, via the owner, and a copy is to be posted in the 
crew area, however there is no way to verify that this is done.  In terms of engaging 
with representatives, there is no systematic practice.  Furthermore, as the 
inspectors repeatedly pointed out, on smaller vessels, this is more difficult as each 
member of the crew is considered to be a representative, so the system does not 
work well.  Without any relationship with a crew representative, inspectors 
explained that during inspections, members of the crew are questioned when they 
are encountered.  However, this is challenging as they find problems with 
seafarers being willing to speak:    
We tend to find that very few seafarers will speak out directly to us. It will 
normally come through another route. In 100% of cases it is always about 
wages and repatriation not health and safety.  Naturally if it is UK seafarers 
there is a more open conversation as they know our organisation is honest 
and fair. To foreign seafarers we may be considered Police-like and best 
not say anything… In Eastern Europe you don’t say anything against the 
State.  So you go on board the ship and say “what’s the food like on here?” 
“Oh it’s great, great.” When as a matter of fact it’s rubbish.  Unfortunately 
the industry is small and no one wants to stand out of line for fear of 
recrimination.  So as inspectors we need to be careful about how we 
approach these matters to avoid targeting individuals. (KI-10 – senior 
inspector). 
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The work environment, particularly on small ships, does not allow for 
seafarers to be privately approached.  This experience refers to both foreign ships 
in UK waters and on UK-registered ships.  Issues of seafarers’ precariousness that 
inhibit “speaking” out become relevant in efforts at enforcing standards.  Others 
have found that some inspectors are careful in how they gather information from 
seafarers so that they are not compromised, while seafarers who wish to bring 
situations to the attention of inspectors are also wary (eg. Bloor et. al. 2005).  In 
this study, the inspectors’ reports corroborate each other on some seafarers’ 
reluctance to engage with State officials.  As one explained, “I could just leave a 
ship and they say everything is great and then the welfare centre phones me up 
to say something is wrong” (KI-13).  He continued:     
Well, they’re afraid of us you know.  I suppose they just see us as police 
you know, and I suppose they’re quite afraid of being victimized.  No 
matter how they tell us everything is ok…they’re just afraid of stepping out 
you know so we will hear about it in a reverse way…(KI-13).   
The inspectors noted that there was more openness with British nationals on UK 
ships, and explained that culture may account for differences in seafarers’ 
willingness to speak:    
…culture yes is an issue.  I think for example, if we were on a ferry, you 
know a local ferry, and if it was a total UK crew, we guarantee we would 
have quite a number of people who would be quite engaging with us about 
safety and issues, because there is a culture of openness on board, you 
know the UK society, that’s maybe not there in other societies…I suppose 
there is a clashing of cultures…not clashing, I think there is some 
subservience between cultures on multinational crew ships (KI-13).   
Nevertheless, there are instances where British nationals are also reluctant to 
speak, as seen from this account by the union official:   
So there is a mix, some seafarers you will find out are not afraid to speak 
their minds, but a lot of them are cautious just in terms of being noticed as 
a trouble maker.  Particularly among our young members we have young 
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cadets who would be afraid as their career is starting they would be afraid 
to cause any trouble and junior officers climbing their way up, the more 
senior you are the more likely you are to raise an issue directly with the 
company. (KI-15). 
This finding is not unlike discussions in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2) where those 
lower in rank are less likely to get involved, although they may be more vulnerable 
to health and safety risks due to their social positions on board (Bhattacharya, 
2012a; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006).  Workers’ social, material and personal 
resources are important determinants of their level of vulnerability to work 
stressors and therefore their health (Scott-Marshall, 2010: 316-319).  The 
traditional hierarchical structure is an important factor influencing work relations 
on board ships and seafarers’ willingness to lodge a complaint.  The senior 
inspector noted: 
…there is still the perception that the master is God and we’ve had issues 
with complaints, a lot of seafarers don’t complain even though there are 
provisions within the MLC for complaints, they are frightened to complain 
because the repercussions that may occur, and there is evidence to suggest 
that’s happening. (KI-10). 
This is a factor recognized in the industry and one example was given of how a 
particular UK company sought to address the issue to mitigate the master’s 
influence on the crew’s willingness to participate in OHS meetings:    
One company we go with believe the captain shouldn’t be the chairman of 
the safety committee because the captain is the leader, so if the leader sat 
in the room will anybody challenge the leader?  So a lot of the captains…the 
captain sometimes is almost like a dictator on board, so if the captain is 
there nobody is going to speak up because the captain enforces the policy 
so when the captain is present…there is no free speech. (KI-13).   
Under the UK system, this was a deviation from the policy where the 
captain is to chair the OHS committee meetings.  This deviation is considered a 
non-conformity in the language of inspection.  It is particularly associated with 
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audit systems to indicate where practices deviate from procedures.  In this 
example, the shipowners’ deviation from the UK’s policy for constituting the safety 
committee was recorded as a non-conformity, but as was explained, an exemption 
was later granted for the company to modify the requirements in this way.  This 
example might have been an opportunity for the policy makers to revisit the 
regulations in recognition that the theory and practice may not align.  At this level, 
the research finds more perpetuation of customary practices rather than active 
engagement for continuous improvement with how representation might be 
crafted to benefit the shipboard work environment.  
 
7.3.3. Selecting Representatives: Appointment versus Election 
The MLC and UK systems allow for the election or appointment of representatives.  
From the inspectors’ experiences, it appears challenging on merchant ships with 
few crew members to elect representatives.  Participants explained that on cruise 
ships with many departments and a more structured system, workers elect their 
representatives.  On merchant ships, it is more likely that representatives are 
appointed.  An inspector explained that:   
…what should happen is that they should elect the safety representatives, 
what tends to happen is…, in multinational crew…, for example, 
yesterday…here we got minutes of the meeting, on the last ship inspected 
yesterday, right, this ship…this is the minutes of the safety committee, so 
there was only a crew of 15, so what happens on a ship is nobody wants to 
be the safety rep…it tends to be that what we see is that unless people are 
told to go to these meetings, they don’t go, so in theory, they are to elect 
a safety rep and it tends in practice to be the case of who would like to be 
the safety rep…so on this ship there are 15 crew members, so the whole 
crew attends. (KI13). 
During the interviews, the architects also reveal some awareness of 
seafarers’ lack of willingness to participate.  This awareness was not reflected in 
the meeting discussions at the time of the negotiations to suggest that the 
provisions for representation might be problematic.  One of the architects from 
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the shipowners’ group thought that refusals to participate should be considered 
as a disciplinary matter (KI-2).  Such a perception lacks understanding of the 
factors that determine participation which might explain why seafarers do not 
wish to be representatives or participate in general (eg. Bhattacharya, 2012a).  The 
most common practice therefore, also substantiated by the seafarers’ experiences 
(Chapter 8), is to consider everyone a member of the safety committee.   
Other means by which representatives are selected is by job description 
(discussed further in Chapter 8).  This method was not an option in any of the 
policy documents or regulations.  As the senior inspector explained:   
The representatives are supposed to be elected, 9 times out of 10 that 
doesn’t happen.  It goes with the job, if you are the second mate you are 
the deck officer representative on the safety committee.  If you are the 
second cook, you are the catering representative.  So the elections do not 
really happen, that’s your job.  (KI-10 – senior inspector).   
Selecting representatives based on their job descriptions is also 
problematic for ensuring the type of representation envisaged in the MLC.  This 
practice is experienced for both UK-flagged ships and others inspected in UK 
waters.  In consideration of the findings so far, the likelihood is greater that 
representation in situations where representatives are appointed based on job 
functions, might serve the shipowners’ interests rather than seafarers.’  A 
management appointed representative is perhaps more consistent with 
management initiatives to “involve” workers (Lansbury and Wailes, 2008), 
particularly when associated with job description.  This might also create 
confusion among seafarers, as Chapter 8 will further show.   
     
7.4. Union Involvement On Board 
The thesis findings have established that the MLC is set within the tripartite 
governance structure of the ILO where all its measures to address decent work 
should be developed through social dialogue.  The provisions for representation 
have been established with the same philosophy of social dialogue where 
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shipowners shall involve seafarers, or their representatives in on board practices 
to safeguard seafarers’ health and safety.  Likewise, the UK takes a tripartite 
approach to developing its maritime policies consistent with ILO requirements.  
The UK also has a national bipartite committee of shipowners’ and seafarers’ 
representatives, to which senior government policy makers are invited although 
they do not contribute to decision-making.  However, the inspectors’ experiences 
show that representation as envisaged in theory is disconnected from the 
practices on board.  Workplace democracy is not typically a feature on ships.  
Consistent with the theory for effective representation, the thesis asserts that an 
absence of unions on ships, is an important aspect of the disconnect.   
The findings in this study showed that union officials are faced with several 
difficulties in penetrating the shipboard work environment.  “They’re far away and 
we rarely get to visit them” (KI-15) is a lament by the senior union official 
interviewed.  Changes in the nature of shipping has undermined union 
involvement at the shipboard level for countries such as the UK (Walters and 
Bailey, 2013).  Where there remains some union involvement, the difficulties are 
limited engagement with members due to the remoteness of shipping, lack of 
recognition by shipowners and the fragmentation of members across ships and 
flag States.  There was some influence in the cruise sector, where unions have 
recognition by shipowners, but for the most part, the social dialogue espoused in 
the meeting documents and in the MLC framework seems to end at the national 
policy level in the UK.    
Where unions are recognised by a shipowner and have members on board 
particular ships, there is the possibility of having union members as 
representatives.  Additionally, some shipowners are amenable to unions assisting 
in organizing the participatory systems on ships.  However, as was explained, there 
is no statutory requirement for union recognition:   
…yes it can be in some companies but you will find as well there is no 
requirement for health and safety committee to be organized by the union 
or to be full of union members, but yes, we will certainly be involved where 
ever possible. (KI-15 – senior union official). 
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This lack of union involvement deprives seafarers of an important source 
of support.  Unions provide training to support representatives in their role (James 
and Walters, 1997; Nichols, 1997).  They have the resources to provide the type of 
training in the legal requirements for OHS and the issues involved in being a 
representative.  This study found that unions are also limited in this area.  The 
union in question engages with its members remotely through mailing of 
information, providing training videos and through their websites:  
…we’ve done some publications in the past, our role is promoting by 
literature in the main, and get some things on our website to promote 
these issues, but our role is also one of education in the lack of company 
focus… companies in the main concentrate on safety rather than the 
broader health issues…so we hope the information is reaching the 
seafarers if we’re sending stuff out.  We do bulk mailing to the ships, but 
the idea is for them to receive the guides we develop for our seafarers in 
the mail they get. (KI-15 – senior union official). 
While the unions attempt to work within the constraints, it is a problematic 
mode of providing information.  Receiving information individually may help to 
reinforce the individualization of health (Chapter 8).  Others have found that 
seafarers engage in self-medication and are inclined not to report health matters 
(Acejo et. al. 2011) which might be a consequence of this individualization.  
Attention in the industry seemed more focused on those issues that immediately 
impact commercial activities, for example, fatigue.  Unions might have also 
contributed to this skewed focus: “We very much push fatigue…project 
horizon…that’s a good example of something where the union was in the forefront 
of pushing an issue onto the agenda.” (KI-15 – senior union official).  As the union 
official continued to explain, strategic choices are made to focus on areas where 
it is believed results may be achieved: 
It is a question of priority isn’t it? The main reasons are you are focussing 
on something where you can achieve success and again prioritising.  A lot 
of it is relying on our members to tell us what is important to them.  Fatigue 
was a big issue overtime.  Lifeboats is an issue we are in the forefront of 
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changes there because it was an issue that was brought to our attention.  
If an issue is raised with us and we are aware there is a problem, then we 
will take it on and raise it wherever possible with the shipowners, with the 
government, with international authorities or with the regulators. (KI-15). 
Operating from outside the shipboard work environment might therefore 
have unintended consequences of neglect.  The reliance on seafarers to bring 
issues to the attention of unions without the support and training necessary to 
create awareness of potential issues is limiting.  As the senior inspector said, 
comparing his experiences as an enforcement officer with time spent at sea, 
unions are far less involved, and the reluctance of seafarers to be involved is a 
constraint on how much assistance unions can offer:   
You don’t hear much talk of unions at all these days, it tended to be more 
so when I sailed…when I was at sea, yes, when I mostly sailed on ferries.  
The element of unionization is gone, the only union involvement seems to 
be in generating collective bargaining agreements on behalf of 
seafarers…unions may get involved…the ITF…and also it usually occurs 
after the event…and often it’s a case of don’t rock the boat for most 
seafarers you know…so things don’t get out. (KI-10 – senior inspector).   
Union decline has been discussed across industries and countries as a 
feature of contemporary work (Boxall, 2008; Biffl and Isaac, 2002).  Economic and 
political forces that similarly focus on de-regulation and workforce fragmentation 
are also implicated in union decline (Boxall, 2008).  In enabling business practices 
that create precarious work, the system has also created workers who are either 
wary of, or lack the knowledge, to individually take up their statutory rights 
(Lewchuk, 2013a; Quinlan et. al. 2001).  The seafaring workforce has been 
particularly affected by these changes that have undermined unions’ effectiveness 
in the shipboard work environment (Walters and Bailey, 2013; Kahveci and 
Nichols, 2006). 
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7.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter the findings showed that the MLC provisions did not offer a strong 
regulatory lead to ensure the implementation of more robust practices in the UK.  
The provisions were similar to what already existed in the UK and made little 
difference in regulating for the effective implementation and practice of 
representation.  As with the developmental stage, the regulation of 
representation continued according to customary practices.  The findings showed 
that the UK has influenced the MLC requirements more than they have affected 
any changes at the UK level.  Although in theory the UK offers what might be 
considered a relatively strong lead overall, as its regulatory guidelines speak to 
management commitment, consultation, information sharing and two-way 
communication with seafarers or their representatives, the limited provisions for 
representatives’ role raise questions as to the extent it is embraced as a viable 
mechanism in OHSM.       
The regulatory steer is constrained by customary practices that limit the 
extent to which inspectors can perform their duties.  Furthermore, factors such as 
the ship’s size and seafarers’ capacity to participate, challenge attempts at a strong 
regulatory steer.  Seafarers’ reluctance to speak out presents a paradox as they 
are relied on to assist in enforcing the standards by offering information to State 
officials and unions.  There is no evidence that these factors were given 
consideration in operationalizing the provisions for representation.  While 
tripartism seems to be well developed at the national level, employers resist union 
recognition on ships, with union representatives restricted primarily to the cruise 
sector.  The next chapter focuses on the experiences of seafarers and explores 
representation in practice to further understand the subject.    
188 
 
8 
  Experiencing the Regulatory Lead 
 
Seafarers’ literally live at the point of convergence of the decisions and procedures emanating 
from the interlaced network of national and international organisations and institutions which 
define, and then attempt to enforce, the regulatory framework of the maritime industry.  
Although most international conventions and regulations are of course aimed at ship owners, 
the very fact that few ships ever spend more than 20% of their operating time in ports and 
that very few owners ever sail on the ships they own, means that seafarers are the only actors 
within the industry who have practical day to day experience of the outcomes of these 
attempts at regulation (Alderton and Winchester, 2002a, p.35). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
8.1. Introduction 
The three previous findings chapters focussed on the development and 
administration of provisions for representation.  They examined the nature and 
strength of the regulatory lead from perspectives external to the workplace.  A 
common theme across both the developmental and administrative levels is that 
representation was taken as a customary practice without much consideration for 
its viability in the current context and supports to direct its implementation and 
practice.  This chapter focuses on the workplace level.  It examines seafarers’ 
experiences and perceptions of representation drawing on the findings from 
interviews with seafarers working on a range of ships, including a small number 
serving on UK-flagged ships.  Responses of the seafarers on UK ships were not 
qualitatively different from the other seafarers and therefore their responses are 
not reported separately.      
This chapter consists of three sections.  The first section focuses on who 
the seafarers considered to be their representatives and the implications for 
representation.  The second section deals with seafarers’ perceptions of 
representation and the practices found on board for seafarers’ input and how 
these are experienced.  The third section explores support on board for 
representation.  The chapter ends with a conclusion highlighting the main 
elements of these findings. 
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8.2. Who Represents the Seafarer On Board? 
Provisions in the MLC framework are geared towards improving working 
conditions on ships, an important element of which is health and safety.  The MLC 
framework mandates the participation of seafarers’ representatives on health and 
safety committees and provides for a participatory system that includes 
consultation, information sharing, risk assessment and training.  The thesis 
presumes that the standards aim to give seafarers a collective “say” in health and 
safety, as is the nature of such standards in other industries and evidenced by the 
text within the MLC framework.  This section deals with seafarers’ awareness of 
the MLC and the provisions for their representation.  It is important that the 
beneficiaries know of the purpose of the MLC and how it is envisaged that their 
working conditions will be improved by deploying these standards.  This could be 
said to be the first step in assessing the viability of these provisions.   
  
8.2.1.  Knowledge of the MLC 
All the seafarers interviewed had a general awareness of the MLC and a basic 
knowledge of its purpose.  The general response was that the MLC was about 
seafarers’ rights and working and living conditions.  In terms of knowledge about 
health and safety, the focus was work/rest hours, which is driven by the industry 
in the context of fatigue and is found in Title 2.  Representation (Section 8.2.2.) 
was more complicated.     
It was surprising that there were officers who admitted to not knowing 
much about the MLC, including Title 4 on health and safety management.  For 
example, Eddie, a Chief Engineer reported that he was not exactly familiar with 
the health and safety section, but he knew a few parts regarding hygiene on board 
such as clean cabins, cleanliness of the galley, and the quality of the food.  These 
are in fact provisions under Title 3 for accommodation, recreational facilities and 
food and catering, although they go along with health and safety.  Others gave 
similar responses regarding working conditions, with quality of food, work/rest 
hours and being paid on time, among the common responses.  Winston, a Wiper55 
                                                             
55 Rating position in the engine room, below the Oiler. Keeps engines and machinery clean. 
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indicated that: “The MLC is the convention where the seafarers are required to 
follow it, it is about their working hours on board.”  A Captain, in explaining that 
the MLC was about crew rights and welfare was somewhat dramatic in his 
response:  
A seafarer should be treated like a human, not like a slave and not like a 
robot, which previously used to happen… they were all [like] prisoners 
used to be sent on board… the MLC change the whole face of the shipping 
industry, because it was for the first time, without getting any monetary 
return from the ship, they had to implement things (Nigel – Captain). 
This Captain was of the opinion that the compliance and enforcement standards 
were the elements that contributed to the MLC making this difference as ships 
could now be detained for labour standards violation.   
Seafarers learnt about the MLC mainly through on board experiences.  This 
could be in a safety meeting, through work experience, reading material or 
computer-based training (CBT).  Notes from Eva’s interview, a Fourth Engineer, 
indicated that she learnt about the MLC in the company, and thought it was 
through CBT.  Sam, a Second Officer, indicated that he learnt about the MLC 
through his company and during his studies to upgrade his seafarers’ certificate: 
Yes, company gave out information booklet about a year ago. I also ensure 
I was up to date with new regulations and as I am studying for my next 
certificate of competency, I like to stay appraised of what’s new. (Sam) 
Others indicated learning through familiarization on first joining the ship or in 
health and safety committee meetings.  For example, Mark, a Junior Officer 
explained:  
We have a safety meeting every month including about the MLC.  The 
Captain teaches us about working hours, safety, about the food…this 
Captain tells us what is our right and benefits of the MLC.   
Mark also reported that before joining the vessel he attended a maritime 
labour seminar in the Philippines.  Others learnt about the MLC through personal 
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interest.   For example, Stanley, a Steward, when asked about his knowledge of 
the MLC said:   
Yes of course, yes, yes. Since the MLC enforce about 2013, yes I am familiar 
because I always read about the rules and regulations on the ship. I read 
on my own because it is very important because it affects my life at sea.  
Mostly my friends they don’t care, because they don’t know …they don’t 
understand most of my friends… 
Although not common, the point about seafarers educating themselves 
raises the question as to whether some seafarers are receiving adequate 
education on the MLC.  This was evidenced by the limited knowledge among some 
of the interviewees, and the attitudes of others towards the MLC.  For example, 
Frank, a Fitter who thought he would learn about the MLC if it becomes necessary 
for him to do so.  He pointed out that:   
The MLC is about working conditions, rights of seafarers, getting paid on 
time, good quality food… I never had problems and conflict situations, so 
my knowledge is minimal because I don’t need to know. If I need it I will 
find more information. You work according to the ISM. When you join the 
ship they tell you about the MLC but it is not part of everyday work so you 
forget. (Written notes).   
Another seafarer also claimed to have learnt about the MLC but had 
forgotten (Archie, Acting 2nd Engineer).  Forgetting about the MLC, not seeing it as 
integral to daily work or having only basic knowledge, raise questions about the 
role this convention might play in improving working conditions on ships.  The 
foregrounding of the ISM may be a reason for the neglect of the MLC.  Other 
seafarers indicated that they work according to the ISM while the MLC has not 
made much of a difference in practices on board.  Sam, the Second Officer, was of 
the opinion that both the ISM and MLC could co-exist but believed there was 
insufficient understanding of the MLC: 
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I would say there is scope for them to go hand in hand. Although I do not 
think there is enough understanding of MLC at present and it is often seen 
negatively as it just causes more paperwork, inspections etc.   
In support of Sam’s opinion, a few seafarers did express some resistance 
to the MLC.  For example, Ezie, an Electro-Technical Officer (ETO), complained that 
the MLC was an added burden.  He noted: 
For me, I’m an old guy you know, for me it’s too much. We have to do 
everyday, how many hours of work, so many things, paperwork.  The MLC 
is added paperwork, it’s too much, it’s too much. 
This lament might have to do with how work is organized and the company’s 
control of work, seen in Ezie’s expanded comments: 
They say you have to find something which is related to safety. And the 
ship who is producing this thing maybe every day is good ship, if it was old 
then maybe if it was not a good ship, but this is a good ship so maybe there 
is nothing, maybe you leave safety, but you must find something, 
something broken…this risk assessment… you have to produce even if it’s 
not there…it is not ok when you must do this, you must produce 
paperwork. If you don’t find it means you’re not so good. 
A Third Engineer who reported not being knowledgeable about the MLC 
also thought that maritime regulating was “too much:”  
Only thing I know about the MLC is yes, it’s the maritime labour convention 
and I know they are looking at hours of work, fatigue, health and safety, all 
these kinds of things, but I couldn’t be more in-depth about it because 
there are so many different conventions and so many...for a seafarer there 
are so many abbreviations and conventions and… to be honest with you it 
is a bit of an overload, it really is…IMO, the MCA, the MLC, the SMS, the 
ISM, the ISPS, the IOPP, SOPP, it goes on and on and on…the MARPOL, the 
STCW, SOLAS…it is a bit much. (Earl – 3rd Engineer). 
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It was revealing that this seafarer thought the MLC was an instrument of the IMO. 
After explaining to him, he continued: 
I don’t know too much about it. Nobody’s really said oh, this is the MLC 
and this is what you need to know, if it’s not enforced then nobody is gonna 
be…ah it’s another abbreviation…Somebody comes up in 2006 with a new 
Convention, well unless it’s really implemented like the STCW, because 
everybody’s got to do it, …then it’s just gonna be there. (Earl– 3rd Engineer). 
It appears from these accounts that the MLC has not been effectively 
introduced to some seafarers.  Some of the responses were from ratings but also 
officers, who one might have expected to have comparatively better knowledge 
of regulations governing their work.  Alternately, it may naturally be only those 
regulations that are deemed important that are given attention, such as the ISM 
Code.  A response from Sam, the Second Officer, offers some insight into what the 
problem might be:   
A main constraint is that health and safety guidelines produced are often 
fleet wide…these aren’t always relevant for our ship type.  There’s been a 
huge increase in paperwork and I think this uses time which could be used 
for promoting health and safety and on board training. Many more junior 
crew and ranks often see health and safety as the company trying to 
control them, rather than actually understanding why it is important for 
them as individuals.  
There was much discussion in the negotiations regarding compliance and 
enforcement and the training of inspectors in inspecting labour standards, as it 
was recognized that there were deficiencies in this area.  It was suggested that the 
ILO offer technical assistance in training inspectors which would also be useful in 
encouraging States to implement the convention (Chapter 5).  Yet there was an 
absence of discussions on educating seafarers on the MLC.  In the guidelines, 
training is a requirement under the shipowners’ obligations, nevertheless, as the 
seafarers’ testimonies showed, this is not systematic and sustained and seems 
inadequate where it was mentioned.      
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8.2.2. Supervision versus Representation 
Knowledge and awareness of the standards for representation are important for 
implementation and practice.  Land-based studies show that when workers are 
aware of having representatives it helps to stimulate positive attitudes and health 
and safety practices in the workplace (Olle-Espulga, 2015).  Representatives also 
rely on constituents’ support as an important contribution to being effective in 
their role (Garcia et. al., 2007).  As such, employees should be made aware of the 
arrangements for their representation through training.  Some seafarers had 
difficulties identifying their representatives.  The difficulties arose from seafarers 
not understanding the concept of representation and/or there were no 
representatives on board.  In these cases, the safety or the medical officer were 
identified as the representative.  For example: 
The Second Mate, so he makes sure everybody knows about safety and 
know what to do if there is a fire, like that, he is the one who explains to 
us, the Second Mate, so if the Second Mate cannot answer or have 
difficulty about safety, he will ask for the Chief Mate, and if the Chief Mate 
cannot solve the problem, then the Master. (Stanley – Steward).  
On this particular ship, there were separate officers for health (medical 
health), safety and security.  There were no representatives on this ship, 
underscored by the above response which mirrors the complaints procedure.  
Another seafarer’s response further corroborates the tendency to identify the 
safety officer in situations without representatives: 
The Chief Mate is the safety representative.  He is in charge of safety.  
There is nobody from among the crew as representative like that.  The 
counterpart of the Chief Mate in the engine room is the 2nd Engineer.  It is 
company policy to have this. (Winston – Wiper). 
Subsequent to an explanation to those who were uncertain of what 
representation meant in the research,56  seafarers identified the Boatswain as 
                                                             
56 The person elected from among the crew to bring the crew’s health and safety concerns to the 
senior officers or the company if needs be, the one who ‘speaks’ on behalf of the crew on any 
matter. 
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their representative.   Yet, the role of the Boatswain as representative turned out 
to be the job function as supervisor of the deck ratings.  Oliver, an Ordinary 
Seafarer (OS) reported:   
Yes, the Boatswain, he is our leader…and the Chief Officer, if you have 
some questions or something’s not… you can talk directly to the Chief 
Officer.  The Chief Officer is in charge of safety and for medical, you don’t 
have to directly talk to the Boatswain.  
He continued to explain:   
For example, if the Chief Mate has a job order, the Boatswain will take it 
and will tell the crew, the deck crew, the ratings what to do.  This is usually 
the Boatswain, that is the position (Oliver – OS). 
 Oscar, another OS, described how on a previous ship the Boatswain was 
the representative who would take the crew’s concerns to the health and safety 
meetings.  An example of such concerns was use of the recreational fund.  On his 
current ship they had no representative in the manner described.  Although he 
said the Boatswain was the crew representative, he was also aware that this was 
in his supervisory position.  He indicated that: 
The Second Mate is in charge of health. If someone is sick he gives them 
medicine and takes care of injuries.  There is no safety representative in 
that way.  The Boatswain is for working safely. (Written notes). 
 However, the issues that were brought to the Boatswain’s attention in Oscar’s 
previous and current situations were not much different and had to do with 
“domestic” matters.  At the time of the interview, they had requested gym 
equipment.       
Therefore, in most instances, those identified as representatives were in 
positions that were designed to serve the interest of the company.  Eva’s response 
succinctly describes the status of those identified as representatives: 
The role of the Boatswain and the Fitter [representative for the engine 
room ratings], is to motivate the crew in their work, but I don’t see much 
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situations for them to do anything special. No experience of that. In the 
meetings the Boatswain raises his hands and most of the time speaks for 
the crew. Some Boatswains are quiet, so it depends on him but on this ship 
the Boatswain is dependable and trustworthy. (Written notes).     
Although she identified the Boatswain as dependable, Eva also reported that they 
can all “speak” in the safety meetings.  It is the practice on most ships for all the 
crew to attend safety meetings. 
The reports on representation may be summed up in Eva’s words, “nothing 
special.”  Even in situations where seafarers elected their representatives and 
there was a clear understanding of their role, activities were limited.  Joseph, a 
Captain also indicated that the representative role on his ship was “nothing 
special.”  As he said: “In practice they don’t do anything different from what 
everyone else does.  Perhaps they take on a bit more of a role, but they don’t do 
an awful lot.”  Expanding his comments also indicated that the focus was safety.  
That role has never been a proactive role.  I think in the past the safety 
representative was seen as somebody who the crew could go to, to report 
something but we’ve changed the way we report internally on board and 
rather than wait 6 weeks for a meeting or a month for a meeting, we have 
what we call safety observation cards, it is an avenue for anybody on board 
to actually report something safety related. (Joseph – Captain). 
A clearer representative system was described by Chief Officer Christine 
who explained that the elected representative was for the entire crew, including 
the officers:   
…so on my vessel it happens to be the person that we call the boatswain.  
That person would be elected by the crew. … The crew representative 
would cover everybody, even the officers.  Yes… crew being everybody 
barring the Captain. 
She worked on an anchor handing vessel in the offshore sector.  The offshore 
sector might be different from other shipping sectors with respect to 
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representation.  Woolfson (2013) for example, outlined how some high-profile 
accidents in this sector led to the tightening of regulations for workers’ 
representation.  Although these standards seemed to have been resisted by 
business interests and the result was weaker standards than envisaged.  Perhaps 
this explains why Carl, a Chief Officer, who worked on a similar ship-type, said 
there was no need for representatives because all the crew “can speak.”  As seen 
in the inspectors’ accounts as well as those of some seafarers, there are ships 
where all the crew is considered representatives.  The difference may be company 
practices, but more so, it highlights the tendency for flexibility in self-regulatory 
practices that allow companies in the same sector to implement different 
practices.  Carl’s ship does have a health and safety committee where all the crew 
attends meetings.  These two seafarers however stressed the flat structure on 
their ships and thought it was a unique characteristic of the offshore industry 
having worked in other sectors.  They thought less hierarchy was useful in 
managing health and safety.  This makes for interesting reflections on the 
possibilities for effective representation owing to the issues of hierarchy raised in 
this study and other research.   
In explaining the practices on her ship, Christine pointed out that the 
representative was elected informally, “perhaps done over coffee.”  But she also 
reported working on a “good ship” with an open culture where seafarers were 
able to speak to anyone if they had any problems.  The representative system was 
informal, and the representative decided how to engage with the crew:    
It would be up to him to basically have a discussion. He would be told, 
normally a few days’ notice, he would be told when the meeting’s going to 
be, operations depending, and it would be up to him.  Everybody knows 
about him, they approach him, he approaches them, it is very much an 
open culture.  Then if he has anything to bring up, he brings it up then. 
(Christine – Chief Officer).  
Another instance of a representative system showed the selection of the 
Boatswain as informal and based on customary practice.  Nigel, the Captain 
explained: “…everyone knows who is responsible for what, everyone knows he is 
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the boatswain he is in charge of the crew.”  This was a bulk carrier, and the practice 
seemed more a function of leadership style.  Nigel, reported that the Boatswain 
would bring the crew’s interest to the meetings “they used to tell OK, this is right 
this is wrong this can be implemented this cannot be…we want these things…this 
kind of food.”  In this example, it appeared that the Boatswain was active in 
bringing crew concerns to the officers: 
Safety representatives is like a union, it’s like a factory where you have the 
mill workers and you have a union and you have a union leader. The same 
thing. You have crew members and they select one person and they tell 
him in advance, if there is a meeting you write it down, we want to discuss 
this, we want this food, we want this, so basically that person is very 
powerful.  When he comes up and he sits with us [the officers] he will bring 
up the rights of the crew members... (Nigel – Captain). 
This account shows a more functional representative role than other experiences 
described, although the prevalence of such practices is not known, and the 
experiences of the other seafarers seemed to be the rule.   That is, representation 
within the meaning of the MLC (and land-based practices) was little understood 
or experienced by most seafarers in this study.  The second key point arising 
regarding representation on ships was that even where they existed, the role was 
not fully developed and functional. 
  
8.3. Participation Practices on Ships  
In exploring the MLC provisions for representation, the previous sections showed 
they were not established in the envisaged manner.  Those reporting some limited 
form of representation pointed out that these systems were in place prior to the 
MLC.  A common response among the seafarers is that they “can all speak” and 
this was the basis on which representation was typically seen as unnecessary.  This 
section explores the seafarers’ claims of being able to participate and speak out, 
and the nature of this participation. 
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8.3.1. “We Can All Speak” 
All the seafarers interviewed indicated that they were not afraid to “speak out.”  
For example, Stanley, the Steward said: 
I don’t know about that [when asked about seafarers being afraid to 
speak].  I just speak according to my experience, about that I don’t know, 
generally I don’t know, this is my personal experience.  As far as I know in 
this company, people are comfortable to talk.  This is my 4th contract with 
this company. 
The “atmosphere” on the ship seems an important factor in seafarers 
saying they were not afraid to speak.  For example, Eva, the Fourth Engineer said 
“the relationship on the ship is good. There is a formal system for complaints, but 
you can also go to somebody you are comfortable with to speak” (Written notes).  
According to another: 
Seafarers express their opinions… If they have good connections with the 
Captain and officers, I think they speak.  Long time ago maybe [he has been 
on ships where seafarers were afraid to speak] but now it’s better…I have 
good relations I can talk [to the Captain] but usually I talk to the Chief 
Engineer (Ezie – ETO).  
The importance of the Captain in creating the atmosphere is underscored 
by Captain Joseph’s response.  He claimed that on his ship seafarers are given the 
opportunity to speak.  In reference to whether seafarers were willing to speak up 
in the safety committee meetings, he explained that: 
Yes, and they’re all given equal voice. On my ship, it’s up to the Master of 
the ship how he wants to run it, but there is an agenda which is set by the 
company we discuss from previous meetings and we would look at our 
safety records on board, any incidents or any reports that come in and we 
are given an opportunity to raise any matters that we want to be addressed 
by the company, which would then require them [the seafarers] to 
respond. 
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Likewise, Captain Nigel indicated that: 
We have monthly meetings…it’s not a safety meeting…in that everyone has 
a right to speak out, and people speak, very honestly they speak, - we want 
this – and again I am telling you it totally depends upon the Captain of the 
ship how comfortable he’ll make the crew.  If they’re comfortable they’ll 
speak out. 
In addition to leadership, working on a “good ship” is another factor that 
seems to promote seafarers’ participation and helps to discount or dismiss the 
need for representation.  Some of the seafarers point to an open structure on their 
ship which encourages participation.  For example, Carl, the Chief Officer who 
reported that there was no representative on his ship, thought there was no need 
for representation as intended by the MLC.  When asked about seafarers on his 
ship having representatives he said:   
No, because they can all speak at the meetings themselves.  So anything 
that’s raised beforehand is discussed during the meeting… Anything they 
can raise it with myself, the captain or any of the officers and it will get 
brought up to me and it gets added to the meeting agenda, so they can 
approach anyone on board…at the end of the meeting you go around and 
check with every single person that they don’t have anything further to 
add.  It’s very open and informal so people can say what they want to say. 
This lack of seeing anything special about the role of the representative is 
likely to be connected to the seafarers overall understanding of representation 
and their limited knowledge of the MLC in general.  Carl’s perception provides an 
example as to how seafarers might view representation.  He said:   
How I understand it, the health and safety committee as described in the 
MLC, is that you just have 5 guys, the head of each department go off and 
have their own meeting. Because we are less departmentalised than that, 
we just have one with all the crew and everyone all present, I think that 
actually, then you don’t need one [a representative], if everyone’s involved 
with it and everyone raises their own point. (Carl – Chief Officer).  
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While Carl also thought that there might be those who would not 
participate in the meetings, he was of the opinion that their work environment, 
which was open, and where relations were less hierarchical, would naturally 
provide avenues for those persons to “speak.”  He continued: “There’s always 
people who…say someone’s shy and they don’t want to speak up, then they’ll 
speak to one of their friends maybe and then he can do it.”  This perception is 
problematic as it does not consider structural issues that might account for a 
seafarer’s reluctance to speak out.  Speaking out is individualized.  Like being 
“shy,” others suggest that if a seafarer does not wish to speak, it is a personal, or 
a personality issue.  Eva the Fourth Engineer indicated that on her ship: 
 …people may be afraid to speak, but it depends on the person if they feel 
afraid, but they can find somebody who they are comfortable with and 
speak to them (Written notes). 
Another seafarer was of the opinion that seafarers being afraid to speak was in 
the past: 
It depends on the person some people are open…It is different from person 
to person, but I have the feeling people nowadays are more intellectual, 
and more well-read, so they know their own rights…and always say what 
is wrong. (Eddie – 2nd Engineer). 
In other studies, the concerns with seafarers’ participation highlight social 
factors that inhibit their input.  Factors such as employment arrangements, 
hierarchy on board and multi-nationality, influenced seafarers’ participation on 
board (Xue et. al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2009).  Perhaps having a culture of 
openness and camaraderie on board is helpful in giving seafarers the impetus to 
speak.  The question however is whether this is a sustainable means of ensuring 
seafarers’ participation in health and safety?  The experiences described by these 
seafarers are consistent with Cullinane’s and Dundon’s (2014) analysis of how 
paternalism is used to justify employers’ unitarist approach to workplace relations, 
and therefore their maintenance of control in the workplace.  The findings, up to 
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this point, and to be discussed, reveal that shipowners are not committed to 
representation.    
Although, the seafarers interviewed did not relay any personal fear of 
speaking out, there was an admittance of the possibility.  One of the basic reasons 
for representation is to provide some balance of power between workers and 
management that might mitigate this fear factor.  Chapter 3 explained that 
seafarers are considered precarious workers and studies into land-based 
workplaces show that such workers do not make effective use of individual 
measures to safeguard their health and safety (Lewchuk, 2013a).  Perhaps in 
situations where workers are treated well, they might also feel obligated not to 
complain.   
The seafarers’ views on representation might be influenced by the lack of 
organizational support for representation to educate the seafarers on its role and 
benefits.  Yet in abstract terms, the general perception favoured representation.  
For those who thought the role went a bit further than the supervision of work, it 
was seen as a good thing to have someone as intermediary between seafarers and 
the officers.  However, the scope of this representation is limited as previously 
noted.  For example, Ezie, the ETO, explained some of the issues seafarers speak 
about to their representatives:  
It is better, it is good to have the Boatswain, like the ratings they talk in the 
mess room and they say what they want to do, some movies and they have 
this money and they say what they like. 
Other seafarers were of the perception that representation would be 
important for solving conflicts.  For example, Oscar explained that it was good to 
have the Boatswain as representative (i.e. supervisor), as the ratings were able to 
speak freely with him, and he in turn spoke with the officers.  He gave an example 
in the event of a conflict or an officer “hurts someone’s feelings he can tell the 
Boatswain who would discuss this with the officer.”  The seafarer indicated that 
they were not afraid to speak to the Boatswain.  As he said, “if you keep it in, it will 
affect your mind, it is good to speak.” (Oscar – OS). 
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8.3.2.  Consultation 
Effective representation is associated with meaningful communication (James and 
Walters, 2002).  Requirements for consultation is explicitly stated in regulations to 
ensure workers without unions have statutory support to ensure management 
consults with them (eg. the EU Framework Directive 89/391, and the UK’s HSCE 
regulations).  Without representation on board, the seafarers in this study were 
asked about participatory activities and how they exercised “voice” on board.  
Seafarers described making suggestions and using the mechanisms in place to 
report issues, such as suggestion boxes, observation cards and the ships’ notice 
boards.   
These experiences described by the seafarers were in keeping with 
managerialist approaches to soliciting workers’ views.  Seafarers did not report 
any systematic process for two-way meaningful communication with an 
understanding that they would be listened to.  For example, Winston the Wiper, 
explained: “…seafarers, can suggest, but the officer in charge will decide.  
Everyone can give suggestions.  They say that in the safety meetings.” 
Seafarers’ views were solicited at the end of safety meetings, or as some 
described, informally “over coffee” or via the notice boards.  Issues were raised by 
being posted on the board, using observation cards, or approaching an officer.  
Oniel, a Second Officer, explained how he would bring issues to the attention of 
management: “The Chief Officer makes us aware if there are issues to write it on 
the notice board before the meeting is to take place, so I would know to write it 
there.”  The main channel for communication on this particular ship was the notice 
board.  As such, minutes of meetings with outcomes and other information the 
company wished to convey were placed on the notice board.  
Other mechanisms on board reveal a behaviour-based approach to OHSM.  
This is consistent with the ISM Code system already discussed.  Seafarers reported 
that they work according to the ISM and it is much a part of their daily lives more 
so than the MLC.  Behaviour-based approaches are underpinned by psychological 
notions of the accident-prone worker and therefore to address these flaws, 
mechanisms are developed to correct faulty behaviour.  One of the instances in 
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which seafarers’ input is considered, comes from observation cards.  This system 
is a mechanism to report positive and/or negative safety practices and is 
consistent with “safe behaviour programmes” described for land-based sectors 
(Hopkins, 2006: 584).  This behaviour-based approach seems to promote 
responsibilization (Gray, 2009) where everyone on board is said to be responsible 
for safety.  It may also encourage blame and punishment of workers, and certainly 
does not address structural issues influencing workers’ behaviours (Hopkins, 2006; 
Nichols, 1997).   
In this study, seafarers reported that they are given cards on which they 
record shipmates’ behaviours that they perceive as either promoting or 
jeopardizing safety.  Christine explained for her experience, this anonymous 
system is geared towards a “no blame culture:”   
We do have a system in place where people can, we call it a safety 
observation in our company and basically if anybody on board the ship sees 
anything you could say, whether it be positive or negative, we have like a 
little note pad for that, that people fill in and it goes into, I suppose you 
could say a little collection box and these are read and discussed on a 
weekly basis. (Christine – Chief Officer).  
Captain Joseph explained that observation cards were introduced to 
change reporting practices on his vessel, which used to be via the representatives: 
“…we have what we call safety observation cards, it is an avenue for anybody on 
board to actually report something safety related.”  These cards should be 
completed anonymously both for the seafarer reporting and the person thought 
to be committing the violation.  These are discussed in safety meetings as best 
practices and lessons to be learnt.  Whether such measures are positive for 
creating a healthy and trustworthy work environment on board is not known.  
Attempts at developing a no-blame culture in the maritime industry has been 
challenging particularly for the behaviour-based managerial practices associated 
with the ISM Code (Bhattacharya, 2012a; 2012b; Bailey 2006). 
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8.3.3. Participating in Decision-Making  
Consultation also implies some influence in decision-making.  This research 
explored the extent to which seafarers participated in decision-making to 
ascertain what scope existed for influencing decisions and therefore the nature 
and substance of their participation.  The findings showed that much of this 
participation takes place at the “domestic level.”  Ratings reported being able to 
make suggestions relating to welfare matters, for example diet (type of food), 
entertainment and exercise equipment, as previously reported.  In elaborating on 
the ways seafarers influence their work environment, Eddie, the Second Engineer 
explained:  
They, the ratings, talk about what they want to have on board to make 
themselves feel good… 
[Interviewer: Like?]   
Filipino crew, they always say we need a karaoke system on board  
[Interviewer: will the company do it?] 
It depends on the Master how he manages the fund and gets the stuff for 
them.  For this ship it goes to the office, but it will come back to the 
Master… why hasn’t it been done so far if the people are asking for it?  
Usually the Master tries to do as soon as possible before it goes to the 
office.  I’ve seen the change, before nobody bothered about how the 
seafarer is doing on board, whether they are getting what they want or 
not, what’s the quality of the food, now with the MLC its better.   
Examples of this nature show that the MLC has had some influence on 
some ships in bringing social issues into the global regulatory regime.  Other 
seafarers also noted that the MLC had made a difference in food quality, increased 
attention to work/rest hours and recreation equipment.  Although in some 
instances, the seafarer was not sure if this was due to the MLC or general changes 
taking place.  Archie, the Acting Second Engineer, explained that attention is paid 
to diet and healthy lifestyle: “they talk about health and the food…because we 
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have different nationalities on the ship…it’s partly because of the MLC and then 
everything is changing.”   
Stanley, the Steward however was certain the MLC made a difference.  As 
his example illustrates: 
In our company, before MLC was enforced we had to buy water and also 
food. Now we have MLC…you know different countries have different 
food… sometimes we have difficulty to accept this kind of food and the 
Chief Cook sometimes they don’t care about it.  When the MLC in force the 
cook changed, you now have this rule, if you don’t like the food you can 
complain to the Chief Cook and the Chief Cook must provide what you can 
eat.  Before the MLC we could not do that, whatever is cooked you have to 
eat whether you like it or not.  And also water, before you had to buy 
water, now it is free because MLC it states, water must be provided free of 
charge.  The policy is coming from the company because the company 
must follow the MLC you know, before the MLC we have to buy everything. 
While these examples may not be decision-making in the strictest sense, they 
serve to demonstrate the areas of influence for seafarers.  Welfare issues have 
gained prominence in the maritime industry (see Sampson 2013), and these 
examples were readily provided in demonstrating where seafarers had a “say” and 
were able to influence working and living conditions on board, with the passage 
of the MLC, particularly as these are now grounds for detaining a ship.      
Exploring other types of decisions however, showed minimal involvement.  
Procuring safety equipment, these were controlled at company level, even on the 
few UK ships, although the COSWP indicates that seafarers are to be consulted on 
type of equipment to be purchased (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.1).  Sam, the Second 
Officer on a UK ship reported that they rarely participate in decisions: “ships are 
often just advised of changes.”  Enroy, a Third Engineer, explained that his 
company uses research data and industry information, as well as best practices 
within its fleet, to determine what was needed on the ship and seafarers did not 
participate in those decisions.  Another Second Officer noted that seafarers are 
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rarely involved in any decisions affecting the ship, they are often just advised of 
changes.  In instances where seafarers reported making requests to the company 
or giving feedback on equipment, there were no assurances as to the outcome.  
Carl, the Chief Officer, in explaining the level of participation in decision-making 
said: 
…anything that gets purchased for the ship, we choose what we want and 
then we’ll put that to the company and they approve or don’t approve.  
Safety equipment like the helmets and body suits etc. are done by the 
company, we just request a certain amount and they’ll give it to you.  If 
we’ve got feedback on them we can send that to the company. 
[Interviewer: for example?] 
Say…we use custom boiler suits which are good and they are good quality, 
if they were sub-standard quality for any reason, we could feed that back 
to the company 
[Interviewer: would they make any changes?] 
They would certainly take that into account, I don’t know if they would 
change them. 
Nigel, the Captain also explained that seafarers do not necessarily 
participate in decisions.  The decision-making position on a ship is with the Captain 
and this relates to his position as the person with full responsibility for the ship.  
He noted:   
When you get any orders from the company you are deemed to follow 
those orders. You are… a Master is the representative of the company,…   
as per ISM code, so it’s his duty to implement all company’s ideas, 
ideologies, work and everything on board, again as per ISM.  The Master is 
a person who is sole responsibility for the safety of the ship, safety of the 
people, safety of cargo.  The Master has overriding authority over 
everything. If he sees things going wrong he has overriding responsibility 
over the company and the company will support him for that,…Apart from 
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those kinds of decisions there is no participation in decisions, it’s the 
company, they will tell us what to do. (Nigel – Captain). 
The company making decisions without consulting seafarers seems the 
standard practice for relations between the company and the ship.  One rationale 
for participation in decision-making is to ensure employers tap into workers’ 
knowledge and experiences (Walters and Nichols, 2009).  There is also the 
underlying ethical principle regarding social dialogue that is embedded in the MLC 
philosophy (Chapter 5).  However, such philosophy is not consistent with the 
traditional relations on ships which is hierarchical and undemocratic in their 
structures and practices (Quinlan, 2013b; McFarlane, 1970).  With a unitarist 
model embedded in the shipping culture and perpetuated by the managerialist 
ISM’s health and safety management system, it is difficult to imagine how certain 
aspects of the MLC, with its pluralist philosophy, might gain any traction without 
a firm regulatory lead and the other preconditions, for support.  It appears from 
this section that the aspects of the MLC that do not overlap with the ISM are 
providing some support to seafarers, however provisions such as representation 
might not be implemented, particularly as shipowners might feel they have an 
adequate OHSM system in place (Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.).     
 
8.3.4. The Complaints Procedure 
The complaints procedure featured prominently in seafarers’ narratives of being 
able to express concerns and make complaints.  This is the chief means of 
representing interests separate from those relating to the ship.  This mechanism 
exists under the ISM Code.  Although the MLC framework includes a complaints 
mechanism, this was not referred to by the seafarers.  They only made references 
to contacting the company’s Designated Person Ashore (DPA), should they have 
any problems that cannot be solved on board the ship rather than any other 
authority suggested in the MLC.  For example, Stanley the Steward explained that:    
…the 3rd Officer is for health and the Second Mate’s duty is safety, security 
is the Chief Mate’s duty…and they also have the DPA.  So, if the 3rd Mate 
or Second Mate or Chief Mate cannot solve a problem, they call this DPA. 
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This seafarer outlined the complaints procedure as a mechanism where 
they can represent their interest particularly in solving individual problems.  
Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.2.2.) explained the shipowners’ reluctance to having a more 
autonomous complaints mechanism during the MLC negotiations.  The 
compromise made, which is reflected in the MLC, is that a seafarer with a 
complaint must first exhaust the shipowners’ complaints procedures before 
appealing to other authorities.  The seafarers’ accounts however revealed that the 
procedure under the ISM is well engrained, which underscores shipowners’ 
commitment to the unitarist OHSM approach.   
For some seafarers, the complaints mechanism is the overall system for 
representing their interest and the Boatswain as supervisor is one step in that 
process.  For example, Oliver who identified the Boatswain as the leader, 
explained being represented in the event of having an issue, as follows: 
We have only one system, it is step-by-step.  If you have a problem you will 
go to the Boatswain first and then the Chief Mate and then the Captain…it 
is step-by-step.  If you have disagreement or whatever you go to the 
Boatswain first and you go like that, step-by-step. (Oliver – OS). 
In this sense the Boatswain is the supervisor, and not the representative who 
would take this issue forward as would be expected of a mechanism for 
representation.  For others, the Boatswain is not part of the procedure, which 
begins with the Safety Officer.  As Stanley, the Steward further explained: 
If I have a problem about safety, I can talk to the Second Mate, this is the 
chain of command.  You cannot go directly to the Captain or Chief Mate 
because they have somebody in charge, so you first speak to the Second 
Mate and if the Second Mate explains everything and I am satisfied with 
the explanation I don’t need to go to the Chief Mate. If the Second Mate’s 
explanation is not satisfactory, I can go the next level, like that…I have no 
choice. It is the chain of command, if in the ship I am not satisfied I can call 
the DPA representative.  That is the company policy.   
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The MLC framework, in contrast, seeks to provide additional support to the 
seafarer by making provisions for the seafarer to be accompanied by a 
representative or a friend in making a complaint.  Yet none of the seafarers 
described this as one of the steps, which shows that a piecemeal approach is taken 
to implementing some aspects of the MLC.  Except for one seafarer, none of the 
others reported using the complaints mechanism.  According to Oscar, “this is a 
good ship, we do not complain” (Oscar – OS).  Nigel reported using the complaints 
mechanism while he was a Chief Officer:    
I’ve used it because I was not getting signed off.  I was due for my sign off, 
after one month passed they were not signing me off.  I rang up the DPA 
and within 2 days I got signed off. (Nigel – Captain). 
For this same ship, Nigel explained a complaints procedure similar to other 
seafarers, “step-by-step” – the Boatswain, the Chief Officer, the Captain and then 
the DPA.  In his position as Chief Officer, he was able to telephone the DPA as the 
second step, rather than a rating who would have had to proceed through all the 
steps.  Additionally, such actions as Nigel’s were dependent on individuals and 
were not an organizational feature where everyone felt empowered to use the 
system.  Nigel admitted that often seafarers were afraid to use this system for 
reasons, also found in other studies (Bhattacharya 2009).  As he explained: 
“People are scared that they will not get a job, that’s what they are scared about, 
they will not get a job, they will not return to sea, their families will suffer.”  
Although the seafarers in this study did not report themselves being afraid to 
‘speak,’ they did admit in various ways that such possibility existed.   
 
8.3.5. Health and Safety Committees 
The health and safety committee is the other avenue for direct participation as 
well as representative participation.  These committees existed prior to the MLC, 
but the MLC has made them mandatory.   Like other areas of shipboard practices, 
the MLC provisions did not have much impact in this respect.  Except for one 
example, none of the seafarers reported any difference in practices relating to the 
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committees, which they could say was stimulated by the MLC.  In this example, 
Nigel explained: 
As the safety officer I had to make sure everyone knew about the 
amendments to the SMS when they came. So in 2012 they were making 
preparations for 2013 for the MLC. So this is what some good companies 
do because they will start inspecting in 2013. We had an audit for MLC and 
then it was implemented.  The company sent the materials, the QMS 
department, sent the documentation which was incorporated in the SMS, 
part of the SMS system.  Safety committee as per the MLC was one area 
added.  The SMS was amended and sent to the ship and it was 
implemented and everyone should know. (Nigel – Captain). 
 In exploring the functioning of OHS committees it was established that 
these are safety committees and seafarers rarely used the term ‘health and 
safety.’  Although one seafarer explained that it was for convenience, the skewed 
focus on safety in the committee meetings and on board generally, demonstrates 
that it is the reality of practice.    
This is perhaps unsurprising as health and safety committee meetings are 
dominated by operational safety matters.  The findings revealed a variety of 
configurations for types of health and safety committees, frequency of meetings, 
attendance and topics discussed.  Some seafarers reported weekly meetings and 
then one large meeting at less frequent intervals.  Others reported a monthly 
health and safety meeting but explained that daily “tool box” meetings are held.  
Tool box meetings were described as brief morning meetings specific to the jobs 
to be done for the day in question.  In some experiences, tool box meetings were 
only held if non-routine work was to take place such as drills.  Extraordinary 
meetings were also possible depending on prevailing circumstances, such as a 
disease threat or a casualty or near miss or other information that the company 
wished to bring to the seafarers’ immediate attention.  On some ships, it was 
customary to have special meetings depending on the port of call.  Here seafarers 
were briefed as to ship preparations for particular ports.    
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There were also variations in how the meetings were conducted and what 
was discussed.  Depending on the rank of the seafarer being interviewed, and 
whether it was a tool box or monthly safety meeting, they may or may not know 
how meetings are conducted.  This might be because all seafarers do not attend 
the OHS committee meetings even if this was the policy.  Attendance was dictated 
by the work schedule.  When this happened, on some ships, seafarers may be 
asked to sign the minutes of the safety meeting to indicate they had seen them.  
Stanley, the Steward explained:   
Yes, there is a health and safety committee.  Only some people go, it is 
supposed to be everybody but you have duty you know, so we have some 
representative from the crew, one person.  We have meeting every month.  
Different people go randomly, but I never go, but every month come from 
the Chief Mate that we have meeting…They explain in the paper [minutes] 
what was discussed and so I sign…in my company it is like this.   
The ship’s schedule may also determine when meetings are held which can be 
haphazard:    
We have health and safety meetings.  We have weekly or once a month.  If 
there is not time, if the crew is working then once a month.  If we are at 
sea it is not so busy so once a week.  The Captain calls us together like in 
the recreation area on Sundays in the afternoon when not much work is 
going on. (Frank- Fitter).  
Some seafarers’ explanations showed that OHS meetings are dominated 
by the company.  Although issues raised on the ships were discussed, the meetings 
described, underscored the dominance of the company in setting the meeting 
agenda.  For example, Christine, the Chief Officer, who indicated she worked on a 
well-run ship noted:   
The weekly meetings tend to be any information that is coming in from the 
office and what we call Alerts and any…vessel sharing incidents, anything 
that maybe come up from other institutions like the MAIB or the safety 
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forum and … It would tend to be any sort of like, information that’s coming 
in from the office because there tends to be a lot of that.   
Much emphasis was placed on organizational learning and behaviour-
based safety management in the meetings.  All the seafarers reported the 
discussion of company flashes and alerts from among their fleet of both negative 
and positive information, incidents that occurred and how to avoid future 
occurrences, as well as best practices from which they could learn.  Incidents 
arising from the specific ship were also discussed:  
Firstly, you go through the previous minutes, discuss anything raised in the 
last meeting, make sure anything that is closed out should be closed out 
and discuss what’s been done about the previous points. Then we have a 
monthly safety flyer or a report from the company and the important 
points from that get raised. Then something like a positive safety 
observation, which are good points and the best ones from the company 
are in that, so we read them out and discuss them… ones that were raised 
on board and the best ones from the company. (Carl – Chief Officer). 
Although all seafarers reported health and safety committees, these bear 
little resemblance in practice to what is envisaged in joint participatory 
arrangements where health and safety should be discussed.  These committee 
meetings were a continuation of what was happening prior the MLC, and while its 
coming into effect might have made health and safety committees mandatory, it 
did not appear to have influenced practices.   
In relation to health issues, seafarers found it challenging to give examples 
which had to be provided by the researcher.  The MLC speaks to a few health issues 
(Standard B4.3.1: 62) and the industry is expressing concern for seafarers’ mental 
health.  Yet these did not come readily to the minds of seafarers.  The continued 
focus on safety in these findings and supported by other evidence (eg. Bloor et.al. 
2005) show that a comprehensive approach to OHSM is missing in practice.   
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Health issues, for the most part, are not discussed in the committee 
meetings.  Examples of addressing health at the end of safety meetings show a 
casual approach.  For example: 
Yes, the captain asks after the meeting “everybody feel good; alright; any 
problem about yourself, your family?  We talk about each other…to have 
good bonding on the ship, we are like a whole family there, and the Captain 
is like your father (Mark – Junior Officer). 
Seafarers rely on the open culture and camaraderie on board as a means 
of addressing some health issues.  For example, when asked about issues such as 
depression, mental health problems or bullying, these were not discussed in 
health and safety meetings but were left to be treated should an issue arise.  For 
example, Christine (Chief Officer) explained: 
You find if you work on a good ship, and every ship is so very different, you 
know, in the case of the vessel that I’m on now, it is actually quite easy to 
see if somebody has any issue, because you work and live with these 
people all the time, so you take a very informal approach to it and you’d 
deal with it on a one-to-one basis.  I would say that comes down to the 
people you work with…if I was to see somebody with what I thought was 
potential problems then it would be addressed on a much more informal 
private basis, and it would probably be dealt with directly with the Captain, 
in all fairness it wouldn’t really go any further…it isn’t something that is 
openly discussed, we don’t have telephone numbers or anything on the 
notice boards to say if you have a problem call this number.   
Seafarers do not have an equivalent to the DPA ashore for health.  Eva, the 
Fourth Engineer was explicit in her response: “we don’t talk about that” she said.  
She continued to explain that health issues and those of a psychosocial nature 
such as depression and isolation, is up to the individual to manage.  “You are the 
best help for yourself.  You are alone even though you have friends to talk to.”  
These findings reflect an individualizing of health issues.  A few seafarers 
introduced the “healthy seafarer effect” raised in other studies (eg. Acejo et. al., 
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2011).  They explained that seafarers are healthy as they undergo an extensive 
medical before joining a ship and therefore, they were in good health (Russel, 3rd 
Engineer).    
It is surprising that seafarers’ knowledge on health issues that might affect 
their lives is quite limited, particularly when compared with the narratives in the 
shipping industry on mental issues, bullying, depression, stress and other illnesses.  
Seafarers in this study individualize health and are not aware of their employers’ 
responsibility in that respect.  This is another failure of the regulatory regime to 
deliver comprehensive protection for this workforce.  
 
8.4. Selective Partnership and Social Dialogue  
This final section reflects on the broader idea of social dialogue seen as essential 
to achieving decent work.  From the previous data chapters, social dialogue 
stopped at the national level.  The seafarers’ accounts in this chapter underscore 
those findings that social dialogue is not a feature on the ships where the seafarers 
who participated in this study worked, and it is likely that this pattern is replicated 
on many other ships.  The findings showed that arguably the two most important 
preconditions, organized labour and management commitment, are not met to 
support representation.  
The seafarers’ reports revealed that they were not treated collectively.  As 
the ISM is the dominant OHSM system which uses a direct participatory approach, 
it became evident that a pluralist approach to health and safety is absent from 
their experiences.  However, this did not preclude shipowners,’ or companies’ 
commitment to safety and seafarers’ welfare.  As the seafarers explained, they 
worked on “good ships.”  In most instances this meant being treated well and 
receiving wages on time.  For example, Oscar, the OS said: 
This company is good. They pay attention to rest hours…the food is good.  
The Chief Cook is good and we can request the meal we want.  He is Filipino 
so he knows what we eat. We also receive our pay on time. (Written notes). 
Ashton, an Able-bodied Seafarer (AB) indicated that: 
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The company was not so good not so bad, but it was better than his 
previous companies.  He receives his pay on time and its more than on 
previous ships. This was important as he had a daughter in school and there 
was no work ashore for him. (Written notes). 
Seafarers thought that there was a commitment to safety in reference to 
the practice of organizational learning discussed in Section 8.3.5 on health and 
safety committee meetings and working safely in their immediate working 
environment.  Safety is seen as a priority which involves following the SMS and 
being conscious of safety practices.  Alfred, an AB reported “they are serious about 
safety on board. Like sometimes I don’t wear my hard hat and the Chief Mate will 
say you are not wearing it.”  Winston, the Wiper also noted “Like using chemicals 
for cleaning…you use safety googles, safety gloves.” Working safely is discussed in 
tool box meetings.      
This study has reported fairly positive experiences from the seafarers who 
participated despite a lack of autonomous support.  Union presence on board was 
absent as discussed in Chapter 7.  For those who reported being in a union, they 
were individually engaged.  Christine, for example explained that her union had 
company representatives but none on board: 
Every company would have a [name of union] representative, so I know 
who my contact would be within [union name] if I had any issues with the 
company…the contact would mainly be down to email, you don’t tend to 
find meetings are held. (Christine - Chief Officer).  
Likewise, Captain Joseph reported being a member of a union and he receives 
information via email and a monthly newsletter sent to his home: 
I’m a member of [union name].  I get information by email and a monthly 
newspaper delivered to my home.  Union is not involved in organizing 
representation or selection of representatives for health and safety 
committee.  Unions really have minimal daily influence in safety on board.  
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Captain Nigel, also explained that many seafarers are unionized but there was no 
on board involvement to support representation:  
Yes, I am a member of a union, an officers’ union.  Everyone on board is in 
a union, national union, it is mandatory. The governments of India and the 
Philippines make this mandatory.  ITF combines them all.  Anyone can 
approach ITF at any time…  No, there’s no union on board involvement, 
only if you’re having problems you can contact the union.    
Structural changes in shipping, as discussed in Chapter 3, have weakened 
union direct involvement in shipboard operations for those traditional maritime 
countries.  Unions may have members on ships, but not necessarily union 
recognition.  The seafarers’ experiences substantiate those findings from the 
union official and inspectors about the limited level of union involvement on ships.  
As an important precondition, union support is missing from seafarers’ 
experiences.  Further, the management commitment described is skewed towards 
a managerialist approach and excludes dialogue.  In this study, the shipboard work 
environment is driven by management with a unitarist approach which has most 
likely contributed to the ways in which seafarers experience and think about 
participation.     
 
8.5. Conclusion    
This chapter examined the findings for seafarers’ experiences of representation in 
health and safety management on ships.  Representation as a formal structure to 
ensure seafarers exercise this right and do not have to individually navigate their 
way through work relations, is absent from their experiences.  The findings reveal 
that the Boatswain is most often identified as the safety representative for the 
ratings.  However, this is primarily related to duties as their supervisor.  The few 
instances where some resemblance of representation in the pluralist sense exists, 
were also underdeveloped.    
Mechanisms, such as the complaints procedure, the organization and 
functioning of the safety committee, and schemes to solicit seafarers’ input, were 
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the means through which seafarers exercised “voice.”  These mechanisms were 
claimed to be supported by an organizational culture of openness where everyone 
was encouraged to participate by raising issues.  As such a theme of “we can 
speak” was prominent in the seafarers’ accounts, contributing to representation 
being discounted.  Given the hierarchical and undemocratic traditions on ships 
(Quinlan, 2013), the extent of openness needs to be questioned.  The research 
shows that the issues on which seafarers speak were limited, while consultation 
and participation in decision-making were below what would be expected in an 
effective participatory system.  The next chapter brings together the different 
levels of data collection to draw out the central findings and implications of the 
study.    
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9  
Problems with Standards for Representation On Board 
 
The importance of representation is about workers having “actual influence, not feeling of 
influence” [original italics].  Strauss’ (2006: 779). 
[There are] injurious consequences of management alone determining health and safety… 
(Nichols, 1997: 149). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9.1. Introduction  
The findings in the preceding chapters reveal that representation as envisaged in 
the MLC framework was not implemented on ships.  The analysis offers an 
explanation within the context of the lack of the preconditions, the nature, 
organization and control of work on board, as well as the tensions due to the 
different frames influencing the workplace.  Furthermore, in examining the 
provisions for representation within the context of the requirements for a “firm” 
regulatory lead, they were found to be inadequate.  The thesis argues that the 
inadequacy is aligned with a number of key findings that emerged in the research 
related to how and what the architects thought (or not thought) about regulating 
representation on ships.   This chapter discusses these findings in order to go some 
way towards answering the research question: Are the MLC provisions for 
seafarers’ representative participation in OHS a firm response to poor working 
conditions on ships?  
Four key findings in the preceding chapters (5-8) affirm that the MLC 
provisions are not the firm response envisaged.  First, both meeting documents 
and interview responses at the developmental level, provided empirical evidence 
that representation was not discussed.  The research reveal that the standards for 
representation were influenced by traditional approaches associated with the 
institutional structure of the ILO as a tripartite body, and land-based practices 
found in developed countries, rather than any conscious decision to include 
representation as an institution to give seafarers influence over their high risk 
working conditions.    
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The second key finding is at the administrative level and shows the inaction 
surrounding representation for seafarers.  Policy officers and inspectors explained 
that the UK was largely compliant with the MLC prior to its coming into effect 
(Chapter 7).  The findings reveal that the UK was actively involved in the 
development of the MLC and its guidelines and assisted in providing a regulatory 
lead consistent with what was already in place.  The provisions were therefore a 
perpetuation of the status quo rather than a re-think of longstanding measures 
towards developing standards suited to address how seafaring work had changed.   
At the shipboard level, the third key finding also confirms the analysis 
behind the first key finding that participation was not thoroughly thought through 
and therefore had no impact on board.  In examining seafarers’ experiences, the 
study found representation as a practice in disarray.  There were tensions between 
existing unitary safety management systems implemented to satisfy the ISM Code 
and the MLC pluralist provisions for representation.  These tensions undoubtedly 
account for some of the confusion found among seafarers, as the ISM framework 
supposedly makes allowances for representation in requiring the appointment of 
seafarers’ representatives to serve on shipboard OHS committees.  However, the 
dominant form of representation the ISM supports in practice is individual and 
direct, rather than collective and autonomous.    
The final key finding indicates that in reality, seafarers discount the 
importance of representation.  While hypothetically most of those interviewed 
believed representation to be a good thing, they did not regard it as an important 
aspect of their work relations.  Representation was overshadowed by direct 
participation and so was dismissed as unnecessary in some instances and in others 
it was regarded as “nothing special” because the seafarers felt they already had a 
“say” through the managerial means established under the ISM system.    
This chapter brings together the key issues emerging from these findings 
in relation to the research aim to explore and understand the viability of the 
provisions on representation in the MLC framework.  The first section synthesises 
the findings from the documentary research and comments on the text of the 
provisions which the thesis argues do not provide a firm regulatory lead.  The 
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second section of the chapter focuses on the accompanying preconditions for 
effective representation: management commitment, organized labour and the 
regulatory steer.  It discusses how weaknesses in these preconditions might have 
contributed to failures to effectively implement representation on ships.    
 
9.2.  Negotiating Standards   
The MLC is the product of the ILO’s tripartite regime where cooperation, 
compromise and consensus guide negotiations for developing standards.  The 
documents revealed that producing the MLC might have been unprecedented as 
the employers’ and employees’ groups had agreed on the instrument and basic 
elements before joining forces to convince the governments of the need for the 
convention.  It appears from other accounts of negotiations at the ILO, that 
employers are not usually as cooperative in the setting of standards (Thomas, 
2018; Thomas and Turnbull, 2018).  This research found that employers were 
willing to cooperate in a re-regulation of the industry consistent with their interest 
of addressing unfair competition.  This is not unique to the ILO maritime efforts as 
DeSombre (2006) for example, has recorded instances of some shipowners’ 
willingness to accept some regulatory oversight in order to prevent a “race to the 
bottom” in maritime standards established by the IMO.    
However, cooperation, consensus and compromise also have their 
drawbacks as Chapter 5 demonstrated.  Although popular accounts of the MLC as 
the seafarers’ “bill or rights” and a “firm response” to poor working conditions 
might paint the picture that seafarers are the main beneficiaries, this research 
evidence has somewhat tempered those claims in reference to representation.  In 
order to develop an instrument to satisfy the various interests, areas of the MLC 
were much weaker than the seafarers’ group would have liked.  The documents 
showed that the MLC was developed as a framework convention with the 
minimum requirements, while much of the substantive elements were outlined in 
non-mandatory guidelines to the satisfaction of governments and the employers.  
Such is the nature of the ILO tripartite system for developing standards where 
provisions are traded off to find the best compromise, otherwise, the convention 
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might not have been adopted (Trebilcock, 2009).  The ILO model has attracted 
criticism from some writers, who question the value of standards developed to 
satisfy the more powerful negotiators rather than being relevant to the situation 
they are meant to address (Standing, 2008).   
Additionally, the text of the provision is not consistent with a firm 
regulatory lead as a precondition for effective representation.  This finding further 
highlights the weakness in the ILO’s governance regime.  The ILO relies on member 
States to implement its provisions without any real means of ensuring compliance 
(Bauer, 2008: 649; Biffl and Isaac, 2002: 9).  Developing a framework convention, 
which relies on its horizontal governance mechanism to ensure a firm regulatory 
steer, seems inadequate from the evidence of this research.  The framework 
approach lacks the necessary details and allows flexibility.  Although the architects 
were of the view that the guidelines provided the substance which should be given 
“due” consideration, the research found no more substantial provisions were 
developed in the case of the UK that might have demonstrated the force of the 
guidelines.  Besides, the UK’s provisions were more substantial than those in the 
MLC, although in practice, these also failed to ensure effective representation.  
These arguments surrounding the lack of firmness in the negotiated standards and 
other findings of the neglect of developing representation to the level to have 
some effect, raise questions regarding the value placed on these provisions as a 
means to contribute to alleviating poor employment and working conditions for 
seafarers. 
Besides the weakness in the regulatory lead, there are also weaknesses in 
ensuring compliance.  The compliance and enforcement regime is regarded as one 
of the strong elements of the MLC that will ensure its effectiveness (Lillie, 2008; 
Bolle, 2006).  In negotiating the standards for compliance and enforcement, it 
appears that the architects expected this element to be one of the significant areas 
of the MLC.  Nevertheless, a different picture where inspectors are challenged in 
carrying out their duties in general, and also with enforcing the requirements in 
respect of representation emerged in the study.  The enforcement system relies 
on traditional approaches that use documentary evidence which are not usually 
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an accurate reflection of reality.  The other means of verification is the seafarers 
who are also unreliable as they may be wary of speaking to State officials (Section 
9.3.4).  In negotiating the standards, the challenges of enforcement at the 
shipboard level were not adequately considered.  Others have shown how 
seafarers in particular are wary of engaging with inspectors and this may leave 
important matters uninspected (Bloor, et. al. 2005). 
In pulling these findings together, it was shown that while representation 
was not featured prominently in the negotiations, the general experiences in that 
respect, suggest that the overall strength of the MLC might have been 
compromised due to the need to satisfy the varying interests and develop a 
document that would be adopted.  Representation was one area where the 
substantive elements were relegated to guidelines that, despite the architects’ 
beliefs, turned out to be less effective than envisaged. 
 
9.3.  Supports for Effective Representation     
The study is guided by the view evident in the literature that for representation to 
be effective, certain preconditions must be in place (Walters and Nichols, 2007; 
Walters et. al. 2005).  This section discusses the findings on the status of the 
preconditions to support representation on ships according to the MLC framework 
to further develop previous discussion on the lack of interest shown for seafarers’ 
representation, and therefore the likely reasons for the seafarers’ experiences.  
 
9.3.1. Management Commitment in Theory 
Management commitment is one of the important preconditions for effective 
representation.  Chapter 6 explains that this thesis has adopted the MLC’s 
definition of a shipowner which places obligations for satisfying its requirements 
on the shipowner or any person or entity agreeing to take responsibility for the 
operation of the ship.  The generic term “shipowner” is used in the MLC in 
reference to this responsible person or entity and was used in conducting the 
interviews.  As such, references in this discussion to the shipowner should also be 
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taken as a reference to management and its commitment whether the term 
“shipowner” or “the company” is used.   
There are layers of management influencing the shipboard work 
environment which extends from the shore-based office to the ship (Xue et. al. 
2017; Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013).  Senior management (i.e. the shipowner) was 
the main source of support the architects envisioned for representation on ships, 
and therefore determined the focus of this discussion on management 
commitment.  However, it emerged in this study that shipboard management, 
particularly the Captain, has some influence in the practice of representation.  
Studies conducted on ships, stress the importance of line managers in creating an 
enabling (or an inhibiting) environment for seafarers’ participation in OHSM 
(Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013; Bhattacharya, 2012b).  The following sections 
discuss the man issues surrounding management commitment as found in this 
research, such as drivers of commitment, the nature of this commitment in 
practice and the consequences of the type of commitment found.   
 
9.3.1.1. Paternalism and Enlightened Self-Interest as Commitment 
Paternalism in terms of the “good shipowner” and enlightened self-interest with 
respect to cost considerations, were the main motivators articulated for 
management commitment to representation on board.  This representation was 
consistent with direct participation rather than seafarers’ autonomous and 
collective involvement.  The “good shipowner,” the “good ship” and “the good 
company” were used as assurances and explanations as to why shipowners would 
be amenable to implementing the MLC provisions on representation.  At the 
administrative level, the “good company” and the “good ship” were used to 
indicate where satisfactory efforts were being made to follow the OHSM rules as 
per the UK’s regulations.  Seafarers also used these terms to indicate their 
satisfaction with their working conditions and to emphasize why they thought 
representation was unnecessary.    
The “good shipowners” were characterized as those whom the architects 
represented at international fora, who wished to be compliant with regulations 
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(Chapter 6).  These were the ones who were involved in the MLC’s development 
for whom sub-standard shipping was a problem and who were also to benefit from 
this attempt at regulating labour standards.  As explained in Chapter 5, the MLC 
also serves to “create a level playing field” for good shipowners. 57  At the UK level, 
good shipowners were actively involved in the national maritime committees and 
in consultations with their social partners to set standards.  On board, 
demonstration of this commitment from the inspectors’ perspective, was for 
example, having OHS committee meetings and detailed minutes showing where 
issues raised were addressed.  For seafarers, the “good company” or the “good 
ship” meant that they were paid on time and working conditions were satisfactory 
in terms of having culturally appropriate, quality food in sufficient quantity; 
recreation facilities; medical care; and having a “say” in OHS matters.  Overall, the 
study found that there was a general perception across the research levels that 
“good shipowners” were not the targets of the MLC.    
The “goodness factor” suggests some amount of paternalism might also be 
in operation consistent with some forms of unitary framing of the workplace (Budd 
and Bhave, 2008).  This “goodness factor” in this research resonates with 
Cullinane’s and Dundon’s (2014) perspective of paternalism as a unitarist view of 
the workplace, which can discourage workplace representation.  Paternalism, they 
note, legitimises the employer’s control of the workplace through showing care 
for employees.  Unions are seen as disruptive to the familial atmosphere and 
unnecessary as the employer will attend to the welfare of the employees.  As this 
study found, seafarers reported that their welfare, including health and safety, 
were being addressed by the “good company.” 
Paternalism, as a reason to expect shipowners to be committed to 
representation is problematic.  The seafarers’ experiences showed that 
management commitment in practice was inconsistent with the architects’ 
expectations for shipowners to support representation.  Despite the apparent care 
                                                             
57As a reminder, the less publicized rationale for the MLC was to assist in creating a ‘level playing 
field’ for ‘good shipowners,’ recalling the continuing campaign against sub-standard shipping and 
attempts to stymie the “race to the bottom” in working standards on ships by eliminating 
competition on labour standards (DeSombre, 2006; 2008; Lillie, 2006).   
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for seafarers, the study found that a number of important areas of seafarers’ OHS 
protection were deficient (discussed in Section 9.3).   
Management commitment requires concrete actions to mobilize resources 
and activities for representation (Menendez, et. al. 2009; Walters and Nichols, 
2007).  These include time and training to support representatives in their role; 
active two-way communication and consultation of representatives; and ensuring 
representatives are safeguarded from victimization associated with their role.  The 
MLC framework is similar in these respects, except those details are in the non-
mandatory guidelines.  Despite the architects’ confidence that these were “more 
than just guidelines,” none of these activities had taken place in their entirety in 
respect of the ships on which the seafarers in this study worked.    
The situation examined at the UK level was not much different.  Although 
the UK inspectors reported some level of compliance on ships (in both flag and 
port State inspections), they also confirmed that the practice was below what their 
regulations required.  This is not surprising when compared with similar findings 
in land-based studies (eg. EU-OSHA, 2012; Walters et. al. 2005).  Management’s 
commitment is demonstrated not only by their capacity to provide resources, but 
also their will (Walters and Nichols, 2007).  While this study is limited in responses 
from shipowners or managers, sufficient evidence emerged to suggest that 
shipowners’ will to implement representation is lacking.  Shipowners’ will is 
towards maintaining the ISM Code system.  Indications are that this is a deliberate 
tactic to maintain control of the workplace.  In the MLC deliberations, they resisted 
texts that suggested a sharing of authority on board (Chapter 5).  In the seafarers’ 
experiences, participation is direct, and management unilaterally controls health 
and safety despite claiming to establish joint OHS committees where seafarers are 
represented.  In practice, seafarers are included to support the SMS and the safety 
of the ship, without any of the features suggestive of genuine participation.     
Enlightened self-interest also proved an inadequate motivator for 
shipowners to support representation.  The architects noted that it was in the 
shipowners’ best interest to listen to seafarers in order to address situations 
before they escalated into costly incidents.  On the one hand, this thinking reflects 
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the more practical rationale for representation as a means to tap into workers’ 
day-to-day knowledge of their work processes with which management is not 
entirely familiar (Walters and Nichols, 2009).  On the other hand, there is an ethical 
reasoning for including workers which is consistent with broader notions that 
labour is not a commodity and therefore workers ought to be given the 
opportunity to use their knowledge to contribute to their own protection 
(Robinson and Smallman, 2013).  It appears however that the architects were 
speaking less to the practical and ethical element and more to the business case 
for health and safety management (Chapter 6).  
The business case espouses that there are financial benefits of investing in 
health and safety (Cutler and James, 1996) and there is the received wisdom that 
workers should be included as a means of achieving the organizations’ health and 
safety goals (RoSPA, 2010).  Countries such as the UK embarked on national 
campaigns to promote the “safety pays” slogan.  However, some researchers have 
argued that the evidence for a business case has not been proven. Smallman and 
John, (2001: 228) contends that if there is an argument that safety pays, it must 
be made clear for whom.  Management decisions to spend are not necessarily 
related to cost but other reasons such as organizational reputation, or their own 
subjective thinking as to what is necessary expenditure (Sampson, 2011; 2016; 
Cutler and James, 1996).  In other words, management’s decision-making is not 
straightforward.  Management is compelled by forces of competition and short-
term profits, particularly small enterprises (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999).  In 
that respect, the business case is not necessarily a reliable basis for expecting 
regulatory compliance, as the following sections demonstrate.    
 
9.3.2. Management Commitment in Practice 
This section discusses key findings from the seafarers’ experiences which 
substantiate the above analysis on the limitations of paternalism and enlightened 
self-interest to compel shipowners to implement representative practices.  Among 
the key findings is that representation as per the MLC framework was not 
implemented.  Where there were some practices, these were established prior to 
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the MLC.  The evidence showed that the MLC provisions had little impact on OHSM 
practices on board.  Firstly, the commitment to tripartism and social dialogue at 
the other two levels and which underpins the MLC, did not translate to the 
shipboard level.  While OHS committee meetings were held, and seafarers’ 
representatives were appointed in most instances, the practices did not reflect the 
kind of participation envisaged in a collective representative system.   
  
9.3.2.1. Participation Under the ISM and the MLC    
Chapter 5 explains that the ISM Code and the MLC provisions on representation 
are underpinned by conflicting philosophies.  The ISM Code is unitary in its 
approach and in its practices of OHSM.  It is a managerialist systems approach and 
OHS is managed in a top-down manner (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.1.).  In contrast, the 
MLC provisions on representation have a pluralist tradition of seeking to 
coordinate conflicting interests in the workplace and where union involvement is 
implicit in its tripartism.  However, representation becomes complicated in 
practice as the underpinning self-regulatory paradigm within which all this takes 
place is framed in a unitary way.58  But without any deliberations of the provisions 
for representation by the architects, these issues were not unearthed for 
clarification.  The MLC provisions were therefore introduced on ships with the 
existing unitary framework with an expectation that they would somehow 
integrate into the work practices.    
The evidence at the development level suggests that the shipowners’ 
intention was to maintain the status quo (Chapter 6, Section 6.3.3.).  Although 
there is the recognition that activities to include workers in health and safety 
under the ISM may not be working, its provisions were nevertheless deemed to 
be sufficient.  The ISM system has received criticism in previous studies for failing 
                                                             
58 This refers to the “Robens Model” (discussed in Chapter 2) and the “common interest” 
assumption underlying self-regulation which saw no need for bargaining on OHS, which suggests 
no need for unions, and also advocates de-regulation.  This left workers vulnerable to the decisions 
of management in terms of how workers would be included, as the self-regulatory framework 
offers the flexibility for managers to consult either directly with workers or through representatives 
(James and Walters, 2002).  In situations where workers are not organized, as on ships, or do not 
have union support, also in contemporary precarious working conditions, workers are not able to 
make use of these arrangements.    
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to contribute significantly to OHSM on ships because its practices do not 
effectively incorporate seafarers’ participation (Bhattacharya, 2012a; Bailey, 2006; 
Anderson, 2003).  In supporting the ISM system, a respondent from the 
shipowners’ group claimed that the problem of seafarers’ lack of participation lies 
with shipowners’ lack of education on how to effectively communicate with 
seafarers, rather than the mechanism for communication.  This participant 
emphasized more education for shipowners rather having more regulations, 
contrary to research evidence that employers respond to regulations (eg. Walters 
and James, 1997).    
Other research shows that management’s willingness to share in the co-
management of OHS is important for effective participation (Markey and Patmore, 
2011; Milgate et. al. 2002).  While this research found some recognition of value 
in participation, there was no evidence that shipowners typically supported 
representative participation.  The instances of support mentioned for the cruise 
sector deserve their own study as this sector reflects characteristics of large 
workplaces and perhaps reputational prerogatives compel cruise ship employers 
to be more amenable to sharing management of the workplace.     
For the seafarers interviewed, their experiences were of unilateral 
management where the company control OHSM.  Seafarers were more 
knowledgeable on the ISM and its requirements and in comparison, had limited 
knowledge of the MLC.  While it could be argued that the MLC is relatively new, 
the findings did not uncover any concerted effort to educate seafarers on 
participation, nor were there attempts to establish collective participatory 
practices that would suggest these practices would mature over time.    
 
9.3.2.2. Direct Participation On Board 
This section and those following draw on the empirical evidence to support the 
above analysis that co-management of OHS was not a feature in shipboard work 
relations.  Seafarers in this study reported satisfaction with their experiences of 
direct participation.  For them, working on a “good ship” or working with a “good 
company” facilitated their involvement through various managerialist 
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mechanisms, such as tool box meetings, safety observation cards and the 
complaints mechanism.  These were methods they believed allowed them to have 
a “say” whereas representation was regarded as “nothing special.”   
This finding initially seemed to contradict other research that seafarers’ 
participation is constrained by the nature, organization and control of work on 
ships (Xue et. al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2012a; 2012b; Bailey, 2006).  Evidence from 
this study, suggested that the issue is complex and there is reason to believe that 
seafarers are constrained in individually representing their interests due to fear of 
losing their jobs, not being able to secure future work or the leadership style on 
board.  These are fears similar to those described for precarious workers in land-
based industries (Lewchuk, 2013a; 2013b).  Seafarers are characterised as 
precarious workers (Walters and Bailey, 2013; Sampson, 2013; DaCanay and 
Walters, 2011; ILO, 2004) and these findings on fear of speaking out suggest that 
it remains an issue and should be considered in developing regulatory provisions.     
The importance of line managers was also raised by inspectors and a few 
seafarers.  Particular mention was made by inspectors of the constraints on 
seafarers due to the persistence of traditional hierarchical structures, also 
confirmed in other research (eg. Sampson, 2013).  The inspectors explained that 
this might prevent some seafarers from speaking up in OHS committee meetings, 
and it was one of the challenges they faced in carrying out inspections.  Previous 
research shows the importance of on board management in facilitating seafarers’ 
“voice” and how strict hierarchy inhibits some seafarers’ participation 
(Bhattacharya and Tang, 2013).  Simard and Marchand (1994) note that hierarchy 
has negative effects on workers’ OHS outcomes.  Earlier commentators such as 
McFarlane (1970: 18) argued against continuing such strict hierarchy in the 
modern shipboard work environment for its negative effects on good employee 
relations.  As he suggested, the era which gave rise to the need to invest the 
Captain with such powers to secure the interests of shipowners has long passed.  
Of the few examples in this research where representation was found, the 
seafarers indicated the importance of the Captain in facilitating its functioning.       
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9.3.2.3. Competence of Representatives and OHS Committee Members 
The “good shipowner” narrative also comes under scrutiny in respect of the 
shipowners’ obligations to ensure competence of representatives and OHS 
committees.  No seafarer could point to health and safety training in the manner 
to ensure that representatives or the OHS committee was competent in OHS 
matters.  Providing resources, training in OHS and enlisting expertise, are some of 
the demonstrable evidence of senior management commitment to ensuring the 
competence of representatives and/or OHS committee members (Markey and 
Patmore, 2011; Garcia et. al., 2007; Milgate et. al., 2002).   
The evidence presented in Chapter 8 indicated that in most instances, 
representatives were appointed for their occupational position, rather than for 
any consideration of their willingness or ability to carry out the role.  For workers 
to make use of rights to representation, they have to be informed about those 
rights and have the necessary preconditions to ensure the provisions are 
implemented in the first place (Walters and Nichols, 2007).  Delp and Riley (2015: 
60) argue that, “Education enables workers to collectively recognize hazards and 
the impact on their health, understand their rights and identify violations of health 
and safety standards…” 
The most prominent role on the safety committee was the safety officer.  
The MLC framework provides for the appointment of a safety officer, but again 
this was explained as carrying over from practices prior to the MLC.  Under the 
ISM code, the safety officer is responsible for operational and technical safety 
issues and this appeared to have continued.  Where seafarers indicated that they 
themselves were safety officers, they did not receive training specific to their role 
as members of the OHS committee consistent with the MLC guidelines.  
Additionally, these safety officers were unaware of any resources being provided 
to particularly target the health and safety responsibilities of the committee 
consistent with the MLC framework.  The literature argues that representatives 
and OHS committee members need technical as well as legal knowledge on OHS, 
skills in negotiating with management, and in understanding complex health and 
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safety issues (Milgate et. al., 2002).  From the seafarers’ experiences, the safety 
committees on their ships were not reflective of such committees.      
 
9.3.2.4. Health and Safety Management? 
A recurring theme in this thesis is the skewed focus on safety to the extent that 
some seafarers were uncertain that they had a health and safety committee.  
Including the word “health” was confusing in some instances and it was discovered 
that the practice on ships was to say “safety” only.  Health was understood mostly 
as medical care and occupational health issues were treated informally, 
particularly psychosocial health.  On some ships, the small size and camaraderie 
among the crew were relied on as a means of managing psychosocial health.  
Others were clear in their responses that “we don’t talk about that” in reference 
to health issues and in particular psychosocial health.   
The MLC provisions stipulate that modern diseases such as HIV Aids and 
mental health illnesses should be taken into account, when policies and 
programmes are being developed (MLC B4.3.1 paragraphs 2-4: 62).  These were 
not discussed in OHS committee meetings on board ships.  Considering the 
combination of OHS risks seafarers face and increasing attention in the maritime 
press on mental illness among seafarers (eg. MAREX, 2017), this is a failure of the 
OHSM system to adequately address health and safety.  Studies show that 
representatives can contribute to addressing traditional as well as non-traditional 
OHS concerns (eg. EU-OSHA, 2012: 17).    
Seafarers in this study believed that it was their responsibility to care for 
their own health.  This resonates with Gallagher’s and Underhill’s (2012: 237) 
assertion that there is an individualization of psychosocial health risks in the 
contemporary workplace, and an apparent return to previous narratives that 
individual behaviour and characteristics are the causes and solutions for issues 
such as work stress.  Acejo et. al., (2011) came to a similar conclusion on the 
responsibilization of seafarers in their findings of high levels of self-medication 
among seafarers.  In my study, the seafarers on “good ships” pointed out the 
availability of gym and entertainment equipment as a means to help individuals 
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safeguard their own mental health.  While this thinking might be commendable as 
workers do have a responsibility to care for themselves, it abdicates the shipowner 
from his responsibility as the employer to safeguard his employees’ OHS.    
This abdication of the shipowner is underscored when the “healthy worker 
effect” (Acejo, et. al. 2011: 90-92) is assessed.  It emerged from the seafarers’ 
interviews that they might subscribe to the “healthy worker effect” as a way of 
substantiating their explanations that representation was unnecessary.  Seafarers 
indicated that they had no problems on board with health because they were 
medically fit.  As part of their employment requirements, seafarers are subjected 
to a comprehensive medical prior to joining a ship and they argued that this 
confirmed that they were healthy.  Acejo, et. al., 2011 suggest that seafarers may 
downplay health problems to protect their employment and may not wish to make 
disclosures to researchers which they feel might compromise their employment.  
Although it was uncertain whether this was the case in my research, the study 
does point to deficiencies in seafarers’ knowledge and understanding of 
occupational health and safety underscoring the need for effective OHS training.  
In effect, the seafarers dismissed representation on grounds of the “healthy 
worker” and safety on the grounds that they could “speak.” 
Seafarers’ experiences of discussing health issues was ad hoc.  In some 
instances, this was at the end of OHS committee meetings, or tool box meetings, 
when a general question was asked.  For example, “Is everybody ok?”; “Everybody 
feel good, any problem about yourself, your family?”  Overall, the findings did not 
show any sustained and systematic means of training, creating awareness or 
addressing health comprehensively.  These are matters that might have been 
addressed with effective representation.  Other studies show that where there are 
active representatives and a functioning participatory system, workers are more 
OHS conscious as representatives stimulate other activities such as training and 
the provision of information (EU-OSHA, 2012; Garcia, et. al., 2007; Milgate et. al. 
2002).  When the evidence in this study is considered, the high commitment to 
direct participation and established managerial practices do not adequately serve 
seafarers’ OHS protection.   
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Nichols (1997: 149), argued that there are “injurious consequences of 
management alone determining health and safety.”  The consequences that 
emerged in this research is that seafarers’ health was not given equal attention as 
ship safety and they lacked the knowledge or support to hold their employers’ 
accountable.  The thinking behind the functioning of the system relied on the 
“good shipowner” to do the right thing which is not a strong and sustainable 
approach to OHSM.  This thinking does not serve seafarers who might not be the 
beneficiaries of benevolent owners, neither is it sustainable in times of economic 
pressure (Gunningham and Johnstone, 1999). 
 
9.3.3. Trade Union Involvement  
This section discusses the findings on organized labour as one of the important 
supports for effective representation.  It focuses on trade union activities on UK 
ships consistent with the data gathered (Chapter 4).  Union activity on board is 
limited.  The elements of representation that emerged from the findings, such as 
the establishment of OHS committees, existed prior to the MLC (Chapter 8).   The 
section first discusses trade union involvement in the wider context of setting the 
standards, and then goes on to discuss barriers to on board organisation.    
 
9.3.3.1. Mind the Gap: Selective Cooperation in OHSM   
The findings revealed a paradox of tripartism and social dialogue which were 
espoused and practiced at the international and national levels but stopped short 
of being integrated in work relations on board.  Instead, broad statements of 
involving seafarers or their representatives were made, despite trade unions being 
integral to the process of developing, operationalizing and enforcing maritime 
labour standards.  Existing research provides convincing evidence that trade 
unions deliver the most effective representation at the workplace level whether 
specific to OHS or broader issues (Heery, 2010; Strauss, 2006; Walters, 2006; 
Milgate et. al. 2002; Nichols, 1997).  Yet, the MLC provisions do not make direct 
reference to the involvement of trade unions to support the establishment and 
functioning of representation.  Frick and Walters (2000: 45-46) argue that trade 
unions are most suited to enable joint OHS committees, the model of 
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representation adopted in the MLC framework.  It might be argued that union 
involvement on ships is implicit in the MLC framework owing to the ILO as the 
“parent” organization where tripartism is emphasized, and that unions are 
involved at other levels.  But, unless explicitly stated, broad statements are left to 
the interpretation of member States.      
The MLC is a product of the ILO’s tripartite system where the social 
partners cooperate to produce these labour standards.  Trade unions were 
integral to MLC’s development before and during the negotiations and continues 
to be involved in its continuous review.  As Chapter 5 explained, the JMC was 
responsible for triggering the process leading to the MLC.  At the UK level, 
seafarers’ unions are active in the national maritime OHS committee and in 
consultations to set policies and programmes nationally.  The UK unions also feed 
into international and regional policy agendas as UK’s representatives or as 
advisers and experts to various regional and international committees.  Yet, such 
depth and breadth of union involvement does not feature on UK ships.   
The absence of union involvement on board might help to explain the 
disarray in representation that emerged in this study, and seafarers lack of 
knowledge.  The presence of trade unions might help to address issues of fear of 
speaking out.  Trade unions can contribute to a more comprehensive approach to 
OHSM which includes training and education for representatives and their 
constituents (EU-OSHA, 2012; Markey and Patmore, 2009).  Unions are important 
in ensuring regulatory provisions for OHSM are complied with in the workplace 
and have the resource base to engage employers (Nichols, 1997).    
  
9.3.3.2. A Long-Distance Relationship 
The findings of limited union activity on ships can be understood through the lens 
of the fragmentation of the seafaring labour force and reorganizing of shipping 
business as a result of economic globalization (DeSombre, 2006; Lillie, 2004).  One 
of the laments of the union official interviewed was that their members are 
scattered on different flag ships, so they rarely see them.  The shipping industry is 
not unique in this regard as it reflects the broader context where union 
236 
 
involvement in workplaces has declined across most advanced economies (Delp 
and Riley, 2015; Biffl and Isaac, 2002; Quinlan et. al. 2001).  Multinational hiring 
practices destroyed the common national identities that were found on single 
crew ships of traditional maritime States and so removed an important basis for 
union involvement on board (Kahveci and Nichols, 2006; Lillie, 2004; 2006).   
Unions have also been criticized for their inertia to break from traditional 
organizing methods, which are not suited to the contemporary world of work.  
However, these reasons might be less significant when considered alongside 
shipowners’ unwillingness to recognize unions on board.  As explained by the 
union official in Chapter 7, the union had more leverage in the cruise sector 
compared with other shipping sectors because unions were recognized and were 
therefore involved in on board support, such as assisting with participatory 
arrangements and having union members as representatives on OHS committees. 
Cruise ships resemble large workplaces which suggests that the small 
workplace characteristics of many ships is a factor to be considered in gaining 
union recognition.  The union official explained that the cruise ship companies find 
it easier to bargain collectively as it saves time and resources.  It may also be the 
nature of the cruise sector which is more visible in the public eye and for 
reputational reasons, would wish to appear as good employers (Smallman and 
John, 2001).  Except for cruise ships, union involvement consisted of engagement 
with operators at the national level (in the UK) and using those opportunities to 
raise OHS concerns, whether or not they have recognition from a particular 
shipowner.    
Lack of direct involvement on ships leaves unions with the option of relying 
on seafarers for information regarding issues to be resolved.  This point 
underscores the importance of constituents who are active and aware of statutory 
requirements governing their work environment in order to bring breaches to the 
union’s attention (Delp and Riley, 2015).  The absence of representation on board 
makes active relationships with unions even more important in safeguarding 
seafarers’ health and safety.  Yet, if seafarers’ participation is constrained, they 
become an unreliable source of information.  While the union official did not 
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report this aspect as a special concern for his union, he explained that some 
members may be afraid to speak out on issues, particularly cadets, or junior 
officers at the beginning of their careers, who were reluctant to “stand out” or be 
seen as “trouble makers.”  As such, he explained that seafarers preferred speaking 
with their unions and to remain anonymous.  This underscores the importance of 
unions in creating a source of support for workers independent of the shipowners’ 
sphere of influence.    
While this study does not claim generalization, there is consistency with 
previous work and discussions on limited union activity on board ships (Sampson, 
2013, Walters and Bailey, 2013; Kahveci and Nichols, 2006).  There are also 
similarities with experiences of many land-based industries where union 
involvement in workplaces has declined and individualization and 
responsibilization of workers’ rights take the place of collective practices (Hilgert, 
2013; Lewchuk, 2013a; Gray, 2009; Quinlan et. al. 2001).    
 
9.3.4 Challenges in Enforcing the Regulatory Lead   
A firm regulatory lead requires a firm steer to ensure standards are effectively 
implemented and practised.  This section discusses the compliance and 
enforcement regime for representation on ships.  The evidence in Chapter 5 
showed that those who developed the MLC sought to institute a strong 
compliance and enforcement regime to support the convention in general.  
Representation is to be subject to this regime as it falls under health and safety 
and accident prevention, which is listed among the areas that must be given 
attention in both flag and port State inspections (MLC, Appendices A5-1 and A5-
111).  The findings reveal that in practice, inspecting for representation is 
challenging. 
The challenges begin with the limited role given to safety representatives 
relative to safety officers and the health and safety committee and is compounded 
by the lack of statutory weight.  The only element strongly stated in the MLC 
framework is for representatives to be selected or appointed and to be given the 
authority to sit on OHS committees.  As was the concern in the MLC deliberations 
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about having objective measures to enable inspections, these were two objective 
measures that could be inspected.  The UK inspectors reported that they checked 
that OHS committees were established and that representatives and the other 
members of the committee were appointed, and this appointment was officially 
recorded according to the provisions.  Beyond that, the regulatory lead is silent, 
and therefore inspections for representative practices are carried out in “good 
faith” according to the “rules of engagement” for inspections.     
The “rules of engagement” require that documentary evidence is checked 
as prima facie evidence that a ship’s arrangements for health and safety comply 
with national regulations or with the requirements of the MLC.  This should then 
be supplemented by a walk around the ship and speaking to seafarers to verify 
conditions.  Inspectors are only allowed to do more detailed inspections if they 
have reasonable grounds to do so.  This is mainly for port State inspections and 
followed the established practices in the industry (see Bloor et. al. 2005).   
While the same rules apply to flag State inspections, inspectors have more 
powers on their own flag-ships as they are more intimately involved with their 
national systems and depending on the national regulations, can go beyond what 
is required for port State inspections.  For port State, the standard practices do 
not allow for a closer inspection of the practice of representation.  It is also not 
expected that under the circumstances of neglect of representation at the 
developmental stage, that it will be given much attention beyond the 
requirements for checking that committees are established and that key persons 
are appointed in the main roles.   
The MLC provisions are said to have been influenced by land-based 
approaches, but these emerged as more limited than some land-based regimes, 
such as the UK.  Elements that might have provided a strong regulatory lead were 
missing from the mandatory sections of the MLC, such as a stated relationship 
between inspectors and representatives and a role for unions.  Commentators 
have noted that for land-based enterprises, where these elements do exist, they 
are rarely included in inspections as the focus has been on health and safety rather 
than workplace structures (Walters and Nichols, 2007: 115).  By contrast, in 
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shipping, some attention is paid to the workplace structures, but the details to 
support the inspections are in non-binding guidelines.    
Others have found that regulatory standards are not uniformly applied 
across countries even when there are specifications (Bloor et. al., 2005). 
Therefore, in the absence of details, it is more likely that representation will be 
further neglected in some jurisdictions.  Efforts on the part of UK inspectors 
painted a slightly more optimistic picture for inspecting representation on ships, 
although they faced a number of challenges.  These included challenges with 
verifying the documentary evidence by speaking with seafarers due to their 
frequent reluctance to speak, or that their responses might not tell the whole 
truth.  This presents a paradox, as although seafarers’ responses are important to 
verify the official reports, they can also be unreliable.  Inspectors may therefore 
make subjective judgements which brings personal style, experience and 
conscientiousness into play.   
Discretion is an accepted element in PSC practices (Bloor et. al. 2005: 12).  
Inspectors’ individual approaches and experiences feature in their inspection 
practices and account for inconsistencies in ship inspections (Bloor et. al. 2005), 
also observed in shore-based industries (Hutter, 1993).  This is not a sustainable 
means of ensuring standards are universally applied, particularly where the 
regulatory lead is weak, and when the wider context of challenges in governing 
health and safety in the maritime industry are considered (see Bloor et. al. 2005). 
One important challenge is the conventional approach to representation 
addressed in previous chapters.  In applying the status quo, the UK’s regime, 
likewise the MLC framework, turned out to be a perpetuation of traditional 
structures and practices that are unsuited to contemporary situations.  The 
requirement for the Captain to chair the OHS committee for example, may prove 
a barrier to seafarers’ participation (Bhattacharya 2012a), yet this was not given 
any consideration at the UK level despite inspectors’ experiences and attempts by 
one shipowner to take a different approach (Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2.).   
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Relatedly, inspectors reported that most representatives were appointed 
rather than elected and the common practice was to name all crew members as 
representatives or appoint representatives based on their job descriptions.  These 
practices were also reported by seafarers.  In the conventional practice, inspectors 
focus on safety officers to verify functioning of the safety system.  This continued, 
although for the UK, the MLC elements are merged with the ISM elements for 
inspection purposes and an aide memoire is used to ensure all the relevant aspects 
are inspected.  The safety officer is a key position on the OHS committee and, 
providing this person has the competence in standards for health and safety, and 
that the inspectors check this knowledge, then the safety officer could give an 
account as to whether health and safety are effectively managed.  However, the 
evidence in this research suggests otherwise, in that technical and operational 
safety continue to be the priority and that members of the OHS committee might 
not be receiving training in the labour aspects of OHSM.    
Inspections are not stand-alone activities and as this study demonstrates, 
without the other supports, inspections were difficult and occurred at a superficial 
level despite inspectors’ efforts.  Inspectors are guided by regulations which are 
limited in both the MLC and the UK’s provisions.  While the UK provides for 
inspecting that representative structures are in place, the details are missing in 
terms of inspecting for the supports and processes such as the provision of 
training, consultation and receiving information.  Including an explicit statement 
on the relationship between the inspectors and seafarers’ representatives might 
have helped to raise the profile of representatives and assist in effective 
representation.  Despite the challenges and barriers inspectors face, the practice 
of inspection continues along customary lines and opportunities to re-think the 
system have gone unheeded.    
 
9.4. Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the key findings of the research drawing together the three 
levels in the context of the theory for effective representation.  Representation is 
regarded in this study as important for the shipping industry which is isolated and, 
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where workers are precariously employed and are generally silenced.  A strong 
regulatory lead is needed which sets out the requirements for implementation and 
practice to ensure its effectiveness (Walters and Nichols, 2007; 118).  Recent 
studies in coal mining shows that even where all the preconditions are not fully in 
place, a strong regulatory lead gives support to maintaining an effective 
representational structure (Walters et. al. 2016a).  
While seafarers’ participation is claimed to be important in the industry 
towards developing a “safety culture,” and attempts at individual participation 
have not produced the desired results, a discussion on alternative approaches to 
on board work relations is not forthcoming.  Neither is relevant discussions 
between ship and shore being raised sufficiently to address the lack of 
commitment to representation.  This study found that the preconditions were not 
met to support the MLC model of representation.  The findings show that the 
regulatory lead is weak, the regulatory steer is constrained, union involvement on 
ships is absent and management commitment to representation is lacking.   
The thesis attributes these deficiencies in the MLC framework, to the 
neglect at the development phase where the architects failed to consider the 
viability of such a model in the context of the nature, organization and control of 
work on board.  Although the architects were in possession of information on how 
economic globalization had affected seafarers’ working and living conditions, this 
knowledge did not feature in developing the provisions for representation.    
Developing the standards for representation on ships, required 
consideration of a number of factors that link theory and practice.  It was not 
enough to impose the MLC provisions for representation on ships without 
considering possible barriers and supports for their implementation.  With these 
gaps uncovered, the study raised uncertainty as to the value placed on 
representation in this latest international effort to improve seafarers’ working 
conditions.  Was seafarers’ representation intended to be an integral part of 
regulating OHSM on ships or was it included solely to be consistent with tradition?  
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10 
Conclusion: Understanding the Disconnect 
  
Representation matters (Robinson and Smallman, 2013: 689). 
 
  
10.1. Introduction 
This study was motivated by personal experiences which gave rise to concerns 
regarding the difficulties some seafarers faced in resolving their OHS and general 
welfare matters.  The coming into effect of the MLC 2006 presented an 
opportunity to explore a “new” set of labour standards developed to address such 
concerns.  The MLC is promoted by the ILO as the seafarers “bill of rights” and a 
“firm but flexible” response to poor employment working conditions on ships.  The 
basis of this study was the MLC framework for allowing seafarers some input in 
their health and safety protection.  Previous research shows that seafarers lack of 
“voice” is a source of concern for health and safety on ships (Xue et. al., 2017; 
Bhattacharya, 2012a’ 2012b; Bailey, 2006).   
Not being free to “speak” increases seafarers’ work risks as issues are not 
brought to the fore to be addressed (Xue et al., 2017).  Such evidence of lack of 
participation, is contrary to the maritime industry’s pursuit of a safety culture and 
exposes the gap between the extent of such rhetoric and the on board realities of 
practice.  The study therefore assumed that the MLC provisions to address the lack 
of seafarers’ participation was a positive development in the maritime industry.  
Nevertheless, it problematized these provisions and questions whether the 
standards for giving seafarers a “say” provide the “firm response” envisaged by 
the architects of the MLC. 
The MLC’s development is framed in the context of the ILO’s decent work 
agenda which seeks to improve the situation of “human beings in the world of 
work” (STWGMLS/2002/5, p.1).  Giving workers a “say” in determining their 
working conditions is an important aspect of decent work with broader ideological 
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notions of social justice, wellbeing and self-actualization of workers.  Yet, the 
collective “voice” of the approximately 1.5 million seafarers worldwide, is muted 
in many instances, although they are exposed to above average risks in their 
workplaces (Walters and Bailey, 2013: 43-68; Nielsen and Panayides, 2005).  This 
study explored whether the measures for representation in the MLC framework 
provided a viable means for addressing this gap.   
This study was conducted by examining the three levels relevant to the 
development, administration and implementation of these provisions for 
representation.  This chapter concludes the study.  It reflects on the core findings 
and highlights their contribution towards understanding these standards for 
regulating representation on ships.  It revisits the research question and objectives 
and discusses the shortcomings that were found at the developmental level and 
what influence these might have had on the findings at the administrative and 
shipboard levels.  The implications for wider issues of global governance and the 
ILO’s ability to produce effective standards are highlighted.  The chapter also 
identifies the study’s empirical and conceptual contributions, along with some 
policy implications.  It ends with acknowledging the limitations of the study and 
points to areas for future research.  
 
10.2. Research Summary and Key Findings 
Scholars of the shipboard work environment emphasize the risks associated with 
lack of seafarers’ genuine participation (Xue et. al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2012a; 
Bailey, 2006).  One means of improving workers’ exposure to risks is to have 
suitable regulations for their autonomous representation that are effectively 
applied (James and Walters, 2002).  Similar arguments have been made for the 
seafaring labour force regarding the potential for representation to improve 
working conditions (Walters, 2005).  However, the supports to make this happen 
were shown to be poorly constituted for the maritime industry (Bhattacharya, 
2012a; Bailey, 2006).  Therefore, the study posed the central question: Are the 
MLC provisions for seafarers’ representative participation in OHS a firm response 
to poor working conditions on ships?  Three key outcomes of the study suggested 
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that the provisions are not the firm response envisaged by the architects of the 
MLC.   
First, the empirical evidence revealed that the seafarers in this study were 
not benefitting from representation as intended by the standards in the MLC 
framework, as representation was not implemented in the manner to influence 
health and safety practices.  Second, the provisions were not viable in the kinds of 
shipboard environment described in the research.  On the one hand, the standards 
did not present the regulatory lead to stimulate the practices associated with 
representation.  On the other, the standards themselves were based on practices 
that were unsuited to current shipboard work environment.  As one of the 
preconditions for effective representation, the regulatory lead was found to be 
weak.  The third key finding was that the other preconditions for effective 
representation were not met.  The study found that adhering to the traditional 
approach beset the regulatory steer, while management was committed to a 
unitarist approach, and unions support on board was for the most part absent.    
The evidence at all three levels of the research pointed to several factors 
that challenged the development and operationalization of representation, and 
therefore accounted for the disconnect in its implementation and practice.  Firstly, 
the architects claimed that the provisions were influenced by the ILO’s 
institutional tripartite structure and its tradition of including representation in the 
instruments it developed, along with other influences from land-based 
approaches found in advanced countries.  Secondly, some of them stated that 
representation was an uncontroversial issue in the MLC negotiations and 
“everyone accepted it” so there was no need to deliberate its inclusion.  This 
finding was surprising considering the evidence in land-based studies that 
employers are resistant to representation, particularly as it is associated with 
unionisation (Cullinane and Dundon, 2014; James and Walters, 2002).  Indeed, the 
third factor that challenged the development and operationalization of 
representation on ships was that shipowners were not amenable to union 
representation on board.  These factors underscore the gap between the 
architects thinking and the realities on ships.  
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The architects’ perspective on representation also contradicted the 
literature that shows representation as a contested area of workplace relations 
(eg. Walters et. al. 2005).  In stating that representation was unanimously 
accepted, the architects seemingly assumed a “shared understanding” of what it 
meant and how it was to be practised, but this was not supported by the evidence.  
As representation is contested, a “shared understanding” is necessary.  A “shared 
understanding” means all those involved in the development of such provisions 
agree on their meaning and therefore, how they are to be given effect (Frick and 
Walters, 2000).   
The architects’ testimonies showed that there were different 
understandings of representation.  There was one view that it was akin to shop 
floor representation.  Another dismissed shipowners’ accepting any union-type 
programme on board, while a third view, saw representation in the pluralist sense 
with union involvement.  Representation was not defined in the MLC, neither was 
it deliberated in the negotiations, so there is uncertainty as to the basis for the 
architects’ claims that “everyone accepted it,” other than they were invoking 
received wisdom about the importance of such arrangements.  These 
contradictions in the architects’ testimonies and the evidence that representation 
was not a priority agenda item in the MLC development, revealed how the 
provisions could lack the necessary elements to be considered a firm regulatory 
lead.    
The arguments for the weakness of the regulatory lead at the 
developmental level are substantiated at the administrative level where the 
findings revealed a similar lack of attention to representation.  In operationalizing 
the standards, there was a reliance on conventional approaches in policy and 
practice.  It is therefore understandable that a disconnect existed between the 
national regulations and on board practices.  As one of the key actors in the 
development of the MLC, the UK’s arrangements for participation were already in 
compliance with these provisions for representation.  The research evidence 
showed that instead of stimulating suitable practices, the MLC provisions 
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perpetuated the status quo.  As such, the study revealed a case of the MLC 
framework being influenced by existing UK practices and not the reverse.      
At the shipboard level, representation emerged as a practice in disarray.  
With the scant attention given to the text of the provisions and measures to 
support their implementation and practice, it was unsurprising that there was 
confusion and uncertainty among seafarers as to who their representatives were 
and the purpose of representation as intended in the MLC framework.  Some 
seafarers were dismissive of representation because they claimed to have a “say” 
in health and safety matters.  However, the evidence showed that this was not the 
autonomous participation envisaged in representative systems (Frick and Walters, 
2000; Walters and Nichols, 2007).  Details of the nature of the “voice” these 
seafarers claimed to have, revealed that it was confined to “domestic matters” or 
operational safety issues, and did not include consultation and decision-making as 
intended in situations reflecting genuine participation (Walters and Nichols 2007; 
James and Walters, 1997; 2002).   
The skewed focus on safety in the seafarers’ experiences, underscored the 
weakness in the regulatory lead.  Health was individualized, and its management 
left to informalities supported by the open work relationship on some ships rather 
than a comprehensive approach to OHS.  This is an unsustainable approach to 
managing health as the extent of openness on these ships might be questionable 
and is certainly not universal.  This study showed a continuation of practices in 
which seafarers’ health was neglected, as others have noted (Bhattacharya, 2009; 
Bloor et. al. 2005; Nielsen and Panayides, 2005).  An effective representative 
practice entails attention to both health and safety, including difficult psycho-
social matters (EU-OSHA, 2012), which are also of concern in the maritime 
industry.59  Such neglect is likely to be the result of a lack of consideration for 
representation and the work context for its implementation, and unmet 
                                                             
59 Examples of fairly recent news in the maritime press: https://safety4sea.com/cm-addressing-
seafarer-mental-health-issues/ ; https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/bbc-looks-at-
seafarer-mental-health; https://www.martek-marine.com/blog/mental-health-problems-at-sea-
a-storm-is-brewing/  
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preconditions to support the implementation of representation.  These are 
reflected on in the next 2 sections. 
 
10.2.1. Representation for Whom?  
One of the main findings that emerged is the lack of thought that went into 
developing the provisions for representation.  The absence of any recorded 
discussion, along with the testimonies of the architects, raised questions as to 
whether the architects intended the provision to have any real impact.  As pointed 
out in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the standards for representation were minimal.  The 
thinking of the architects about its place in the regulatory regime reflected a more 
corporatist approach to assist shipowners to meet their safety objectives rather 
than a mechanism for seafarers to influence their working conditions.  While 
meeting operational and technical safety objectives are important, the skewed 
focus on management’s safety goals and simultaneous neglect of seafarers’ 
health, are the kinds of evidence that support those arguments (on land and at 
sea) for autonomous representation backed by firm regulations to ensure 
workers’ interests are not neglected. 
The thinking that goes into formulating regulatory measures has 
implications for their viability in the context in which they are to operate.  As 
Chapter 2 demonstrated, the unitarist thinking that underpinned the development 
of statutory provisions under the self-regulatory paradigm for OHSM, proved 
unsustainable as the nature and organization of worked changed.  The thinking 
was also faulty in the conceptualization of the self-regulatory paradigm.  This 
thinking regarding the nature of workplace injuries and common interests 
between workers and employers on health and safety, was inadequate to address 
the needs of workers as it ignored the power imbalances in the employment 
relationship and did not consider the production and profit priorities of 
management (eg. Beck and Woolfson, 2000; Nichols, 1997).  This flawed thinking 
left a gap in regulatory measures to protect vulnerable workers.  While a pluralist 
thinking was introduced in this regulatory regime due to the work of trade unions, 
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the unitarist mode prevailed, particularly as union membership and influence 
subsequently declined.   
Similarly, in this study, the thinking (or lack thereof) had consequences for 
the standards developed for representation on ships.  The MLC provisions proved 
to be inadequate for their purpose.  The provisions were inspired by land-based 
practices on health and safety and bear elements of the unitarist thinking albeit 
cloaked in a pluralist framework.  Like land-based provisions, the MLC framework 
makes references to seafarers and/or their representatives, making room for 
direct participation without autonomous representation, a practice already 
discussed as problematic (Chapter 2).  The study found that tripartism and social 
dialogue were practised at the developmental and administrative levels and were 
espoused in the narratives during the MLC deliberations, but these principles and 
attendant practices did not materialize at the shipboard level.  More suitable 
standards might have been produced if the architects had given consideration to 
these provisions and what impact they were intended to have on board.   
To compound the matter, the study also found a clash of regimes where 
practices continued according to the ISM Code managerial standards, and the MLC 
labour standards in respect of representation were side-lined.  The findings 
revealed a strong unitary approach in obtaining seafarers input.  Similarly, others 
found that shipping management prefers to control OHS activities on board (Xue 
et. al., 2017; Bhattacharya, 2012a, 2012b).  Practices for fully engaging workers 
were minimal as the evidence showed.  Consultation did not appear to exist; 
training of the representatives and the OHS committee members to ensure their 
competence was not evident in the findings; OHS committee meetings were 
directed by the company; and in general, direct participation was the preferred 
mode of engaging workers.  This distinction between the MLC pluralist orientation 
for autonomous collective representation (whether it is seafarers and, or their 
representatives), and the ISM unitarist orientation, needs to be reconciled if 
seafarers are to be given a mechanism to influence health and safety on board.   
Seafarers’ accounts of participation underscored the need for 
reconciliation of the two regimes.  While seafarers in the study indicated 
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satisfaction with arrangements for their participation and noted that personally 
they had no fear of “speaking out,” there were also accounts of a reluctance which 
suggested some consistency with previous studies (eg. Bhattacharya, 2012a; Xue 
et. al., 2017).  The seafarers admitted that others might be afraid to speak as a 
consequence of similar concerns for their jobs that previous research found 
(Bhattacharya, 2012a).  Inspectors also expressed their concerns that seafarers 
were unwilling to speak, which challenged their (the inspectors) efforts at 
supporting the regulatory lead.  The evidence showed that seafarers’ participation 
remains a concern.  Furthermore, the study raises questions as to the nature and 
extent of the “voice” they claimed to have. 
There may also be barriers of a historical nature to developing a strong 
regulatory lead for representation on ships.  In the past, there was little scope for 
representation and for seafarers to speak out about their working conditions 
(Quinlan, 2013b; McFarlane, 1970).  Quinlan (2013b: 285), for example, described 
how seafarers suffered severe penalties, such as long prison sentences for 
deserting oppressive working conditions under British maritime regulations.  
While the situation has much improved, ships still remain hierarchical and the 
captain’s leadership style plays a significant role in the practices on board.  A few 
seafarers pointed to the importance of the captain in setting the tone for seafarers 
to speak out on their ships.  The inspectors also reported continued perceptions 
of the captain as “God.”  As such, management commitment at this level also has 
to be considered for effective representation alongside the tone set by shore 
management.    
 
10.2.2. Unmet Preconditions 
In drawing on the theoretical position of the research, a firm regulatory lead is to 
be supported by the other preconditions including: management commitment; 
organized labour and a firm regulatory steer.  But in the maritime industry these 
can be seen to be underdeveloped and therefore limited in the ways they could 
support representation.  The study showed that while efforts were made at 
developing a strong regulatory steer, through the MLC compliance and 
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enforcement mechanism, in practice they were beset by the nature of the 
shipboard work environment and the traditional approaches to ensuring 
regulatory compliance which constrained inspectors.  
Management commitment for representation was absent.  Participation 
under the ISM Code meant seafarers should follow the company’s safety 
management system and seafarers reported they worked according to the ISM 
Code.  In this study, health and safety meetings were dominated by the company’s 
safety agenda.  The literature argues that OHSM systems might not be geared 
towards workers autonomous representation of their interests but to serve 
management’s agenda (Frick and Walters, 2000).  Indeed, the ISM does not 
mention seafarers’ participation in its functional requirements.   
In the UK’s case, union presence depends on shipowners’ recognition and, 
except for the cruise sector, recognition to enable union involvement on board 
other ship types was not evidenced in the study.  The union experienced further 
constraints by the isolated, mobile and multinational nature of the seafaring 
workforce.  Others have argued that the fragmentation of the global seafaring 
labour force due to globalization has diminished union involvement on ships (Lillie, 
2006).  One of the important roles that unions play, is the education and training 
of representatives and constituents from a labour perspective (James and Walters, 
1977; Walters, 1996; 1998).  Seafarers’ lack of knowledge on the MLC in general 
and their confusion regarding participation, are likely the consequences of union 
absence on board ships.  Union absence may also explain some of their dismissive 
views on the relevance of participation.   
Further, OHS training is an important element for effective representation 
(Geldard, et. al., 2010; Liu et. al. 2010) to ensure representatives are 
knowledgeable and competent in OHS matters.  In such instances the 
representatives also help to educate their constituents on OHS matters.  Seafarers’ 
in this study had limited knowledge of health issues and tended to take an 
individual approach to addressing health.    
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In summary, the study found a set of provisions not fit for the purpose they 
were intended.  Representation was absent on ships and the seafarers in this study 
were not beneficiaries, as its potential to contribute to positive OHSM was not 
being realized.  It is important that regulations provide a strong lead and that the 
preconditions are in place to ensure effective implementation and practice 
(Walters et. al. 2005; Milgate et. al. 2002).  These MLC provisions were found to 
be weakened by a number of factors beginning at the developmental level where 
it was not discussed and there was a false belief that consensus existed around its 
inclusion.  Achieving consensus underpins the governance regime of the ILO which 
at times prove to be a barrier in developing effective global standards (Hilgert, 
2013).  The absence of a discussion on representation was interpreted by the 
architects as a sign of consensus on its inclusion, a consensus which did not impact 
on the practices on board.   
     
10.3. Contributions of the Study 
This section highlights the empirical and conceptual contributions of the study.    
The study has made an important contribution to the field of regulating 
representation on ships by being the first, to my knowledge, to explore these 
provisions in the MLC.  Although the MLC is a consolidation of existing 
instruments, it is worth academic exploration as the previous instruments were 
not widely ratified, nor studied.  The focus of existing empirical research on 
regulating the shipboard work environment has been the IMO conventions (eg. 
Bhattacharya, 2012a; Bailey, 2006; Anderson, 2003).  Although there is a small 
body of literature on the MLC, these relate to legal opinions or are promotional in 
tone (eg. McConnell, 2011; Bolle, 2006).  A few critical writings exist, but these 
mostly examine the MLC in general and speculate on its likely effects as they were 
published before the MLC came into effect (eg. Bauer, 2008; Lillie, 2008).  The MLC 
has institutionalized representation for the global seafaring workforce and this 
study has contributed to closing a gap in the literature on representation on ships, 
while setting the stage for future research. 
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The study is important as it addresses a workplace mechanism to 
contribute to improved health and safety management on ships from a labour 
perspective.  Seafarers face enormous risks at sea, and until the MLC, the focus 
has been mainly on the safety of ships.  The MLC foregrounds seafarers’ labour 
issues and makes provisions for their representation.  Empirically, representation 
has been found to contribute to better working conditions.  It was therefore 
important to explore the likelihood of this potential being realized for seafarers 
given the high-risk nature of their work.  
Empirically, the study demonstrates that a disconnect exists between the 
theory of representation and its practice in the workplace.  The evidence shows 
that the standard is not fit for purpose as it is conventional while there have been 
changes in the nature and structure of work at sea.  The disconnect is linked to the 
nature of global governance where standards are negotiated to suit interests and 
perhaps less so the situation to be addressed.  Representation was not discussed 
for its suitability because there was an assumption as to what it meant and how it 
could be implemented which did not align with the reality, based on the evidence 
of this research.  This is a likely reason that it proved to be ineffective in the 
situation it was aimed to address. 
The study also makes an empirical contribution in documenting inspection 
for representation on ships and the challenges this presents to inspectors.  
Inspecting representation is not a common practice for inspectorates (Walters, 
1998), and the literature in this area is also quite limited.  Much of the focus in the 
literature is on inspecting for OHS rather than representation.     
Conceptually, the study challenges the ILO’s claim that the MLC is a “firm 
response” to seafarers’ poor working conditions in respect of representation.  The 
study highlights that there are factors in the shipboard work environment that are 
inimical to representation.  These need close monitoring to develop an 
understanding of the shipboard work environment that might lead to better 
standard making.  The study shows that the shipboard work environment is void 
of the preconditions to support the effective implementation and practice of 
representation.  The study exposes challenges to be addressed if seafarers are to 
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benefit from representation and if OHSM on ships is to be enhanced, consistent 
with the potential of representation (EU-OSHA, 2012).    
The research highlights the tensions between the ISM and MLC that need 
to be reconciled if representation in any form is to be given effect on ships.  
Bhattacharya (2012a; 2009), for example, found that management’s unitarist 
approach to OHSM under the ISM system is based on behaviour-based notions of 
accidents.  Ship managers in this instance were authoritarian in their management 
style.  In contrast, the MLC is based on pluralist ideas of tripartism and social 
dialogue requiring more democracy.  The study did not find any evidence that the 
introduction of MLC on board was done in a manner to smoothly integrate the 
two.     
The study also raises questions as to the appropriateness of the particular 
model of representation.  With the absence of the preconditions, and the nature 
of shipping, it is difficult to envision the model in the MLC framework being 
effectively deployed on ships.  Seafarers have been characterised as precarious 
workers (Sampson 2013; Walters and Bailey 2013) and precarious workers are 
least likely to exercise their rights (Lewchuk 2013a; Quinlan et. al. 2001).  This 
study therefore interrogates the suitability of this model considering the nature, 
organization and control of work on board ships.  The shipboard work 
environment is multinational, hierarchical and autocratic, despite examples of 
openness on some ships.  Openness appears to be the exception and the model 
envisaged in the MLC is unsuited to such autocratic structures where there is lack 
of a collective identity among workers and where employment is typically 
precarious.     
This study has sought to directly address standards for representation 
given the absence of seafarers’ genuine input, their high-risk working conditions 
and the potential for representation to make a contribution.  It reveals, both 
empirically and conceptually, that there are challenges to be addressed.  It might 
be that additional provisions are required to strengthen the regulatory lead or a 
rethinking of the model of representation is necessary.  Given the nature of 
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shipping, seafarers’ autonomous representation should be considered despite the 
likely challenges uncovered in this study.   
 
10.4. Limitations of the Study and Areas for Further Research  
No one study can comprehensively deal with all the issues of concern to a topic, 
and as is the nature of PhD studies, the scope was limited due to time and 
resources constraints as well as access to key participants.  Nevertheless, the study 
provides valuable insights in regulating representation on ships, demonstrates 
likely explanations as to why standards may fail to address problems in practice 
and sets the basis for a future research agenda. 
The research is limited by an absence of the shipowners, particularly at the 
administrative level.  Shipowners are key stakeholders, but few studies exist that 
focus on their role and perceptions and one of the reasons is that they are difficult 
to access.  Their perceptions on the issues raised, such as the viability of the 
particular model of representation and the preconditions would have provided 
further understanding of the topic.  Shipowners seem wary of unions on ships, as 
suggested in the study.  Attempts at recruiting shipowners bore this out and two 
refusals in particular were telling, as they were made on the grounds that the 
shipowners feared that this research might be “hijacked by a militant union 
agenda” (Chapter 4, Section 4.5.1.).    
The insights gained regarding seafarers’ experiences of representation are 
valuable.  They reveal some contradictions and highlight areas not commonly seen 
in the literature on representation such as workers dismissing its importance.    
This is an area to be understood in developing appropriate mechanisms.  The 
apparent contradictions between this study and the literature surrounding 
seafarers’ “voice,” also present an area for future research if regulating 
representation is to be understood.  Do seafarers’ really have a voice and under 
what circumstances?  As the sample size of this study is small, the thesis is not 
generalizing, but the insights gained raise issues for consideration.   
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The seafarers in this study expressed satisfaction with direct participation 
however, the study shows that areas of a genuine participatory mechanism are 
missing.  The literature elsewhere discounts direct participation in situations of 
unequal power relations (eg. Walters and Nichols, 2007), but some workers have 
shown preference for direct participation in small workplaces.  Nevertheless, 
owing to seafarers’ precariousness, it might still be necessary to have autonomous 
representation.  These are matters that could be explored in a future project.    
Representatives on board ships were absent from the study and this leaves 
a gap to be filled by future research.  The data already generated provides a 
reliable picture of the experiences of seafarers when triangulated with interviews 
at the other levels, and knowledge gained from the literature.  The perceptions of 
representatives as an important sub-group of seafarers are valuable in furthering 
the understanding of their role where they might exist.  Particularly, clarification 
on seafarers’ willingness to serve as representatives is important.  What are the 
dynamics involved? Under what conditions is this model viable, if at all?  How do 
they (would they) relate to their constituents in a heterogenous and precarious 
work environment?    
The architects of the MLC were clear that the MLC is geared towards the 
more substandard end of the shipping industry.  This study is biased towards the 
better end of the industry with the UK as the case study and interviewing 
seafarers’ coming into UK’s ports, yet arrangements for representation did not 
conform to the MLC provisions.  Further research should broaden this scope to 
assess the situation in open registries or countries with less capacity to administer 
the provisions.  Jamaica, for example, has now ratified the convention, but a visit 
to their submission shows that the regulatory provisions are incomplete, and there 
are no provisions for representation.60  A future study investigating different types 
of administrations and how they have given effect to representation will be 
                                                             
60 ILO – Jamaica 2015. Labour laws for Jamaica Available at: 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/legosh/en/f?p=14100:1100:0::NO:1100:P1100_ISO_CODE3,P1100_SUB
CODE_CODE,P1100_YEAR:JAM,,2015:NO Accessed 10 August, 2018. 
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valuable for understanding the impact of the global policy and practice of 
representation.   
Despite the limitations, the data generated is of a quality to make 
conclusions in the context of this particular study and provides insights that are 
worth deliberating in attempts to understand representation on ships towards its 
effective implementation and practice.   The study also points to wider issues of 
the ILO tripartite governance structure and its limits.  While there is a body of 
literature on the ILO as an institution, there is limited research on the dynamics of 
negotiating standards.  There is much scope for future research to develop the 
ideas on the limits of global regulations that this research raises. 
     
10.6. Representation Going Forward 
This research bears out one of the central postulates of the thesis that: there is a 
disconnect between the theory of representation as outlined in the MLC 
framework and the practices as seen through the seafarers’ experiences.  
Representation is an important institution in modern regulatory requirements for 
workplace OHSM.  The thesis began with the assumption that it is a welcomed 
element in measures to address health and safety on ships considering seafarers 
face above average work risks.  As presented throughout the thesis, studies show 
that where representation is effectively implemented, it benefits OHSM in the 
workplace and workers’ OHS outcomes.   
Nevertheless, this study shows that the seafarers who participated did not 
benefit from representation, neither had it been considered a priority in the MLC 
development.  This lack of consideration went alongside contradictory thinking 
and misunderstandings regarding representation amongst the architects of the 
MLC to produce a labour standard not fit for purpose.  Also, there was a lack of 
consideration for the shipboard context for implementing representation.  Issues 
that emerged as problematic included small workplace features, possible 
leadership issues, seafarers’ reluctance to speak and the clash between the two 
regimes expected to address health and safety on ships, as well as absence of the 
preconditions known to impact effective representation.  Taking these features 
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together suggests that it might be overly ambitious to implement a model which 
asks seafarers in precarious working conditions to become active constituents, to 
select representatives, or volunteer to be elected.  These issues need careful 
consideration if seafarers are to have any influence on their working conditions 
and contribute towards positive OHSM practices and OHS outcomes.    
In considering an appropriate model, seafarers who reported being 
satisfied with direct participation on board should not be dismissed.  Nevertheless, 
the thesis has discussed the limitations of direct participation and has shown that 
some areas of seafarers’ health and safety are neglected under direct 
participation.  This matter will therefore require further study to closely examine 
direct participation on ships and determinants of its effectiveness.  Although 
controversial, there is a clearer need for union support in the shipboard work 
environment as one of the preconditions which has been strongly supported in 
other studies, and which this study shows is lacking.  Unions could therefore 
consider raising the issue of more union presence on board ships in their collective 
bargaining meetings with employers or making representation to government.  
The findings of this thesis have shown that the development of the MLC 
provisions on representative participation in safety and health on ships were 
heavily influenced by conventional practices on land but stops short of union 
support.  This development was undertaken without an adequate appreciation of 
the nature, organization and control of work on ships, and the legal and historical 
bases that might prevent a conventional land-based approach from simply being 
transferred to ships without careful thought about how such provisions might be 
modified to suit the shipping context.  At the very least, the architects of the MLC 
might have taken the opportunity to ensure the viability of the measures they 
proposed by deliberating likely barriers and addressing measures for the on board 
support of representation.  Perhaps then another model is needed to ensure 
seafarers participate as their input remains important considering that most of the 
activities leading to workplace harm occur at sea (Alderton and Winchester, 
2002a: 35).   
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In that respect, the industry might wish to consider an adaptation of the 
“regional representative” Swedish model (Frick, 2009) that was developed to 
address the challenges of small workplaces.  In this model representatives do not 
necessarily have to be physically attached to specific workplaces and union 
involvement is essential.  The ITF already has the infrastructure with its global 
network of inspectors but has also discussed the idea of an independent body to 
address enforcement in the maritime industry (Bauer, 2008: 650).”  These ideas 
could be further discussed by the Special Tripartite Committee of the MLC 
established to oversee the implementation and operation of the convention and 
make amendments. 
As the MLC is publicized as the seafarers’ “bill of rights,” there is a 
reasonable expectation that what might make representation effective at sea 
would have been given some thought.  The ILO has claimed that the MLC is an 
innovative instrument, “firm on rights and flexible on implementation.”  With 
respect to representation, the evidence presented here suggests that in fact it has 
been rather more flexible than firm.  And, as such, it is fair to conclude that in the 
development of the MLC an opportunity was missed to adequately address 
effective regulatory support for seafarers’ autonomous participation in health and 
safety.   
However, the MLC is slated for continuous review under Article XIII. This 
provides some possibility that the implications of the findings discussed in this 
thesis might usefully inform a revisiting of its provisions on representation.  In so 
doing, the findings might prove helpful in moving towards the adoption of a 
framework for seafarers’ autonomous representative participation that addresses 
the conditions of employment and safety and health, that are well-known features 
of work in the shipping industry.  
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Glossary 
 
This glossary clarifies and expands on some key terms and how they are understood and 
used in this thesis.  The definitions have several sources as indicated, but mainly the MLC 
list of definitions, and the ILO’s Frequently Asked Questions on the MLC.     
 
 
Competent Authority: The competent authority is the minister, government department 
or other authority having power to issue and enforce regulations, orders or other 
instructions having the force of law in respect of the subject matter of the provision 
concerned. (MLC 2006: 2).  
Flag States, Port States and Port State Control: A flag State refers to the nationality of a 
ship under international maritime law.  Ships on a country’s registry are subject to the 
laws of that country wherever in the world they are.  States who receive foreign ships at 
its port facilities are port States.  When a ship enters the port of another country, the 
country has certain legal rights to board and inspect for compliance with international 
maritime standards.  Where States exercise their legal rights to do so, this is referred to 
as port State control (PSC) (see entry on Port State Control Inspections).    
Flag State Inspections:  When a Member (see entry on Member) carries out a maritime 
labour inspection (see entry on Maritime Labour Inspection) on its own ships. 
Master/Captain: Any person having command and charge of a vessel (ship). (ILO 2011: 
Manual for Drafting ILO Instrument: 98). 
Maritime Industry.  The term “maritime industry” is commonly used interchangeably with 
the term “shipping industry” and is acceptable.  However, these can also be 
differentiated.  The maritime industry is technically a broader term than the shipping 
industry.  Maritime suggests all things relating to shipping, which is the movement of 
cargo on ships, and all the other activities, both on land and at sea that are mobilized to 
facilitate the movement of cargo.  Activities such as banking, insurance, brokering, and 
the host of professionals that are engaged in facilitating the transportation of cargo by 
sea and the consequences of this shipping such as pollution of air and sea, are said to fall 
under the ambit of maritime.  Shipping is limited to the movement of cargo from port to 
port and the related activities to accomplish this.     
Maritime Labour Inspection:  The examination and assessment by qualified persons that 
conditions on board ships comply with established standards and regulations.  It can be 
divided into two parts: the first concerns the physical items such as the seafarer 
accommodation and galley conditions, whilst the second relates to other elements of 
decent work or human and operational issues such as payment of wages, seafarer 
employment agreements, minimum age, medical certification and hours of work or rest. 
Some areas of concern, such as occupational safety and health, are mixed, involving 
physical aspects (protective equipment/construction) and operational practices on a ship. 
For a satisfactory inspection to be completed, it is likely that the inspector will need to 
employ different methods, including document review, visual observation, general 
discussions with seafarers and interviews with seafarers in private. When inspectors are 
interviewing seafarers, they will need to be sensitive on what may be considered to be 
277 
 
personal or potentially controversial matters. (ILO, 2009: Guidelines for Flag State Inspections 
Under the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006: 25-26). 
Member/Member State/Member Country: Refers to countries that are Members of the 
ILO.  In the context of the MLC, a reference to “Member” or “Each Member” should be 
understood as referring to countries that have ratified the Convention. (ILO, 2015b: MLC 
FAQ: 15).  
No More Favourable Treatment: During port State control inspections, ships flying the 
flag of countries that have ratified the Convention will not be placed at a competitive 
disadvantage as compared with ships flying the flag of countries that have not ratified the 
MLC, 2006.  This means that all ships will be held to the same standards in the MLC 
whether or not the country where the ship is registered have ratified the MLC. (ILO, 2015b: 
MLC FAQ: 6).   
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS).  OSH is generally defined as the science of 
anticipation, recognition, evaluation and control of hazards arising in or from the 
workplace that could impair the health and well-being of workers. ILO (2009b) 
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@relconf/documents/meetingdocumen
t/wcms_103485.pdf  
Focus in this thesis is on the labour aspects of OHS having to do with working and living 
conditions and the OHS risks arising from these such as traditional slips, trips and falls but 
also including the issues addressed in the MLC such as accommodation, recreation, diet 
and exercise and psycho-social illnesses.  The tendency in shipping is to focus on 
operational and technical safety to prevent major casualties and address ship safety issues 
and marine pollution incidents.   
Port State Control Inspections: When a member carries out a maritime labour inspection 
on foreign ships calling at its ports to verify that the condition of the ship and its 
equipment comply with the requirements of international regulations and that the ship is 
manned and operated in compliance with these rules. 
With the coming into effect of the MLC, ships are also inspected for labour conditions.  
(IMO: http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/MSAS/Pages/PortStateControl.aspx).   
Rating: A member of the crew other than a master or officer and includes a certificated 
seaman. (ILO 2011: Manual for Drafting ILO Instrument: 102). 
Seafarer (can be substituted for crew, rating, officer, master): Any person who is 
employed or engaged or works in any capacity on board a ship to which the MLC 
Convention applies. (MLC, 2006: 2).  Although the MLC covers other types of workers in its 
definition, such as cabin and cleaning personnel, bar staff, waiters, entertainers, singers, 
kitchen staff, casino personnel and aestheticians (ILO, 2015b: MLC FAQ: 22), this thesis is 
concerned only with seafarers directly responsible for the navigation of the ship and 
transport of cargo (although in some instances references are made to passenger ships 
where these arose in the interviews).  
Seafarers’ Representatives: See entry for Workers’ Representatives.  
Ship (also refer to as a vessel): A ship other than one which navigates exclusively in inland 
waters or waters within, or closely adjacent to, sheltered waters or areas where port 
regulations apply. (MLC, 2006: 3).  A State may choose to apply the MLC to domestic 
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shipping or other exempted ships. Article II, paragraph 4 of the MLC outlines the scope as 
“all ships whether publicly or privately owned, ordinarily engaged in commercial 
activities,” other than fishing or other similar vessels or traditional vessels (eg. dhows and 
junks).  Warships and naval auxiliaries are also exempt.  
Shipowner: The owner of the ship or another organization or person, such as the 
manager, agent or bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for the 
operation of the ship from the owner and who, on assuming such responsibility, has 
agreed to take over the duties and responsibilities imposed on ship- owners in accordance 
with the MLC Convention, regardless of whether any other organizations or persons fulfil 
certain of the duties or responsibilities on behalf of the shipowner. (MLC 2006: 2).  
Social Dialogue: The ILO also includes tripartism in this definition.  Sound industrial 
relations and effective social dialogue are a means to promote better wages and working 
conditions as well as peace and social justice.  As instruments of good governance they 
foster cooperation and economic performance, helping to create an enabling 
environment for the realization of the objective of Decent Work at the national level. 
Social dialogue and tripartism covers: 
• Negotiation, consultation and information exchange between and among the 
different actors; 
• Collective bargaining; 
• Dispute prevention and resolution; and 
• Other instruments of social dialogue, including corporate social responsibility and 
international framework agreements. 
Preconditions for sound social dialogue: 
• Strong, independent workers' and employers' organizations with the technical 
capacity and access to relevant information to participate in social dialogue; 
• Political will and commitment to engage in social dialogue on the part of all the 
parties; 
• Respect for the fundamental rights of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining; and 
• An enabling legal and institutional framework. 
(ILO website: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/workers-and-employers-organizations-
tripartism-and-social-dialogue/lang--en/index.htm. [Accessed 24 August, 2018]).  
Substantial Equivalence: Is one means of achieving flexibility in implementing the MLC 
provisions.  If the Member concerned “satisfies itself” that the relevant legislation or other 
implementing measure “is conducive to the full achievement of the general object and 
purpose of the provision or provisions of Part A of the Code concerned” and “gives effect 
to the provision or provisions of Part A of the Code concerned”. The Member’s obligation 
is principally to “satisfy itself”, which nevertheless does not imply total autonomy, since 
it is incumbent on the authorities responsible for monitoring implementation at the 
national and international levels to determine not only whether the necessary procedure 
of “satisfying themselves” has been carried out, but also whether it has been carried out 
in good faith in such a way as to ensure that the objective of implementing the principles 
and rights set out in the Regulations is adequately achieved in some way other than that 
indicated in Part A of the Code.  (ILO, 2015b: MLC FAQ: 9). 
Where a flag State is not in a position to implement a particular requirement in 
Titles 1–4 of the MLC Convention in the manner set out in Part A of the Code (the 
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Standards), it is permitted, under Article VI, paragraph 3, of the MLC, 2006, to adopt a 
“substantially equivalent” provision in its national laws, regulations or other measures. 
Any substantially equivalent provisions that relate to matters that are subject to 
certification must be noted in Part I of the Declaration of Maritime Labour Compliance 
(DMLC). In considering the adoption of substantially equivalent provisions, the flag State 
must take account of Article VI, paragraph 4, of the MLC, 2006, which lays down that, for 
a national law or other measure to be considered as substantially equivalent, in the 
context of this Convention, the flag State must have satisfied itself that:  
(a) it is conducive to the full achievement of the general object and purpose of 
the provision or provisions of Part A of the Code concerned; and  
(b)  it gives effect to the provision or provisions of Part A of the Code concerned.  
(ILO (2009). Guidelines for Flag State Inspections Under the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006: 16-
17; and MLC, 2006: 13). 
Workers’ Representatives: Persons who are recognised as such under national law or 
practice, whether they are: (a) trade union representatives, namely representatives 
designated or elected by trade unions or by the members of such unions; or (b) elected 
representatives, namely representatives who are freely elected by the workers of the 
undertaking in accordance with provisions of national laws or regulations or of collective 
agreements and whose functions do not include activities which are recognised as the 
exclusive prerogative of trade unions in the country concerned.  (ILO 2011: Manual for 
Drafting ILO Instrument: 106). 
In the context of the thesis, these functions refer specifically to health and safety.  
The thesis however avoids the term safety representatives in recognition of the relatively 
limited attention to health and considering the broader elements of occupational health 
and safety including psychosocial and ergonomic elements.   
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APPENDIX I 
Report to the ILO on Abandoned Vessel 
Ships Name: M/T Oceanic Power 
IMO No. 8008280 
 
Ship name:  Oceanic Power 
Flag:  Union of Comoros 
7-digit IMO no.:  8008280 
Type of vessel:  Gas Carrier 
Port of abandonment:  Kingston, Jamaica 
Circumstances:  Vessel was towed into Kingston as it lost 
power on its way to Greece from the 
Bahamas.  Several promises by the owner 
to pay salaries and repatriate seafarers 
have not been fulfilled. Local agent has 
been supplying food and drinking water to 
seafarers from their own purse.  
Abandonment date (date 
when ITF first made aware 
of the case): 
 Brought to the attention of the Registrar of 
Seafarers, Maritime Authority of Jamaica on 
January 9, 2012. 
Date of notification to the 
flag State: 
  Email sent to Flag State contact found 
online (dptcomoros@abv.bg) on January 10, 
2012. No response was received.  
Another email was sent to a third party who 
forwarded the information to the Head 
Office of the Union of Comoros Maritime 
Administration on behalf of the Maritime 
Authority of Jamaica.  No response has 
been received to date of report, February 2. 
Actions taken to resolve the 
case: 
 Registrar of Seafarers, Maritime Authority 
of Jamaica, from January 9 – February 2, 
2012 has done the following: Contacted 
local agent to ascertain status of seafarers, 
requested meeting with Captain and some 
crew to ascertain condition. Contacted 
foreign affairs ministry, contacted Greek 
and Bangladeshi Consuls in Jamaica, spoke 
with prospective purchaser of vessel 
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indicating plight of seafarers and to 
ascertain a possible resolution date. 
Constant contact with agent and seafarers, 
two subsequent meetings with captain and 
members of the crew at the offices of the 
Maritime Authority of Jamaica. Spoke with 
owner who gave promises of resolution. 
Response from Bangladeshi Consul who 
indicated that the Government has been 
informed. Copies of crew passports have 
been scanned and sent to Consul.  
 
However up to February 2, 2012 no 
resolution, no response from Flag or 
country of nationality. 
   
 
Reporting Member Govt. or 
Org.: 
 Maritime Authority of Jamaica 
No. of Seafarers:  9 
Nationalities:  Greek (Captain) – 1 
Bangladeshi - 8 
Repatriation status:  Outstanding  
Outstanding pay status:  At January 11 – US$39,476 (crew) 
                         - EURO 9,600 (captain) 
Comments:  Seafarers are contemplating arresting ship, 
however there is no definitive time frame 
for resolution if this route is taken. A local 
maritime lawyer was consulted. Also they 
need money to do this. Seafarers have been 
promised tickets by owner, and have been 
advised by Registrar of Seafarers to begin 
thinking about getting home as they cannot 
remain in the country indefinitely. However 
they are reluctant to leave vessel as they 
are worried that they will not receive 
salaries if they go home.  
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APPENDIX III 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – Developmental Level 
Preamble 
My name is Carolyn, I am a student at Cardiff University, in the Seafarers International 
Research Centre.  I am doing a PhD on the Maritime Labour Convention.  The research 
focuses on the provisions for seafarers’ representatives to participate in health and safety 
management on ships.  I would like to know about the development of these provisions.  
Where these provisions came from, why they were included and how they are to be 
implemented on ships.  I am also going to ask about some things that took place in the 
meetings.    
Could I also have your permission to tape the interview, this is for my own 
purposes of recall and will not be used for any other purposes.  Our university has strict 
policies on confidentiality and protection of research information.  Your name will not be 
used in the writing up of the research, there will be no information to identify you. The 
information you give is only for my own research and is confidential. 
If at any point you wish to stop the interview or if there is a question you do not 
wish to answer, please let me know. This is a consent form as part of the ethical 
requirements to say you understand what I have explained and you are willing to go ahead 
with the interview. Please read and sign.   
Thank you. 
Biography 
• Before we get into the MLC could you tell me something of your background. 
How you got into the maritime industry? 
• What is your job description and duties?  
• How long have you been in this position? 
• Do you sit on any committees at the international or national level? 
MLC  
• Were you involved in the development of the MLC?  
• How were you involved? 
  
Origins and Rationale for Representation in the MLC 
 
• Do you recall how the provisions were introduced in the MLC? Who proposed 
them or where they were taken from? 
• Why have these provisions in the MLC? 
• Why was representation not discussed in the meetings? 
• Why did shipowners not want safety management systems in the MLC? 
• Why did seafarers not want the ISM model? 
Supports for Representation  
• How is it envision that representation will work on board? 
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• Will shipowners implement this provision? 
• Will seafarers participate? 
• What of issues with seafarers speaking out? 
 
Perceptions of Representation 
• What do you think about having this provision in the MLC?  
 
Thank you for your time. 
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APPENDIX IV 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – Administrative Level 
Preamble 
My name is Carolyn, I am a student at Cardiff University, in the Seafarers International 
Research Centre.  I am doing a PhD on the Maritime Labour Convention.  The research 
focuses on the provisions for seafarers’ representatives to participate in health and safety 
management on ships.  I would like to know about how these provisions are dealt with at 
the UK level.  How they were implemented, if the UK had to adjust its laws etc.    
Could I also have your permission to tape the interview, this is for my own 
purposes of recall and will not be used for any other purposes.  Our university has strict 
policies on confidentiality and protection of research information.  Your name will not be 
used in the writing up of the research, there will be no information to identify you. The 
information you give is only for my own research and is confidential. 
If at any point you wish to stop the interview or if there is a question you do not 
wish to answer, please let me know. This is a consent form as part of the ethical 
requirements to say you understand what I have explained and you are willing to go ahead 
with the interview. Please read and sign.   
Thank you. 
Biography 
• Before we get into the MLC could you tell me something of your background. 
How you got into the maritime industry? 
• What is your job description and duties?  
• How long have you been in this position? 
• Do you sit on any committees at the international or national level? 
MLC  
• Were you involved in the actual development of the MLC?  
• How were you involved? 
 
For Unions: Stop here and go to the end of schedule 
  
Implementing Representation in the MLC 
 
• Please explain the UK’s system for representation. 
o How did the UK prepare for compliance with the provision for 
representation? 
o How do the provisions for health and safety and representation relate to 
UK’s existing laws? 
o Was representation discussed from the UK’s perspective in preparing for 
compliance? 
o What is the relationship between land-based requirements and the 
MLC? 
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o How does the UK communicate its expectations for practicing 
representation to shipowners, how are instructions given? 
Inspecting for Representation 
• Where does representation and having a health and safety committee rank in 
conducting an inspection?  
• What role do the Declarations and Certificate of Compliance play in an 
inspection? 
• UK land-based regulations stipulates a relationship between inspectors and 
representatives to liaise with safety representatives and send copies or 
inspection reports, is this done for shipping? How would that work? 
• How do you account for inspecting ISM and MLC requirements? 
• Please describe how you conduct a PSC inspection? How is that different from a 
flag State inspection? 
Supports for Representation  
• How is it envision that representation will work on board? 
• Will shipowners implement this provision? 
• Will seafarers participate? 
• What of issues with seafarers speaking out? 
 
Perceptions of Representation 
• What do you think about having this provision in the MLC?  
 
UNION 
• How does the MLC feature in what you do? 
• Please explain your relationship with shipping companies? 
• Is health and safety in the MLC discussed with shipowners? 
• Do unions get involved with organizing representation on board? 
• What is the unions’ role in sensitizing seafarers to the MLC and health and 
safety issues? 
• Seafarers deal with health individually and some do not have representatives 
other refers to the boatswain in his work capacity. What is the purpose of 
having this role for seafarers?  
• Who determines the public health and safety agenda? Seafarers talk about 
fatigue, but are less knowledgeable on other occupational illnesses? 
• Do you find seafarers willing to speak on issues to managers or shipowners? 
• What do you think of having this provision in the MLC? 
• What do you think about the focus on direct participation on ships? 
 
Thank you for your time. 
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APPENDIX V 
INTERVIEW GUIDE – Shipboard Level 
Preamble 
Hello, my name is Carolyn, I am a student at Cardiff University, in the Seafarers 
International Research Centre.  I am doing a PhD.  My research is on the Maritime Labour 
Convention.  I want to know about health and safety practices on ships in terms of 
seafarers’ input.  The MLC says seafarers should participate in health and safety activities 
on board ships by having representation.  Seafarers should be allowed to select their 
representatives (or one is appointed).  The representative should have the authority to sit 
on the health and safety committee to ensure seafarers interests on health and safety are 
brought to management and that management will listen to what seafarers have to say 
in how health and safety is managed on board.   I want to ask about those things and what 
your experiences are and what you think of this provision in the MLC.    
Could I also have your permission to tape the interview, this is for my own 
purposes of recall and will not be used for any other purposes.  Our university has strict 
policies on confidentiality and protection of research information.  Your name or the ship 
you are on, neither the company, will not be used, there will be no information to identify 
you. The information you give is only for my own research and is confidential. 
If at any point you wish to stop the interview or if there is a question you do not 
wish to answer, please let me know. This is a consent form as part of the ethical 
requirements to say you understand what I have explained and you are willing to go ahead 
with the interview. Please read and sign.   
Thank you. 
 
Biography 
Before we get into the MLC could you tell me something of your seafaring background. 
• Nationality 
• When did you become a seafarer?  Tell me about that. 
• Current rank/position  
• Type of ship and where registered  
• Crew on current ship – number and nationality 
• Any previous experience before current ship 
MLC  
Do you know about the MLC? 
• What it is, what it is supposed to do? 
• What about the health and safety section? Do you know there is a section that 
says seafarers’ representatives must be on the safety committee? If yes… How 
did you learn about this provision?   
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Health and Safety Management and Representation 
 
• Who is in charge of (health and) safety on the ship?   
• What is the common term used on the ship – “health and safety” or “safety”.  
• [If you say safety alone] is it understood that health issues are included?  Please 
give some examples of health issues. 
• Is there someone from the crew who is considered to be the representative of 
the crew on health and safety, someone who collects crew’s concerns and 
suggestions about health and safety and take these to the health and safety 
committee or to the officers.  
• Who is this person, the representative? 
• Is there a [health and] safety committee on your ship?   
• Is this health and safety representative selected by the crew or is the person 
appointed by the captain or the company? 
• Is this person different from the person in charge of safety? 
• What are the duties of this representative? 
 
Committee Meetings 
• How often does the committee meet? 
• Who goes to the committee meetings? 
• Who sets the agenda for the committee meetings? 
• What things are discussed in these meetings?  Could you give examples please.  
• Are things like loneliness, depression, HIV, mental issues discussed?  
 
Perceptions of Representation 
• What do you think about having a safety representative from among the crew?  
o Do you think it is helpful to have a representative?   
o [If one does not exist on the ship], do you think having such a person on 
your ship to represent the crew would be helpful? Please explain. 
o Do seafarers like to speak about health and safety matters to their 
supervisors or captain (or safety officer)?  
 
• Do you get information about health and safety from the company? 
o What kind of information? 
o When the company makes decisions about health and safety for 
example buying safety equipment, developing procedures for how work 
should be done, do they ask the crew or the representative for their 
input? [Example?] 
• Are the seafarers in any union or you yourself. 
 
• How does the union function to support its members? Is the union involve in 
selecting the representative, giving information and training? 
 
• Is there any other information on the subject that you believe is important to 
give me a better understanding of how your ship works in managing health and 
safety? 
Thank you for your time.  
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APPENDIX VI 
 
CARDIFF UNIVERSITY 
SEAFARERS INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH CENTRE 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
CONSENT FORM 
TITLE: Managing Occupational Health and Safety at Sea: Seafarers’ representatives in 
the Maritime Labour Convention 
 
I understand that this study forms a part of a PhD research.  It is investigating the 
involvement of seafarers’ representatives in the management of occupational health and 
safety on board ships as provided for in the Maritime Labour Convention, Standard A4.3, 
paragraph 1 (c).  The information provided is purely for research purposes, all information 
will be held in the strictest of confidence.  Names will be anonymised.  
The study relates to an understanding of the role of seafarers’ representatives in the 
management of health and safety on board ships from the perspective of those persons 
involved in the development, administration and operationalization of the provisions of 
the MLC.  This aspect of the convention is of interest as it mandates the institution of 
safety representatives in the management of occupational health and safety on board 
ships.   The study therefore investigates the thinking behind this provision: where did it 
come from; why was it included; how it is envisaged that this provision will be 
implemented and the supporting system necessary for its successful implementation. 
I hereby consent to being interviewed regarding the subject matter.  I understand that 
this is voluntary and I may opt out at any time or chose not to respond to a question.  I 
also understand that the information is solely for research purposes and will be held in 
the strictest of confidence. 
 
Print Name: ___________________________________________ 
Signature: ________________________________________ 
Date: ______________________ 
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APPENDIX VII 
 
CODES and THEMES 
 
MEETING DOCUMENTS 
                  Sub-themes 
• Role of the JMC                 Consensus 
• Geneva Accord 
• Agreement between Shipowners’ and Seafarers’ groups 
• Government’s consent 
• Tripartism and Social Dialogue guiding principles 
• MLC – bill of rights; level playing field                            Economic fairness 
• Good shipowners 
• Good administrations    
• Globalization 
• Poor working conditions on ships          Seafarers’ OHS 
• Consolidation process          Consolidation deal 
• Cooperation, consensus and compromise  Cooperation 
• Flexible instrument     Consolidation 
• Firm on rights; flexible on implementation   Compromise 
• Framework convention     Flexibility 
• Wide ratification              Firm provisions 
• Inspection and enforcement regime 
• ISM approach                       Conflict/rejection 
• Certification of compliance 
• Relationship with IMO instruments 
• Representation not discussed                  Individual provisions  
• Health and safety committee established  
• Complaints mechanism     direct participation 
      
 
DEVELOPMETNAL LEVEL     
                   Sub-themes 
• Participants’ Involvement in the MLC    
o At the Joint Maritime Commission                       Greatly involved 
o At the beginning in 2001 
o After 2006 
• Origins and Rationale for Provisions for Representation 
o ILO tradition      
o ILO Tripartite structure      Traditional 
o Other ILO conventions       Customary 
o General changes in OHSM                         Taken-for-granted 
o EU requirements/directives                         Received wisdom 
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o Consolidation 
o How things are done 
o Requirements for Risk Assessment 
• Implementation and Practice of the Provisions   
o Problems with the provision                    No consideration 
o Does not work as intended 
o Taken for granted that seafarers are included informally 
• Negotiating the MLC Text      
o Joint Maritime Commission                      Consolidation 
o Consolidation                  Cooperation, consensus 
o Social dialogue         compromise 
o Tripartism 
o Cooperation 
• Discussing Representation      
o No need to discuss                      Uncontroversial 
o Acceptance unanimous          Taken for granted 
o Uncontroversial            Status quo 
o No problem with representation  
o Existing provision from consolidation 
o It was a given 
• Support for Implementing Representation                        Good shipowners 
o Shipowners interest/costly accidents             Business case  
o Good shipowners/well established companies were already doing 
o Part of ISM system    
o Education of Shipowners and fewer Regulations  
 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEVEL 
                   Sub-themes 
• Participants’ Involvement in the MLC    
o Head of Maritime OHS Section           Greatly involved 
o National Committees            Wrote guidelines 
o International Committees 
o Drafting supporting guidelines 
o Operational duties, Compliance and Enforcement 
• Origins and Rationale for Representation    
o ILO                    Status quo 
o EU            Customary practices 
o UK                      Institutional influences 
• Role of MLC provisions (Supports) 
o Up to recognition by shipowners               No preconditions 
o Health and safety negotiated at national/sector level  
o Not fit for purpose                      Does not work 
• Inspection Regime       
o Code of Safe Working Practices                        Status quo 
o Document checks           Customary practices 
o Physical state of ship               Challenging 
o Health and safety committees established               In good faith 
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o Safety representative system challenging 
o Seafarers are reluctant to become representatives 
o Seafarers do not speak to inspectors 
o Inspection in good faith 
o Small ships versus large ships 
o No relationship between inspectors and representatives 
 
SHIPBOARD LEVEL 
         Sub-themes 
• Knowledge about the MLC 
o Working conditions 
o Rights           Relatively limited 
o Safety of Crew          Not systematic 
o Familiarization on ship          Unstructured 
o Learnt about the MLC ashore                 Learn on a need to know 
o Will learn when it is needed 
o Not important to daily activities 
o Work according to the ISM Code 
• Health and Safety Management and Representation 
o Health and safety personnel 
o Working safely               Operational safety focus 
o Crew Representative      Direct participation 
o Selection of representative 
o Safety officer 
o Medical officer       No representatives 
o Boatswain                   Work roles confused with 
o Duties of representative                 representative role 
o Health and safety committee 
o Frequency of meetings                 All crew are representatives  
o Attendance        Ad-hoc or systematic 
o Agenda items        Safety focussed 
o Topics discussed in meetings  Company controlled 
• Perceptions of Representation 
o Safety representative useful           Useful 
o Safety representative not necessary      Unnecessary 
o We can speak out        We can speak 
o Fear of speaking 
• Participation in Decision Making 
o Recreational equipment 
o Food         Domestic issues 
o Company decisions        daily job briefings 
o Working safely 
• Mechanism for Participation 
o Complaints procedure      Individualized 
o Direct participation                   Direct participation 
• Handling Non-technical Aspects of Safety 
o Informality                      Individualized 
o No discussion          We don’t talk about that 
o Individual responsibility          Responsibilization 
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• Union Presence 
o Not on board                 Union absence 
o Contact through emails and publications 
• Benefits of the MLC 
o Food quality improved    Beneficial 
o Work/rest taken seriously 
o Protect seafarers 
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APPENDIX IX 
Maritime Labour Convention 2006 – Title 4 
TITLE 4. HEALTH PROTECTION, MEDICAL CARE, WELFARE AND SOCIAL 
SECURITY PROTECTION 
Regulation 4.3 – Health and safety protection and accident prevention 
Purpose: To ensure that seafarers’ work environment on board ships promotes 
occupational safety and health 
§ 1. Each Member shall ensure that seafarers on ships that fly its flag are provided with 
occupational health protection and live, work and train on board ship in a safe and hygienic 
environment. 
§ 2. Each Member shall develop and promulgate national guidelines for the management of 
occupational safety and health on board ships that fly its flag, after consultation with 
representative shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations and taking into account applicable 
codes, guidelines and standards recommended by international organizations, national 
administrations and maritime industry organizations. 
§ 3. Each Member shall adopt laws and regulations and other measures addressing the 
matters specified in the Code, taking into account relevant international instruments, and 
set standards for occupational safety and health protection and accident prevention on 
ships that fly its flag. 
 
Standard A4.3 – Health and safety protection and accident prevention 
§ 1. The laws and regulations and other measures to be adopted in accordance with 
Regulation 4.3, paragraph 3, shall include the following subjects:  
§ (a) the adoption and effective implementation and promotion of occupational safety 
and health policies and programmes on ships that fly the Member’s flag, including risk 
evaluation as well as training and instruction of seafarers; 
§ (b) reasonable precautions to prevent occupational accidents, injuries and diseases 
on board ship, including measures to reduce and prevent the risk of exposure to 
harmful levels of ambient factors and chemicals as well as the risk of injury or disease 
that may arise from the use of equipment and machinery on board ships; 
§ (c) on-board programmes for the prevention of occupational accidents, injuries and 
diseases and for continuous improvement in occupational safety and health 
protection, involving seafarers’ representatives and all other persons concerned in 
their implementation, taking account of preventive measures, including engineering 
and design control, substitution of processes and procedures for collective and 
individual tasks, and the use of personal protective equipment; and 
§ (d) requirements for inspecting, reporting and correcting unsafe conditions and for 
investigating and reporting on-board occupational accidents. 
§ 2. The provisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Standard shall:  
§ (a) take account of relevant international instruments dealing with occupational safety 
and health protection in general and with specific risks, and address all matters 
relevant to the prevention of occupational accidents, injuries and diseases that may 
be applicable to the work of seafarers and particularly those which are specific to 
maritime employment; 
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§ (b) clearly specify the obligation of shipowners, seafarers and others concerned to 
comply with the applicable standards and with the ship’s occupational safety and 
health policy and programme with special attention being paid to the safety and health 
of seafarers under the age of 18; 
§ (c) specify the duties of the master or a person designated by the master, or both, to 
take specific responsibility for the implementation of and compliance with the ship’s 
occupational safety and health policy and programme; and 
§ (d) specify the authority of the ship’s seafarers appointed or elected as safety 
representatives to participate in meetings of the ship’s safety committee. Such a 
committee shall be established on board a ship on which there are five or more 
seafarers. 
§ 3. The laws and regulations and other measures referred to in Regulation 4.3, paragraph 
3, shall be regularly reviewed in consultation with the representatives of the shipowners’ 
and seafarers’ organizations and, if necessary, revised to take account of changes in 
technology and research in order to facilitate continuous improvement in occupational 
safety and health policies and programmes and to provide a safe occupational environment 
for seafarers on ships that fly the Member’s flag. 
§ 4. Compliance with the requirements of applicable international instruments on the 
acceptable levels of exposure to workplace hazards on board ships and on the 
development and implementation of ships’ occupational safety and health policies and 
programmes shall be considered as meeting the requirements of this Convention. 
§ 5. The competent authority shall ensure that:  
§ (a) occupational accidents, injuries and diseases are adequately reported, taking into 
account the guidance provided by the International Labour Organization with respect 
to the reporting and recording of occupational accidents and diseases; 
§ (b) comprehensive statistics of such accidents and diseases are kept, analysed and 
published and, where appropriate, followed up by research into general trends and 
into the hazards identified; and 
§ (c) occupational accidents are investigated. 
§ 6. Reporting and investigation of occupational safety and health matters shall be designed 
to ensure the protection of seafarers’ personal data, and shall take account of the guidance 
provided by the International Labour Organization on this matter. 
§ 7. The competent authority shall cooperate with shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations 
to take measures to bring to the attention of all seafarers information concerning particular 
hazards on board ships, for instance, by posting official notices containing relevant 
instructions. 
§ 8. The competent authority shall require that shipowners conducting risk evaluation in 
relation to management of occupational safety and health refer to appropriate statistical 
information from their ships and from general statistics provided by the competent authority. 
 
Guideline B4.3 – Health and safety protection and accident prevention 
 
Guideline B4.3.1 – Provisions on occupational accidents, injuries and diseases 
§ 1. The provisions required under Standard A4.3 should take into account the ILO code of 
practice entitled Accident prevention on board ship at sea and in port, 1996, and 
subsequent versions and other related ILO and other international standards and 
guidelines and codes of practice regarding occupational safety and health protection, 
including any exposure levels that they may identify. 
§ 2. The competent authority should ensure that the national guidelines for the management 
of occupational safety and health address the following matters, in particular:  
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§ (a) general and basic provisions; 
§ (b) structural features of the ship, including means of access and asbestos-related 
risks; 
§ (c) machinery; 
§ (d) the effects of the extremely low or high temperature of any surfaces with which 
seafarers may be in contact; 
§ (e) the effects of noise in the workplace and in shipboard accommodation; 
§ (f) the effects of vibration in the workplace and in shipboard accommodation; 
§ (g) the effects of ambient factors, other than those referred to in subparagraphs (e) 
and (f), in the workplace and in shipboard accommodation, including tobacco smoke; 
§ (h) special safety measures on and below deck; 
§ (i) loading and unloading equipment; 
§ (j) fire prevention and fire-fighting; 
§ (k) anchors, chains and lines; 
§ (l) dangerous cargo and ballast; 
§ (m) personal protective equipment for seafarers; 
§ (n) work in enclosed spaces; 
§ (o) physical and mental effects of fatigue; 
§ (p) the effects of drug and alcohol dependency; 
§ (q) HIV/AIDS protection and prevention; and 
§ (r) emergency and accident response. 
§ 3. The assessment of risks and reduction of exposure on the matters referred to in 
paragraph 2 of this Guideline should take account of the physical occupational health 
effects, including manual handling of loads, noise and vibration, the chemical and biological 
occupational health effects, the mental occupational health effects, the physical and mental 
health effects of fatigue, and occupational accidents. The necessary measures should take 
due account of the preventive principle according to which, among other things, combating 
risk at the source, adapting work to the individual, especially as regards the design of 
workplaces, and replacing the dangerous by the non-dangerous or the less dangerous, 
have precedence over personal protective equipment for seafarers. 
§ 4. In addition, the competent authority should ensure that the implications for health and 
safety are taken into account, particularly in the following areas:  
§ (a) emergency and accident response; 
§ (b) the effects of drug and alcohol dependency; and 
§ (c) HIV/AIDS protection and prevention. 
 
Guideline B4.3.2 – Exposure to noise 
§ 1. The competent authority, in conjunction with the competent international bodies and with 
representatives of shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations concerned, should review on 
an ongoing basis the problem of noise on board ships with the objective of improving the 
protection of seafarers, in so far as practicable, from the adverse effects of exposure to 
noise. 
§ 2. The review referred to in paragraph 1 of this Guideline should take account of the 
adverse effects of exposure to excessive noise on the hearing, health and comfort of 
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seafarers and the measures to be prescribed or recommended to reduce shipboard noise 
to protect seafarers. The measures to be considered should include the following:  
§ (a) instruction of seafarers in the dangers to hearing and health of prolonged exposure 
to high noise levels and in the proper use of noise protection devices and equipment; 
§ (b) provision of approved hearing protection equipment to seafarers where necessary; 
and 
§ (c) assessment of risk and reduction of exposure levels to noise in all accommodation 
and recreational and catering facilities, as well as engine rooms and other machinery 
spaces. 
Guideline B4.3.3 – Exposure to vibration 
§ 1. The competent authority, in conjunction with the competent international bodies and with 
representatives of shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations concerned, and taking into 
account, as appropriate, relevant international standards, should review on an ongoing 
basis the problem of vibration on board ships with the objective of improving the protection 
of seafarers, in so far as practicable, from the adverse effects of vibration. 
§ 2. The review referred to in paragraph 1 of this Guideline should cover the effect of 
exposure to excessive vibration on the health and comfort of seafarers and the measures 
to be prescribed or recommended to reduce shipboard vibration to protect seafarers. The 
measures to be considered should include the following:  
§ (a) instruction of seafarers in the dangers to their health of prolonged exposure to 
vibration; 
§ (b) provision of approved personal protective equipment to seafarers where 
necessary; and 
§ (c) assessment of risks and reduction of exposure to vibration in all accommodation 
and recreational and catering facilities by adopting measures in accordance with the 
guidance provided by the ILO code of practice entitled Ambient factors in the 
workplace, 2001, and any subsequent revisions, taking account of the difference 
between exposure in those areas and in the workplace. 
Guideline B4.3.4 – Obligations of shipowners 
§ 1. Any obligation on the shipowner to provide protective equipment or other accident 
prevention safeguards should, in general, be accompanied by provisions requiring their 
use by seafarers and by a requirement for seafarers to comply with the relevant accident 
prevention and health protection measures. 
§ 2. Account should also be taken of Articles 7 and 11 of the Guarding of Machinery 
Convention, 1963 (No. 119), and the corresponding provisions of the Guarding of 
Machinery Recommendation, 1963 (No. 118), under which the obligation to ensure 
compliance with the requirement that machinery in use is properly guarded, and its use 
without appropriate guards prevented, rests on the employer, while there is an obligation 
on the worker not to use machinery without the guards being in position nor to make 
inoperative the guards provided. 
Guideline B4.3.5 – Reporting and collection of statistics 
§ 1. All occupational accidents and occupational injuries and diseases should be reported so 
that they can be investigated and comprehensive statistics can be kept, analysed and 
published, taking account of protection of the personal data of the seafarers concerned. 
Reports should not be limited to fatalities or to accidents involving the ship. 
§ 2. The statistics referred to in paragraph 1 of this Guideline should record the numbers, 
nature, causes and effects of occupational accidents and occupational injuries and 
diseases, with a clear indication, as applicable, of the department on board a ship, the type 
of accident and whether at sea or in port. 
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§ 3. Each Member should have due regard to any international system or model for recording 
accidents to seafarers which may have been established by the International Labour 
Organization. 
Guideline B4.3.6 – Investigations 
§ 1. The competent authority should undertake investigations into the causes and 
circumstances of all occupational accidents and occupational injuries and diseases 
resulting in loss of life or serious personal injury, and such other cases as may be specified 
in national laws or regulations. 
§ 2. Consideration should be given to including the following as subjects of investigation:  
§ (a) working environment, such as working surfaces, layout of machinery, means of 
access, lighting and methods of work; 
§ (b) incidence in different age groups of occupational accidents and occupational 
injuries and diseases; 
§ (c) special physiological or psychological problems created by the shipboard 
environment; 
§ (d) problems arising from physical stress on board a ship, in particular as a 
consequence of increased workload; 
§ (e) problems arising from and effects of technical developments and their influence 
on the composition of crews; and 
§ (f) problems arising from any human failures. 
Guideline B4.3.7 – National protection and prevention programmes 
§ 1. In order to provide a sound basis for measures to promote occupational safety and health 
protection and prevention of accidents, injuries and diseases which are due to particular 
hazards of maritime employment, research should be undertaken into general trends and 
into such hazards as are revealed by statistics. 
§ 2. The implementation of protection and prevention programmes for the promotion of 
occupational safety and health should be so organized that the competent authority, 
shipowners and seafarers or their representatives and other appropriate bodies may play 
an active role, including through such means as information sessions, on-board guidelines 
on maximum exposure levels to potentially harmful ambient workplace factors and other 
hazards or outcomes of a systematic risk evaluation process. In particular, national or local 
joint occupational safety and health protection and accident prevention committees or ad 
hoc working parties and on-board committees, on which shipowners’ and seafarers’ 
organizations concerned are represented, should be established. 
§ 3. Where such activity takes place at company level, the representation of seafarers on 
any safety committee on board that shipowner’s ships should be considered. 
Guideline B4.3.8 – Content of protection and prevention programmes 
§ 1. Consideration should be given to including the following in the functions of the 
committees and other bodies referred to in Guideline B4.3.7, paragraph 2:  
§ (a) the preparation of national guidelines and policies for occupational safety and 
health management systems and for accident prevention provisions, rules and 
manuals; 
§ (b) the organization of occupational safety and health protection and accident 
prevention training and programmes; 
§ (c) the organization of publicity on occupational safety and health protection and 
accident prevention, including films, posters, notices and brochures; and 
§ (d) the distribution of literature and information on occupational safety and health 
protection and accident prevention so that it reaches seafarers on board ships. 
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§ 2. Relevant provisions or recommendations adopted by the appropriate national authorities 
or organizations or international organizations should be taken into account by those 
preparing texts of occupational safety and health protection and accident prevention 
measures or recommended practices. 
§ 3. In formulating occupational safety and health protection and accident prevention 
programmes, each Member should have due regard to any code of practice concerning the 
safety and health of seafarers which may have been published by the International Labour 
Organization. 
Guideline B4.3.9 – Instruction in occupational safety and health protection and the 
prevention of occupational accidents 
§ 1. The curriculum for the training referred to in Standard A4.3, paragraph 1(a), should be 
reviewed periodically and brought up to date in the light of development in types and sizes 
of ships and in their equipment, as well as changes in manning practices, nationality, 
language and the organization of work on board ships. 
§ 2. There should be continuous occupational safety and health protection and accident 
prevention publicity. Such publicity might take the following forms:  
§ (a) educational audiovisual material, such as films, for use in vocational training 
centres for seafarers and where possible shown on board ships; 
§ (b) display of posters on board ships; 
§ (c) inclusion in periodicals read by seafarers of articles on the hazards of maritime 
employment and on occupational safety and health protection and accident 
prevention measures; and 
§ (d) special campaigns using various publicity media to instruct seafarers, including 
campaigns on safe working practices. 
§ 3. The publicity referred to in paragraph 2 of this Guideline should take account of the 
different nationalities, languages and cultures of seafarers on board ships. 
Guideline B4.3.10 – Safety and health education of young seafarers 
§ 1. Safety and health regulations should refer to any general provisions on medical 
examinations before and during employment and on the prevention of accidents and the 
protection of health in employment, which may be applicable to the work of seafarers. Such 
regulations should specify measures which will minimize occupational dangers to young 
seafarers in the course of their duties. 
§ 2. Except where a young seafarer is recognized as fully qualified in a pertinent skill by the 
competent authority, the regulations should specify restrictions on young seafarers 
undertaking, without appropriate supervision and instruction, certain types of work 
presenting special risk of accident or of detrimental effect on their health or physical 
development, or requiring a particular degree of maturity, experience or skill. In determining 
the types of work to be restricted by the regulations, the competent authority might consider 
in particular work involving:  
§ (a) the lifting, moving or carrying of heavy loads or objects; 
§ (b) entry into boilers, tanks and cofferdams; 
§ (c) exposure to harmful noise and vibration levels; 
§ (d) operating hoisting and other power machinery and tools, or acting as signallers to 
operators of such equipment; 
§ (e) handling mooring or tow lines or anchoring equipment; 
§ (f) rigging; 
§ (g) work aloft or on deck in heavy weather; 
§ (h) nightwatch duties; 
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§ (i) servicing of electrical equipment; 
§ (j) exposure to potentially harmful materials, or harmful physical agents such as 
dangerous or toxic substances and ionizing radiations; 
§ (k) the cleaning of catering machinery; and 
§ (l) the handling or taking charge of ships’ boats. 
§ 3. Practical measures should be taken by the competent authority or through the 
appropriate machinery to bring to the attention of young seafarers information concerning 
the prevention of accidents and the protection of their health on board ships. Such 
measures could include adequate instruction in courses, official accident prevention 
publicity intended for young persons and professional instruction and supervision of young 
seafarers. 
§ 4. Education and training of young seafarers both ashore and on board ships should include 
guidance on the detrimental effects on their health and well-being of the abuse of alcohol 
and drugs and other potentially harmful substances, and the risk and concerns relating to 
HIV/AIDS and of other health risk related activities. 
Guideline B4.3.11 – International cooperation 
§ 1. Members, with the assistance as appropriate of intergovernmental and other 
international organizations, should endeavour, in cooperation with each other, to achieve 
the greatest possible uniformity of action for the promotion of occupational safety and 
health protection and prevention of accidents. 
§ 2. In developing programmes for promoting occupational safety and health protection and 
prevention of accidents under Standard A4.3, each Member should have due regard to 
relevant codes of practice published by the International Labour Organization and the 
appropriate standards of international organizations. 
§ 3. Members should have regard to the need for international cooperation in the continuous 
promotion of activity related to occupational safety and health protection and prevention of 
occupational accidents. Such cooperation might take the form of:  
§ (a) bilateral or multilateral arrangements for uniformity in occupational safety and 
health protection and accident prevention standards and safeguards; 
§ (b) exchange of information on particular hazards affecting seafarers and on means 
of promoting occupational safety and health protection and preventing accidents; 
§ (c) assistance in testing of equipment and inspection according to the national 
regulations of the flag State; 
§ (d) collaboration in the preparation and dissemination of occupational safety and 
health protection and accident prevention provisions, rules or manuals; 
§ (e) collaboration in the production and use of training aids; and 
§ (f) joint facilities for, or mutual assistance in, the training of seafarers in occupational 
safety and health protection, accident prevention and safe working practices. 
 
SOURCE: ILO website: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:91:0::::P91_ 
SECTION:MLCA_AMEND_A4 Accessed August 5, 2018. 
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APPENDIX X 
RESOLUTION ON LINKING THE ISM CODE AND THE MLC 
Resolution concerning the International Safety Management Code, submitted by the 
Government delegations of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom  
The General Conference of the International Labour Organization,  
Having adopted the Maritime Labour Convention, 2006,  
Considering that this Convention aims to establish a new pillar of international 
legislation for the shipping industry,  
Noting that the International Safety Management (ISM) Code of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) is an essential element of the safe operation of ships, and 
that the Code was developed to address the human element of operating ships safely, 
that both the Maritime Labour Convention and the ISM Code have common aims and 
objectives and should be linked more closely, and that a comparison of IMO Conventions 
and the Maritime Labour Convention shows that there is a great deal of common ground,  
Recognizing the difficulty in trying to utilize the ISM Code to implement fully the 
Maritime Labour Convention at present, because of the apparent limitations in the scope 
of application of the ISM Code, and that both instruments would work more effectively if 
the scope of the ISM Code were extended to cover matters affecting seafarers’ living and 
working conditions,  
Noting that there are doubts as to whether the scope of the ISM Code is 
sufficiently broad to be applied to ILO matters, and that seeking to do so might lead to 
ambiguity, for example, in the preamble and more explicitly in section 1.2.1 of the ISM 
Code, which states its purpose and objectives as ensuring safety at sea, prevention of 
human injury or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the marine environment and to 
property, whilst section 1.2.3 goes on to state: “The safety management system should 
ensure: (1) compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and (2) that applicable 
codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the Organization, Administrations, 
classification societies and maritime industry organizations are taken into account”, and 
that many therefore consider that the scope of the ISM Code does not permit audits of 
compliance with ILO matters relating to crew welfare, crew agreement, terms and 
conditions of employment, etc.,  
Recognizing that ISM audits can at present deal with matters relating to crew 
qualifications, training, health and safety and some crew accommodation elements 
(relating to safety),  
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Noting that the main advantage of the ISM Code is that the company must 
implement the statutory requirements and can be held to account, and that if it fails to 
put into place measures to rectify serious deficiencies there is the ultimate sanction of 
withdrawing the Document of Compliance, effectively stopping all the ships of that 
company from operating,  
Recognizing that many of the requirements laid down in the Maritime Labour 
Convention can be dealt with only at company level, which leads to far more effective 
implementation than that on board the ship only,  
Recognizing that an extension of the scope of the ISM Code by the International 
Maritime Organization will not reduce the implementation or enforcement of the 
Maritime Labour Convention in any way (for example inspections of the ships according 
to the scope of Appendices A5-I and A5-III at regular intervals of not more than three 
years), but that it will provide more opportunity for inspectors and governments to ensure 
that the Convention is properly implemented, especially at the company level on a more 
regular basis, noting that the ISM company audits are required annually;  
Invites the Governing Body of the International Labour Office to request the 
Director-General to invite the International Maritime Organization to review the ISM Code 
with a view to achieving these objectives, possibly by developing appropriate 
amendments to the Code, in order to ensure the effective global and uniform 
implementation and enforcement of both the Maritime Labour Convention and the ISM 
Code.  
 
Source: ILO (2006) International Labour Conference. Provisional Record 6. 94th Maritime 
Session. Geneva. 
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‘There are no simple answers,’ 
Voice grated, knife on rock, 
‘The true path’s no open highway, 
Good governance no wind-up clock.’ 
A gaunt figure stepped among them: 
He gave each a piercing look. 
His boots were worn, his cloak was stained, 
And he bore a calf-bound book. 
‘Who art thou?’ they cried in wonder, 
‘And what thing’s your burden there?’ 
‘I’m the Inspector,’ spake the stranger, 
‘And the Law’s my burden fair.’ 
…. 
Consumer viewed Inspector, 
Eyes lit with wild surmise: 
‘It’s up to you to punish, 
Right wrongs, and nail their lies?’ 
‘In truth, that is my duty – 
The goal for all my kind – 
But the journey is a long one, 
And the road’s not paved, nor signed. 
 
Excerpt from: The Rime of the Globalized Mariner: Part II  
Michael Bloor (2012). 
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